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$. J5, $. J4, $. J3, $. J2, and $. J1, $ you$ will$ be$ asked$ to$ complete$ a$ series$ of$ tasks.$ These$ tasks$ are$ substantially$ different$ from$ what$ you$ have$ done$in$the$first$part$of$this$experiment.$Your$profit$for$each$task$will$depend$on$both$ your$ effort$ (the$ number$ of$ ECU$ received$ at$ the$ task)$ and$ a$ random$ component$ (a$ positive$or$negative$choc).$Each$task$can$give$you$individually$0$16$or$20$ECU.$ Individual$shocks$may$affect$your$own$payoff$by$the$following$amounts

$. At, will$ be$ randomly$ grouped$ with$ 3$ other$ participants.$ Once$the$group$is$formed,$it$will$remain$identical$until$the$end$of$the$experiment.$Before$ the$ beginning$ of$ the$ second$ task,$ your$ group$ will$ be$ asked$ to$ choose$ a$ redistribution$ rule.$ The$ retained$ redistribution$ rule$ will$ be$ implemented$ after$ each$ task:$

. Once, $one$and$only$one$solution$among$ the$ group$ members$ will$ be$ randomly$ drawn$ and$ implemented$ for$ the$ group$ until$ the$ end$ of$ the$ experiment.$ For$ instance,$ if$ one$ of$ your$ group$ member$ chose$ 20%$ of$ the$ libertarian$system,$50%$of$the$egalitarian$system,$and$30%$of$the$socialJliberal$system,$ and$that$his/her$solution$has$been$selected$to$be$implemented,$the$redistribution$that$ will$ occur$ after$ each$ task$ will$ be$ made$ in$ the$ following$ proportions