Taxation, redistribution and observability in social dilemmas - Archive ouverte HAL Accéder directement au contenu
Pré-Publication, Document De Travail Année : 2017

Taxation, redistribution and observability in social dilemmas

Résumé

In the presence of social dilemmas, cooperation is more difficult to achieve when populations are heterogeneous because of conflicting interests within groups. We examine cooperation in the context of a non-linear common pool resource game, in which individuals have unequal extraction capacities and have to decide on their extraction of resources from the common pool. We introduce monetary and nonmonetary policy instruments in this environment. One instrument is based on two variants of a mechanism that taxes extraction and redistributes the tax revenue. The other instrument varies the observability of individual decisions. We find that the two tax and redistribution mechanisms reduce extraction, increase efficiency and decrease inequality within groups. The scarcity pricing mechanism, which is a per-unit tax equal to the marginal extraction externality, is more effective at reducing extraction than an increasing block tax that only taxes units extracted above the social optimum. In contrast, observability impacts only the Baseline condition by encouraging free-riding instead of creating moral pressure to cooperate.
Fichier principal
Vignette du fichier
1726.pdf (1.18 Mo) Télécharger le fichier
Origine : Fichiers produits par l'(les) auteur(s)
Loading...

Dates et versions

halshs-01609971 , version 1 (04-10-2017)
halshs-01609971 , version 2 (01-10-2018)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : halshs-01609971 , version 2

Citer

Daniel A Brent, Lata Gangadharan, Anca Mihut, Marie Claire Villeval. Taxation, redistribution and observability in social dilemmas. 2017. ⟨halshs-01609971v2⟩
294 Consultations
1080 Téléchargements

Partager

Gmail Facebook X LinkedIn More