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Believing, holding true, and accepting

Abstract : Belief is not a unified phenomenon. In this paper I argue, as a number of other riters argue, that one should distinguish a variety of belief-like attitudes: believing proper - a dispositional state which can have degrees - holding true - which can occur without understanding what one believes - and accepting - a practical and contextual attitude that has a role in deliberation and in practical reasoning. Acceptance itself is not a unified attitude. I explore the various relationships and differences between these doxastic attitudes, and claim that although acceptance is distinct from belief, it rests upon it, and is therefore a species of belief.
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Contributor : Julie Solviche <>
Submitted on : Wednesday, September 16, 2015 - 4:33:35 PM
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  • HAL Id : halshs-01200561, version 1



Pascal Engel. Believing, holding true, and accepting. Philosophical Explorations, 1998, 1 (2), pp.140--151. ⟨halshs-01200561⟩



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