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Article Dans Une Revue Philosophical Studies Année : 2010

Relative Truth and the First Person

Résumé

In recent work on context-dependency, it has been argued that certain types of sentences give rise to a notion of relative truth. In particular, sentences containing predicates of personal taste and moral or aesthetic evaluation as well as epistemic modals are held to express a proposition (relative to a context of use) which is true or false not only relative to a world of evaluation, but other parameters as well, such as standards of taste or knowledge or an agent. I will argue that the sentences that apparently give rise to relative truth should be understood by relating them in a certain way to the first person. More precisely, such sentences express what I will call 'first-person-based genericity', a form of generalization that is based on an essential first-person application of the predicate. The account differs from standard relative truth account in crucial respects: it is not the truth of the proposition expressed that is relative to the first person; the proposition expressed by a sentence with a predicate of taste rather has absolute truth conditions. Instead it is the propositional content itself that requires a first-personal cognitive access whenever it is entertained. This account, I will argue, avoids a range of problems that standard relative truth theories of the sentences in question face and explains a number of further peculiarities that such sentences display.

Dates et versions

halshs-00775623 , version 1 (22-01-2013)

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Citer

Friederike Moltmann. Relative Truth and the First Person. Philosophical Studies, 2010, 150 (2), pp.187-220. ⟨10.1007/s11098-009-9383-9⟩. ⟨halshs-00775623⟩
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