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Journal articles

Games with incomplete information: from repetition to cheap talk and persuasion

Abstract : This essay aims at showing that repeated games with incomplete information, which were conceived by Aumann and Maschler in the years 1960s, provide basic tools to study information transmission in static interactive decision problems, both when the agents monitoring information can lie (“cheap talk”) and when they cannot (“persuasion”).
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https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03537868
Contributor : Christine Okret-Manville Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Thursday, January 20, 2022 - 4:14:05 PM
Last modification on : Friday, January 21, 2022 - 4:12:51 AM

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  • HAL Id : hal-03537868, version 1

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Françoise Forges. Games with incomplete information: from repetition to cheap talk and persuasion. Annals of Economics and Statistics, 2020. ⟨hal-03537868⟩

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