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The Chinese Newcomers from Behoririka

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Author's contribution

The sole author designed, analysed, interpreted and prepared the manuscript.

Review Article

ABSTRACT

In this article, we will analyze the issue of Chinese newcomers from Behoririka. This area is located in the city center of Antananarivo, in Madagascar. Behoririka also happened to be a leisure destination close to an artificial lake where there are many Chinese restaurants. These different characteristics will allow us to question a contemporary phenomenon that should be placed chronologically. By the end of the 19th century, Chinese were already present in Madagascar as wage laborers in a colony. Then, during the establishment of the second Malagasy Socialist Republic in 1975, there were other migratory flows from China to Madagascar due to the ideological proximity with the Republic of China. The current south-south migration from China to Madagascar raises the question of how these new businesses will be established in the heart of the Malagasy capital. We will draw up a typology of the different overseas Chinese actors in this place, in order to examine the content of this migratory flow and to highlight the various reasons behind these journeys. This will allow us to analyze the stage relative to their anchoring as new actors of Antananarivo over a recent period, from 2003 to 2012.

Keywords: Madagascar; behoririka; malagasy socialistic; chinese actors.

1. INTRODUCTION

Figures on alleged Chinese actors [1] in Africa vary. Eric Nguyen [2] reports 750,000 Chinese workers across the continent. However, the Ministry of Commerce of the Republic of China is

more measured, counting only 672,242 [3]. We also found that reasons for expatriation to Africa vary according to different categories [4]. Since the 1990s, Chinese expatriate traders and auto-entrepreneurs in Africa have been actors whose aim is to make a fortune outside their country of

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origin. What is evident is a strong representation of middle-aged men in this sector of activity. According to the Malagasy daily newspaper La Gazette de la Grande Île, it seems that this economic migration is also the result of single women who have no attachment to their country of origin [5]. It should be noted that most of them are of Chinese nationality, but it is not impossible to meet some who are also of French or Hong Kong nationality. It may be recalled that in 1990, the transfer of Hong Kong to China had similarly conditioned the arrival of Chinese in Africa [6].

These types of migrant traders – as investors and first movers of the last decade – are effectively able to find their way into the heart of the society in which they want to settle permanently, with few means. Once there, however, they need «resource people» to assist them in their business development. Finally, we have seen that these migrants, who emigrate to the community, do not seem to receive directives issued by the central government. We analyze it in the following way: autonomous, they found their own financing.

They have been living abroad in Africa, and their aim has been to make a fortune outside their country of origin since the 1990s [7]. They are the ones who – as investors and first movers of the last decade – are able to find their way into the heart of the society in which they wish to settle, with few means, while being relatively efficient.

2. TYPOLOGY OF A SOUTH /SOUTH MIGRATION FLOW

The 750,000 Chinese expatriates in Africa are part of a South-South migration phenomenon that can be considered as lateral. According to figures provided by the Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, of a total of 672,724 migrant workers from China, it is noteworthy that 24,240 of them come from Fujian Province. Furthermore, we will see how the reasons for expatriation towards Africa differ from one category of Chinese migrants, as mentioned below, to another. Not only they allow us to insist on the characteristics of this South-South migration flow but also to split it into four categories of immigrants, highlight the importance of expatriation patterns and reveal its skeleton:

Chinese merchants and self-entrepreneur expatriates in Africa are actors whose objective is to make money outside of their country since the 1990s. They are those who – as investors and newcomers of the latest decade – manage to find their way into the heart of the society in which they wish to settle down, and this in spite of a lack of resources, while being relatively effective. Once there, Chinese traders and entrepreneurs need one or more "key resource persons" to assist them in the development of their business [8]. In the way of the Huaquio, this category of immigrants also plays the role of investors, although their access to credit remains difficult. They are not necessarily graduates. Some of them, driven by the desire to make money, have deliberately chosen to change occupations during their careers, while others, especially those from lower income groups, only aspire to improve their living conditions thanks to trading businesses. Hence, there is a kind of porosity between coolies and traders [9].

This category of immigrants does not seem to receive directives issued by the central government. Thus, and particularly for marketers and entrepreneurs who wish to settle permanently in Africa, there is a great concern over this category of immigrants. While most of them are of Chinese nationality, it is possible to also meet people in possession of a Hong Kong or French nationality.

Indeed, in 1990, the handover of Hong Kong to China has also conditioned the arrival of Chinese in Africa. From these observations, what appears very clearly is a strong representation of middle-aged men in this activity area. According to the Malagasy newspaper La Gazette of the Big Island, it seems that this economic migration is also the fact of single women who have no more ties with their country of origin.

The Huaquio are a wider category than the previous one. A large majority of them are graduates willing to build a strong international experience before seeking higher positions, and before rising up in the ranks inherent to the central government, either in the private or public sector. As the thugs of the Chinese central government, they can be found leading the 900 major Chinese companies who officiate in Africa since the 1990s. Some of them were senior officials before moving into the private sector, others have taken the necessary steps in order to be promoted to higher positions such as the one of Ministry of Commerce.



Fig. 1. Behoririka, août 2017

Such as, the central government strongly relies on them to orchestrate China's African policy. These are the actors who receive specific directives from Beijing, and who are responsible for negotiating bilateral agreements with representatives of countries in receipt of China's aid. They are also the main interlocutors of African regimes. In the context of such proceedings, they are welcomed as delegations by African elites. Moreover, they are among many foreign investors who transfer funds to Africa.

Indeed, unlike traders and entrepreneurs, access to credit is facilitated by the central government. The embassy staff, consuls, senior officials, diplomats and cooperating agents are state actors working directly with the central government. It is noteworthy that from 1982 they were then recruited on the basis of an open competition which main content was language proficiency and a specialized knowledge of the region in which they were expected to be transferred. Most of them have been trained in the China Foreign Affairs University, a training center for future Chinese diplomatic staff.

Hence, Beijing has made every effort to diversify the profile of its diplomats ensuring on the one hand, the professionalization of the staff in charge of foreign policy, and on the other hand, by making them more effective for law and international trade. As a result, ideology is relegated in the background [10].

In the light of the typology developed above, which classifies the various components inherent to this South-South migration of an inter-continental nature, it appears that some of them will necessarily come across other local migrants

from Africa. This intra-continental route differs somewhat from that of the Chinese's, be it in the peculiar aspect of their paths. On the other hand, African and Chinese migrants coincide in some respects in the motives that drive them to escape the phenomenon of poverty that afflicts their country of origin. As such, it appears that a complementary relationship may arise between some sections of Chinese migrants and certain segments of the African population. Regarding migration of coastal intra-continental [11] from the periphery to the center [12]: different starting points being different towns, or neighboring regions and impoverished provinces, and Antananarivo being the place of arrival. Originally, according to Hubert Deschamps, coastal people like many other Malagasy left their native country for the capital or for other major cities in order to be hired as part of seasonal and / or temporary works as laborers, rickshaw pullers or dock workers [13].

In fact, intra-continental migration movements could not be considered as definitive and were not drawn exclusively from coastal community. In the past, it was not thus a question of exodus as such. Before the arrival of Chinese newcomers in Antananarivo, the goal of the actors of this intra-continental mobility from Malagasy peripheral regions to the center of the country was thus to supplement the active members of the nuclear family in the management of day-to-day needs. Indeed, the use of the latter having been weakened – particularly in the agricultural sector – because of restrictive measures of budget expenses, which also led many Malagasy schoolboys and students to give up their studies, different households in the countryside and surrounding provinces had to face this hardship.

Following the arrival of large number of Chinese traders from the 1990s, those who will therefore benefit from this phenomenon are small street dealers from the coast of Madagascar, who will soon become their main customers, and manage to fill their moneybags. In other words, the recent arrival of Chinese traders and the social emergence of a new Chinese community in Antananarivo, are two most timely phenomena for coastal intra-continental migrants, whose objective is to find a job. These two related migration flows have resulted in a kind of agreement over best interests for both parties: a correlation of a meeting between Chinese migrants and Malagasy people.

Moreover, given the many places in Antananarivo where, not only street vendors sell Chinese products (including textiles), and in the light of the huge number of Chinese shops that are now present in the streets of the capital, it makes sense to attribute the dynamism that characterizes the urban local retail trade to the development of a Chinatown in the very heart of Behoririka. Therefore, this social change, instilled by the arrival of Chinese traders in Antananarivo, provides an opportunity for some segments of the Malagasy population, especially small retailers, on the one hand to incorporate, and on the other hand, to access a form of socialization through informal trade. For their part, the Chinese newcomers optimize their trading exchanges thanks to this collaboration, relying on small dealers who, in this respect, act as resource persons.

Merina traders [14] (Malagasy people from highlands also called Hovas) and Karana [15] (Indo- Pakistani), who were hitherto and undoubtedly accustomed to dominate the commercial sectors of the Malagasy capital, had to pander just after the massive arrival of Chinese retailers in Madagascar, and their range of products manufactured at low cost that swept the heart of the market. First, unlike the coastal migrants, these two ethnic groups live in the capital. Unable to lower their prices to the level of Chinese traders – which are significantly lower than those of the local market – the Karana and Merina are severely affected by the repercussions of this phenomenon. Firstly, the result of the Chinese settlement in Behoririka, which is a consequential phenomenon to this South-South migration flow from China to Madagascar, is noticeable. Secondly, a profusion of manufactured goods coming from China can also be found in the heart of the Malagasy

market. The inflation phenomenon, born in the 1980s, which was long under the control of the Merina and Karana traders, because of higher selling prices, has more or less been stemmed by allowing more purchasing power to the most disadvantaged Malagasy families. It is not only the competition in which Karana and Merina traders are forced into that undermine their interests. Indeed, the Merina are faced with a kind of power embodied by a collective being: a host of Chinese actors, operating as networks and exercising a singular influence in a horizontal and private way. The fact of having classified and identified them gives us the opportunity to define the exercise of such a power, not in the Weberian sense, understood in its vertical binding and state dimension, but very far from all, in a Foucauldian statement, in which it appears as the result of a multiplicity of actors involved in the same social body. Moreover, the typology of Chinese migrants mentioned above allows us to unravel the tangle that represents the Chinese community of Antananarivo, identify

Sino-Malagasy social interactions that govern it and use it. Finally, whenever possible, this classification gives us the means to identify the collective logics and / or individuals to which Chinese and / or Malagasy actors adhere unanimously. At Behoririka, one of the places where Chinese and coastal interests are entrenched, few Merina and Karana traders manage to adapt to this new mode of economic and commercial operation. In sum, Chinese's commercial interests collide those of Merina and Karana, while they branch out with the commercial interests of coastal people. Moreover, by force of circumstance, rather than confront them, most Merina and Karana have decided to give way to the Chinese merchants, then to settle near Behoririka. Like the Isotry market, which is in this respect a place of refuge by the boarder, where the Karana are more or less away from the Chinese community present in the capital.

Thus, settled in an area which virtually looks like their last trading stronghold, the Karana strive to mitigate the effects of Chinese competition on the economic and commercial field in Antananarivo. Therefore, it seems that Chinese traders from Antananarivo have immediately proved themselves as competitors, ignoring state force's presence and jeopardizing local production.

3. THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC ANCHOR OF THE NEW CHINESE MIGRANTS TO MADAGASCAR (2003-2012)

The earlier waves of Chinese migrants to Madagascar occurred from 1896 [16] to 1901. They came from the Canton province toward Tamatave, while the recent waves of Chinese migrants toward Île Rouge came primarily, in the early 90s, from the Fujian province, under the chairmanship of Albert Zafy [17], to settle directly in the Malagasy capital. Antananarivo then already included a Chinese presence and for 14,000 nationals [18] trading was a main activity : « En valeur absolue, les sources convergent entre 15 000 et 40 000 personnes d'origine chinoise dans le pays: 15 000 selon J.-P. Raison, 18 000 selon L. Pan, 20 000 selon L. Rabearimanana. ».[19] These [20] are the earlier waves of newcomer immigrants that have imported into the capital of Madagascar this means of transport called « rickshaw » for which a fee applies. The Cantonese newcomers coming from China arrived in Madagascar between 1786 and 1830 that is to say, in the premises of the French colonial period. Firstly as coolies, when trading economy reached its peak upon request of Gallieni, with a view to build the rail network that still connects today the axes: Fianarantsoa / Manakara Antananarivo / Antsirabe Antananarivo and / Tamatave. « Si l'immigration asiatique est délibérément freinée à partir des années 1930 en corrélation avec les difficultés économiques de la métropole, la puissance économique des deux minorités asiatiques se renforce durant la Deuxième Guerre mondiale et s'affirme durant les décennies suivantes. Dans l'est de Madagascar en particulier, les Chinois exercent toujours un monopole sur la collecte des produits locaux destinés à l'exportation (vanille, café, poivre, litchis...), ainsi que dans le secteur des transports et celui de la transformation des produits de traite. » [21].

The goal of Chinese coolies employed by France was to return home after having honored their contracts. However, the importation of this Asian labor in Madagascar gave rise to an illegal presence of some Chinese who have decided to desert the construction sites because of the difficult conditions imposed by the French capital. Most of them eventually settled in a scattered manner and without any specific strategy as far as their social settlement in Madagascar is concerned. They are equally settled in Tamatave, Nosy Be [22], Antananarivo and

Mahajanga. Some among the first Chinese migrants were even called to positions of deputies (Gema Guillaume was Chinese by his father, Anique Kenbazanamy and Horace Mann Thu June) or Senators (Catherine Chan Ah-Line, Ted Von Them Andrianasolo and Jean-Yves Mac Tong-Ki) in the Malagasy Republic [23].

All these Malagasy personalities of Chinese origin might have to become the interlocutors of the Huaquio population. However, their emotional ties to their homeland remain distant. For others, some have found it more useful to turn to retail or to the food industry in the remote areas of the capital. After 1949, when the People's Republic of China was born, migrants from other provinces like Guangzhou, Fujian and Zhejiang have followed the first waves of migration and have later become Overseas Chinese. While the reasons of the newcomers were mainly economic [24], this wave of migration is driven by motives of a political, economic and demographic nature: the flight from Maoism, the access to a labour contract or overcrowding conditions. In the same way as their predecessors, they are also spread over the Red Island without necessarily trying to build an expatriate community with their compatriots.

Each one of them has respectively opted for an economic and commercial activity, of a self-entrepreneurial type in the retail sector. However, unlike their successors of the 1990s, and those who followed in the 2000s who had a strong socio-economic impact on the Malagasy situation, the spatial dispersal of the newcomers has reduced the possibility to generate any social changes. However, getting to know whether such a goal was or not part of the prerogatives of the first Chinese migrants of Madagascar is far from being obvious.

In this particular case, as we shall see later, the same does not apply to the Chinese newcomers in Antananarivo, although the typology will help us to identify the shifts that may occur between the different categories.

Antananarivo city has undergone many urban transformations in less than 350 years of existence. In addition, the recent arrival of Chinese migrants in the district of Behoririka goes along with those recent social economic and urban changes that we intend to study here. Indeed, the Malagasy capital has benefited from Chinese assistance for many infrastructure constructions such as: le Palais des sports et de

la culture and the Mahamasina stadium. As an example, we can cite the Chinese company called Anhuei Foreign Economic Group, present in Madagascar for the last twenty years, which received a public contract by ministerial decree for the construction of offices in a district located in Antananarivo and that is called «the sixty-seven acres ».

The company must honor this order within ten years and four years have passed since the award of a public contract in 2008. On site, employees work from 7:00 am to 5:30 pm. There are about 200 employees in total, and only 10 of them are Chinese foremen who oversee the work of 190 other Malagasy workers and coolies. Chinese employees live on the construction site, in dormitories, at the rear of the site. These dormitories are also the offices of the company. As for the Malagasy employees, they go home once their daily work is completed. However, besides many infrastructural renovations carried out by Chinese companies, it seems that the arrival of Chinese newcomers from Behoririka has also had an impact on the urban Malagasy capital.

From now on, it will therefore be necessary to carefully trace the specific path of Chinese traders from Antananarivo, in order to assess its impact on the city center. First, a description will

be made of the administrative procedure to which Chinese traders are submitted prior to the step-in respect to the regularization of their stay as independent investors on the Malagasy soil. Depending on the type of requests from the Chinese actors – may they come from either employees or investors – regulatory documents will vary. In addition to visas and passports, Chinese investors should obtain an official document in addition to the previous documents, namely, the CIPENS [25] card (The professional identity card for unemployed foreigners). In contrast, Chinese employees will have an obligation to be in possession of similar identity cards to those of their compatriot's, the only difference being that their employee status requires a work permit that will regulate their stay for a period of three years renewable. Upon acquisition of the CIPENS card, the regional branch of trade Analamanga requires from different economic operators a number of items to be added to their file, namely a supporting information sheet that includes: first and last names, date and place of birth and nationality. Their home address, place and date of issue of the residence card and / or passport will also have to be stated. Finally, the name of the class activity and written notification of the applicant stating the CIPENS card application will have to be mentioned.



Fig. 2. Behoririka, août 2017

Regarding the documents for a new application, investors are asked to address a handwritten letter to the regional directorate of the Analamanga trade, an extract of the criminal record from the country of origin issued within the last three months, a work permit or employment for former employees (a certified copy), passport, residence permit and visa, for foreign residents, the tax position of the company. A photocopy of the status of the company, a certificate of existence of original place of operation issued from Fokontany [26], and finally, two recent passport photos. For any modifications or changes in circumstances: a handwritten letter to be addressed to the regional directorate of the Analamanga trade, a photocopy of the status of the company, the minutes of the meetings, an original extraction and residence certificate issued from Fokontany and finally the tax position of the company.

Given the note from the Ministry of Commerce and the General Secretariat of Commerce on 18 October 2010 for the regional directorate of the Analamanga trade: all operators are informed that in case of cessation of activity or bankruptcy, the return of the CIPENS card and / or accreditation card to the regional directorate of the Analamanga trade is, given the regulations, mandatory. In conclusion, any violation of these provisions will lead to sanctions. The regional directorate of the Analamanga trade has identified in its register the 121 CIPENS card applications issued by Chinese investors since 1982.

Once regulated in the host country as investors or employees, various Chinese actors will be structured in an expatriate community settling mainly in the shopping districts of Antananarivo and in particular in Behoririka's [27]. Buildings where Chinese traders live to organize their activity are also the places where they hire Chinese and Malagasy employees as resellers. They have made their home around Behoririka in small flats near their workplaces. In the suburbs of Antananarivo, Behoririka, Analakely and Soarano, Chinese shops are located around two five-story buildings that dominate the area. They have mainly developed the first building. These buildings house on each floor, several point-of-sale for manufactured products from China. The acquisition of these buildings by Chinese migrants is the result of negotiations with members of wealthy Malagasy industrialist families called Ramaroson [28]. As for the housings adjacent to the Chinese shops they

have been rented and / or sold by a handful of entrepreneurs and investors – as Chinese newcomers in the last decade – to the local bourgeoisie. The purchase of these houses by Chinese traders in this respect was an important step in the socio-economic anchor of the new Chinese migrants settled in the capital of Madagascar between 2003 and 2012.

During this stage, first through their investments in real estate, the Chinese newcomers had now a base home. And in a second time, they could guarantee the arrival of future expatriates [29], while ensuring a place to dwell – this in addition to a sales job to be filled immediately – once there. In fact, an effective social solidarity seems to bring to the Chinese community of Behoririka an internal coherence. The socio-economic anchor of the new Chinese migrants of Madagascar has only been possible thanks to a disruption of the existing social hierarchy that was prior to their arrival in the field of economic and business capital. As seen previously, these newcomers were led to gradually replace the old local bourgeoisie in Behoririka, because of the inability of the latter to follow the price leadership of Chinese traders without causing the ruin of their own business. Because of this spatial occupation and eviction of their main competitors: this phenomenon constantly attracts a succession of Chinese newcomers continuing to expand the number of expatriates. It also confirms the ascendancy of the Chinese community on their main competitors Merina and Karana [30], while promoting the movement of capital from China in and around the Malagasy city. Finally, it can be said that this anchor resulted in a recast of forces at work in Behoririka, and in the emergence of a new type of monopoly held this time by Chinese businessmen.

As the focal point for the first investors in the 1990s [31], the district of Behoririka now allows Chinese trade to compartmentalize itself even within the occupied place and leads to other adjoining market squares such as the market of Andranvoahangy, a market located in an area called the 67 hectares area as well as the market of Pochard and the Isotry's one. In 2010, other Chinese investors have been welcomed by the former Minister of Public Works, on June 16th, to finance future projects related to the economy [32].

« Si dans les années 90 on a dénoté une certaine image négative des produits chinois, les

années 2000 ont marqué une percée positive qui a graduellement évolué pour atteindre une place incontournable et inévitable aujourd'hui, selon le Directeur Général de Média Consulting. Actuellement, on trouve des produits chinois de toutes sortes. Dans certains domaines, les consommateurs sont encore réticents pour les acheter, mais leur qualité a beaucoup évolué. »[33].

From Behoririka to Tsiazotafa:

- Tana Center
- Irresistible
- Globe
- Venic (Chaussurama) - Golden Center
- Advance Center
- Chinese hair salon

From Behoririka to the city of Ankadifotsy:

- C GL (Computer and Hi Fi Center)
- Hi Fi Sarl King Lot IB 80 Bis
- Supermarket Provident
- SIMA-IMMO (Sino-Malagasy company specializing in real estate) Sarl Lot IVF10
- Digital City

In these places sometimes located in the outskirts, sometimes in the heart of Behoririka, other Chinese traders spread this form of economic and commercial expansion at the edge of the Malagasy capital, while small coastal resellers do the same with their own customers.

The point is this Chinese trade manages to dominate this sector below the city center, and also extends itself beyond the limits of Antananarivo – including through the street retailers from the coast – because the first Chinese expatriates were smart enough to cultivate good relationships with the «key actors»[34] of the Malagasy capital. As resource persons, the illicit street vendors have acquired a good knowledge of tananarivian market and an accurate reading of its various irregularities since their arrival in the city center [35]. Creating networks among retailers clearly favours the resale of basic products imported from China and this has once again allowed Chinese traders to unquestionably ensure their domination. Therefore, it is no happenstance if the district of Behoririka has been chosen by the Chinese community as business location.

Chinese shops are starting to take by storm Isotry market; a market mainly structured by

karana traders. This supermarket is kept by Chinese operators who import their supplies mainly from China. They essentially sell l'gasy electronic products from mobile phones, computers, monitors, television, hi-fi to cameras and laptops. The brand belongs to the contractor Bao Lai, one of the largest fortunes in Madagascar.

Other chain stores belonging to Bao Lai are installed throughout the ground floor of Independence Avenue. It seems that Chinese shopkeepers take gradually Isotry market, and this after having conquered the market of Behoririka. As mentioned above, small Malagasy retailers present in the capital, come mainly from the impoverished Malagasy coasts. They are the people who are busy at dawn before the Chinese shops where they buy great quantities of wholesale goods before selling them at retail on roadsides to customers beyond Antananarivo. Therefore, although it is not conspicuous, the contribution of local dealers is crucial. In other words, without them – that is to say, deprived of these internal ramifications in Antananarivo and of its various external joints in the city center – the Chinese trade of Madagascar would probably not have expanded so rapidly, even more so beyond the capital. Moreover, if the Chinese trade is so flourishing in and beyond Antananarivo this is also due to the fact that it allows to stem from the rising prices of basic products.

As a matter of fact, from China, manufacturers take on responsibility of providing Chinese operators in Madagascar with bulky freight for importing products to the port of Tamatave. And nationals can be constantly supplied according to their orders. Compared to the Senegalese situation and because of the geographical proximity between Madagascar and China, migration flows from the Middle Kingdom are much more frequent, more numerous and therefore more conspicuous in the Malagasy capital than in Dakar. Located on the eastern interface of the island, the port of Tamatave facilitates the access to capital, to products and to Chinese actors in Madagascar that transit by cargo through the Indian Ocean. Consequently, the Malagasy port area acts as a gateway for Chinese manufactured products. From Antananarivo, the port of Tamatave is six or seven hours away by car and one hour by plane. The relative proximity allows Chinese traders settled in Behoririka to send convoys to the portuary axis where the berthed vessels



Fig. 3. Behoririka, août 2017

containing the various orders for manufactured products can be found. In short, the supply of Chinese shopkeepers based in Antananarivo is organized in the context of a traffic that extends from the place of manufacture of manufactured products, located in China to then go through the port of Tamatave, before being received as cargoes in Antananarivo.

All things considered, the local implementation of new Chinese migrants in Antananarivo from 2003 to 2012 was primarily made through traders who previously invested funds to settle down in Antananarivo. Indeed, through them, the successive migratory waves will gradually incorporate the Chinese community of Antananarivo. These Chinese merchants were able to unite around them contacts to optimize the sales of their products manufactured at low prices and oust, at the same time the Malagasy competitors of Antananarivo. It is clear that this choice has proven successful, as these contacts – namely, the small coastal retailers – are unique when it comes to meet their clients at the right time, and to get to key places of the capital, in the purpose to sell regular China's imports. Furthermore, in accordance with clichés that are usually fed about them, Chinese expatriate traders of Madagascar appear to be innovative workers. However, the Malagasy traders seem less inclined to work with the Chinese retailers from Antananarivo mentioned above. The fact that Chinese traders make it far more affordable than their competitors from Madagascar to buy imported Chinese goods seems to seriously threaten the local handicraft (a production that seems to be of a higher standard, only because of the quality of raw materials from Madagascar), and create a situation of economic and commercial monopoly in the capital.

4. THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC HOMESTEADING OF CHINESE MIGRANTS IN SENEGAL (2003-2013)

As part of this South-south inter-continental migration, some Chinese migrants will be led to meet other migrants of Africa whose itinerary is different from theirs. As for the intra- continental migration to Dakar, it is rather a rural exodus: the starting point is the groundnut basin area, and Dakar the point of destination. Striking event of the twentieth century, the economic hardship of the 1980s led many Senegalese – the Modu-Modu – to leave home and find work in the capital, and thus supplement the active members in a family nucleus by dealing with daily needs. Indeed, the use of the latter has been weakened because of the budget and expenditures restrictive measures, which also led many African pupils and students to drop out of school. As a consequence, different households located in rural areas and the provinces had to face up this situation.

However, the actual deterioration of the socio-economic context strikes both cities and provinces. This is why, migrant workers whether previously schooled or not, had to take the necessary steps to face social disruption. This means that hiring, including in large cities, has become more difficult given the number of migrants who are now in the center. In order to remedy this situation, the intra-continental migrant workers have chosen to retrain – retraining in which women have a place – in the trade as itinerant tradesmen, an informal status that allowed them to receive an income without having to pay taxes. They are the ones who will later benefit from the influx of Chinese traders from the 2000s, to become their major clients

and fill their moneybags. As for The Baol - Baol – namely, the Lebanese and Senegalese traders – they are in a different perspective.

They clearly cope with this South–South migration flow. It is not only the competition they are bound to that undermines their interests. Indeed, the Baol-Baol are confronted with a kind of power embodied in a collective being: a host of Chinese migrants acting in networks, exercising a singular influence horizontally and privately. Under the presidency of Abdoulaye Wade, more favorable to the Middle Kingdom than his predecessors, the Sino-Senegalese relations were resumed during the liberalization and economic opening of the Senegalese private sector. In accordance with the economic and commercial turning point wanted by Beijing, the terms of the Sino-Senegalese cooperation will fit into this perspective: three stadiums are currently being renovated by Chinese companies, and no less than eleven new stadiums are under construction. This China's African policy manages to seduce the most senior African dignitaries because its offer adequately responds to the specific needs of its partners namely, a relatively low industrialization and deficiencies in infrastructure, and this, without political conditionalities. The work in progress of the National Theatre in Dakar meets in turn a different logic; it is an integral part of the construction projects of prestigious buildings which purpose is to expose to the world the know-how of Chinese architects. By maintaining – what obviously appears as a constant in China's African politics – unbeatable prices and a speed of execution from its workers, Beijing highlights these two pillars to attract future clients. In this sense, in the year 2005, several agreements were signed between the two political systems, which include agreement on major loans: the installation of a central Dakar, to strengthen and renew networks and the aging electrical wiring of the capital.

How Beijing manages to reconcile these two requirements at the heart of an important foreign policy? Obviously, the downside of the latter has to be updated. Indeed, within the huge construction sites, the Chinese workers are paid very little compared to the difficulty of the work performed. Indeed, most of the workers do the dirty work without sophisticated equipment. They allow themselves but few breaks and work without necessarily wearing headgear and without worrying about the sun above their heads. In addition, piled up on each other – for

the entire duration of their contract – in habitats, adjacent buildings and sometimes, in unhealthy dormitories, they live behind closed doors. As total wage-bill, these employees make up a low cost and are extremely profitable for the foremen who employ them. In sum, whether in terms of hardship, insecurity and wage amount, it seems that the Chinese expatriate workers do not have their say. Indeed, given the more than modest social origin of the coolies, they do not have the possibility to refuse such working conditions. In addition, these contractors make little use of machines because they rely primarily on the strength and hard work of these employees.

Initially, a few pioneers were already in Dakar since 1990 and well before the Chinese newcomers in Senegal since October 25, 2005, but these two waves of migration come from Henan province. It is likely that the first Chinese have uncovered the best opportunities, both in terms of purchase or rental of housing and for business as such. Chinese traders and entrepreneurs settled down in the 2000s.

They constitute the bulk of the Chinese newcomers in Dakar who engage in mercantilism, around which crawl a multitude of small Senegalese resellers. There are over a hundred Chinese merchants, from Papa Gueye Fall driveway to Centennial Avenue, in the city of Dakar, where these two categories of actors come together regularly. Obviously, some Senegalese can be counted among employees working in these outlets. This studied area now hosts the largest Chinese community in Dakar, while Independence Avenue was originally a tourist place. It is noteworthy that Chinese traders' choice of location is clearly not down to chance. « Centrally located, the boulevard is surrounded by major markets: Sandaga Colobane, HLM, Tilène. » A variety of manufactured products as diverse as clothing, locks, shoes, sandals, loincloths, plastic toys, small portraits with images of the Baye Fall and Murid marabouts, clocks or kitchen utensils, made in China before being widely sold in the heart of the Senegalese market at unbeatable prices can be found. More discreetly, in the 1990s, and then massively over the years 2000 to 2005, Chinese traders have bought most of the ground floors, patios or garages of Independence Avenue to settle there and do business.

« For most traders, the man came first and set up the shop, and then the woman came and

joined him. Later still, if the deal goes, a cousin will come and assist them. »The aim of the Chinese newcomers is to delegate the management of the business as quickly as possible to their relatives to be supplemented in this task. The state of mind that drives and structures the group and also promotes its cohesion is that both employers and employees take part in these challenges. In this sense, the collective emulation that is unfolded on a daily basis motivates the members of the expatriate community: if the boss lived in a spacious villa while his employees were forced to stay under stringent conditions, this state of mind would be lost. As for Western bosses, they tend to lead a lavish lifestyle in the most beautiful African hotels, or in residential areas, thus living far from local realities. « Chinese from Dakar live near their stores in the Colobane and Medina neighbourhoods (...). » Chinese were stuffed into sorts of crowded dormitories or settlements that were nothing less than unhealthy. Gradually, by renting the two-story buildings that line both sides of the avenue, they were able to settle on the spot, and thus became key economic actors from the center of Dakar, from which a huge quantity of products manufactured throughout the territory and beyond are sold. Whether they are stalls or furnished shops, some outlets are rented or sold at a good price to Chinese traders.

The bordering owners of these properties – i.e.: ground floor, sheds, patios and garages of Independence Avenue – are former executives of the Senegalese public service or retirees who used to work in the private sector and had experienced the post-independence period. These future stores of about 16 square meters, which were previously leased for a monthly cost up to 15,000 CFA francs, are currently leased or sold to Chinese merchants at a rate two to three times the original cost. In other words, these rents represent a significant source of income for these former employees. Beyond the financial aspect, it is noteworthy that the discreet behavior of the future residents of the avenue, to say the least, seems to have worked in their favor in order to acquire such property. Once there, it was of paramount importance for Chinese traders to attract and keep their Senegalese customers which was far from being easy given the local competition they had to face. However, breaking the market prices and competing on the variety of products (although the quality of the products cannot be taken for granted), Asian merchants have succeeded within five years to attract on the one hand, many Senegalese

consumers whose purchasing power was, until then, far from enough. And on the other hand, the street vendors have also found their needs catered as far as the selling prices offered by Chinese shopkeepers are concerned.

In this sense, what was supposed to be at first a road shopping district has gradually become a stronghold for the Chinese trade in Dakar. As a matter of fact, while strolling on Centennial Avenue, many stalls of manufactured products imported from China held by Senegalese resellers can be found. They purchase greater quantities of Chinese products than any other consumer. Note that some shops located near the Chinese shops are run by Senegalese. It is suspected that these new owners and / or tenants were former street retailers who have managed to set up their own business thanks to the Chinese economic implantation in Dakar. Somehow, the presence of these street dealers increases Chinese trade in Dakar, and hence suit the businesses of Chinese traders, fortiori, when they belong to the Murid and Baye Fall brotherhood. Indeed, these two religious groups are respectively driven by the same mystical work and are skilled in a specific discipline.

In order to manage their different institutions on a daily basis, Chinese actors have chosen to reside in the surroundings of Centenaries Avenue. Given the age of the Chinese businesses located throughout the Papa Gueye Fall driveway, if compared to the Centenaries driveway, we will use the term of stalls to designate these small places run by Chinese actors, these shops are less busy – both in terms of clients, diverse goods and Senegalese staff – than the shops. For example, the stores have equipped warehouses.

By contrast, as far as the new institutions on Centenaries Avenue are concerned, we will rather call them shops, knowing that unlike stalls, shopkeepers seem to be able to count Senegalese vendors among them. Even if most of the best sellers of Senegalese origin have been employed in some of the shops on the shopping street, the owners of these outlets are Chinese. The fact of selling the same items than their local competitors, by breaking the sales price, gives a near-monopoly to Chinese traders. Their task is all the more made easier because among vendors they hire on site, those who are hired are among the best ones on the market. This is why «the Chinese staff does not take center stage in the stalls of Dakar ». In addition,

they act as interpreters to overcome the ignorance of the national languages of their bosses. Since manufactured products are sold at low cost, it becomes very difficult for Senegalese buyers / consumers to negotiate lower prices. Located in Yiwu for Chinese and Dubai for their Lebanese and Senegalese competitors, supplies places vary according to traders. Cargo containers come every day to replenish Chinese shops of the avenue, whereas Senegalese and Lebanese traders used to go and buy their products by themselves in China. Beijing has found it more appropriate to manage these sectors itself. According to the idea of just-in-time production, Chinese traders place their orders on the spot that is to say, in China, speaking directly to their suppliers or from their place of residence, to, a priori embassies.

Regardless of the process, the materials for the production of manufactured goods are sent by shiploads in spare parts to the port of Dakar in containers. In short, suppliers constantly supply Chinese traders settled there, according to their respective claims. Once the delivery is received, the products are put together before being sold, avoiding at the same time the shipping costs. As such, the most important customers for the sustainability for the business of Chinese newcomers do not lie on the side of Senegalese buyers / consumers who buy products in single, but on the side of the buyers / retailers to whom they negotiate wholesale prices, who are responsible to sell the products themselves. In terms of profitability and flow of stocks, the role of buyers / retailers is hence crucial for the success of Chinese business. « Once the Senegalese retailers have opened an «account» with them, they take a shipment of items to resell them. But initially, the new Senegalese resellers need to be introduced by the oldest retailers to start working. And it is only later that the network functions. In a way, the old resellers are a guarantee for the newcomers, considering that Chinese traders cannot so easily sell their products without intermediaries. On the other hand, Senegalese resellers will not waste their own livelihood. So, in the morning resellers take their pack of goods in Chinese shops, and when the whole of the merchandise has been sold, they come to replenish supplies again giving back unsold items. Once the relationship is established the network works almost by itself. »

As for Senegalese buyers / resellers, they have all the necessary latitude to set the profit margin they will make out of their street hawking.

Indeed, the informal nature, or the other side of this business, gives buyers / consumers the opportunity to negotiate or revise downward the prices offered by buyers / resellers without necessarily having door slammed as it is the case when dealing with Chinese traders. Regarding the Senegalese buyers / retailers of Murid and Baye Fall obedience, work is seen as a form of purification to which the believer must submit and this singularly spiritual representation of labor increases members' efficiency in their daily tasks, especially in the context of trade. Many Murid have opted for informal trade. And gradually, they took control of the Dakar economy through networking activities, to such an extent that some of them have migrated to the United States and Italy. In that same informal sector, the Baye Fall brotherhood is not far behind. Somehow, these buyers / resellers soften the production circuit organized by the Chinese during the sale, streamlining the flow of manufactured goods. However, residential buyers / resellers, whose stalls manufactures are located near the Chinese shops, and throughout Centenaries Avenue, have, it seems, far less flexibility compared to those who choose to sell their products as hawkers. In addition, the fact of knowing precisely the dates and places where national holidays (April 4), religious (Eid El Kebir), holidays, weddings and other events are celebrated, increases Senegalese retailers efficiency. Because of these parameters, resellers are prominent for the success of Chinese's trade. Moreover, as previously seen, not only the avenue is surrounded by major business centers such as Tilène, Sandaga and Colobane but in extenso, Chinese manufactured products can also circulate in neighboring regions namely, Gambia, Mali, Guinea- Bissau, Guinea- Conakry and Sierra Leone.

5. CONCLUSION

As for the conflicts that may arise in the context of the relationships between Senegalese and Chinese from Dakar, it seems they may be generated by Senegalese traders and entrepreneurs. Indeed, the big losers in this economic liberalization orchestrated by Abdoulaye Wade are local craftsmen, that is to say, shoemakers or weavers, who saw their sales literally collapse from the years 2000-2005, time when their Chinese competitors arrived in the capital of Dakar. The Unacois (National Union of Traders and Industrialists of Senegal) said that competition is unfair and prejudicial to the Senegalese entrepreneurs who previously

exercised a monopoly on trade in Dakar, because the Chinese have no annual charges and do not take real risks when opening their shops because local authorities turn a blind eye on the illegal practices and encourage the arrival of Chinese migrants in Senegal. According to the representatives of the Unacois, many traders and local craftsmen have ceased their activities because of these Chinese newcomers since 2005. It even seems that some crafts have been plagiarized by Chinese traders who then sold them on the market without paying any user fees. For some of these crafts, it is a whole know-how that tends to disappear in favor of large Chinese distribution network which size is such that it is difficult to cope with. Indeed, the Senegalese weavers focus on the quality / price ratio.

However, despite a better quality than the Chinese textile ones, Senegalese buyers / consumers have a preference for products imported from China. De facto, the Senegalese and Lebanese traders adapt to the Chinese presence by diversifying storehouses. In sum, the Senegalese artisanal sector is a victim of counterfeiting organized by manufacturers in China and Chinese traders' expatriates in Africa, who reproduce several copies of traditional clothing models from the African market in order to sell them in the same market without any intervention from the authorities. Eventually, if not heard by governments that hide in silence, these complaints are likely to escalate. It is quite possible that the Unicoi's takes resolutions, by committing acts of vandalism against Chinese shops. Paradoxically, the same indifference can be observed from the part of huaquio against Chinese trader expatriates and their possible grievances.

COMPETING INTERESTS

Author has declared that no competing interests exist.

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8. « In this article, the notion that Chinese migrants introduce beneficial forms of human capital in their host country through the dissemination of new ideas, business networks, and supply chains is explored. Human capital is defined as the knowledge and skills of an individual that allow him or her to be an economically productive member of society. » Cornelia Tremann, « Temporary Chinese Migration to Madagascar: Local Perceptions, Economic Impacts, and Human Capital Flows », *African Review of Economics and Finance*, décembre. 2013;5(1).
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10. Que ce soit celle de Mao ou de Deng.
 11. Par commodité, nous emploierons ce terme imparfait bien qu'il subsume derrière un mot unique : des réalités sociales diamétralement opposées et des pratiques très hétéroclites. Généralement, le terme de côtier sert à définir certains groupes ethniques qui par définition sont originaires des côtes, par opposition aux malgaches issus des hauts plateaux.
 12. Hubert Deschamps, *Les migrations intérieures passées et présentes à Madagascar*, Paris, éd. Berger-Levrault. « L'immigration, à l'heure actuelle, sauf la poussée Tsimihety peu contestable et quelques saisonniers (ouvrier agricole Antandroy, scieur de long Betsileo) est insignifiante. ».
 13. Hubert Deschamps, op.cit. 1959;214:216.
 14. Catherine Fournet-Guérin, op.cit. 545 en note de bas de page 4 : « Groupe ethnique dominant sur les hautes terres et Tananarive. Les souverains merinas ont par ailleurs conquis par la force militaire la plupart des autres régions de Madagascar au XIX^e siècle, contribuant par là à l'unification de l'île, qui fut achevée par les Français. ».
 15. Catherine Fournet-Guérin, op. cit, p. 669 en note de bas de page 8 : « Terme désignant les indiens de Madagascar. Il a parfois une connotation péjorative, mais pas de manière systématique. ».
 16. « Lorsque les Français voulurent amorcer leurs grands travaux, ils se trouvèrent confrontés à l'insuffisance des travailleurs locaux. En 1896, lorsqu'il fut décidé de construire la route Tamatave Tananarive, on fit recruter des Chinois dans l'ouest du Guang Dong (3000 en tout) qui furent employés à des travaux de terrassement ; les conditions de travail étaient très dures beaucoup tombaient malades et souvent mourraient ; tous les survivants quittèrent le pays à la fin de leur contrat. » Lombard-Salmon Claudine. Leon M.S. Slaweki, *French Policy towards the Chinese in Madagascar*. In: *Archipel*. 1973;6:217-221.
 17. De 1993 à 1996, Albert Zafy a libéralisé l'économie malgache, en ouvrant les frontières nationales à d'autres investisseurs que ceux qui étaient présent auparavant.
 18. Catherine Fournet-Guérin, *Les Chinois de Tananarive*, *Annales de géographie*. 2009;669(5):545.
 19. Éric Nguyen, *Les relations Chine-Afrique. L'empire du Milieu à la conquête du continent noir*, Paris, éd. Studyrama, collection dirigée par Annie Reithmann. « Avant 1990, on ne recensait quasiment pas de présence chinoise sur le continent africain. On ne comptait alors de communautés chinoises que dans trois pays africains : l'Afrique du Sud (30 000), l'île Maurice (35 000) et Madagascar (14 000). » 2009;52.
 20. Catherine Fournet-Guérin, *ibid*.
 21. « Tout comme les premiers immigrants chinois, les indiens se cantonnèrent pendant longtemps sur les côtes nord-est de Madagascar. On mentionne un flux d'immigrants sur l'île de Nosy-Be à la fin du XIX^e siècle fuyant la crise démographique, les disettes, les famines, les sécheresses et les épidémies qui frappèrent l'Inde à cette époque. » Poulain, Michel & Razanakoto, Thierry. (2014). *Migration à Madagascar Profil National*. 2013;35.
 22. Interview de Jean-André Dremanjary du actuel Ministre de l'enseignement technique et professionnel; 2012.
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 24. Une Carte d'Identité Professionnelle des Etrangers Non-Salariés.
 25. Il s'agit d'une circonscription malgache, en charge de la gestion du quartier de Behoririka.
 26. Interview de Tabera Randriamanantsoa du 9 septembre 2012: d'après le Ministre de la Fonction publique, il est à la fois plus aisé pour les nouveaux arrivants chinois de la capitale de recevoir les importations et d'effectuer les démarches administratives, en s'installant dans le centre-ville; 2012.

27. Interview du Colonel Botomanovatsara du 20 septembre 2012 actuel Ministre des Travaux Publics; 2012.
 28. Notamment en 2003, date à laquelle Marc Ravalomanana a ouvert les frontières, en cessant de taxer les importations; 2003.
 29. Ces ethnies comptent traditionnellement de nombreux commerçants qui connaissent de longue date les nombreuses singularités du marché de la capitale. Que ce soit au niveau des habitudes des consommateurs malgaches ou des périodes propices à la vente de marchandises, les ethnies merina et karana semblaient avoir une longueur d'avance.
 30. « Ainsi, les entrepreneurs privés chinois arrivés depuis le milieu des années 1990 jusqu'au début des années 2000, qui ont obtenu des succès économiques certains et se sont enracinés sur place, sont rarement évoqués et n'ont jamais été enquêtés de manière appropriée. Pourtant, au contraire des commerçants très mobiles, certains de ces entrepreneurs réalisent des investissements plus importants et envisagent leurs activités sur la durée, dans le but d'assurer une croissance et une diversification à long terme, en opérant dans des domaines aussi variés que l'immobilier, l'agriculture, la pêche, l'industrie, l'exploitation minière, la santé et les secteurs du service ou du tourisme. Se considérant eux-mêmes comme « installés » dans leur nouvel environnement, ils paraissent avoir adopté des stratégies délibérées d'intégration sociale et économique. » Tremann, Cornelia. « « Anciens » et « nouveaux » Chinois à Madagascar : Stratégies d'intégration et rapports de force intergénérationnels », Politique africaine. 2014;134(2):69-88.
 31. Interview du Colonel Botomanovatsara du 20 septembre 2012. L'actuel Ministre des Travaux Publics faisait référence à son prédécesseur Eric Razafimandimby, qui a reçu une délégation de nouveaux investisseurs chinois en 2010.
 32. « Chinatown in Tanà. Rendez-vous en octobre » in Malaza Madagascar, n°2338, du 28 août 2012;7.
 33. Précisons que l'activité de revendeur à la sauvette exercé par les côtiers vient en complément des autres métiers plus modestes pratiqués jusqu'alors : cireurs de chaussures, conducteurs de pousse-pousse en zone touristique, etc.
 34. Il s'agit des fêtes nationales malgaches et/ou des dates relatives aux événements historiques qui permettent aisément d'écouler les produits manufacturés chinois. Cependant, le fait de connaître précisément les jours de festivité plus ponctuels (tels que : les mariages, les fêtes communautaires ou familiales. Les rentrées scolaires des établissements privés) requiert une appréciation spécifique du terrain, chose qui semble suffisamment faire défaut aux commerçants chinois d'Antananarivo pour qu'ils ne puissent pas se passer du concours de leurs collaborateurs malgaches originaires des côtes.
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