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Communication Dans Un Congrès Année : 2020

Two-sided markets : the role of technological uncertainty

Résumé

This paper examines the effect of technological uncertainty on the optimal pricing and investment decisions in a two-sided market. A platform offers a basic good and a developer offers a complementary good. The performance of the complementary good is stochastic and is endogenously determined by the pricing policy the platform adopts. Heterogeneous consumers join the platform either before uncertainty is resolved or after. In the former case, consumers obtain the basic good and an option to benefit from the complementary good in the future. The platform trades off building an earlier mass of consumer base and extracting profits from late adopters. Consumers are divided into three groups: early adopters, late adopters, and those who never join the platform. A platform's pricing policy depends on the value of the complementary good and the cost of its development. If the cost is small, a price skimming policy is optimal. When the cost is higher, price skimming remains optimal if the value of the complementary good is either small or relatively high. For intermediate values, the platform adopts a price penetration policy. We discuss some examples from the empirical literature in light of the model.
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Dates et versions

hal-03005930 , version 1 (14-11-2020)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : hal-03005930 , version 1

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Hamed Ghoddusi, Alexander Rodivilov, Baran Siyahhan. Two-sided markets : the role of technological uncertainty. 18th Paris December Finance Meeting, AFFI EUROFIDAI (European Financial Data Institute), Dec 2020, Paris, France. ⟨hal-03005930⟩
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