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Manipulation of Opinion Polls to Influence Iterative Elections

Abstract : In classical elections, voters only submit their ballot once, whereas in iterative voting, the ballots may be changed iteratively. Following the work by Wilczynski [2019], we consider the case where a social network represents an underlying structure between the voters, meaning that each voter can see her neighbors' ballots. In addition, there is a polling agency, which publicly announces the result for the initial vote. This paper investigates the manipulative power of the polling agency. Previously, Wilczynski [2019] studied constructive manipulation for the plurality rule. We introduce destructive manipulation and extend the study to the veto rule. Several restricted variants are considered with respect to their parameterized complexity. The theoretical results are complemented by experiments using different heuristics.
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Contributor : Anaëlle Wilczynski Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Friday, September 18, 2020 - 1:42:14 PM
Last modification on : Thursday, January 6, 2022 - 11:38:04 AM
Long-term archiving on: : Friday, December 4, 2020 - 5:17:20 PM


Baumeister et al. Manipulation...
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  • HAL Id : hal-02942925, version 1



Dorothea Baumeister, Ann-Kathrin Selker, Anaëlle Wilczynski. Manipulation of Opinion Polls to Influence Iterative Elections. 19th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2020), May 2020, Auckland, New Zealand. ⟨hal-02942925⟩



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