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Towards An Approach to Hilbert’s Sixth Problem: A Brief Review

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Abstract

In 1900 David Hilbert published his famous list of 23 problems. The sixth of them - the axiomatization of Physics - remains partially unsolved. In this work we will give a gentle introduction and a brief review to one of the most recent and formal approaches to this problem, based on synthetic higher categorical languages. This approach, developed by Baez, Schreiber, Sati, Fiorenza, Freed, Lurie and many others, provides a formalization to the notion of classical field theory in terms of twisted differential cohomologies in cohesive (∞, 1)-topos. Furthermore, following the Atiyah-Witten functorial style of topological quantum field theories, it provides a nonperturbative quantization for classical field theories whose underlying cohomology satisfies orientability and duality conditions. We follow a pedagogical and almost non-technical style trying to minimize the mathematical prerequisites. No categorical background is required.

1. Introduction

In the year of 1900, David Hilbert (a mathematician which is mostly known in Physics for his contribution to the Einstein-Hilbert action functional) published a list containing 23 problems (usually known as the *Hilbert’s problems*) which in his opinion would strongly influence the development of 20th century mathematics [107]. The sixth problem is about the axiomatization of the whole physics and, presently, it remains partially unsolved. Our aim is to introduce basic ideas of an approach to this problem following works of Urs Schreiber, Domenico Fiorenza, Hisham Sati, Daniel Freed, John Baez and many others, mostly inspired by the seminal topos-theoretic works of William Lawvere [134, 137, 135, 138, 136] and formalized through the development of higher topos theory by André Joyal [118, 120, 119], Michael Batanin [27], Ross Street [223], Charles Rezk [183, 184], Carlos Simpson [213], Clark Barwick [24, 25, 26], Tom Leinster [140, 48], Dominic Verity [236, 235], Jacob Lurie [147, 148] and many others. For reviews on these different approaches to higher category theory, see [47, 141, 140].

The idea goes as follows. Some points are also discussed in [179, 191, 58, 54, 44]. See [202] for a technical introduction and [160] for a gentle exposition. See [128] for a discussion on other mathematical problems deeply influenced by Hilbert’s works, [215, 178] for a more philosophical discussion and [128] for the history of the sixth problem.

There are two kinds of math: *naive* (or *intuitive*) math and *axiomatic* (or *rigorous*) math. In naive math the fundamental objects are *primitives*, while in axiomatic math they are defined in terms of more elementary structures. For instance, we have *naive set theory* and *axiomatic set theory*. In both cases (naive or axiomatic) we need a *background language* (also called *logic*) in order to develop the theory, as in the diagram below. In the context of set theory this background language is just *classical logic*.

Notice that, when a mathematician is working (for instance, when he is trying to prove some new result in his area of research), at first he does not make use of completely rigorous arguments. In fact, he first uses his intuition, making some scribbles in pieces of paper or in a blackboard and usually considers many wrong strategies before finally discovering a good sequence of arguments which can be used to prove (or disprove) the desired result. It is only at this later moment that he tries to introduce rigor in his ideas, in order for his result to be communicated and accepted by the other members of the mathematical community.

Thus we can say that in the process of producing new mathematics, *naive arguments come before rigorous ones*. More precisely, we can say that naive mathematics produces conjectures and rigorous mathematics turns these conjectures into theorems. It happens that the same conjecture generally can be proved (or disproved) in different ways, say by using different tools or by considering different models. For instance,
many concepts have algebraic and geometric incarnations (e.g., Serre-Swan theorem [224, 210, 175], Stone duality [116], Gelfand duality [174, 180] and Tannaka duality [59, 145]), suggesting the existence of a duality between algebra and geometry, as in diagram (1) below.

As will be discussed, this duality between algebra and geometry, which in some generality is formalized by Isbell-type dualities [112, 113, 220, 22], extends to the context of physics, leading to dual approaches to Hilbert’s sixth problem. For another incarnation of this duality, notice that when a geometric entity \( x \) has a commutative algebraic incarnation \( A(X) \), then we can define the noncommutative version of \( X \) simply by dropping the commutativity requirement on \( A(X) \). This is precisely the approach used in noncommutative geometry [97, 52].

When compared with mathematics, physics is a totally different discipline. Indeed, in physics we have a restriction on the existence of physical objects, meaning that we have a connection with ontology [215]. More precisely, while math is a strictly logical discipline, physics is logical and ontological. This restriction on existence produces many difficulties. For instance, logical consistence is no longer sufficient in order to establish a given sentence as physically true: ontological consistence is also needed (see [178] for a comparison between philosophical aspects of math and physics). Thus, even though a sentence is logically consistent, in order to be considered physically true it must be consistent with all possible experiments! This fact can be expressed in terms of a commutative diagram:

But now, recall that logic determines the validity of mathematical arguments, which was also translated in terms of the commutative diagram (1). So, gluing the diagram of physics with the diagram of math, we have a new commutative diagram:

One of the most important facts concerning the relation between physics and mathematics is that, in the above diagram, the arrow

\[ \text{logic} \rightarrow \text{physics} \]

has an inverse

\[ \text{logic} \leftarrow \text{physics} \]

This last arrow is called physical insight. The composition of physical insight with axiomatic math produces a new arrow, called mathematical physics.

Therefore, the full relation between physics and mathematics is given by the following diagram

leading us to the following conclusion:

**Conclusion:** we can use physical insight in order to do naive mathematics and, therefore, in order to produce conjectures. These conjectures can eventually be proven, producing theorems, which in turn can be used to create mathematical models for physics (mathematical physics).
The axiomatization problem of Physics\(^1\) concerns precisely in building and studying concrete realizations of the following sequence.

\[
\text{physics} \leftrightarrow \text{logic} \leftrightarrow \text{naive algebra} \leftrightarrow \text{math} \leftrightarrow \text{theorems} \leftrightarrow \text{conjectures}
\]

Since this sequence depends explicitly on a background language and since there is a duality between algebra and geometry, it is natural to expect that this duality induces a duality in the level of mathematical physics, as shown in the following diagram.

\[
\text{physics} \leftrightarrow \text{logic} \leftrightarrow \text{naive algebra} \leftrightarrow \text{math} \leftrightarrow \text{theorems} \leftrightarrow \text{conjectures}
\]

\[\text{geometry} \leftrightarrow \text{algebra}
\]

This is really the case. At the quantum level it dates from the dual Heisenberg and Schrödinger approaches to quantum mechanics (QM) and it extends to the context of Quantum Field Theories (QFT) with the so-called Functorial (or Topological) QFT (FQFT or TQFT) and Algebraic QFT (AQFT). Both of them are based on a functorial approach capturing a locality principle. More precisely, a TQFT is a functor \(F\) assigning to each instant of time \(t\) a Hilbert space \(H_t\), and to each trajectory \(\Sigma : t \to t'\) an operator \(F(\Sigma) = U(t'; t)\) representing time evolution on the other hand, an AQFT can be defined as a functor assigning to each small region \(U \subseteq M\) of spacetime the corresponding local algebra \(\mathcal{A}(U)\) of observables, such that causality conditions are satisfied \[18, 74\].

At the classical level, it begins with the Gelfand duality between the configuration space of Classical Mechanics \(M\) and its algebra of observables \(C^\infty(M)\) and generalizes to a duality between an arbitrary symplectic manifold \((M, \omega)\) and its corresponding Poisson algebra of observables.

As we will see, in order to take the axiomatization problem seriously one needs to consider arbitrarily abstract languages, which are “higher” versions of the classical language, so that one has to talk about “higher algebra” and “higher geometry”, which should play a dual role. In this paper we will follow only the geometric side, so that we will review an approach to Hilbert’s sixth problem by means of higher geometrical language. The “higher TQFT” are called extended TQFT. For the higher algebraic approach see \([30, 34, 32, 35, 33, 31]\) and \([54, 170, 171]\). To a comparison between both approaches, see \([200, 198]\). In sum, we have the following table:\(^2\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>higher Poisson geometry</th>
<th>higher algebra</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Schrödinger</td>
<td>Higher Poisson algebra</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TQFT</td>
<td>AQFT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>phase space</td>
<td>alg. observables</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: geometry vs algebra

Because a TQFT is a functor (a categorical object) assigning time evolution operators to trajectories, it is natural do regard extended TQFT’s as \(\infty\)-functors (which are \(\infty\)-categorical objects) assigning trajectories and higher trajectories (which are equivalent to trajectories of arbitrarily dimensional objects) to higher operators acting on \(\infty\)-Hilbert spaces. This is the approach of Baez-Dolan Freed \([7, 238, 81]\), formalized and classified by Lurie \([149]\).

On the other hand, recalling that functors are sources of mathematical invariants, from (2) we conclude that homotopical invariants should play an important role. There are basically two kinds of such invariants: homotopy groups and cohomology groups. Gauge theories are about \(G\)-bundles with connections, which are classified by a flavor of cohomology: the nonabelian differential cohomology \([42, 211, 109, 201]\).

On the other hand, the \(D\)-brane charges are supposed to be represented in twisted cohomology \([239, 39]\), so that twisted nonabelian differential cohomology should be the natural context to describe gauge theories and string theory. What about M-theory? In recent years, Schreiber, Fiorenza and Sati showed that if the \(C\)-field of supergravity is quantized in twisted cohomotopy cohomology (assumption known as the Hypothesis H), then several folks involving M-theory, including anomaly cancellations, can be proved in all needed mathematical rigor \([76, 75, 193, 43, 192, 194, 77]\). Thus:

**Conclusion:** the \(\infty\)-categorical language, when regarded as background language, seems to produce a promising approach for working for Hilbert’s sixth problem.

The remaining of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we emphasize the difference between axiomatization and unification, where the latter is introduced as a particular approach to the former. In Section 3 we discuss why the classical set-theoretic language is not enough to attack Hilbert’s sixth problem, and in Section 4 we consider the categorical language as the next natural candidate. We discuss that it is a nice choice when trying to axiomatize particle physics, but in Section 5 we argue that it is not sufficient to the entire Hilbert’s sixth problem, so that one has to consider more

\(^1\)As will be discussed in next section, there exists another different (but strictly related) problem: the unification problem of physics.

\(^2\)For a complete version of this table, see [1].
abstract languages. Section 6 is devoted to the discussion of an “abstractification process”, which assigns to each language a more abstract language by means of categorification [14, 160]. Iterating the process and taking the limit one gets an infinitely abstract language: the ∞-categorical language. It is argued that this language solves the problems of Section 5 faced by categorical language. In Section 7 the role of abstract cohomology theory in the description of classical theories is introduced and in Section 8 the quantization problem is briefly considered and reviewed. Finally, some concluding remarks are presented in Section 9.

2. Axiomatization vs Unification

Recall that the existence of physical insight gives the “mathematical physics” arrow, as shown below. An approach to Hilbert’s sixth problem can then be viewed as a way to present mathematical physics as a surjective arrow.

\[
\text{axiomatic math} \quad \overset{\text{math}}{\longrightarrow} \quad \text{physics}
\]

Because axiomatic math is described by some kind of logic, the starting point is to select a proper background language. The selected background language determines directly the naive math, so that the next step is to analyze the following loops:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{naive math} & \quad \overset{\text{math}}{\longrightarrow} \quad \text{physics} \\
\text{background language} & \quad \overset{\text{math}}{\longrightarrow} \quad \text{physics}
\end{align*}
\]

Then, once some model has been selected, we lift it to axiomatic math, as in the first diagram below. The final step is to verify if the corresponding “mathematical physics” arrow is surjective or not. In other words, we have to verify if the axiomatic concepts produced by the selected logic are general enough to model all physical phenomena.

Presently, physical theories can be divided into two classes depending on the scale of energy involved: the classical theories and the quantum theories, as shown below.

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{classical physics} & \quad \overset{\text{math}}{\longrightarrow} \quad \text{physics} \\
\text{quantum physics} & \quad \overset{\text{math}}{\longrightarrow} \quad \text{physics}
\end{align*}
\]

Thus, there are essentially two ways to build a surjective “mathematical physics” arrow. Either we build the arrow directly (as in the diagram above), or we first build surjective arrows (a) and (b), which respectively axiomatize classical and quantum physics, and then another arrow (c) linking these two axiomatizations, as in the diagram below.

We emphasize the difference between the two approaches: in the first one, all physical theories are described by the same set of axioms, while in the second classical and quantum theories are described by different axioms, but that are related by some process. This means that if we choose the first approach we need to unify all physical theories.

There are some models to this unification arrow, but they are not our focus. Just to mention one, string theory is maybe the most well-known. It is based on the assumption that the “building blocks” of nature are not particles, but rather one dimensional entities called strings, i.e., connected one-dimensional manifolds, which are diffeomorphic to some interval (when it has boundary or when it is not compact) or to the circle (if it is boundaryless and compact). In the first case we say that we have open strings, while in the second we say that we have closed strings.

From the mathematical viewpoint, string theory is very fruitful - see [58, 191, 241, 67] for general discussions and [62] for a brief review. This mathematical interest arises in part from the following facts. Since strings are 1-dimensional objects, their worldsheets are 2-dimensional manifolds (typically oriented). In the case of closed strings, these are Riemann surfaces, whose moduli space is finite-dimensional [60, 172]. Since the path integrals are defined on the moduli space of trajectories, it follows that for closed strings they are well-defined [61]. Not only this, they compute many geometric-topological invariants [154, 164, 69, 46], playing a fundamental role in many areas of math, such as complex algebraic geometry [154, 46, 55], complex dynamics [70, 71, 108] and symplectic topology [87, 226, 164]. See [233] for a nice pedagogical overview. In the case of open strings, they
start and end in high dimensional objects, called $D$-branes, which fits into a (higher) category called Fukaya category, also playing a fundamental role in symplectic topology. Besides that, they appear in Mirror Symmetry, which became a highly active branch of algebraic geometry since the seminal contribution [127] of Kontsevich. See also [110, 55, 122].

On the other hand, one needs to recall that physics is not completely determined by the arrow logic $\Rightarrow$ physics, but there is also the ontological (i.e., empirical) branch, and presently there is no concrete empirical proof that strings (instead of particles) really are the most fundamental objects of nature [231, 8].

In this text, we will describe an attempt to realize the second approach. As we will see, if one starts with a sufficiently abstract (or powerful) background language, then one can effectively axiomatize separately a huge amount of classical and quantum theories, leaving the problem of finding a suitable quantization process, which is the really difficult part\footnote{Notice that one of the Millennium Problems is part of this quest [115].}. At least in the approach that will be discussed here, this difficulty comes in part from the fact that the underlying background language is itself under construction. Even so, there is a very promising process, intended to generalize geometric quantization from geometry to higher geometry, known as motivic or cohomological or pull-push quantization [201, 176].

3. Towards The Correct Language

As commented in the last section, independently of the approach used in order to attack Hilbert's sixth problem, the starting point is to select a proper background language. The most obvious choice is the classical logic used to describe set theory. This logic produces, via the arrow logic $\Rightarrow$ axiomatic math, not only set theory, but indeed all classical areas of math, such as group theory, topology and differential geometry, since each of them can be described in terms of set theory. Therefore, for this choice of background language, the different known areas of mathematics could be used in order to describe classical and quantum physical phenomena.

Since 1900, when Hilbert published his list of problems, many classical and quantum theories were formalized by means of these by now well known areas of mathematics. Indeed, quantum theories were observed to have a more algebraic and probabilistic nature, while classical theories were presumably more geometric in character.

For instance, a system in quantum mechanics (which is about quantum particles) can be formalized in the Schrödinger approach as a pair $(\mathcal{H}, \hat{H})$, where $\mathcal{H}$ is a complex (separable) Hilbert space and $\hat{H} : D(\hat{H}) \to \mathcal{H}$ is a self-adjoint operator defined in a (dense) subspace $D(\hat{H}) \subseteq \mathcal{H}$ [181, 103]. We say that $\hat{H}$ is the Hamiltonian of the system and the fundamental problem is to determine its spectrum, which on one hand is the set of all information about $\hat{H}$ that can be accessed experimentally and on the other hand is the spectrum (in the mathematical sense, i.e., the generalized eigenvalues) of $\hat{H}$ [227, 57]. The dynamics of the system from a instant $t_0$ to a instant $t_1$ is guided by the unitary operator $U(t_1, t_0) = e^{i\hat{H}(t_1 - t_0)\hbar}$ associated to $\hat{H}$ or, equivalently, by the (time independent) Schrödinger equation $i\hbar \frac{d\psi}{dt} = \hat{H}\psi$.

On the other hand, classical theories for particles are given by some action functional $S$ : Fields$(M) \to \mathbb{R}$, defined in some “space of configurations” (or “space of fields”) over a spacetime $M$. These configurations (or fields) generally involve paths $\gamma : I \to M$, interpreted as the trajectories of particles moving in some spacetime. If the particles are not free, i.e., if they are subjected to some interaction, we have also to consider its source as part of the configurations. The presence of an interaction can be measured by means of a force. Furthermore, it may (or not) be intrinsic to the spacetime $M$. For the geometrical aspects of classical field theories, see [91, 153, 104, 16] and the standard references [173, 79].

For instance, since the development of general relativity in 1916, gravity is supposed to be an intrinsic force\footnote{There is an old but active discussion whether gravity is actually an external force (gauge theory). It is not the focus of this review. See [130, 66, 232, 114, 190, 189].}, meaning that it will act on any particle. The presence of an intrinsic force is formalized by the assumption of a certain additional geometric structure on the spacetime $M$ - in the case of gravity, a Lorentzian metric $g$ on $M$. Other intrinsic interactions are modeled by other types of geometric structure. But not all manifolds may carry a given geometric structure, specially if integrability conditions are required [102, 221, 56]. This means that not all manifolds can be used to model the spacetime. Indeed, each geometric structure exists on a given manifold only if certain quantities, called obstruction characteristic classes vanish. For example, a compact manifold admits a Lorentzian metric iff its Euler characteristic $\chi(M)$ vanishes, which implies that $S^4$ cannot be used to model the universe [29, 56]. On the other hand, $M$ has a spin structure (needed to consider spinorial fields on $M$) iff its first two Stiefel-Whitney classes are null [133]. Furthermore, if one tries to model gravity using geometries other than the Lorentzian one the obstructions are even stronger [157, 156].

An important class of non-intrinsic interactions are given by Yang-Mills theories (or more general gauge theories). These depend on a Lie group $G$, called the gauge group, and on a $G$-principal bundle $P \to M$ over the spacetime $M$. The interaction is modeled by a connection on $P$, which is just a vertical equivariant $g$-valued 1-form $A : TP \to g$, where $g$ is the Lie algebra of $G$. We can think of $A$ as the potential of the interaction, so that the force is just the (exterior covariant) derivative $d_A A$ of $A$. Here, the standard example is electromagnetism, for which $G$ is the abelian group $U(1)$ and $A$ is the electromagnetic vector potential. We can think of an arbitrary Yang-Mills interaction as some kind of “nonabelian” version of electromagnetism, leading, e.g., to the development of nonabelian Hodge theory [214, 212, 89, 111] and to the formulation of powerful topological invariants, such as Donaldson invariants [65, 64, 85] and Seiberg-Witten invariants [208, 63, 226]. Note that if one tries to extend or modify
the Yang-Mills-type interactions one also finds obstructions [158, 159].

Now, let us return to focus on Hilbert’s sixth problem. It requires answering for questions like these [201, 202]:

1. What is a classical theory?
2. What is a quantum theory?
3. What is quantization?

Notice that the previous discussion does not answer these questions. Indeed, it only reveals some examples and aspects of what classical and quantum theories should be; it does not say, axiomatically, what they really are. Furthermore, the presence of obstructions for freely extending the Lorentzian geometry of gravity and Yang-Mills theories suggests the existence of another background language in which these obstructions disappear. This leads us to the following conclusion:

**Conclusion:** classical logic, viewed as a background language, is very nice in order to formulate and study properties of particular classical and quantum theory. On the other hand, a priori it does not give tools to study more deeper questions as those required by Hilbert’s sixth problem.

4. **The Role of Categorical Language**

   The above conclusion is that, in order to attack Hilbert’s sixth problem, the natural strategy is to replace classical logic by a more abstract background language. What kind of properties should this new language have?

   Recall that by making use of classical logic we learn that classical theories are generally described by geometric notions, while quantum theories are described by algebraic and probabilistic tools. Since the quantization process is some kind of process linking classical theories to quantum theories, it should therefore connect geometric areas to algebraic/probabilistic areas. So, the idea is to search for a language which formalizes the notion of “area of mathematics” and the notion of “map between two areas”.

   This language actually exists: it is categorical language. In categorical language, an area of mathematics is determined by specifying which are the objects of interest, which are the morphisms between these objects and which are the possible ways to compose two given morphisms. This data defines a category. The link between two areas of mathematics described by categories C and D is formalized by the notion of functor. This is given by a rule F : C → D assigning objects into objects and mappings into mappings in such a way that compositions are preserved. See [37, 168, 150] for classical books on category theory and [186, 142, 185, 155] for more recent, introductory and pedagogical expositions. See [139] for a very elementary text. See [50, 51] for introductions devoted to physicists.

   Notice that we have a category Set, describing set theory, whose fundamental objects are sets, whose morphisms are just maps between sets and whose composition laws are the usual compositions between functions. That all classical areas of mathematics can be described by categorical language comes from the fact that in each of them the fundamental objects are just sets endowed with some further structure, while the morphisms are precisely the maps between the underlying sets which preserve this additional structure. For instance, linear algebra is the area of mathematics which study vector spaces and linear maps. But a vector space is just a set endowed with a linear structure, while a linear map is just a map preserving the linear structure.

   Therefore, each classical area of math defines a category C equipped with an inclusion functor i : C → Set which only forgets all additional structures (in the context of linear algebra, this functor forgets the linear structure). The categories which can be included into Set are called concrete. Thus, in order to recover classical logic from categorical language it is enough to restrict the latter to the class of concrete categories.

   The fact that categorical language is really more abstract than classical logic comes from the existence of non-concrete (also called abstract) categories. There are many examples of them. For instance, given a natural number p, we can build a category Cob_2 whose objects are p-dimensional smooth manifolds and whose mappings Σ : M → N are cobordisms between them, i.e., (p + 1)-manifolds Σ such that ∂Σ = M ∪ N. The abstractness of this category comes from the fact that the morphisms are not mappings satisfying some condition, but actually higher dimensional manifolds. For a formal definition of Cob_2 with applications to homotopical aspects of cobordism theory, see [83]. See also [222, 188, 88]. We recall that the study of cobordisms dates from the seminal work of Thom [6, 228].

   Observe that for p = 0 the objects of Cob_1 are just 0-manifolds: finite collection of points. The cobordisms between them are 1-manifolds having these 0-manifolds as boundaries. In other words, the morphisms are just disjoint unions of intervals, while the composition between intervals [t_0; t_1] and [t_1; t_2] is the interval [t_0; t_1].

   With categorical language on hand, let us try to attack Hilbert’s sixth problem. We start by recalling that the dynamics of a system in quantum mechanics is guided by the time evolution operators U(t_1; t_0) = e^{i\hbar(t_1-t_0)\hat{H}}. Notice that when varying t_0 and t_1, all corresponding operators can be regarded as a unique functor U : Cob_1 → Vec_C, where Vec_C denotes the category delimiting complex linear algebra (i.e., it is the category of complex vector spaces and linear transformations). Such a functor assigns to any instant t_0 a complex vector space U(t) = H_t and to any interval [t_0; t_1] an operator U(t_1; t_0) : H_0 → H_1.

   At this point, the careful reader could make some remarks:

   1. As commented previously, a system in quantum mechanics is defined by a pair (H, \hat{H}), where we have a single space H which does not depend on time, so that for any interval [t_0; t_1] the time evolution operator U(t_1; t_0) is defined in the same space. On the other hand, for a functor U : Cob_1 → Vec_C we have a space H_t for each instant of time and, therefore, for any interval the corresponding operators are defined on different spaces.

   2. In quantum mechanics, the evolution is guided not
by an arbitrary operator, but by a unitary operator. Furthermore, in Quantum Mechanics the space $\mathcal{H}$ for systems describing more than one (say $k$) particles decomposes as a tensor product $\mathcal{H}^{t_0} \otimes \ldots \otimes \mathcal{H}^{t_k}$. However both conditions are not contained in the data defining a functor $U : \text{Cob}_1 \rightarrow \text{Vec}_C$.

About the first remark, notice that if there is an interval $[t_0; t_1]$ connecting two different time instants $t_0$ and $t_1$, then there exists a inverse interval $[t_0; t_1]^{-1}$ such that, when composed (in $\text{Cob}_1$) with the original interval, gives precisely the trivial interval. In fact, the inverse is obtained simply by flowing time in the inverse direction. In more concise terms, any morphism in the category $\text{Cob}_1$ is indeed an isomorphism. But functors preserve isomorphisms, so that for any interval $[t_0; t_1]$ the corresponding spaces $\mathcal{H}_{t_0} = U(t_0)$ and $\mathcal{H}_{t_1} = U(t_1)$ are isomorphic. This means that the spaces $\mathcal{H}_t$ actually do not dependent on the time $t$: up to isomorphisms they are all the same.

Concerning the second remark, let us say that there are some reasons to believe that the unitarity of time evolution should not be required as a fundamental axiom of the true fundamental physics, but instead it should emerge as a consequence (or as an additional assumption) of the correct axioms. For instance, in quantum mechanics itself the unitarity of $U(t_0; t_1)$ can be viewed as a consequence of the Schrödinger equation, because its solutions involve the exponential of a Hermitian operator which by Stone’s theorem is automatically unitary [227]. There are even more fundamental reasons involving the possibility of topology change in quantum gravity [9].

On the other hand, it is really true that an arbitrary functor $U : \text{Cob}_1 \rightarrow \text{Vec}_C$ does not take into account the fact that in a system with more than one particle the total space of states decomposes as a tensor product of the state of spaces of each particle. In order to incorporate this condition, notice that when we say that we have a system of two fully independent particles, we are saying that time intervals corresponding to their time evolution are disjoint. Thus, we can interpret the time evolution of a system with many particles as a disconnected one dimension manifold, i.e., as a disconnected morphism of $\text{Cob}_1$. Consequently, the required condition on the space of states can be obtained by imposing the properties

\[ U(t \sqcup t') = U(t) \otimes U(t') \quad \text{and} \quad U(\varnothing) \simeq \mathbb{C}, \]

where the second condition only means that a system with zero particles must have a trivial space of states.

Now, notice that both categories $\text{Cob}_1$ and $\text{Vec}_C$ are equipped with binary operations (respectively given by $\sqcup$ and $\otimes$), which are associative and commutative up do isomorphisms, together with distinguished objects (given by $\varnothing$ and $\mathbb{C}$), which behave as neutral elements for these operations. A category with this kind of structure is called a symmetric monoidal category. A functor between monoidal categories which preserves the operations and the distinguished object is called a monoidal functor (see [5, 150, 73] for a formal definition of monoidal categories and monoidal functors, and [209] for an interesting survey on the different flavors of monoidal structures). Therefore, these observations lead us to the following conclusion:

**Conclusion.** A system in quantum mechanics is a special flavor of monoidal functor from the category $\text{Cob}_1$ of 1-dimensional cobordisms to the category $\text{Vec}_C$ of complex vector spaces.

Consequently, eyeing Hilbert’s sixth problem we can use the above characterization in order to axiomatize a quantum theory of particles as being an arbitrary monoidal functor

\[ U : (\text{Cob}_{p+1}, \sqcup, \varnothing) \rightarrow (\mathbb{C}, \otimes, 1) \]

for $p = 0$ and taking values in some symmetric monoidal category. This is precisely the 1-dimensional version of the functorial topological quantum field theories (TQFT) of Atiyah-Witten [7, 238], inspired in the functorial formulation of Conformal Field Theories by Segal [207, 206, 36]. See also [9] for a comprehensive introduction. For the classification of the functors (4) in the case $p = 1$, see [2, 126, 132] and compare with the 2-dimensional conformal case [206]. For discussions on the beautiful math arising in the $p = 2$ case, see [19, 41, 23, 125, 20].

A natural question is on the viability of using the same kind of argument (and therefore the same background language) in order to get an axiomatization of the classical theories of particles. This really can be done, as we will outline following ideas of Chapter 1 of [201]. We start by recalling that a classical theory of particles is given by an action functional $S : \text{Fields}(M) \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$, defined in some space of fields. Therefore, the first step is to axiomatize the notion of space of fields. In order to do this, recall that it is generally composed by smooth paths $\gamma : I \rightarrow M$, representing the trajectories of the particle into some spacetime $M$, and by the interacting fields, corresponding to configurations of some kind of geometric structure put in $M$. The canonical examples of interacting fields are metrics (describing gravitational interaction) and connections over bundles (describing gauge interactions), as discussed in Section 3.

Now we ask: which property smooth functions, metrics and connections have in common? The answer is: locality. In fact, in order to conclude that a map $\gamma : I \rightarrow M$ is smooth, it is enough to analyze it relative to an open cover $U_i \hookrightarrow M$ given by coordinate charts $\varphi_i : U_i \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^n$. Similarly, a metric $g$ on $M$ is totally determined by its local components $g_{ij}$. Finally, it can also be shown that to give a connection $A : TP \rightarrow g$ is the same as giving a family of 1-forms $A_i : U_i \rightarrow g$ fulfilling compatibility conditions at the intersections $U_i \cap U_j$. Therefore, one can say that a space of fields over a fixed spacetime $M$ is some kind of set $\text{Fields}(M)$ of structures which are local in the sense that, for any cover $U_i \hookrightarrow M$ by coordinate systems, we can reconstruct the total space $\text{Fields}(M)$ from the subset of all $s_i \in \text{Fields}(U_i)$ that are compatible in the intersections $U_i \cap U_j$.

Notice that we are searching for a notion of space of fields (without mention of any spacetime), but up to this point we got a notion of space of fields over a fixed spacetime. The main idea is to consider the rule $M \mapsto \text{Fields}(M)$ from which follows the immediate hypothesis that it is functorial. Therefore, we could
axiomatize a space of fields as a functor

\[ \text{Fields} : \text{Diff}^{op} \to \text{Set} \]

assigning to any manifold a set of local structures. This kind of functor is called a sheaf on the site of manifolds and coordinate coverings (or a smooth set, a smooth sheaf or even a generalized smooth space). See [152, 117, 123] for general discussions on sheaves on sites, and [11, 131, 201] for smooth sets and generalized smooth spaces. See also [160].

This is still not the correct notion of space of fields, however. Indeed, recall that in typical situations the set \( \text{Fields}(M) \) contains geometric structures. But when doing geometry we only consider the entities up to their natural equivalences (their “congruences”). This means that for a fixed space \( M \) we should take the quotient space

\[ \text{Fields}(M) / \text{congruences}. \quad (5) \]

In order to do calculations with a quotient space we have to select an element within each equivalence class (a representative) and then prove that the results of the computations do not depend on this choice. The problem is that when we select an element we are automatically privileging it, but there is no physically privileged element. So, in order to be physically correct we have to work with all elements of the equivalence class simultaneously. This can be done by replacing the set (5) with the category whose objects are elements of \( \text{Fields}(M) \) and such that there is a mapping between \( s, s' \) iff they are equivalent. In this category, all mappings are obviously isomorphisms, so that it is indeed a groupoid. The sheaves on the site of manifolds which take values in \( \text{Gpd} \) are called smooth stacks or smooth groupoids, and they finally give the correct way of thinking about the space of fields for the case of particles [165]. See Chapter 1 of [201] for a very nice discussion and [160] for a pedagogical approach.

Therefore, in order to finish the axiomatization of the “classical theory” notion for particles we need to define what is the action functional. Given a spacetime \( M \) this should be some kind of map between the space of fields \( \text{Fields}(M) \) to \( \mathbb{R} \). Notice that \( \mathbb{R} \) is a set, but we promoted the space of fields to a groupoid. So, in order to define a map between these two entities we also need to promote \( \mathbb{R} \) to a groupoid. This is done defining a groupoid whose objects are real numbers and having only trivial morphisms.

We can then finally axiomatize a classical theory of particles as being given by a smooth stack \( \text{Fields} \) of fields and a rule \( S \) assigning to every manifold \( M \) the action functional

\[ S_M : \text{Fields}(M) \to \mathbb{R}. \]

On the other hand, from the higher Yoneda embedding, every smooth groupoid \( X \) can be regarded as a smooth \( \infty \)-stack \( y(X) \) [147]. Thus, \( \mathbb{R} \) itself can be regarded as smooth \( \infty \)-stack \( y(\mathbb{R}) \) and the action functional is just a morphism \( S : \text{Fields} \Rightarrow y(\mathbb{R}) \) between smooth \( \infty \)-stacks [201].

5. The Need of Highering

Up to this point we have seen that starting with categorical logic as the background language we can effectively axiomatize the notions of classical and quantum theories for particles. Indeed, a quantum theory is a symmetric monoidal functor \( U : \text{Cob}_1 \to \text{Vec}_\mathbb{C} \), while a classical theory is given by a smooth stack \( \text{Fields} \) and by an action functional

\[ S : \text{Fields}(\cdot) \to \mathbb{R}. \]

On the other hand, the nonexistence of clues that strings and higher dimensional objects are the correct building blocks of nature cannot be used to completely exclude them. Thus, any approach to Hilbert’s sixth problems which intends to be stable under new physics should be based on a background language which allows the axiomatization of classical and quantum theories not only for particles, but for objects of arbitrary dimension. In this regard, categorical logic fails as background language. Indeed, we have at least the following problems (see also [201, 191, 15, 219, 160]):

- **in quantum theories.** Recall that for any \( p \) we have the category \( \text{Cob}_{p+1} \), so that we could immediately extend the notion of quantum theory for particles by defining a quantum theory for \( p \)-branes as a symmetric monoidal functor \( U : \text{Cob}_{p+1} \to \text{Vec}_\mathbb{C} \), which coincides with the Atiyah-Witten \( p \)-dimensional TQFT [7, 238]. The problem is that in this case we are only replacing the assumption that particles are the correct building blocks of nature with the assumption that \( p \)-branes are the correct building blocks of nature. Indeed, in both cases we can only talk about quantum theories for a specific kind of object, while Hilbert’s sixth problem requires an absolute notion of quantum theory (this is related with the locality principle and with the principle of general covariance [9, 200, 197, 203]);

- **in classical theories.** The trajectories of particles (which are 0-dimensional objects) on a spacetime \( M \) is described by smooth paths \( \varphi : I \to M \), which are smooth maps defined on a 1-dimensional manifold \( I \). Therefore we can easily define the trajectory of \( p \)-branes (which are \( p \)-dimensional objects) on \( M \) as smooth maps \( \varphi : \Sigma \to M \) defined on a \( (p+1) \)-dimensional manifold \( \Sigma \), leading us to sigma-model theories [58]. The problem is that in the space of fields of a classical theory we have to consider not only the trajectories but also the interactions which act on the object. For particles we could consider these interactions as modeled by connections because the notion of connection is equivalent to the notion of parallel transport along paths. But, to the best of our knowledge, there is no obvious global notion of parallel transport along arbitrary higher dimensional manifolds\(^5\).

\(^5\) Actually, all attempts to higher dimensional parallel transport that we know make use, at least implicitly, of higher categorical structures [151, 205, 204, 12, 92, 217, 124].
**Conclusion.** In order to axiomatize the notions of classical and quantum theories for higher dimensional objects we need to start with a language which is more abstract than categorical language.

The immediate idea that comes in mind is to try building some kind of process which takes a language and returns a more abstract language in such a way that set-theoretical things are replaced by their categorical analogue. Before discussing how this can be done, recall that for a selected background language, the first step in solving Hilbert’s sixth problem is to consider the loop (3) involving naive math, the language itself and physics. So, having constructed a more abstract language from a given one, we would like to consider loops for the new language as arising by extensions of the loop for the starting language, as in the diagram below.

![Diagram showing the process of abstractification](image)

This condition is very important, because it ensures that the physics axiomatized by the initial language is contained in the physics axiomatized by the new language. So, this means that when applying the process of “abstractification” we are getting languages that axiomatize more and more physics. Consequently, by iterating the process and taking the limit one hopes to get a background language which is abstract enough to axiomatize the whole physics. See the discussion at the introduction and section 2.3 of [160].

### 6. Highering

In the last sections we saw that category theory is useful to axiomatize particle physics, but not string physics and physics of higher-dimensional objects, so that we need to build some “abstractification process” which will be used to replace category theory by other more abstract theory. Notice that categorical language is more abstract than classical language, so that learning how to characterize the passage from classical logic to categorical logic should help knowing how to iterate the construction, getting languages more abstract than categorical language. In other words, the main approach to the “abstractification process” should be some kind of categorification process.

In order to get some feeling for this categorification process, notice that a set contains less information than a category. Indeed, sets consist of only one type of information: their elements. On the other hand, categories have three layers of information: objects, morphisms and compositions. Thus, we can understand the passage from set theory to category theory (and, therefore, from classical logic to categorical logic) as the addition of information layers (see [14] for an interesting discussion; see also Part 2 of [160]).

When iterating this process we expect to get a language describing entities containing more information than usual categories. Indeed, we expect to have not only objects, morphisms between objects and compositions between morphisms, but also morphisms between morphisms (called 2-morphisms) and compositions of 2-morphisms. Thus, if we call such entities 2-categories, adding another information layer we get 3-categories, and so on. Taking the limit we then get ∞-category. The basic example, which reveals the connection between higher category theory and homotopy theory, is the ∞-categories of topological spaces, continuous maps, homotopies, homotopies between homotopies, and so on.

Similarly, if a functor between categories maps objects into objects and morphisms into morphisms, then a k-functor between k-categories maps objects into objects and i-morphisms into i-morphisms for every $1 \leq i \leq k$. Taking the limit $k \to \infty$, we can define ∞-functors. Since the categorical language is about categories and functors (and natural transformations), then we obtain a ∞-categorical language, consisting of ∞-categories and ∞-functors (and higher natural transformations), which by constructions is arbitrarily abstract. See Part 3 of [160] for a more detailed intuitive discussion on this new language. We then have the following conclusion:

**Conclusion.** A natural candidate for a background language sufficient to solve Hilbert’s sixth problem is ∞-categorical language.

With this conclusion in mind we need to build a math-language-physics loop (3) for the ∞-categorical language by means of extending the loop obtained using categorical language. This can be done as follows:

- **in quantum theories:** Recall that the problem with the definition of quantum theories as symmetric monoidal functors $U : \text{Cob}_{p+1} \to \text{Vec}_C$ involves the fact that such functors take into account only $p$-branes for a fixed $p$, implying that we need to know previously what are the correct building blocks of nature. This can be avoided in the ∞-categorical context. Indeed, we can define a ∞-category $\text{Cob}(\infty)$ having 0-manifolds as objects, 1-cobordisms (i.e., cobordisms between 0-manifolds) as morphisms, 2-cobordisms (i.e., cobordisms between 1-cobordisms) as 2-morphisms and so on. Notice that differently from $\text{Cob}_{p+1}$ (which contains only $p$-manifolds and cobordisms between them), the defined ∞-category $\text{Cob}(\infty)$ contains cobordisms of all orders and, therefore, describe $p$-branes for every $p$ simultaneously. Thus, one can define an absolute (or extended) quantum theory (as required by Hilbert’s sixth problem) as some kind of ∞-
functor \( U : \text{Cob}(\infty) \to \infty \text{Vec}_\mathbb{C} \), where \( \infty \text{Vec}_\mathbb{C} \) is some \( \infty \)-categorical version of \( \text{Vec}_\mathbb{C} \) (i.e., is some \( \infty \)-category of \( \infty \)-vector spaces). See [81, 13, 149].

### In classical theories

The problem with the axiomatization of classical theories via categorical language was that in the space of fields we have to consider interacting fields. For particles, these fields are modeled by connections on bundles, which are equivalent to parallel transport along paths. But, as commented, there is no canonical notion of transportation along arbitrary higher dimensional manifolds [151, 205, 204, 12, 92, 217, 124]. Another way to motivate the problem is the following: in order to define a connection \( A \) locally (i.e., in terms of data over an open covering \( U_i \hookrightarrow M \)) we need a family of 1-forms \( A_i \) on \( U_i \), subject to compatibility conditions on \( U_i \cap U_j \). The information \( U_i \) and \( U_i \cap U_j \) belong to an usual category \( \mathcal{C}(U_i) \), whose objects are elements \( x_i \in U_i \) and there is a morphism \( x_i \to x_j \) iff \( x_i, x_j \in U_i \cap U_j \). On the other hand, if we try to define higher transportation locally we need to take into account data on \( U_i \) which is compatible not only on \( U_i \cap U_j \), but also on \( U_i \cap U_j \cap U_k \), on \( U_i \cap U_j \cap U_k \cap U_l \), and so on. Thus, we need to consider much more information layers than can be put inside an usual category, justifying the nonexistence of connections along arbitrary higher dimensional manifolds. But they can be put inside a \( \infty \)-category \( \mathcal{C}_\infty(U_i) \), meaning that we actually have a notion of \( \infty \)-connection when we consider \( \infty \)-categorical language (see [12, 204, 195, 205]).

More precisely, the initial problem is avoided if we define the space of fields not as a smooth stack, but as a smoothly \( \infty \)-stack (or smooth \( \infty \)-groupoid: a \( \infty \)-functor \( \text{Fields} : \text{Diff}^\infty \to \infty \text{Gpd} \) such that for any \( M \) the quantity \( \text{Fields}(M) \) is determined not only by \( \text{Fields}(U_i) \) and \( \text{Fields}(U_i \cap U_j) \), but also by (see [197, 203, 201, 202, 160]):

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Fields}(U_i \cap U_j \cap U_k) & \quad (6) \\
\text{Fields}(U_i \cap U_j \cap U_k \cap U_l) & \quad (7) \\
\text{and so on.} & \quad (8)
\end{align*}
\]

**Remark.** In parts, the difficulties with this approach to Hilbert’s sixth problem arise from the fact that the \( \infty \)-categorical language is still in development. Recall that a groupoid is a category such that all morphisms are invertible. When we are in a higher category we have higher morphisms, so that given a \( k \)-morphism, it can be invertible (in the classical sense) or invertible up to \( k + 1 \)-morphisms. A \( \infty \)-groupoid is a \( \infty \)-category such that each \( k \)-morphism is invertible up to \( k + 1 \)-morphism, for every \( k \). The theory for this kind of \( \infty \)-category is well-studied and in some cases it is equivalent to the homotopy theory of topological CW-complexes, which since [10] is known as the Homotopy Hypothesis [182, 101] (see Section 8.4 of [160] for a discussion on its role in physics). More generally, we can define a \( (\infty, n) \)-category as a \( \infty \)-category such that each \( k \)-morphism is invertible up to \( k + 1 \)-morphisms, for every \( k > n \). Thus, \( \infty \)-groupoids are the same thing as \( (\infty, 0) \)-categories. The theory of \( (\infty, 1) \)-categories is also well-studied [118, 120, 119, 27, 140, 48, 147, 148]. But, in order to describe extended TQFT and higher quantization we need to work on \( (\infty, n) \)-categories for \( n > 1 \) [149, 202, 197, 203, 201], whose theory is not as well developed as the theory for \( n = 0, 1 \) [24, 25, 26].

### 7. The Cohomological Description

In theoretical physics, the concept of “cohomology” is more well known as the cohomology groups \( H^n(X; \mathbb{Q}) \) induced by a nilpotent operator \( Q : X^* \to X^* \) (i.e., such that \( Q^2 = 0 \), defined in a graded vector space \( X^* = \bigoplus \mathbb{Q}^n \) (or in a graded algebra) which is typically related to the conservation of some gauge charge [218, 219, 21]. In mathematics, on the other hand, it has not only this fully algebraic meaning (which arises from homological algebra [237, 90]), but also a more topological one: the generalized cohomology theories. These consist of sequences of functors \( H^n \), assigning abelian groups to topological spaces, subjected to the so-called Eilenberg-Steenrod axioms. Examples include the ordinary cohomology theory (which in real coefficients is equivalent to de Rham cohomology), K-theory, cobordism theory and topological modular forms [143, 4, 72]. The facts that particles are charged in ordinary cohomology and that D-brane charges can be described by K-theory show that generalized cohomology theory is also important in physics. Thus, in view of Hilbert’s sixth problem, it is natural to search for an axiomatization to cohomology which contains both flavors of cohomology as particular examples.

By Brown’s representability theorem, generalized cohomologies are fully determined by sequences \( \overline{E} = (E_n)_n \) of topological spaces known as spectra [143, 4, 72]. More precisely, for every \( n \geq 0 \) there is a topological space \( E_n \) such that for every topological space \( X \) we have \( H^n(X) \simeq [X; E_n] \), where the right-hand side denotes the set of homotopy classes. Via Dold-Kan correspondence \( N \), the algebraic cohomology groups \( H^n(X^*; \mathbb{Q}) \) are also determined by a sequence of entities \( E_n \) such that \( H^n(X^*; \mathbb{Q}) = [N(X^*); E_n] \), where \( X^* \) is the dual chain sequence of \( X^* \) (see Chapter 1 of [201] and Chapter 9 of [160]). The only difference is that now the representing objects are higher-categorical entities and therefore belong to a \( (\infty, 1) \)-category instead of to a classical category, but recall that topological spaces, continuous maps, homotopies and higher homotopies also define a \( (\infty, 1) \)-category, so that in the first case we also are in the context of \( \infty \)-categories.

Another similarity between both flavors of cohomology is the following. We say that a topological space \( Y \) is deloopable if there is another topological space \( BY \) whose loop space is (weak) homotopic to \( Y \), i.e., such that \( \Omega BY \simeq Y \). In a generalized cohomology theory each \( E_n \) is deloopable, with \( BE_n = E_{n+1} \). In particular, \( E_n = B^n E_0 = B(B(...(BE_0)...)) \) [162, 3]. We note that in every suitable\(^6\) \( (\infty, 1) \)-category we can also consider loop spaces \( \Omega Y \), so that we can also

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\(^6\)With \((\infty, 1)\)-pullbacks or homotopy pullbacks.
talk about deloopable objects [93, 147, 201]. But via Dold-Kan correspondence the spaces $E_n$ characterizing algebraic cohomology are also deloopable, with $B^nE_n \cong E_{n+1}$, so that again we have $E_n = B^nE_0$. This motivates us to axiomatize the notion of cohomology in any $(\infty,1)$-category as follows [40, 68, 147, 201, 160]. Given an object $E_0$ in an $(\infty,1)$-category, for every other object $X$, the 0th cohomology of $X$ with coefficients in $E_0$ is given by $H^0(X; E_0) := [X; E_0]$. Analogously, if $E_0$ has deloopings $B^nE_0$ we define the $n$th cohomology as $H^n(X; E_0) := [X; E_n]$.

The amazing fact of this abstract axiomatization is that it does not only unify different flavors of cohomology, but also sets classical theories in a new powerful language [201]. More precisely, recall that, as discussed in Section 6 the space of fields is supposed to be a smooth $\infty$-stack $\text{Fields}(-) : \text{Diff}^{op} \to \infty\text{Grpd}$. Via higher Yoneda embedding [147], each smooth manifold $M$ can itself be regarded as a smooth $\infty$-stack $\gamma(M)$ and $\text{Fields}(M) \cong [\gamma(M); \text{Fields}]$, so that the space of fields are actually the coefficients of a cohomology in the $(\infty,1)$-category of all smooth $\infty$-stacks [201]. On the other hand, $\gamma(\mathbb{R})(M) = [\gamma(M); \gamma(\mathbb{R})] = H^0(M; \mathbb{R})$. Therefore, the action functional $S : \text{Fields} \to \gamma(\mathbb{R})$ is secretly a morphism between cohomology theories. In homotopy theory, this is known as a cohomology operation.

Let us look at a particular example. Every Lie group $G$ is deloopable and by the classification theorem of principal bundles, the cohomology $H^1(M; G) := [M; BG]$ classifies precisely $G$-bundles over $M$ [161, 56]. The interacting fields acting on particles are not $G$-bundles, but $G$-bundles with connections, so that it is natural to ask if this classification theorem cannot be lifted to the context of bundles with connections. This is really the case if we look at the language of smooth $\infty$-stacks. Indeed, by the higher Yoneda embedding, we have $H^1(M; G) \cong [\gamma(M); BG]$. On the other hand, there is another smooth $\infty$-stack $B\text{G}_{\text{diff}}$ such that fixing a connection $A$ in the $G$-bundle classified by a map $f : \gamma(M) \to B(G)$ is equivalent to giving a lifting $\tilde{f} : \gamma(M) \to B\text{diff}(G)$ of $f$. Consequently, the abstract cohomology $H^1_{\text{diff}}(M; G) := [\gamma(M); B\text{diff}(G)]$, called nonabelian differential G-cohomology describes the space of all gauge fields [199, 42, 211, 109]. Thus, gauge theories in the classical sense are the same thing as cohomology operations on nonabelian differential cohomology.

If $G$ is only a group, then the smooth $\infty$-stack $B(G)$ needs not be deloopable. On the other hand, if $G$ is a more general higher group, then $B^n(G)$ exists and, in similar way, there also exists the differential refinement $B^n_{\text{diff}}(G)$, leading us to define the 2th differential cohomology $H^2(M; G) := [\gamma(M); B^2_{\text{diff}}(G)]$ [199, 201]. Similarly, if $G$ admits deloopings we can define higher-degree differential cohomology. Notice that if cohomology operations in 1th differential cohomology describes gauge theories, cohomology operations in higher differential cohomology should describe higher gauge theory, i.e, classical theories whose interacting fields are not vectorial, but tensorial, as typically string theory (with the B-field) and supergravity/M-theory (with C-field). This is really the case [82, 199, 201, 225, 169, 17].

Finally, recall that cohomology theories are the natural environments in which obstruction theory can be developed [105, 161, 28]. On the other hand, there are typical anomaly cancellation conditions in (higher) gauge theories, which typically can be interpreted as obstructions to the preservation of some symmetry at the quantum level or as a charge quantization condition. Examples such as the quantization of D-brane charges in (twisted) $K$-theories [239, 39, 167, 84, 98, 99], the Freed-Witten anomaly as pull-push operations in (twisted) $K$-theory [86, 121, 45, 176], the fermionic anomaly as the trivialization of a line bundle [78, 80], the Green-Schwarz mechanism and its description in terms of liftings to twisted differential cohomology [82, 53, 196] and, more recently, the Hypothesis H, about the quantization of the C-field on (twisted) cohomoay cohomology theory and its many consequences [76, 75, 193, 43, 192, 194, 77] seem to reveal that this cohomological approach to physics, where the meaning of obstruction is very clear, is not only formal, but very fruitful.

8. Quantization

In the previous sections we discussed that $\infty$-categorical language is abstract enough to provides suitable axiomatization of classical and quantum physics, making it a natural candidate to attack Hilbert’s sixth problem. Thus, using this class of languages, we need to build a quantization process linking any classical theory to a corresponding quantum theory. Besides the problems involving the current development of $(\infty,n)$-categorical languages for higher $n$, building this full quantization process remains an open problem. Discussing complete details is beyond the scope of this paper. See [202] for a concise discussion, [160] for a guide and [201] for a complete reference. Even so, let us say a few words.

With the axiomatization of classical and quantum theories on hand we can a priori build $\infty$-categories Class and Quant, so that it is expected that a quantization process should be some kind of $\infty$-functor $Q : \text{Class} \to \text{Quant}$ such that it assigns to each system of Classical Mechanics a corresponding system of quantum mechanics. Since as discussed in Section 3 these disciplines can be axiomatized using 1-categorical language, one should expect that, when restricted to them, the quantization $\infty$-functor $Q$ becomes a functor. But, by counterexamples of van Hove and others [234, 100, 95, 94, 96], this quantization 1-functor does not exist, forcing us to take into account higher layers even in the simple case.

On the other hand, there is a canonical way to map classical mechanics into quantum mechanics given by the so-called geometric quantization [240, 216], where the main idea was to incorporate the higher layer on it. The first step was to observe that part of the data needed to apply that quantization corresponds to an orientation in complex $K$-theory [166, 129]. The second one was the extension of geometric quantization from symplectic manifolds to symplectic groupoids (and
therefore from set-theoretic objects to categorical-theoretic entities) [38, 106, 187]. The higher geometric quantization is then a program aiming to join both observations and build a quantization for higher groupoids by means of cohomological methods, which is a natural strategy in virtue of the discussion in Section 7. A very promising approach which has been more extensively developed in the last decade is the so-called cohomological quantization, also known as pull-push quantization or motivic quantization. See [197, 203, 177, 187, 202, 201] and the references therein.

9. Conclusion

In this paper we described and surveyed in a pedagogical way a formal approach to Hilbert’s sixth problem based on works of Urs Schreiber, John Baez, Daniel Freed, Jacob Lurie and many other researchers. We discussed that the problem requires languages which are arbitrarily abstract and synthetic, so that higher categorical languages were presented as natural candidates. We saw that these higher languages seem to be abstract enough to axiomatize classical and quantum physics, leaving open the problem of building a global quantization co-functor. Some comments on recent cohomological quantization were made.

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