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, Security protocols open repository

, Main source code repository of the tamarin prover for security protocol verification, A Proofs of Theorems, vol.1, issue.2

, Theorem 1. Given a set of well-formed protocol rules P , a rule ru ? Variant(P ), a variable x occurring in ru, and ? returned by SourceLemma(Variant(P ), ru, x), then ? is satisfied by Variant(P )

, The rule ru is of the form, Proof. Let P be a set of protocol rules, ru ? Variant(P ) and a variable x occurring in ru, let ? be a formula returned by SourceLemma(Variant(P ), ru, x)

F. ?(?k-right, , p.1