Efficiency inducing taxation for polluting oligopolists: the irrelevance of privatization - Archive ouverte HAL Accéder directement au contenu
Article Dans Une Revue Economics Bulletin Année : 2010

Efficiency inducing taxation for polluting oligopolists: the irrelevance of privatization

Résumé

This paper studies the optimal environmental policy in a mixed market when pollution accumulates over time. Specifically, we assume quantity competition between several private firms and one partially privatized firm. The optimal emission tax is shown to be independent of the weight the privatized firm puts on social welfare. The optimal tax rule, the accumulated stock of pollution, firms' production paths and profit streams are identical irrespective of the public firm's ownership status.
Fichier principal
Vignette du fichier
EB-10-V30-I4-P270.pdf (150.87 Ko) Télécharger le fichier
Origine : Fichiers éditeurs autorisés sur une archive ouverte
Loading...

Dates et versions

hal-02655045 , version 2 (29-02-2012)
hal-02655045 , version 1 (29-05-2020)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : hal-02655045 , version 2
  • PRODINRA : 44622

Citer

Denis Claude, Mabel Tidball. Efficiency inducing taxation for polluting oligopolists: the irrelevance of privatization. Economics Bulletin, 2010, pp.2946-2954. ⟨hal-02655045v2⟩
166 Consultations
119 Téléchargements

Partager

Gmail Facebook X LinkedIn More