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Buyer power from joint listing decision

Abstract : We consider a model of vertically related markets, in which an upstream firm faces a competitive fringe of less efficient suppliers and negotiates with customers that compete in a downstream market. We allow downstream firms to form a buyer group which selects suppliers on behalf of its members. We show that transforming individual listing decisions into a joint listing decision makes delisting less harmful for a group member, which in turn enhances the group members’ bargaining position at the expense of the upstream firm. We also discuss the implication for upstream investment incentives.
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Submitted on : Wednesday, May 27, 2020 - 11:05:51 PM
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Stéphane Caprice, Patrick Rey. Buyer power from joint listing decision. Economic Journal, Wiley, 2015, 125 (589), pp.1677-1704. ⟨10.1111/ecoj.12241⟩. ⟨hal-02637457⟩

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