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Experimental Analysis of the Electromagnetic Instruction Skip Fault Model

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Abstract—Microcontrollers storing valuable data or using security functions are vulnerable to fault injection attacks. Among the various types of faults, instruction skips induced at runtime proved to be effective against identification routines or encryption algorithms. Until recently, most research works assessed a fault model that consists in a single instruction skip, i.e. the ability to prevent one chosen instruction in a program from being executed. We question this fault model for EM fault injection on experimental basis and report the possibility to induce several consecutive instructions skips.

Index Terms—EM fault injection, fault model

I. INTRODUCTION

Hardware attacks take advantage of the physical implementation of an electronic device to overcome its security features. To this purpose, either passive side channel techniques or active fault injection techniques can be used. The former is out of the scope of this article. Fault injection techniques aims to force the device out of its specification by altering its environmental conditions [1] (e.g. its voltage, temperature, frequency, etc.). An attacker that successfully induces an erroneous behavior refers to it as an injected fault. These faults can then be used as an attack primitive to extract a cryptographic key [2] or provide an unauthorized access to some of the target functionalities [3]. The set of properties of a fault induced by an electromagnetic (EM) perturbation (or by any other fault injection means) is referred to as a fault model (FM). It is often linked to a given attack scheme and expressed as an ability to meet requirements in terms of synchronization with the target activity and extension of the induced fault (e.g. the FM of the well-known Piret fault attack (FA) [4] requires to fault one byte of the AES algorithm calculations before its last MixColumn transformation).

Among fault injection (FI) techniques, laser FI and EM fault injection (EMFI) achieve the best performances [5]–[7]. Laser is probably the most expensive FI means, however it makes it possible to inject faults with high accuracy even at advanced technology nodes [5]. It is accurate both in terms of timing (faults may be injected with laser pulses as short as a few picoseconds [8]) and in terms of location (its effect is mainly limited to the logic gate located within its spot size which

may be as low as a few micrometers [6]). EMFI on the other hand does not require a direct access to the die, the clock, or the power supply of the target, while enabling an attacker to fault micro-architectural features [9]. As an operational setup can be build for less than a thousand dollars [10], EMFI is currently the best compromise between price and locality.

In this work, we report our analysis of the EM-induced instruction skip FM. This FM relates to how a given instruction of a microcontroller program may be skipped (i.e. not executed) at runtime. Several works already described this FM and assessed the possibility of EM-induced single instruction skips [11]–[14]. The assessment of FMs on experimental grounds is of high interest regarding how FIS countermeasures (CMs) are designed and tailored. As a matter of example, the authors of [14] discussed two CMs based on instruction redundancy designed on the assumption that an attacker is only able to induce single instruction skips. Would this assumption be proved wrong, their CMs would be vulnerable.

Our experiments extend further this FM by reporting the feasibility of inducing several successive instructions skips by EM perturbation.

Our contributions are as follows:

- We achieve to skip, with a perfect reproducibility, several consecutive fetch operation with a single pulse, controlling both the timing and the number of affected instructions,
- We highlight the influence of the width of the voltage pulse on the observed fault model,
- We demonstrate practical application on an 8-bit microcontroller, bypassing state-of-the-art software CM.

This article is organized as follows. Section II discusses the state-of-the-art of instruction skips and introduces the aim of our work. Our experimental setup and settings are described in section III. Section IV reports the obtained results. Then, the assessed FM is discussed in section V. Section VI concludes the paper.

II. THE EM-INDUCED INSTRUCTION SKIP FAULT MODEL

Our research objective was to reproduce EM-induced instruction skips on a microcontroller and study the main characteristics of its FM: accuracy, extent, success rate, etc. Our aim was also to assess if the multiple instructions skip fault model relies on specific micro-architectural features (i.e.

cache or pipeline). This question is paramount, as CMs based on a too narrow FM may reveal vulnerabilities at test time.

A. Fault model definition

A fault model refers indistinctly either to the abstract properties of a fault or to the main properties of a FA scheme. These are often expressed in terms of extension (e.g. bit, byte, nibble) and synchronization with the execution of the program. However, a fault and a FA scheme are most conveniently described at two different level of abstraction, i.e. the physical layer and the logical layer. The authors of [5] follow the former approach and describe laser-induced bit-set and bit-reset faults at the transistor and gate level. However, this approach is extremely difficult and time consuming if the attacker has a limited insight on the device internals. The authors of [4] follow the latter approach and describe a mono-byte FM to corrupt the AES algorithm calculations before its last MixColumn transformation. However, this approach faces practical limitations in understanding the underlying fault mechanism because of the complex interaction between the physical and the logical layer of an electronic device.

The instruction set architecture (ISA) is a natural interface between the physical and the logical layer. Previous work highlighted that the characterization of FM at the level of the ISA covers a wide range of practical faults [14], [15]. In this article, we followed this approach and analyzed the behavior of microcontrollers at the level of the ISA in order to assess EM-induced instruction skips.

B. Instruction skip fault model

An instruction skip is a fault that results in skipping, meaning not executing, one instruction of a program at runtime. There is to date very few explanations of how an instruction skip is induced at gate level, with the notable exception of [15]. It describes how progressively increasing the stress applied by a clock glitch to a microcontroller induces an increasing number of bit-reset faults into the opcode of an instruction. It results in (1) instruction modification at low stress or (2) in turning the instruction into an actual *no operation* instruction (*nop*) at high stress.

An instruction modification has the same effect as an instruction skip if the modified instruction has no effect on the context of the program. While this modification are the most frequent in practice [16], we focused our experiments toward achieving instruction skips by turning the target instructions into *nop* instructions.

Several works studied the EM-induced instruction skip FM. Most of them assessed single instruction skips, in the same 8-bit microcontroller as the one studied in this work [11], in a 32-bit microcontroller [14], and in an FPGA based RISC-V implementation [17].

Several works also studied the laser-induced instruction skip FM. In [18], the authors obtained single instruction skips with high accuracy and high success rate. Still on the same target, [19] reports single instruction skips based on resetting one or two bits of the targeted instruction opcode. The authors of

[20] induced single instruction skips on a more complex 32-bit cortex-M3 microcontroller. They were able to inject two single instruction skips distant from 58 ms to defeat a protected CRT-RSA algorithm.

While the instruction skip FM alone does not encompass the complexity of practical faults [16], skipping multiple instructions was, until recently, a theoretical consideration.

C. Multiple instructions skip fault model

The state-of-the-art in laser-induced instruction skip reports that the number of successive instructions that could be skipped was not limited in the same 8-bit microcontroller as the one studied in this work [21]. Moreover, the injection can be synchronized with the program execution and the duration of the laser pulse is linearly correlated with the number of consecutive instructions which are skipped. This is a strong FM as entire sections of code can be selectively *erased* by an attacker. To the best of our knowledge, the only works reporting several successive instructions skips with other injection techniques are [9], [22] and [23]. The authors of [9] assessed four successive EM-induced skips of instructions stored in the instruction cache of an ARMv7 microcontroller. The authors of [22] succeeded in faulting instructions stored in the pipeline of a FPGA implementation of the LEON7 core with a clock glitch. Last but not least, the authors of [23] reported EM-induced skips of up to six consecutive instructions with a low repeatability on a RISC-V FPGA implementation. However, they did not provide an understanding of the micro-architectural effects.

Based on previous experiments and taking into account the state-of-the-art we described, we focused our experiments toward achieving instruction skips by turning the targeted instructions into *nop* instructions. Our experiments were carried out with the same 8-bit microcontroller studied by [11], [15], [18], [19], so that our results can be easily compared. Moreover, this microcontroller has a very simple 2-stage pipelined architecture and no caches, which is easy to analyse in the absence of unwanted architectural effects. The results of this research should give a better insight on the tradeoff between the laser and the EM injection techniques on the basis of the instruction skip FM.

III. EXPERIMENTAL SETTINGS

A. EM injection bench

The EM pulse injection setup we used is similar to the one described in [7], it consists in the following elements:

- a voltage pulse generator,
- an injection probe,
- a XYZ positioning table,
- an oscilloscope,
- a target (described in III-B),
- a control PC interfacing the different elements of the bench and running the test series.

The EM disturbance that induces a fault is generated thanks to the voltage pulse generator: it delivers a square voltage pulse with a transition time of 2 ns (for the first edge of the pulse,

Fig. 1. Frontside view of the ATmega328P test chip - Flash, RAM and EEPROM memories highlighted in red; fault sensitive areas for laser and EM injection highlighted resp. by a small and a greater deep blue stars.

the second edge has a transition time of 5 ns), a maximum amplitude of ± 400 V, and a width in the 6-100 ns range. The voltage pulse edges are converted into current variations in a coil wrapped around the tip of a handcrafted injection probe. The coil is made of six turns of copper wire around a ferrite core which diameter is $\sim 500 \mu\text{m}$. The swift current variation induces an EM perturbation at the root cause of the injected faults. A trigger signal generated by the device under test synchronizes the voltage pulse with the operation of the microcontroller target.

B. Test chip

We chose a simple target for the purpose of being able to analyse easily its responses to fault injection: an 8-bit non-secure ATmega328P microcontroller designed in the old CMOS $0.35 \mu\text{m}$ technology. It has 2 kB RAM, 3 kB Flash and 1 kB EEPROM memories; a Harvard architecture with a 2-stage fetch-execute pipeline. It runs at 16 MHz and has 32 general purpose registers (registers r16 to r25 were used during our experiments). Figure 1 gives a front view of the test chip with its Flash, RAM and EEPROM memories highlighted in red. The laser sensitive area that makes it possible to induce an instruction skip is highlighted by a small deep blue star (slightly outside the Flash memory at its left), it is in the order of a few micrometers [21]. The EM sensitive area, which is convenient for inducing instruction skips, is larger (see experimental results in section IV), it is in the order of a hundred of micrometers. It is located in the bottom-right part of the Flash memory and highlighted by a greater deep blue star in Fig. 1. As the strength of the magnetic field generated by the coil strongly decreases with the distance from the injection probe, it was placed close to the target's silicon die (~ 1 mm). To this end, the package of the target device was open on its top by chemical etching.

```

1 # Store 0x39 to 0x30 in RAM at address Z
2 # Initialize r16 to r25 at 0x55
3 # Set synchronization trigger
4 nop # 400 ns
5 # Set core trigger
6 ld r16,Z+      ld r16,Z+
7 ld r17,Z+      ld r17,Z+
8 ld r18,Z+      ld r18,Z+
9 ld r19,Z+      nop
10 ld r20,Z+      ld r20,Z+
11 ld r21,Z+      ld r21,Z+
12 ld r22,Z+      ld r22,Z+
13 ld r23,Z+      ld r23,Z+
14 ld r24,Z+      ld r24,Z+
15 ld r25,Z+      ld r25,Z+
16 # Clear core trigger
17 nop # 700 ns
18 # Clear synchronization trigger
19 # read back r16 to r25

```

Listing 1: Test code - Instruction skip analysis.

C. Test codes

We studied the effect of EM-induced faults on dedicated test codes mostly written in assembly language. Our intent was to induce and analyze instruction skips by examining their effect.

For each test series, we used two trigger signals for synchronization purposes (two outputs of the test chip):

- a synchronization trigger signal to accommodate for the latency of our EM injection setup (about ~ 300 ns),
- a core trigger signal to synchronize the actual EM perturbation (thanks to an image of the transmitted perturbation) with the part of the assembly code of interest.

Listing 1 provides a description of the test code we used to tune our settings in order to induce instruction skips. The core part of the test code (encompassed by the core trigger setting and clearing) is a series of ten `ld rX,Z+` instructions. Each one corresponds to a load in a destination register `rX` of a byte value stored in RAM memory at address `Z` with a post increment of `Z`. Prior to that, the ten destination registers, `r16` to `r25`, are initialized at `0x55` and an array of ten byte values `0x39` to `0x30` are stored in RAM with `Z` storing the address of its first element. Registers `r16` to `r25` are read back after the synchronization trigger is reseted. The two top signals in Figure 2 are the synchronization and core triggers, the bottom blue signal is an approximated image of the EM perturbation (obtained by wrapping the wire end of a coaxial line around the wire conducting the voltage pulse to the injection probe). The top part of Table I displays the values read back from `r16` to `r25` for a fault-free execution.

TABLE I
REGISTERS R16 TO R25 READ BACK VALUES, FOR A FAULT FREE EXECUTION (TOP) AND FOR AN INSTRUCTION SKIP (BOTTOM).

Register	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
Fault free	0x39	0x38	0x37	0x36	0x35	0x34	0x33	0x32	0x31	0x30
Faulted	0x39	0x38	0x37	0x55	0x36	0x35	0x34	0x33	0x32	0x31

As an example, the right column of the test code core part in listing 1 displays the effect of an EM perturbation turning

Fig. 2. EM-induced single instruction skip: effect on execution time, triggers waveforms modification due to EM injection (from top to bottom, synchronization trigger, core trigger, and approximated image of the EM perturbation).

the `ld` instruction of line 9 into a `nop` instruction. The effect of such an EM-induced instruction skip is highlighted in the bottom part of table I: the initialization value `0x55` is read back from `r19` (in red), and because an increment of address `Z` is missing, all the values read back from `r20` to `r25` are shifted (in black).

IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS

A. Finding the Points-of-Interest

EMFI has a local effect ([7], [24]) that may be classified in between the strongly local effect of laser FI [21] and the global effect of other FI means (such as clock and power glitches). As a result, the position of the injection probe w.r.t. the target has a significant effect on the FI process: a fault may be injected or not, different FMs may be obtained ([7], [11], [12]). Our research objective was to induce instruction skips similar to that described in [21] for laser FI. This implied to test a large amount of settings: injection probe location, synchronization with the test code, and voltage pulse parameters. Because this search space has several dimensions, this process could be very time consuming, especially regarding the XY position of the injection probe (for the other parameters, previous work helped us to converge in a matter of a few hours). It took approximately a week to find the right settings allowing to induce an instruction skip (the injection probe location is shown in Fig. 1).

Figure 2 exemplifies the kind of instruction skip that can be observed. It displays the trigger signals of the test code (two top waveforms) and an image of the EM perturbation (third waveform). The trigger signals are both drawn for a fault-free execution (in red, denoted as 'normal operation') and for an EM-injection that induces an instruction skip of the `ld` instruction into register `r19` (in blue). Because execution of a `ld` instruction takes two clock periods contrary to that of a `nop` instruction which takes one clock period, each consecutive instructions skip shall correspond to a reduction of the test code of one clock period. This phenomenon is displayed in Fig. 2. The test code execution time is shortened

Fig. 3. EM-induced single instruction skip: ability to choose the skipped instruction - Faulted registers as a function of EM injection time (ns) for a -200 V voltage amplitude and 100 ns pulse width.

as well as the duration of the triggers signals: the faulted execution triggers in blue last one clock period less than the fault free execution. This experiment was performed with a voltage pulse amplitude set to -200 V and a width of 100 ns (the values read back from the registers were actually those mentioned in the bottom part of Table I). For these settings a 100% success rate was achieved.

It assessed the ability of EMFI to induce an instruction skip in a running microcontroller. These settings (in particular the injection probe location) served as a basis for the experiments we carried out to analyze further the EM instruction skip FM (as reported in the following subsections).

B. EM-induced instruction skip, test of accuracy

In terms of accuracy, we tested whether the single instruction skip fault model was still valid while targeting the `ld` instruction of the other test registers. Our aim was to assess an attacker ability to target an arbitrary instruction in a program. To do so, we swept the time delay between the EM-perturbation and the synchronization trigger signal to span the whole test code. Figure 3 reports the obtained results. It displays the skipped registers (positions 1 to 10 correspond to registers `r19` to `r25`) as a function of the delay. It reveals that an attacker is able to inject EM-induced single instruction skips into a running microcontroller with high timing accuracy. For each instruction, we were indeed able to find an injection timing leading to a 100% success rate.

C. EM-induced multiple instructions skip

Some experimental results (not reported here) suggested that several consecutive instructions may be skipped simultaneously. In order to verify this assumption, we again carried out our experiments with a voltage pulse amplitude increased to -250 V. The corresponding results are displayed in Fig. 4. It shows that this increase makes it possible to skip two consecutive instructions with a still high timing accuracy (i.e. the ability to choose the two instructions that are skipped). As

Fig. 4. EM-induced instruction skip: ability to skip two consecutive instructions - Faulted registers as a function of EM injection time (ns) (-250 V voltage amplitude and 100 ns pulse width).

an illustration (denoted in blue in Fig. 4), the two successive load instructions into `r19` and `r20` are skipped for a trigger to shot delay of 980 ns. A further increase of the voltage pulse amplitude to -400 V did not change the number of skips (similar results were obtained using positive voltage pulses).

In addition, we discovered that tuning the width of the voltage pulse had an effect on the number of achievable successive skips. The use of different values of the voltage pulse width led to different number of skips as reported in Fig. 5. For the same settings (location, voltage amplitude, and delay) but different pulse widths, up to four successive instructions skips were obtained (for a width between 20 ns and 35 ns). The tuning of the width also made it possible to choose precisely the number of skips: 2, 3 or 4. With other settings (location and voltage amplitude) we ascertained the ability to increase to six the number of successive instructions skipped.

Fig. 5. EM-induced instruction skip: effect of the voltage pulse width - Number of EM-induced instruction skips as a function of the voltage pulse width (ns).

D. PIN bypass with EM perturbation

In order to improve our assessment of the threat raised by EM-induced instruction skips, we targeted a 4-digit PIN verification algorithm (described in [3] and denoted by `verifyPIN` hereafter). It is protected against brute force attacks (i.e. attacks that consist in testing all existing PIN codes) thanks to a trial counter (denoted by `g_ptc` hereafter). The value of the counter is tested before calling the PIN verification routine: `byteArrayCompare` (it is in charge of comparing the user PIN to a reference PIN). `g_ptc` is decremented and memorized before each verification. It is initialized at 3 (and restored to this value after a successful identification). If `g_ptc` reaches zero, a conditional `if` statement denies the entry into the `byteArrayCompare` routine. As a result, the verification systematically fails. The (simplified) pseudo-code of this algorithm is shown in Listing 2, where `BOOL_TRUE` and `BOOL_FALSE` are resp. the true and false boolean values, and `g_auth` a variable indicating whether the user is authenticated or not (`g_auth` set to `BOOL_TRUE` indicates that the user has been successfully authenticated).

```

1  BOOL g_auth = BOOL_FALSE;
2  ...
3  g_ptc--;
4  if(g_ptc > 0){
5      if(byteArrayCompare(...) == 1){
6          g_ptc = 3;
7          g_auth = BOOL_TRUE;
8      }
9  }

```

Listing 2: C code of the `verifyPIN` algorithm.

[3] describes several instruction skip attacks that may result in a successful PIN bypass: most of them targeting one or a few successive code instructions. We chose to implement that which consists in skipping the verification of the trial counter (line 4 of Listing 2), allowing us to perform a bruteforce attack on the four digits of the secret PIN code.

Figure 6 displays the trigger signals highlighting the execution of the `verifyPIN` algorithm in red, and of the `byteArrayCompare` routine in blue. When `g_ptc` equals zero (Fig. 6.a), the access to the `byteArrayCompare` routine is denied (the corresponding trigger stays low). Fig. 6.b reports a successful EMFI attack (an image of the EM perturbation is depicted in purple) that forces the entry into the `byteArrayCompare` routine: the PIN code entered by the attacker is checked against the reference PIN despite the exhaustion of the PIN try counter. We were able to find settings that achieve a 100% success rate and then to brute force the `verifyPIN` algorithm.

V. DISCUSSION

A. EM-induced instruction skip fault model

The experimental results reported in section IV demonstrate that a very high accuracy is achievable with EM-induced instruction skips: we were able to choose and skip a single

Fig. 6. Illustration of PIN bypass through EM-induced instruction skip.

instruction of a test sequence with a 100 % success rate. Moreover, we were able to increase its extent to skip six successive instructions which adds to its strength (unlike [9], [22], the ability to skip consecutive instructions was not linked to the micro-architecture of the target). From an attacker perspective, this attack does not require any insight on the underlying micro-architecture, which makes it easily reproducible. This FM has been successfully applied to brute force a PIN verification algorithm. We demonstrate on a 8-bit microcontroller that several consecutive fetch operation can be skipped with a single EM pulse, extending the current FMs.

This fault model shares similarities with laser-induced instruction skips in terms of accuracy and repeatability under the same synchronization requirements. However, the number of consecutive instructions which can be skipped is limited with the EM injection technique, whereas an arbitrary number of instruction can be blinded with laser injection [21]. This difference might be understood as a difference in the nature of the stress induced by laser and EM injection techniques. The former can be precisely tuned with the laser power and pulse duration, whereas the latter only occurs during the rising edge of the EM pulse. While software CMs against EM-injection may take advantage of this temporal limitation, the number of consecutive instructions which can be skipped might be higher than the number assessed in this article.

Finally, we underline the importance of synchronization of the EM injection with the target code to achieve the high repeatability we report. We also refer the reader to [21] for a discussion on how synchronization may be obtained.

B. Discussion of the EM-induced fault injection mechanism

Several physical mechanisms have been proposed to describe the faults induced by an EM pulse [7], [13], [25]. The authors of [7] and [13] highlighted the similarities between EM induced faults in an IC and faults that were obtained with the violation of timing constraints. A model of the glitch induced by an EM pulse on a power-ground network was later proposed in [26]. The authors of [25] suggested that glitching the set and reset circuitry corrupts the operation of D-flip-flop memory cells, thus explaining the specificity of the timing of

EM injections. In the same time, the authors of [27] measured and analyzed the effects of an EM pulse on the clock circuitry of a FPGA. The diversity of suggested hypothesis reflects the complexity of the analysis of EM physical effects.

In this article, we observed a non-linear correlation between the width of the EM pulse and the number of skipped instructions. This result shares some similarities with [28], where damped oscillation were obtained by glitching a FPGA power supply with a voltage pulse. The authors observed constructive and destructive interference for various duration of the pulse. Moreover, positive and negative polarities of the voltage pulse were shown to have the same effects, as this is the case with our experiments. These elements support the hypothesis that we observed violation of timing constraints in our experiments.

VI. CONCLUSION

This research work assesses on experimental basis an extended fault model for EM-induced instruction skips. The main characteristics of this fault model are:

- its accuracy, or ability to choose the skipped instruction with a 100 % success rate provided a precise synchronization is obtained,
- its extension, or ability to skip up to six successive instructions (without the help of any micro-architectural effect).

We also highlighted the influence of the width of the voltage pulse, which has been underestimated until now, in the properties of EM-induced faults.

Simply put, EMFI may offer an attacker the ability to erase a small part of several instructions of a microcontroller firmware at runtime. Though, this EM fault model is not as threatening as the laser FM that offers the ability to erase several chosen parts of arbitrary length of a running program [21]. It nonetheless extends the threat model that shall be considered when securing microcontrollers against FAs as EMFI is more common and affordable than laser FI.

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