. Routledge, and Cambridge University Press have let me reuse parts of 'Mill and the Secret Ballot: Beyond Coercion and Corruption, pp.354-378, 2007.

C. Brettschneider, Democratic Rights: the Substance of Self-Government, 2007.

, A Democratic Conception of Privacy', (unpublished) MIT thesis, 1997, available at www.alever.net. I also examine women's political and personal interests in abortion, and show why any democratic justification of abortion rights needs also to look at women's personal and political interests in childbearing. I examine Catherine MacKinnon's critique of privacy in 'Must Privacy and Equality Conflict? A Philosophical Examination of Some Legal Evidence, I use feminist criticisms of privacy to reinterpret the nature and value of privacy from a democratic perspective in A. Lever, vol.67, pp.142-162, 2000.

J. Cohen, Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy', originally published in Seyla Benhabib, pp.154-180, 1996.

, See, On Privacy, pp.3-8

P. Brettschneider, 71, where he refers to 'decisional autonomy', which is another way of describing the issues associated most clearly with the Constitutional right to privacy, in America, as opposed to Common Law, conceptions of privacy. The distinction between the two and the way that these figure in American philosophical critiques of privacy is well discussed by Anita Allen and Judith deCew, Pursuit of Privacy: Law, Ethics and the Rise of Technology, 1988.

, For a fuller discussion of the difficulties in characterizing privacy see the introduction to On Privacy. For the different ways we might disaggregate the concept of privacy, and their significance for Judith Thomson's critique of a moral right to privacy, see On Privacy, ch.4. For the implications of these arguments for the idea of a property owning democracy see A. Lever, 'Privacy, Private Property and Collective Property, Good Society, vol.21, issue.1, pp.47-60, 2012.

A. Lipjhart, for a wonderfully helpful book, which has much influenced my thinking about democratic elections see also George Bingham Powell, Thinking About Democracy: Power Sharing and Majority Rule in Theory and Practice, 2000.

B. Manin, Principles of Representative Democracy, 1997.

J. Hart and E. , s Democracy and Distrust: a Theory of Judicial Review Cambridge, 1980.

, Wade's claim -410 US 113 (1975) -that there is a constitutional right to privacy which protects women's legal right to abortion, on the grounds that such a right has nothing to do with the procedures necessary for democracy, and therefore is an example of a substantive interpretation of the US constitution's 14 th Amendment's due process clause

, A Democratic Conception of Privacy', I try to show that women's interests in political freedom and equality are sufficient to justify legal rights to abortion, although they have important personal interests in abortion as well, Yale Law Journal, vol.82, issue.5, pp.920-949, 1905.

J. Cohen, Pluralism and Proceduralism, Chicago-Kent law Review, vol.69, issue.3, pp.589-618, 1994.

, Personally, I think this is a clearer account of the problems of pure proceduralism

, Stuart Hampshire's critique of Rawls, then his earlier, 'Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy

. Brettschneider, , p.3

. Brettschneider, , p.4

. Brettschneider, , pp.9-27

. Brettschneider, , p.23

. Brettschneider, , p.75

. Brettscneider, , p.76

. Brettschneider, , p.77

. Brettschneider, , p.23

. Brettschneider, , p.9

. Brettschneider, , p.25

. Brettschneider, , p.75

P. Boling, eg. P. 159. and Wendy Brown, States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity, pp.152-155, 1995.

. Brettschneider, , p.76

, See On Privacy, ch1, where I use the characteristic strengths and weaknesses of intrinsic and instrumental claims about value to illustrate the strengths and weaknesses of competing conceptions of privacy. As I try to show, difficulties that occur in the one type of argument often appear in the other. Something similar can also be seen in arguments about the justification of intellectual property. Though the literature commonly treats the intrinsic value/instrumental value distinction as analytically crucial, the central problem in the philosophy of IP is how to explain why the creators of good ideas should be able to profit financially from their creations. However, this problem arises whether one adopts an instrumental or an intrinsic account of the value of IP, See A. Lever, (ed)., New Frontiers in the Philosophy of Intellectual Property, pp.27-28, 2012.

. Brettschneider, , p.75

. Brettschneider, , p.75

, Mill's views on the secret ballot can be found in ch, Mill's ideas on the secret ballot, and on politics more generally, may want to look at Nadia Urbinati's Mill on Democracy: From the Athenian Polis to Representative Government, 2002.

, Acton's collection of Mill's Considerations, on Representative Government in H. B, 1984.

G. Brennan and P. Pettit, Unveiling the Vote, British Journal of Political Science, vol.20, pp.311-344, 1990.

, For a discussion of Mill's distinction between secret voting in private clubs, which he accepts, and in legislative elections, which he condemns, see A. Lever, 'Mill and the Secret Ballot, pp.364-365

A. Lever, On Privacy, pp.26-28

, For the problems of 'shameful acknowledgements' and of public shaming from a democratic perspective see

J. Wolff and . Fairness, Respect and the Egalitarian Ethos, Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol.27, pp.97-122, 1998.

A. Lever, Mill and the Secret Ballot, pp.26-28

, Mill appears to take non-voting as the baseline against which the rights and duties of citizens are judged, and therefore sees the demand for publicity in citizen voting as appropriate to the exercise of special powers and responsibilities. This is largely a reflection of his belief that the vote should be thought of as a trust, rather than a right. I discuss the difficulties with this view, and the ways we can separate Mill's arguments against secrecy from this claim, By contrast, pp.358-367

, For 'reasonable pluralism' see Joshua Cohen, 'Moral Pluralism and Political Consensus, The Idea of Democracy, pp.38-60

A. Phillips, Feminism and Republicanism: Is This A Plausible Alliance?, Journal of Political Philosophy, vol.8, issue.2, 2000.

, Mill and the Secret Ballot, pp.359-361

, Inviolability of privacy in group association may, in many circumstances, be indispensable to freedom of association, 1958.

, Democracy and Terrorism', originally presented to a discussion on 'Terrorism, Democracy and the Rule of Law' at the House of Lords, 2009.

, I discuss the importance of the Court's decision in the case, and link its perception of the importance of privacy to Virginia Woolf's discussion of female solitude and friendship in A Room of One's Own, pp.14-18, 1929.

, These duties are suggested by Utilitarian and Kantian perspectives on morality: to avoid causing pain to beings capable of pain and suffering; and to treat others as beings with lives of their own to lead, rather than just as means to our own ends. For the significance of this point for the way we think about democratic duties to participate in electoral politics, see A. Lever, 'Democracy and Compulsory Voting: A Critical Perspective, I think of this as a distinctively democratic duty, and one that can usefully be contrasted with two duties which we would have irrespective of the government of which we are members, vol.40, pp.925-929, 2010.

, for a discussion of Patricia Boling's ambivalent attitude to privacy, and the difficulty of reconciling this with her forthright condemnation of outing. See also Jean Cohen's, 'Redescribing Privacy: Identity, Difference and the Abortion Controversy, On Privacy, ch. 2, as well as its implications for the ethics of outing, pp.48-118

, One of the most helpful attempts to work out the implications of this claim for the privacy of politicians remains Dennis F.Thompson's, Political Ethics and Public Office, 1987.

, Until the passage of the Act, married and divorced women were forced to defer to the children's father as sole legal guardian. In Democracy and Judicial Review, I use the injustice of this situation, and the difficulty of overturning it, to illustrate the difficulties of objections to judicial review -such as those by, For details of the act see Stephen Cretney's Law, law Reform and the Family, p.30, 1998.

, in a democracy should be legislative decision. I discuss the inadequacy of relying on Private Members Bills to remove injustices of this sort in 'Is Judicial Review Undemocratic?, pp.280-298, 2007.

. Brettschneider, , p.90

, A classic example of this would seem to be Oliver Sipple, who in deference to his family's feelings and sincere religious beliefs, kept his homosexuality a secret from them, though he was clearly not ashamed of it, and was otherwise willing to campaign for gay causes, as a grown man living in San Francisco, pp.31-34

, On Privacy, ch. 3 explores some of these issues through an examination of Coke's famous dictum that 'An Englishman's home is his castle', which I use to illuminate the differences between democratic and undemocratic families, workplaces and armies

, I make this point at greater length with reference to Patricia Boling's worries that privacy depoliticises injustice in A. Lever, 'Privacy Rights and Democracy: A Contradiction in Terms? Contemporary Political Theory 5, But see Patricia Boling, Privacy and the Politics of Intimate Life, p.159, 1996.

, See the discussion in 'Privacy Rights and Democracy', pp. 154-155, and the ways in which NAACP v. Alabama may help to defuse some, though not all

. Brettschneider, although at p. 91 he acknowledges the difficulty of drawing the distinction in practice, p.89

, Mill and the Secret Ballot, pp.377-385