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Associated consistency, value and graphs

Abstract : This article presents an axiomatic characterization of a new value for cooperative games with incomplete communication. The result is obtained by slight modifications of associated games proposed by Hamiache (Games Econ Behav 26:59–78, 1999; Int J Game Theory 30:279–289, 2001). This new associated game can be expressed as a matrix formula. We generate a series of successive associated games and show that its limit is an inessential game. Three axioms (associated consistency, inessential game, continuity) characterize a unique sharing rule. Combinatorial arguments and matrix tools provide a procedure to compute the solution. The new sharing rule coincides with the Shapley value when the communication is complete.
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Contributor : Isabelle Celet Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Friday, March 6, 2020 - 3:25:44 PM
Last modification on : Tuesday, April 12, 2022 - 4:12:04 PM



Gérard Hamiache, Florian Navarro. Associated consistency, value and graphs. International Journal of Game Theory, Springer Verlag, 2019, ⟨10.1007/s00182-019-00688-y⟩. ⟨hal-02501125⟩



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