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Loi de Wagner et politiques culturelles : les vertus du bras armé

Abstract : We compare the dynamic performance of two models of public intervention in the cultural sector : A centralized ministry’à la française’ and a so-called arm’s length bodies, more British. We study the solutions of a dynamic game where, by hypothesis, the agencies are likely to resist Wagner’s law better than a central regulator, because they can disengage from public funding projects and thus approach the optimal dynamic. The non-cooperative behavior of the agencies creates strategic biases that the center can partially correct. The problem of quality is also addressed.
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https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02497374
Contributor : Isabelle Celet <>
Submitted on : Tuesday, March 3, 2020 - 3:58:34 PM
Last modification on : Friday, February 5, 2021 - 3:56:15 PM

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Pierre Cartigny, Luc Champarnaud. Loi de Wagner et politiques culturelles : les vertus du bras armé. Revue Française d'Economie, Association Française d'Économie, 2020, 34 (4), pp.3-24. ⟨10.3917/rfe.194.0003⟩. ⟨hal-02497374⟩

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