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Using Generic Software Components for Safety-Critical
Embedded Systems – An Engineering Framework

Felix Bräunling, Robert Hilbrich, Simon Wegener, Isabella Stilkerich and Daniel Kästner

Abstract
Modern software development in the automotive domain would be unthinkable without leveraging reusable software components. Such generic software components have to be configured and tailored for each specific target application. Nowadays, complexity has reached a point where developing generic software components and manually adapting each component for each variant in the product family is error-prone and no longer economically feasible. In this article we propose an engineering framework for automated adaptation of generic software components which focuses on temporal and spatial integrity. The framework is built around a generic methodology and leverages specialized software tools to determine an allocation of software components to the resources of an embedded system and to ensure memory integrity. We use a quadcopter example, executed on the Infineon AURIX™ TC277 processor under the AUTOSAR operating system to illustrate our approach.

1 Introduction
Safety-critical embedded systems represent a special class of computerized control systems. The interplay of their software and hardware parts realizes complex functions, such as engine control or vehicular guidance. Undetected errors in the implementation of a function may jeopardize human lives, hence the additional attribute safety-critical. Implementing the necessary software correctly, satisfying all safety requirements and maximizing hardware resource utilization in a cost-sensitive and competitive market poses a significant challenge for established software engineering methods and tools.

A recent example for the increasing capabilities of microcontrollers are embedded multicore processors containing multiple and possibly heterogeneous execution units. In order to tap their potential and maximize resource utilization, software components have to be tightly integrated and optimized specifically for each hardware platform. This optimization step is referred to as adaptation and often conducted manually.

With more software components sharing common resources of a microcontroller, ensuring their isolation against undesired interferences is essential in order to maintain the reliability and safety of the system. Therefore, the adaptation needs to ensure isolation between tightly integrated software components. This can be achieved by controlling access to both memory and CPU time, thereby supporting error containment.

1.1 Problem Statement
Software engineering for safety-critical embedded systems is currently conducted in a “per-project” fashion. Depending on the setup of the system architecture in different projects, it may be necessary to distribute software components across a network of microcontrollers or to run them on different microcontroller derivatives. Unfortunately, due to the complexity and the lack of proper engineering tools, software components are often developed specifically to match the requirements of a particular project. They are allocated manually to the resources in the system’s hardware architecture and adapted manually to make best use of the capabilities of the microcontrollers. Especially for safety-critical systems, ensuring an isolated execution of software components requires additional configuration and analysis steps which are specific to the microcontroller and thus often conducted manually as well.

While the “per-project” approach may be sufficient for a small number of projects, it still requires a lot of manual effort and reduces the reusability of software components. With more and more control functions in safety-critical devices being implemented in software, the need for reusability and adaptability for different hardware platforms increases, which renders the “per-project” approach no longer economically sustainable. The question arises, how software components for safety-critical embedded systems can be developed in a generic and reusable way, so that they can be used in multiple projects, but without reducing resource utilization or jeopardizing their isolation properties and memory safety.
1.2 General Approach

The authors argue that the level of reusability can be significantly improved with a model-based development of generic software components in combination with an automated adaptation toolkit to handle project-specific hardware properties and safety requirements.

In general, software components are concerned with the implementation of specific features of the system. By using abstraction layers, they can be developed in a platform agnostic manner and organized as a library of generic software components for later use in multiple projects. As a result of adopting a formalized and model-based development approach, these generic functions can be automatically tailored and adapted to the specific requirements of a project. In particular, this approach facilitates automated software deployment in combination with automated platform-specific code generation as well as automated configuration and validation of isolation properties. This “feature-based” software development is not entirely new [3, 5]. However, the authors believe that the state of practice and the capabilities of available tools for this purpose have not yet reached the level of maturity needed for the development of multi-platform safety-critical embedded systems.

1.3 Contribution

In this paper, the authors present the results of the development of an engineering framework aiding system architects and software engineers. Software for embedded systems relies on mature development tools in order to cope with complexity and to satisfy all (safety) requirements. Therefore, the framework combines and extends the tools ASSIST, Astrée and cAMP. By providing interoperability between these tools and enhancing them with new functionality, the framework is able to automate the integration and tailoring of applications in safety-critical embedded systems (i.e., automated adaptation).

In its current state, the framework provides an early and significantly less error-prone evaluation of timing and memory-partitioning decisions at the system level, the software level and also the implementation level. Combining these tools as a framework allows to automatically adapt and integrate generic software components in order to create project-specific applications running on project-specific microcontrollers. Project-specific topics, such as the properties of a particular microcontroller, as well as spatial and/or temporal isolation requirements are also taken into account. By taking advantage of code generation, the framework supports an automated development process, thus building the missing link between generic libraries of software components and project-specific applications.

2 Conceptual Overview

Figure 1 depicts the simplified workflow of our framework. It is based on the idea of a strictly top-down engineering approach combined with the correctness by construction methodology [8] and supports the engineer by automating the synthesis and validation of crucial engineering artifacts.

Based on a model of the functional architecture, the systems engineer creates a model of the envisioned system architecture. This model contains a selection of generic software components from a library and a project-specific hardware platform. The feasibility of the chosen hardware platform with respect to the technical and safety-related requirements of the particular project can be automatically validated by constructing a deployment for the selected software components (see Section 6). If a valid deployment cannot be found, either the hardware platform or the selection of software components need to be modified. Then, sound semantic code analysis is applied to all software code to ensure sufficient isolation and memory protection, both of which are essential to ensure the correctness of the system (see Section 7). Finally, data and code of software components are automatically mapped to the isolation partitions of their microcontroller (see Section 8).

The essential parts of the framework are described in more detail in the next sections. However, this paper is not intended to provide a thorough and detailed description for each of the tools used in the framework. Instead it focuses on their contribution for an automated development process based on generic software components.

3 I4Copter

To illustrate our approach, we will use the I4Copter flight controller as an overarching example. The I4Copter is a research project developing a quadcopter as an example for hard real-time systems and control systems [37, 36]. While the quadcopter software was originally meant to be deployed to a single-core Infineon TriCore TC1796, we used the AURIX TC277 for this paper, which is a three-core automotive microcontroller. The control software of the I4Copter consists of six modules: a digital signal processor (DSP) for reading sensor and remote inputs, a two-stage controller, and three observers. All these modules are responsible for controlling the positioning of the quadcopter during take-off, flight and landing. Further details of the I4Copter and the targeted hardware will be given in the following sections to describe their relevance to the presented framework. The example system resembles control systems similar to those used in automotive chassis systems in complexity and size. The AURIX TC277 was selected because it is a widely used microcontroller in the automotive domain. It also provides heterogeneous memories and computation units which allow for a flexible and adaptive deployment of software based on
the product’s requirements, which makes it a suitable target platform for a software platform driven development approach.

4 Platform Development

In order to develop application software components in a reusable and structured way, the state of practice in systems engineering [20] recommends to start with a functional architecture. It is constructed as a result of a rigorous requirements engineering process and its relationship to other system views [27].

The functional architecture is tightly bound to the logical intentions and dependencies of the software applications. It is a special kind of abstraction and usually, it does not include details of the technical architecture.

The separation into a functional and a technical architecture allows for a separation of concerns between the problem domain and the variations of possible technical solutions. This approach allows to construct applications and infrastructure software independently, because implementations on both ends can be developed separately as long as they comply with the “contract” of the common interface.

In our case, this can be described by using the bridge pattern, which is depicted in Figure 2. The bridge pattern is intended to decouple the abstraction from its implementation [12]. A functional element describes an abstract function. A technical implementation on the other hand is a tangible implementation providing the functionality described by the functional element. The functional element does not need to know about the tangible implementation, thus the technical implementation can be replaced by other solutions as long as all project-specific requirements are met. Still, the functional and technical view are not fully independent of each other, because changes in either view may have significant effects on the other.

One example for a functional element in the I4Copter software is the filter used to reduce noise from sensor inputs. A technical implementation to provide the functionality could be an alpha-beta-filter, a running average filter or a Kalman filter. Their software modules must provide a common interface to make the filter implementations exchangeable. The choice of the filtering algorithm can be controlled by changing which module is linked during compile time into the application code.

In each project, it is the task of the systems engineer to select the suitable building blocks for each functional element, i.e., generic software components from a library as well as hardware components (microcontrollers), in order to create the system architecture model. Of course, the model needs to fulfill the requirements set forth in the functional architecture.

5 System Architecture

At the core of our approach is a system architecture model. There are several notations available to model a system architecture, for example SysML, UML, or AMALTHEA [15], which allows to express safety- and timing-related requirements as well-defined first-class model elements.

Generally speaking, the system architecture model comprises of a description of the software components with their distinct resource requirements, a description of the available hardware resources, such as microcontrollers or memory, and also constraints, in particular safety requirements, that restrict the resource usage and allocation of software components.

Examples for safety requirements can be the need to detect sporadic hardware defects in the computation of a software component, heterogeneous hardware execution environments or the use of additional hardware for error correcting/detecting codes. These requirements translate to constraints on the system architecture and thus are limiting the solution space of the architecture.
6 Deployment

With the system architecture model being available, the mapping between software components and hardware resources is constructed in the next step. The construction needs to consider the capacities of all available resources, e.g., the size of flash memory. It must also ensure that the additional constraints (temporal and spatial isolation) are satisfied. This is achieved by constructing a feasible mapping and a static periodic schedule for all software components. Due to the complexity of the solution space and the importance of the correctness of the solution, this process is conducted in an automated fashion with the tool ASSIST [13]. The challenge of finding a correct mapping and a feasible static schedule is addressed by transformation of this problem into an equivalent constraint-satisfaction problem and the subsequent application of constraint programming [10, 4, 31]. Similar approaches for safety-critical systems have been published [14, 32].

Constraint programming refers to a set of techniques in operations research, discrete optimization, and artificial intelligence. These techniques assist in finding solutions for problems based on variables, which are affected by constraints (constraint-satisfaction problems). Each variable has a finite integer domain and every constraint defines valid or invalid solutions for a subset of these variables. Solutions for this problem class can be obtained by applying a combination of search techniques—including backtracking—and constraint propagation techniques for value elimination. ASSIST automates this process and hides the intricacies of a formal specification from the user by offering a user-friendly domain specific language to describe the mapping and scheduling problem.

ASSIST is less detailed. Software tasks are considered to be “black boxes” with annotated resource requirements. ASSIST also aims to simplify the complexity of the scheduling problem, by constructing a scheduling for a single hyperperiod containing periodic executions of all tasks. Internally, ASSIST uses the CHOCO SOLVER [28], which has been successfully applied in a wide variety of scheduling problems.

Figure 3 contains the specification of the hardware properties of the Infineon AURIX TC277 microcontroller. ASSIST allows to specify features, such as an FPU, as well as capacities, for example flash memory, to constrain the deployment process.

The specification of the software architecture is presented in Figure 4. It consists of six applications together with their tasks. For the sake of simplicity and readability of the example, each task only requires a certain amount of the processor time (called CoreUtilization in the specification). The core utilization is determined by the task’s worst-case execution time (WCET) divided by the task’s period. Safe upper bounds on the WCET can be calculated, e.g., by aIT WCET Analyzer [18] for timing-predictable processors such as the AURIX TC277. On non-timing-predictable multi-core processors, WCET estimates can be provided by hybrid WCET analyzers such as TimeWeaver [19].

The task T2.EngineController shows how particular features of a processing core can be required by a task.

Figure 5 shows the dependencies between the different tasks which are present for a single period of the cyclic tasks of the i4Copter system. The tasks T4.HeightObserver and T5.AltitudeObserver could be run in parallel to exploit the resources of the TC277 multicore processor.
Figure 6: Task Graph Specification in ASSIST

Figure 7: Mapping Constraint Specification in ASSIST

Nevertheless, this does not constitute a hard constraint for the deployment synthesis, because a deployment of these tasks to the same core may still be feasible, but less desirable. Therefore, ASSIST needs to treat the information about the parallel execution of T4.HeightObserver and T5.AltitudeObserver as a hint for achieving an optimized solution. For this purpose, a task graph can be specified in ASSIST, which allows the tool to automatically determine which tasks could be run in parallel in order to derive the optimization hints for the deployment. The specification of the task graph for the example of this paper is contained in Figure 6.

In contrast to the “soft” optimization hints, there are also “hard” deployment constraints, such as safety-related constraints, which affect the feasibility and validity of the results. These constraints must be satisfied in order to obtain a valid deployment. For the example use case, two additional safety requirements are assumed to ensure reliability despite potentially harsh environmental conditions.

1. The tasks T6_DSP and T3.AttitudeObserver must not share the same core.
2. The tasks T6_DSP and T4.HeightObserver must not share the same core.

Figure 7 shows how these requirements can be expressed as “hard” mapping constraints in ASSIST.

Based on the deployment specification described in the listings above, ASSIST was able to determine all valid deployment solutions. There are 208 different solutions, which were computed in about 250 ms on a regular desktop computer. In order to find the “best” solutions among the set of valid solutions, ASSIST allows to apply a set of metrics to each deployment. Those metrics allow to compute a score for each solution, which reflects the fulfillment of the optimization goals reflected in the metrics. Solutions with the highest scores are therefore assumed to be the “best” solutions.

Most important is the achievement of parallel execution of tasks by the deployment. Therefore, solutions should be ranked higher, if parallel tasks in the task graph are indeed mapped to different cores. Furthermore, mapping solutions with a uniform core load are preferred over solutions with a heterogeneous load. Figure 8 shows the selection of these metrics in ASSIST. Setting the Weight of the Max parallelism metric to the value of two allows to express the importance of the first goal in comparison to the second optimization goal. The automated evaluation with the aforementioned metrics identified two solutions with the highest score, from which we selected one (see Figure 10).

As a last step, an AUTOSAR-OS configuration file is generated by ASSIST, which constitutes a central engineering artifact for the following steps in our engineering framework.

7 Static Analysis of OS Configuration and Source Code

This section addresses the prerequisites for an automated low-level deployment of code and data in order to provide the memory handling and memory protection.

7.1 AUTOSAR-OS System Model

AUTOSAR is a partnership between different automotive manufacturers to design a standard for an embedded automotive operating system. Currently there are two versions of the standard, the AUTOSAR Classic for static systems and AUTOSAR Adaptive for dynamic systems. In this paper we only refer to the AUTOSAR Classic family of operating systems. The AUTOSAR system model is depicted in Figure 9.

The system is structured around OS-Applications that are executed on one specific computing unit of the underlying hardware. OS-Applications manages instructions and data in memory as an execution environment for one or more tasks. The tasks themselves are schedulable execution units, each with its own data and stack segment. By using hardware-based memory access protection, such as a memory protection unit (MPU), the kernel memory can be spatially isolated from OS-Applications. The same mechanisms also allows for spatial isolation of OS-Applications from other OS-Applications, as well as of tasks inside of OS-Applications. This is indicated by the thick black lines in Figure 9.

The static structure of an AUTOSAR system, consisting of the mapping of cores, OS-Applications, tasks and memory protection regions as well as schedules and timer events, is described in a configuration file. The so called ARXML files are written in an AUTOSAR-standardized XML format. Based on this file operating systems implementing the AUTOSAR standard can generate operating system code reflecting the configuration described in the ARXML file. Such an ARXML
file is the output of ASSIST, which in turn can then be used by Atrée for a semantic analysis of the operating system and the application code.

7.2 Ensuring Memory and Type Safety
Despite the successful deployment of all software components, memory and type safety need to be addressed in order to ensure spatial isolation between all tightly integrated software components. Memory safety in the scope of the C programming language is defined as the absence of memory accesses that trigger undefined behavior, as well as the absence of data races where shared variables are accessed by concurrent threads without proper synchronization. Although the C programming language itself does not ensure memory safety, a sound static analysis of the C source code is able to guarantee memory safety at the programming language level.

Table 1: Mapping of Requirements of Type- and Memory Safety [2] to Atrée Alarm Types [1].

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Requirement</th>
<th>Alarm Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Operations only applied for instances of correct type</td>
<td>Invalid pointer comparison</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtraction of invalid pointers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attempt to write to a constant</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dereference of mis-aligned pointer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overflow of Integers or Float</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invalid shift argument</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of uninitialized variables</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Division or modulo by zero</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undefined integer modulo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invalid function calls</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unsyncronized access to shared data</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access only existing objects</td>
<td>Dereference of null or invalid pointer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pointer to invalid or null function</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of dangling pointer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arithmetics on invalid pointers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possible overflow upon dereference</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access only inside object boundaries</td>
<td>Incorrect field dereference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Out-of-bound array access</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dereference of mis-aligned pointer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Possible overflow upon dereference</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In our framework we use the Atrée analyzer [17, 24]. Its main purpose is to report program defects caused by unspecified and undefined behaviors according to the C99 standard. The reported code defects include integer/float-point division by zero, out-of-bounds array indexing, erroneous pointer manipulation and dereferencing (buffer overflows, null pointer dereferencing, dangling pointers, etc.), data races, lock/unlock problems, and deadlocks. To deal with concurrency defects, Atrée implements a low-level concurrent semantics [23] which provides a scalable sound abstraction covering all possible thread interleavings. The analyzer takes task priorities into account and, for multicore systems, the mapping of tasks to applications and cores. Table 1 shows the relation between memory and type safety and the defects found by Atrée. Atrée is widely used in safety-critical systems, and provides the necessary tool qualification support, including Qualification Support Kits and Qualification Software Life Cycle Data reports.

The AUTOSAR-OS configuration file produced by ASSIST during the high-level deployment is parsed by Atrée to automatically generate a matching analysis configuration that models the asynchronous execution of the various tasks and ISRs. Atrée returns a list of potential code defects. An analysis resulting in zero alarms guarantees the absence of memory safety violations in the C source code. Since the C semantics assumes unlimited stack space, the source-level analysis needs to be complemented by a sound static stack usage analysis at the binary level to prove the absence of stack overflows [16]. Moreover, using a formally verified compiler ensures that no memory safety defects are introduced by miscompilation [21]. Together, these approaches are able to prevent software-induced memory corruption, hence establishing memory safety.

Besides reporting runtime errors and concurrency defects, Atrée also produces detailed data and control flow reports. Soundness provides a guarantee that neither control flow paths nor read or write accesses are missed, even in case of data or function pointer accesses, or task interference. Global data and control flow analysis gives a summary of variable accesses and function invocations throughout program execution.
The reports also contain each effectively shared variable, the list of tasks accessing it, the application and the core to which the task has been assigned, and the types of the accesses (read, write, read/write). Indirect variable accesses via pointers as well as function pointer call targets are fully taken into account. Filtering allows determining the control and data flow per software component, thus supporting the analysis of data and control coupling as required by DO-178C. An excerpt from the data flow report for the example system is shown in Table 2. Note that Astrée detects data races for each of the shared variables in our example system, which is expected, because the code does not contain any synchronization mechanisms.

### 8 Memory Mapping

After the definition of the system, the deployment of all software components, and the analysis for memory safety, the next step constitutes the low-level mapping of all instructions and their data to the physical memories of the specific microcontroller. This step is also called binding.

#### 8.1 Heterogeneous Memory

This task is especially important for multicore processors with heterogeneous memories, such as the AURIX TC277, in order to achieve good runtime behavior as well as spatial isolation for freedom from interference. The AURIX TC277 offers six core-coupled SRAMs for data (DSPR) and instructions (PSPR), a non-volatile flash memory (PMU) and a bus-accessed SRAM (LMU). It is possible to access any of the memories from any of the cores using the microcontroller’s bus. However, read and write operations to the core-coupled SRAM take only one CPU cycle if they originate from the coupled core, whereas memory accesses via the bus take more time. Moreover, accesses via the bus have less deterministic access times because of interference due to concurrent bus accesses. The flash memory is also equipped with error correction capabilities to ensure data integrity.

#### 8.2 Data and Function Classes

At the same time, data and functions exhibit traits such as origin of access, type of access, frequency of access, and logical traits such as being constant or used for in-system calibration. The combination of these properties favors the binding of each data item or function to a different memory of the microcontroller. Data items and functions that exhibit similar traits can be grouped to variable and function classes, each with a set of preferred memories dictated by a binding policy. In the I4Copter example two orthogonal types of classification exists: task-wise and core-wise. Task-local data and functions are only accessed by a single task whereas task-global data is accessed by two or more tasks. Analogous to this, core-local data and functions are only accessed from a single core, while core-global data and functions are shared between different cores. Constant data items are grouped into different classes, as their read-only property makes them suitable for binding them to the flash memory and relying on core-coupled cache memories to reduce access times.

#### 8.3 Binding Policy

Binding policies describe to which memory a particular data item or functions should be mapped, depending on both the properties exhibited by the available memories as well as the variable and function classes.

An example for such a policy is the mapping of task-local, core-local data to the core-coupled SRAM
to achieve the fastest access time. Another policy is that task-global, core-global data is mapped to the core-coupled memory of the core from which most accesses are originating. As the capacity of these memories is finite, it needs to be decided which data and functions are bound first. This can be done by optimizing policies, ranging from a very simple one based on the total access frequency, using different weights for read and write operations, to complex optimization algorithms using either constraint solving problems or integer linear programming.

In the I4Copter example presented in this paper, data items are sorted by the total amount of reads and writes to these data items. The access frequencies are determined by taking the amount of read and writes reported by Astrée multiplied by the amount of task activations during one hyperperiod (9 ms) of the system. Data items with a higher count of total accesses are mapped first.

8.4 Automated Memory Mapping

Gathering the information about data and function traits, combining it into classes and then creating a mapping to hardware memories is not feasible if done manually in systems of arbitrary complexity. The cAMP tool addresses this problem by automatically generating a mapping of instructions and data to memories. For this, all available information from the previous development steps is used: deployment information from ASSIST by taking into account the deployment solution described in the generated ARXML file. Information about data and functions traits can be extracted from Astrée by taking into account the data flow report (see Table 2). Finally, the user requirements from the system specification such as task times, safety requirements and constraints are taken into account.

The information is aggregated within cAMP and used to generate a binding of data and functions to memories, as well as assigning MPU-enforced memory protection regions to each used section of memory. The binding is performed by following the binding policies for the selected hardware. The result of this process is a linker script that describes the memory mapping and exposes the sections needed to configure the system’s MPU.

To reduce the amount of effort necessary to use the linker script, i.e., the assignment of individual variables and functions to the various memory sections, cAMP is able to interface with code generation tools to automatically include the necessary annotations in the generated code. In its current form, cAMP is able to interface with TargetLink, a widely used C code generator for Matlab/Simulink.

The use of cAMP allows the automatic tailoring of applications to specific hardware and memory layouts by creating a reproducible binding process. Using code generation and platform-based development adds further benefits, such as automatic code adaption and reusable binding policies. The automatic binding of data and code results in a significant reduction of software development time, while being less error-prone than manual binding.

9 Related Work

The basic idea for our framework is inspired by KESO and program families presented by Parnas [26]. Parnas was one of the first to give thought to program families and software-product lines (SPL). He described the problem in the context of operating systems. Building on his ideas, later approaches examined the variability challenge in large software systems. For instance, Sincero et al. [34] investigated the Linux kernel and treated it as an SPL through configuration analyses. Liebig et al. [22] looked at configurable software composed in C and explored ways to deal with the complexity induced through preprocessor directives. There are also solutions (e.g., [11, 33]), which use generative programming [9] to create program variants from configurability models. Another project that leverages the idea of program families is an operating-system construction kit called PURE [6]. The authors define a base set of reusable OS-infrastructure components (e.g., threads, scheduling, concurrency, interruptions or memory service) needed to build infrastructure services. For instance, light-weight threads that can be used to compose address spaces and processes. The authors employ a configuration- and code-generation-based framework to create operating-system variants. Different from these prior works, we allow to manipulate spatial and temporal isolation properties in an early design phase based on architecture- and code-analyzing techniques of reusable application parts that can also be developed using model-based techniques.

The KESO Java Virtual Machine [35] provides an isolation concept that is similar to the process concept found in general-purpose operating systems. KESO features a compiler, which is able to produce a virtual machine environment specialized for a particular application. Therefore, KESO adopts ideas from Parnas’ approach. In the following, we describe the characteristics of KESO that are relevant for our work. Spatial isolation ensures that control flows are only able to access memory of data regions belonging to the protection zone (called domain) in the context of which the control flow is being executed. Therefore, each piece of data can be logically assigned to exactly one domain. In Java, type safety ensures that programs can only access memory regions to which they were given an explicit reference; the type of the reference also determines in which way a program can access the memory region pointed to by the reference. To achieve spatial isolation, the KESO compiler enforces that a reference value is never present in more than a single domain. Different from KESO, our applications are not developed in Java but using a model-based technique in which the generated C code is analyzed using abstract interpretation in order to cre-
ate memory-safe C code. We extended Astrée to use in-
formation on the AUTOSAR OS threading model to—
amongst other things—be able to perform a flow- and
context-sensitive analysis based on OS-Applications to
build logical isolation zones that are enforced by mem-
ory protection hardware.

The article [25] addresses problems similar to those
addressed by our work, but assumes a different commu-
nunication model. In contrast to AUTOSAR, which uses
shared memory for communication between task, their
communication model is based on Kahn Process Net-
works, and the used operating system is based on a non-
shared memory model. For spatial isolation, they rely
solely on the use of the MPU to ensure dynamic fault
containment. We, in contrast, use sound static analysis
of the integrated source code to foster safety by con-
struction and utilize the MPU as a safety net. Moreover,
the high-level deployment is not part of their workflow
but assumed as an input.

10 Conclusion

The authors present the results of a joint research and
development project towards an engineering framework
for using generic software components in safety-critical
embedded systems. The framework combines sev-
eral tools, so that generic software components can be
adapted to a particular microcontroller and analyzed for
memory integrity. Common starting point is a model of
the system architecture comprising of a system speci-
fication and a functional architecture. Additional infor-
mation about the target hardware (microcontroller fam-
ily) and a library of generic software components is con-
sidered to be available as well. These specifications are
passed through different engineering tools and code an-
alyzers via common exchange formats.

In particular, the tool suite ASSIST allows to generate
software allocations for the targeted hardware. By in-
cluding timing constraints, it also allows to construct a
static schedule, thus ensuring the feasibility of the sys-

tem design. This results in an operating system config-
uration describing the spatial and temporal behavior of
all software components.

In combination with the generated application soft-
ware, the C sources are examined with Astrée. By re-
moving memory and type defects found during the anal-
ysis, memory integrity can be ensured at the C code
level. Furthermore, information about data and function
access behavior is collected during the analysis step. In
a final step, this information is used by cAMP to per-
form the low-level mapping of data and functions to
physical memories and protection regions.

The final result comprises of annotated application
code and a linker script describing the memory map-
ning, which is guaranteed to satisfy all project-specific
safety requirements and to utilize the capabilities of the
microcontroller. The final results as well as the interme-
diate work products can be found on GitHub [7]. Us-
ing this framework allows to adapt generic application
software for safety-critical systems in an efficient and
automated manner, so that software reusability can be
achieved without reducing resource utilization or jeop-
darding system safety.

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