Skip to Main content Skip to Navigation
Journal articles

Negotiable Votes: Pre-Vote Negotiations in Binary Voting with Non-Manipulable Rules

Abstract : We study voting games on binary issues, where voters hold an objective over the outcome of the collective decision and are allowed, before the vote takes place, to negotiate their ballots with the other participants. We analyse the voters' rational behaviour in the resulting two-phase game when ballots are aggregated via non-manipulable rules and, more specifically, quota rules. We show under what conditions undesirable equilibria can be removed and desirable ones sustained as a consequence of the pre-vote phase.
Document type :
Journal articles
Complete list of metadatas

Cited literature [56 references]  Display  Hide  Download

https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02451048
Contributor : Open Archive Toulouse Archive Ouverte (oatao) <>
Submitted on : Thursday, January 23, 2020 - 10:56:43 AM
Last modification on : Tuesday, September 8, 2020 - 10:32:02 AM
Long-term archiving on: : Friday, April 24, 2020 - 1:26:14 PM

File

grandi_24933.pdf
Files produced by the author(s)

Identifiers

Citation

Umberto Grandi, Davide Grossi, Paolo Turrini. Negotiable Votes: Pre-Vote Negotiations in Binary Voting with Non-Manipulable Rules. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence, 2019, 64, pp.895-929. ⟨10.1613/jair.1.11446⟩. ⟨hal-02451048⟩

Share

Metrics

Record views

217

Files downloads

608