Solving security constraints for 5G slice embedding: a proof-of-concept

François Boutigny (1, 2, 3) , Stéphane Betgé-Brezetz (4) , Gregory Blanc (1, 2, 3) , Antoine Lavignotte (1, 2, 3) , Hervé Debar (1, 2, 3) , Houda Jmila (1, 2, 3)

1 TSP - RST - Département Réseaux et Services de Télécommunications
2 R3S-SAMOVAR - Réseaux, Systèmes, Services, Sécurité
3 IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris
4 Nokia Bell Labs [Paris-Saclay]

Network slicing is a prominent feature of 5G, which allow tenants to rent network and computing virtual resources from one or more Infrastructure Providers (InPs). Those resources are allocated according to tenants requirements, not only in terms of QoS but also in terms of security. In this paper, we build on our previous work to propose and evaluate a security-aware slice embedding implementation which enables tenants to declare security-oriented requirements, while limiting InP network information disclosure. To do so we improve our requirement model so that it becomes compatible with an Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT) formulation. Our implementation distinguishes two sub-problems, one for the intra-domain level (inside each InP) and one for the inter-domain level (in between the InPs). We leverage those sub-problems in a multi-level resolution algorithm to generate all multi-domain slice embeddings.

Mots clés: 5G security; Network slicing; Virtual network embedding; Satisfiability modulo theories; Network virtualization

Domaines: Cryptographie et sécurité [cs.CR]; Réseaux et télécommunications [cs.NI]; Théorie et langage formel [cs.FL]

François Boutigny, Stéphane Betgé-Brezetz, Gregory Blanc, Antoine Lavignotte, Hervé Debar, et al.. Solving security constraints for 5G slice embedding: a proof-of-concept. Computers and Security, 2020, 89, pp.101662-1 - 101662-18. ⟨10.1016/j.cose.2019.101662⟩. ⟨hal-02387073⟩