Skip to Main content Skip to Navigation
Conference papers

Efficiency, Sequenceability and Deal-Optimality in Fair Division of Indivisible Goods

Abstract : In fair division of indivisible goods, using sequences of sincere choices (or picking sequences) is a natural way to allocate the objects. The idea is as follows: at each stage, a designated agent picks one object among those that remain. Another intuitive way to obtain an allocation is to give objects to agents in the rst place, and to let agents exchange them as long as such "deals" are bene cial. This paper investigates these notions, when agents have additive preferences over objects, and unveils surprising connections between them, and with other e ciency and fairness notions. In particular, we show that an allocation is sequenceable if and only if it is optimal for a certain type of deals, namely cycle deals involving a single object. Furthermore, any Pareto-optimal allocation is sequenceable, but not the converse. Regarding fairness, we show that an allocation can be envy-free and non-sequenceable, but that every competitive equilibrium with equal incomes is sequenceable. To complete the picture, we show how some domain restrictions may a ect the relations between these notions. Finally, we experimentally explore the links between the scales of e ciency and fairness.
Document type :
Conference papers
Complete list of metadata

Cited literature [41 references]  Display  Hide  Download
Contributor : Jérôme LANG Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Wednesday, October 23, 2019 - 12:45:13 PM
Last modification on : Monday, September 19, 2022 - 11:23:04 AM
Long-term archiving on: : Friday, January 24, 2020 - 4:41:16 PM


Files produced by the author(s)


  • HAL Id : hal-02328824, version 1


Aurélie Beynier, Sylvain Bouveret, Michel Lemaître, Nicolas Maudet, Simon Rey, et al.. Efficiency, Sequenceability and Deal-Optimality in Fair Division of Indivisible Goods. Conférence Nationale en Intelligence Artificielle, Jul 2019, Toulouse, France. ⟨hal-02328824⟩



Record views


Files downloads