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Exploiting symmetries when proving equivalence properties for security protocols (Technical report)

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ABSTRACT
Verification of privacy-type properties for cryptographic protocols in an active adversarial environment, modelled as a behavioural equivalence in concurrent-process calculi, exhibits a high computational complexity. While undecidable in general, for some classes of common cryptographic primitives the problem is coNEXP-complete when the number of honest participants is bounded.

In this paper we develop optimisation techniques for verifying equivalences, exploiting symmetries between the two processes under study. We demonstrate that they provide a significant (several orders of magnitude) speed-up in practice, thus increasing the size of the protocols that can be analysed fully automatically.

1 INTRODUCTION
Security protocols are distributed programs transmitting data between several parties. The underlying messages may be sensitive—for economical, political, or privacy reasons—and communications are usually performed through an untrusted network such as the Internet. Therefore, such protocols need to guarantee strong security requirements in an active adversarial setting, i.e., when considering an adversary that has complete control over the communication network. Formal, symbolic methods, rooted in the seminal work of Dolev and Yao [DY81], have been successful in analysing complex protocols, including for instance the recent TLS 1.3 proposal [BBK17, CHH18] and the upcoming 5G standard [BDH+18].

While some security properties can be formalised as reachability statements, privacy related properties are generally defined as the indistinguishability of two situations where the value of a private attribute differs. This is why privacy-type properties such as anonymity, (strong flavors of) secrecy, unlinkability, or privacy in e-voting are often modelled as behavioural equivalences in concurrent process calculi, such as the applied pi-calculus [ABF18]. The problem of verifying such equivalences is undecidable in the full, Turing-complete, calculus. Still, decidability results and fully automated analysers exist when the number of protocol sessions is bounded.

Unfortunately, recent results [CKR18a] show that the problem has a high computational worst-case complexity (coNEXP-complete). Yet, other results show that the problem is exponentially simpler (coNP-complete) for a class of practical scenarios (determinate processes) [CD09]. This gap is all the more striking in practice as, for determinate processes, the verification time can effectively be reduced by several orders of magnitude using partial-order reductions [BDH15, CKR18b]. This highlights the gap between the general, pessimistic complexity bound and what can be achieved by exploiting specificities of given instances. In practice, the processes that are analysed show a great amount of symmetries as they often consist of several copies (sessions) of the same protocol executed in parallel. Exploiting this helps factoring out large, redundant parts of equivalence proofs, and making theoretically hard verification feasible in practice.

Contributions
We present optimisation techniques for the verification of trace equivalence in the applied pi-calculus. For that we exploit the symmetries of the two processes to be shown equivalent. More specifically, our contributions are as follows.

(1) We introduce equivalence by session, a new process equivalence that implies the classical trace equivalence. Intuitively, it is a refinement of trace equivalence designed for two processes sharing a similar structure, making verification easier.

(2) We show how partial-order reductions presented in [BDH15] for determinate processes, can be used for proving equivalence by session for any processes.

(3) We give a group-theoretic characterisation of internal process redundancy, inspired by classical formalisations of symmetries in model checking [ES96], and use it to reduce further the complexity of deciding equivalence by session.

(4) We design a symbolic version of the above equivalence and optimisations, based on the constraint solving techniques of the DeepSec prover [CKR18b], a state-of-the-art tool for verifying equivalence properties in security protocols. This allowed us to implement our techniques in DeepSec and evaluate the gain in verification time induced by our optimisations.

Note that, while we designed equivalence by session as an efficient proof technique for trace equivalence it is also of independent interest: to some extent, equivalence by session models attackers that can distinguish different sessions of a same protocol. This may be considered realistic when servers allocate a distinct ephemeral port for each session; in other contexts, e.g. RFID communication this may however be too strong. When equivalence by session is used as a proof technique for trace equivalence, false attacks are possible, as it is a sound, but not complete, refinement. However, on the existing protocols we experimented on, when equivalence by session was violated, trace equivalence was violated as well.

Our prototype is able to successfully analyse various security protocols that are currently out of scope—in terms of expressivity or exceeding a 12h timeout—of similar state-of-the-art analysers. We observe improvements of several orders of magnitude in terms of efficiency, compared to the original version of DeepSec. Among the case studies that we consider are...
• the Basic Access Control (BAC) protocol [For04] implemented in European e-passports. In previous work, verification was limited to merely 2 sessions, while we scale up to 5 sessions.

• the Helios e-voting protocol [Adi08]. Automated analyses of this protocol exist when no revote is allowed, or is limited to one revote from a honest voter [ACK16, CKR18a]. In this paper, we analyse several models covering revote scenarios for 7 emitted honest ballots.

This document is the technical report of the conference paper [CR19]. It contains full technical proofs and generalised results, as well as a different running example to provide a complementary presentation.

Related work
Partial-order reductions (por) for the verification of cryptographic protocols were first introduced by Clark et al. [CJM03]: while well developed in verification of reactive systems these existing techniques do not easily carry over to security protocols, mainly due to the symbolic treatment of attacker knowledge. Mödersheim et al. [MVB10] proposed por techniques that are suitable for symbolic methods based on constraint solving. However, both the techniques of Clark et al. [CJM03] and Mödersheim et al. [MVB10] are only correct for trace properties.

Partial order reductions for equivalence properties were only introduced more recently by Baelde et al. [BDH14, BDH15]: implementing these techniques in the APTE tool resulted in spectacular speed-ups. Other state-of-the-art tools, AKISS [CCCK16] and DeepSec [CKR18a], integrated these techniques as well. However, these existing techniques are limited in scope as they require protocols to be determinate. Examples of protocols that are typically not modelled as determinate processes are the BAC protocol, and the Helios e-voting protocol mentioned above. In recent work, Baelde et al. [BDH18a] propose por techniques that also apply to non-determinate processes (but do not support private channels) and implement these techniques in the DeepSec tool. Unfortunately, these techniques introduce a computational overhead, that tends to limit the efficiency gain. As our experiments will show, our techniques, although including some approximations, significantly improve efficiency.

There exist other tools for the verification of equivalence properties in the case of a bounded number of sessions. The SAT-\textsc{equiv} tool [CDD17] is extremely efficient, but its scope is more narrow: it does not support user-defined equational theories and is restricted to determinate processes. As shown in [CKR18a], AKISS [CCCK16] and SPEC [TNH16] were already less efficient (by orders of magnitude) than DeepSec before our current work. We also mention the less recent \textsc{s3a} tool [DSV03] that verifies testing equivalence in the SPI calculus and integrates some symmetry (but no partial-order) reductions [CDSV04]. The tool however only supports a fixed equational theory and no else branches. We are not aware of a publicly available implementation.

Our approach can also be compared to tools for an unbounded number of sessions. The \textsc{ProVerif} [BAF08], \textsc{Tamarin} [BDS15] and \textsc{Maude-NPA} [SEMM14] tools all show a process equivalence that is more fine-grained than trace equivalence. The resulting equivalence is often referred to as \textit{diff-equivalence} in that it requires that equivalent processes follow the same execution flow and only differ on the data. As a result these techniques may fail to prove equivalence of processes that are trace equivalent. Our approach goes in the same direction but equivalence by session is less fine-grained, for example capturing equivalence proofs for the BAC protocol. A detailed comparison between these two equivalences is given in Section 3.1. Besides, the restriction to a bounded number of sessions allows us to decide equivalence by session, while termination is not guaranteed in the unbounded case.

2 MODEL
We first present our model for formalising privacy-type properties of security protocols, represented by trace equivalence of processes in the applied-pi calculus [ABF18].

2.1 Messages and cryptography
In order to analyse protocols, we rely on symbolic models rooted in the seminal work of Dolev and Yao [DY81]. Cryptographic operations are modelled by a finite signature, i.e., a set of function symbols with their arity $\mathcal{F} = \{f/n, g/m, \ldots\}$. Atomic data such as nonces, random numbers, or cryptographic keys are represented by an infinite set of names $\mathcal{N} = \{a, b, k, \ldots\} = \mathcal{N}_{pub} \cup \mathcal{N}_{priv}$ partitioned into \textit{public} and \textit{private} names. We also consider an infinite set of variables $\mathcal{X} = \{x, y, z, \ldots\}$. Protocol messages are then modelled as terms obtained by application of function symbols to names, variables or other terms. If $A \subseteq \mathcal{N} \cup \mathcal{X}$, $\mathcal{T}(\mathcal{F}, A)$ refers to the set of terms built from atoms in $A$.

Example 2.1. The following signature models the classical primitives of pairs, randomised symmetric encryption, and their inverse:

\[\mathcal{F} = \{\langle\cdot, \cdot\rangle/2, \text{proj}_1/1, \text{proj}_2/1, \text{senc}/3, \text{sdec}/2\}\]

For example, let $m \in \mathcal{N}_{pub}$, and $k, r \in \mathcal{N}_{priv}$ modelling a private key and a random nonce, respectively. The term $c = \text{senc}(m, r, k)$ models a ciphertext obtained by encrypting $m$ with the key $k$ and randomness $r$, and $\text{sdec}(c, k)$ models its decryption.

An equational theory is a binary relation $E$ on terms. It is extended to an equivalence relation $\equiv_E$ that is the closure of $E$ by reflexivity, symmetry, transitivity, substitution and applications of function symbols. All the optimisations we present in this paper are sound for arbitrary equational theories although, obviously, the implementation in DeepSec naturally inherits the restrictions of the tool (limited to destructor subterm convergent rewriting systems). The following equations characterise the behaviour of the primitives introduced in Example 2.1:

\[\text{proj}_1(\langle x_1, x_2\rangle) \equiv_E x_1 \quad \text{sdec}(\text{senc}(x, y, z), z) \equiv_E x\]

That is, a message encrypted with a key $k$ can be recovered by decrypting using the same key $k$. With the notations of Example 2.1, we can derive from these equations that $\text{sddec}(c, k) \equiv_E m$. \\ 

2
A substitution $\sigma$ is a mapping from variables to terms, homomorphically extended to a function from terms to terms. We use the classical postfix notation $t(\sigma)$ instead of $\sigma(t)$, and the set notation $\sigma = \{ x_1 \mapsto x_1 \sigma, \ldots, x_n \mapsto x_n \sigma \}$.

### 2.2 Protocols as processes

#### Syntax

Protocols are modelled as concurrent processes that exchange messages (i.e. terms). We define the syntax of plain processes by the following grammar:

$$P, Q ::= 0 \quad \text{null}$$
$$P \mid Q \quad \text{parallel}$$
$$\text{if } u = v \text{ then } P \text{ else } Q \quad \text{conditional}$$
$$\tau(u).P \quad \text{output}$$
$$c(x).P \quad \text{input}$$

where $u, v$ are terms, $x \in X$, and $c \in Ch$ where $Ch$ denotes a set of channels. We assume a partition $Ch = Ch_{pub} \cup Ch_{priv}$ of channels into public and private channels: while public channels are under the control of the adversary, private channels allow confidential, internal communications. The $0$ process is the terminal process which does nothing, the operator $P \mid Q$ executes $P$ and $Q$ concurrently, $\tau(u)$ sends a message $u$ on channel $c$, and $c(x)$ receives a message (and binds it to the variable $x$).

We highlight the two restrictions compared to the calculus of [ABF18]: we only consider a bounded number of protocol sessions (i.e. there is no operator for unbounded parallel replication) and channels are modelled by a separate datatype (i.e. they are never used as parts of messages). The first restriction is necessary for decidability [CCCK16, TNH16, CKR18a] but still allows to detect many flaws since attacks tend to require a rather small number of sessions. Our optimisations also rely on an invariant that private channels remain unknown to the adversary, hence the restriction to disallow channel names in messages.

#### Example 2.2

We describe a toy protocol that will serve as a running example throughout the paper. This is a simplification of the BAC protocol implemented in the European e-passports. The system builds upon the signature and equational theory introduced in Example 2.1. In a preliminary phase, a reader obtains the private key $k$ of a passport, and then they communicate as follows:

- Reader $\rightarrow$ Passport : get\_challenge
- Passport $\rightarrow$ Reader : $n$
- Reader $\rightarrow$ Passport : senc($n, r, k$) bound as $x$
- Passport $\rightarrow$ Reader : ok if sdec($x, k$) = $n$
- error otherwise

where $n, r \in N_{\text{priv}}$ and get\_challenge, ok, error $\in N_{\text{pub}}$. In particular, the passport triggers an error when it receives a communication originated from a reader that has not the right key $k$, i.e. a reader that has not been paired with an other passport during the preliminary phase. In the applied pi-calculus, they are modelled by the following processes

$$R(k, r) = \tau(\text{get\_challenge})$$
$$c(x_n).\tau(\text{senc}(x_n, r, k)).0$$

The behaviour of protocols is defined by an operational semantics on processes. Its first ingredients are simplifying rules to normalise processes from non-observable, deterministic actions (Figure 1).

- $P | 0 \rightsquigarrow P$
- $0 | P \rightsquigarrow P$
- $(P | Q) \rightsquigarrow P | (Q | R)$
- $P | Q \rightsquigarrow P' | Q \quad \text{if } P \rightsquigarrow P'$
- $Q | P \rightsquigarrow Q | P' \quad \text{if } P \rightsquigarrow P'$
- if $u = v$ then $P$ else $Q \rightsquigarrow P$ if $u \neq_E v$
- $Q \rightsquigarrow P$ otherwise

Figure 1: Simplification rules for plain processes

These simplifying rules get rid of $0$ processes, and evaluate conditionals at toplevel. We say that a process on which no more rule applies is in $\rightsquigarrow$-normal form. By convergence, we will denote by $P$ the unique $\rightsquigarrow$-normal form of $P$.

The operational semantics then operates on extended processes $(P, \Phi)$, where $P$ is a multiset of plain processes (in $\rightsquigarrow$-normal form) and $\Phi$ is a substitution, called the frame. Intuitively, $P$ is the multiset of processes that are ready to be executed in parallel, and $\Phi$ is used to record outputs on public channels. The domain of the substitution $\Phi$ is a subset of a set $AX$ of axioms, disjoint from $X$: they record the raw observations of the attacker, that is, they are the axioms in intruder deduction proofs. The semantics (Figure 2) takes the form of a labelled transition relation $\rightarrow_{\alpha}$ between extended processes, where $\alpha$ is called an action and indicates what kind of transition is performed.

The output rule (Out) models that outputs on a public channel are added to the attacker knowledge, i.e., stored in $\Phi$ in a fresh axiom. The axioms thus provide handles for the attacker to refer to these outputs. The input rule (In) reads a term $\xi$, called a recipe provided by the attacker, on a public channel. This term $\xi$ can be effectively constructed by the attacker as it is built over public names and elements of dom$(\Phi)$, i.e. previous outputs. The resulting term is then bound to the input variable $x$. Rule (Comm) models internal communication on a private channel and rule (Par) adds processes in parallel to the multiset of active processes. These last two actions are internal actions (label $r$), unobservable by the attacker.

#### Traces

A trace of an extended process $A$ is a sequence of reduction steps starting from the extended process $A$

$$t : A \xrightarrow{a_1} A_1 \xrightarrow{a_2} \cdots \xrightarrow{a_n} A_n.$$

When the intermediate processes are not relevant we write

$$t : A \xrightarrow{a_1 \cdots a_n} A_n.$$
We define $tr(t)$ to be the word of actions $a_1 \cdots a_n$ (including $\tau$’s), and $\Phi(t)$ to be the frame of $A_n$. The set of the traces of $A$ is written $T(A)$, and the notation is extended to plain processes by writing $T(P)$ for $T(\{P\}, \emptyset)$.

**Example 2.3.** Consider again the access-control protocol described in Example 2.2. Let $S = \{P(k, n), R(k', r)\} \cup \emptyset$, with $k, k', n, r$ in $N_{\text{priv}}$, a system consisting of a passport and a reader in parallel. The system has the following trace:

$$S \xrightarrow{\tau(ax_0)} \{P(k, n), R_0(k', r)\}, \Phi_0$$

$$\xrightarrow{c(\text{GET\_CHALLENGE})} \{P_0(k, n), R_0(k', r)\}, \Phi_0$$

$$\xrightarrow{\tau(ax_1)} \{P_1(k, n), R_0(k', r)\}, \Phi_0 \cup \Phi_1$$

$$\xrightarrow{c(ax_1)} \{P_1(k, n), \xi(\text{senc}(n, r, k'))\}, \Phi_0 \cup \Phi_1$$

$$\xrightarrow{\tau(ax_2)} \{P_1(k, n), 0\}, \Phi_0 \cup \Phi_1 \cup \Phi_2$$

$$\xrightarrow{c(ax_2)} \{P_1(k, n), 0\}, \Phi_0 \cup \Phi_1 \cup \Phi_2$$

with

$$\Phi_0 = [ax_0 \mapsto \text{GET\_CHALLENGE}]$$

$$\Phi_1 = [ax_1 \mapsto n]$$

$$\Phi_2 = [ax_2 \mapsto \text{senc}(n, r, k')]$$

$$P(k, n) = \xi(x_0).$$

$$P_0(k, n) = \xi(\text{n}).$$

$$R_0(k', r) = \xi(\text{GET\_CHALLENGE}).$$

and $\alpha = \emptyset$ if $k = k'$, and $\alpha = \text{error}$ if $k \neq k'$. Note that the input action $c(\text{GET\_CHALLENGE})$ could be replaced by $c(ax_0)$.

### 2.3 Security Properties

Many security properties can be expressed in terms of indistinguishability (from the attacker’s viewpoint). The preservation of anonymity during a protocol execution can for example be modelled as the indistinguishability of two instances of the protocol with different participants. Strong flavors of secrecy can also be expressed: after interacting with the protocol, the attacker is still unable to distinguish between a secret used during the protocol and a fresh random nonce. Our case studies also include such modellings of unlinkability or vote privacy.

**Static equivalence** The ability to distinguish or not between two situations lies on the attacker’s observations, i.e. the frame. Indistinguishability of two frames is captured by the notion of static equivalence. Intuitively, we say that two frames are statically equivalent if the attacker cannot craft an equality test that holds in one frame and not in the other.

**Definition 2.1.** Two frames $\Phi_1$ and $\Phi_2$ are statically equivalent, written $\Phi_1 \approx \Phi_2$ when $dom(\Phi_1) = dom(\Phi_2)$ and, for any recipes $\xi_1, \xi_2 \in T(F, N_{\text{pub}} \cup dom(\Phi_1))$,

$$\xi_1 \Phi_1 = E \xi_2 \Phi_1 \iff \xi_1 \Phi_2 = E \xi_2 \Phi_2$$

We lift static equivalence to traces and write $t_0 \approx t_1$ when $\Phi(t_0) \approx \Phi(t_1)$ and $tr_0 = tr_1$, where $tr_1$ is obtained by removing $r$’s from $tr(t_1)$. Removing $r$ actions reflects that these actions are unobservable by the attacker.

**Trace equivalence** While static equivalence models the (passive) indistinguishability of two sequences of observations, trace equivalence captures the indistinguishability of two processes $P$ and $Q$ in the presence of an active attacker. Intuitively, we require that any sequence of visible actions executable on $P$ is also executable on $Q$ and yields indistinguishable outputs, i.e., statically equivalent frames.

**Definition 2.2.** Let $P, Q$ be plain processes in $\rightarrow$-normal form. $P$ is trace included in $Q$, written $P \subseteq_{tr} Q$, when

$$\forall t \in T(P), \exists t' \in T(Q), t \sim t'$$

We say that $P$ and $Q$ are trace equivalent, written $P \equiv_{tr} Q$, when $P \subseteq_{tr} Q$ and $Q \subseteq_{tr} P$.

**Example 2.4.** Consider again the model of passport and reader introduced in Example 2.2, and let us write

$$S(k, n, r) = P(k, n)|R(k, r)$$

a system consisting of a passport and a reader in parallel with a shared key $k$. The unlinkability property can be stated by the inability for the attacker to distinguish between two copies of the same passport interacting with readers, and two different passports. That is,

$$S(k, n, r) \cap S(k, n', r') \approx_{tr} S(k, n, r) \cap S(k', n', r')$$

with $k, k', n, n', r, r' \in N_{\text{pub}}$ pairwise distinct. The inclusion $S(k, n, r) \cap S(k, n', r') \subseteq_{tr} S(k, n, r) \cap S(k', n', r')$ indeed holds. However, this model of unlinkability is violated in that the converse inclusion does not hold. Indeed in the right-hand-side process, making a reader interact with the wrong passport produces
an error message, which is not the case in the left-hand side (since the two systems share the same key). Formally, $T(S(k, n, r) \mid S(k', n', r'))$ contains a trace $t$ such that

$$tr(t) = t \bar{c}(ax_0) \bar{c}(ax_1) \bar{c}(ax_3) \bar{c}(ax_2) \bar{c}(ax_1) \bar{c}(ax_2) \bar{c}(ax_3)$$

$$\Phi(t) = [ax_0 \mapsto \text{get\_challenge}, ax_1 \mapsto n, ax_2 \mapsto \text{send}(n, r', k'), ax_3 \mapsto \text{error}]$$

3 OPTIMISING VERIFICATION

The problem of verifying trace equivalence in the presented model is coNEXP-complete for equational theories represented as subterm convergent destructor rewrite systems [CKR18a]. Despite this high theoretical complexity, automated analysers can take advantage of the specificities of practical instances. One notable example is the class of determinate processes that encompasses many practical scenarios and has received quite some attention [CD09, BDH15, CCCK16, CRK18b]. It allows for partial-order reductions [BDH15], speeding up the verification time by several orders of magnitude. Our approach, similar in spirit but applicable in a more general setting, consists in guiding the decision procedure with the structural similarities of the two processes that we aim to show equivalent.

3.1 Equivalence by session

We introduce a new equivalence relation, equivalence by session: the main idea is that, when proving the equivalence of $P$ and $Q$, every action of a given parallel subprocess of $P$ should be matched by the actions of a same subprocess in $Q$. This is indeed often the case in protocol analysis where a given session (the execution of an instance of a protocol role) on one side is matched by a session on the other side. By requiring to match sessions rather than individual actions, this yields a more fine-grained equivalence and effectively reduces the combinatorial explosion. Moreover, thanks to the optimisations that exploit the structural properties of equivalence by session (presented in the following sections), we obtain significant speed-ups during the verification of case studies that are neither determinate nor in scope of the (even more fined-grained) diffusion equivalence of ProVerif and Tamarin.

Twin processes To formalise session matchings we use a notion of twin-process, that are pairs of matched processes that have the same action at toplevel, called their skeleton.

**Definition 3.1.** A twin-process is a pair of plain processes in normal form $(P, Q)$ such that $\text{ske}\{P\} = \text{ske}\{Q\}$, where

if $c \in \text{Ch}_\text{pub}$: $\text{ske}\{c(x):Q\} = \{\text{in}_c\}$ $\text{ske}\{\overline{c(x)}:Q\} = \{\text{out}_c\}$

if $d \in \text{Ch}_\text{prev}$: $\text{ske}\{d(x):Q\} = \{\text{in}\}$ $\text{ske}\{\overline{d(x)}:Q\} = \{\text{out}\}$

$\text{ske}(P_1 \cdots \mid P_n) = \text{ske}(P_1) \cup \ldots \cup \text{ske}(P_n)$

An extended twin-process $A^2 = (\mathcal{P}^2, \Phi_0, \Phi_1)$ is then a triple where $\mathcal{P}^2$ is a multiset of twin-processes and $\Phi_0, \Phi_1$ are frames. This thus models two extended processes with identical skeletons, matched together. We retrieve the original extended processes by projection,

$$\text{fst}(A^2) = (\{P_0 \mid (P_0, P_1) \in \mathcal{P}^2\}, \Phi_0)$$

$$\text{snd}(A^2) = (\{P_1 \mid (P_0, P_1) \in \mathcal{P}^2\}, \Phi_1)$$

The semantics of twin-processes is defined in Figure 3 and mostly requires that the two projections follow the same reduction steps in the single-process semantics. The rule $(\text{PAR})$ is however replaced by a rule that allows to match each parallel subprocess from the left with a parallel process from the right. We underline that, by definition of twin-processes, a transition $A^2 \overset{\alpha}{\rightarrow} A^2$ is possible only if for all $(P, Q) \in \mathcal{P}^2$, it holds that $\text{ske}(P) = \text{ske}(Q)$.

Similarly to extended processes, we use $T(A^2)$ to denote the set of reduction steps from an extended twin-process $A^2$. Besides if

$$t^2 : A^2 \overset{\alpha}{\rightarrow} A^1_2 \cdots \overset{\alpha}{\rightarrow} A^2_n \in T(A^2_1),$$

we also lift the projection functions by writing

$$\text{fst}(t^2) : \text{fst}(A^2) \overset{\alpha}{\rightarrow} \text{fst}(A^1_1) \cdots \overset{\alpha}{\rightarrow} \text{fst}(A^2_n)$$

and similarly for $\text{snd}(t^2)$. Note that $\text{fst}(t^2) \in T(\text{fst}(A^2))$.

**Equivalence by session** Equivalence by session is similar to trace equivalence but only considers the traces of $Q$ matching the structure of the trace of $P$ under study. This structural requirement is formalised by considering traces of the twin-process $(P, Q)$. Formally speaking, given two plain processes $P$ and $Q$ in normal form having the same skeleton, we write $P \equiv_P Q$ when

$$\forall t \in T(P), \exists t^2 \in T(P, Q), t = \text{fst}(t^2) \sim \text{snd}(t^2).$$

We say that $P$ and $Q$ are equivalent by session, referred as $P \equiv_s Q$, when $P \equiv_P Q$ and $Q \equiv_P P$.

While equivalence by session has been designed to increase efficiency of verification procedures, it is also of independent interest. Equivalence by session captures a notion of indistinguishability against an adversary that is able to distinguish actions which originate from different protocol sessions. Such an adversarial model may for instance be considered realistic in protocols where servers dynamically allocate a distinct ephemeral port to each session. An attacker would therefore observe these ports and always differentiate one session from another. When considering equivalence by session, this allocation mechanism does not need to be explicitly modelled as it is already reflected natively in the definition. On the contrary for trace equivalence, an explicit modelling within the processes would be needed. For example equivalence by session of two protocol sessions operating on a public channel $c$,

$$P(c) \mid P(c) \equiv_s Q(c) \mid Q(c)$$

could be encoded by relying on dynamically-generated private channels that are revealed to the attacker. This can be expressed in the original syntax of the applied pi-calculus [ABF18] as:

$$P_{\text{fresh}} \mid P_{\text{fresh}} \equiv_{\text{tr}} Q_{\text{fresh}} \mid Q_{\text{fresh}}$$

where $P_{\text{fresh}} = \text{new } e. \overline{\tau(e)}. P(e), Q_{\text{fresh}} = \text{new } e. \tau(e). Q(e)$. Such encodings however break determinacy and are thus incompatible with the partial-order reductions of [BDH15]. Our dedicated equivalence offers similar-in-spirit optimisations that are applicable on all processes.
We first show that equivalence by session is a sound refinement of trace equivalence.

**Proposition 3.1.** If \( P \approx_s Q \) then \( P \approx_{tr} Q \).

This is immediate as \( t^2 \in \mathcal{T}(P, Q) \) entails \( \text{snd}(t^2) \in \mathcal{T}(Q) \). The converse does not hold in general, meaning that two processes that are not equivalent by session might be trace equivalent. The simplest example is, for \( n \in \mathbb{N}_{pub}^+ \):

\[
P = \exists(n). \bar{n}(n) \quad Q = \exists(n). \overline{\bar{n}}(n)
\]

We call false attacks traces witnessing a violation of equivalence by session, but that can still be matched trace-equivalence-wise. In this example even the empty trace is a false attack since the two processes fail to meet the requirement of having identical skeletons. Such extreme configurations are however unlikely to occur in practice: privacy is usually modelled as the equivalence of two protocol instances where some private attributes are changed. In particular the overall structure in parallel processes remains common to both sides.

More realistic false attacks may arise when the structural requirements of equivalence by session are too strong, i.e. when matching the trace requires mixing actions from different sessions. Consider for example the two processes

\[
P = \exists(n). \bar{n}(n) | s(x). \overline{\bar{b}}(n) \quad Q = \exists(n). \overline{\bar{n}}(n) | s(x). \overline{\bar{a}}(n)
\]

with \( a, b \in C_{pub} \) and \( s \in C_{priv} \). These processes first synchronise on a private channel \( s \) by the means of an internal communication, and then perform two parallel outputs on public channels \( a, b \). They are easily seen trace equivalent. However the skeletons at toplevel constrain the session matchings, i.e. the application of rule (MATCH). Hence any trace executing an output on \( a \) or \( b \) is a false attack.

Finally false attacks cannot happen for determinate processes, i.e. the class of processes for which the partial-order reductions of [BDH15] were designed. A plain process \( P \) is determinate if it does not contain private channels and,

\[
\forall P \triangleleft \triangleright (P_1, \ldots, P_n, \Phi), \forall i \neq j, \text{skel}(P_i) \neq \text{skel}(P_j).
\]

**Proposition 3.2.** If \( P, Q \) are determinate plain processes such that \( P \approx_{tr} Q \) then \( P \approx_s Q \).

The core argument is the uniqueness of session matchings; that is, there is always at most one permutation that can be chosen when applying the rule (MATCH) to a pair of determinate processes. The proof can be found in Appendix B: thanks to the structural requirements imposed by skeletons, we even prove that trace equivalence \((\approx_{tr})\) and inclusion by session \((\subseteq_s)\) coincide for determinate processes.

**Relation to diff-equivalence**

ProVerif, TAMARIN and MAUDENFA are semi-automated tools that can provide equivalence proofs for an unbounded number of protocol sessions. For that they rely on another refinement of trace equivalence, called diff-equivalence \((\approx_d)\). It relies on a similar intuition as equivalence by session, adding (much stronger) structural requirements to proofs. To prove diff-equivalence of \( P \) and \( Q \), one first requires that \( P \) and \( Q \) have syntactically the same structure and that they only differ by the data (i.e. the terms) inside the process. Second, any trace of \( P \) must be matched in \( Q \) by the trace that follows exactly the same control flow. Consider for example

\[
P = \overline{\exists(u)} | \overline{\exists(u')} | R \
Q = \overline{\exists(u')} | \overline{\exists(u')} | R'
\]

For \( P \) and \( Q \) to be diff-equivalent, traces of \( P \) starting with \( \exists(u) \) need to be matched by traces of \( Q \) starting with \( \exists(u') \).

In the original definition of diff-equivalence in [BAF05] the conditional branchings were also required to result into the same control flow. This condition has however been relaxed within [CB13]: the resulting diff-equivalence can be defined in our formalism as equivalence by session in which the rule (MATCH) only performs the identity matching. That is, if we write \( \mathcal{T}_{d}(P, Q) \) for the subset of traces of \( \mathcal{T}(P, Q) \) where rule (MATCH) is replaced by

\[
(\langle P_1 | \cdots | P_n, Q_1 | \cdots | Q_n \rangle) \cup P^2, \Phi_0, \Phi_1
\]

then we define \( P \sqsubseteq_d Q \) as the statement

\[
\forall t \in \mathcal{T}(P), \exists i^2 \in \mathcal{T}_{d}(P, Q), \text{such that } t = \text{fst}(i^2) \sim \text{snd}(i^2).
\]

We say that \( P \) and \( Q \) are diff-equivalent, written \( P \approx_d Q \), when \( P \sqsubseteq_d Q \) and \( Q \sqsubseteq_d P \). By definition \( \mathcal{T}_{d}(P, Q) \subseteq \mathcal{T}(P, Q) \) and diff-equivalence therefore refines equivalence by session. The converse does not hold in general, e.g.

\[
P = \overline{\exists(a)} | \overline{\exists(b)} \
Q = \overline{\exists(b)} | \overline{\exists(a)} \quad a, b \in \mathbb{N}_{pub} \text{ distinct}
\]
This example is extreme as a pre-processing on parallel operators would make the processes diff-equivalent. Such a pre-processing is however not possible for more involved, real-world examples such as the equivalences we prove on the BAC protocol in Section 7. The reason is that the matchings have to be selected dynamically, that is, different session matchings are needed to match different traces.

**Relation to observational equivalence** As a side result we also compare equivalence by session to observational equivalence \( \approx_o \), or technically to the equivalent notion of labelled bisimilarity as described in [ABF18, CKR18a]. Just as equivalence by session, it is known to be an intermediate refinement between diff-equivalence and trace equivalence [CD09]:

**Lemma 3.3.** \( \approx_d \subseteq \approx_o \subseteq \approx_r \). Besides, \( \approx_o \) and \( \approx_r \) coincide for deterministic processes.

In particular by Proposition 3.2 we obtain that the trace, session, and observational equivalences coincide for deterministic processes. However they are incomparable in general:

**Lemma 3.4.** \( \approx_s \) and \( \approx_o \) are incomparable.

**Proof.** If we write \( P = c(x), c(x) \) and \( Q = c(x) \mid c(x) \), then \( P \approx_o Q \) but \( P \not\approx_s Q \). Besides, if \( k_0, k_1, k_2 \in N_{priv} \) we define

\[
R(t_0, t_1, t_2) = \begin{cases} \tau(k_0) | \tau(k_1) | \tau(k_2) | c(x) \text{ if } x = k_0 \text{ then } \tau(t_0) \\ \text{else if } x = k_1 \text{ then } \tau(t_1) \\ \text{else if } x = k_2 \text{ then } \tau(t_2) \\ 
\end{cases}
\]

If \( a, b \in N_{pub} \) distinct, we have \( R(a, b, b) \equiv_s R(b, a, a) \) but \( R(a, b, b) \not\approx_o R(b, a, a) \).

To sum up the relations between all equivalences:

**Proposition 3.5.** If \( \approx \in \{ \approx_o, \approx_s \} \) then \( \approx_d \subseteq \approx \subseteq \approx_r \) and, for deterministic processes, \( \approx = \approx_r \).

### 3.3 Trace refinements

In this section we present an abstract notion of optimisation, based on trace refinements. This comes with several properties on how to compose and refine them, providing a unified way of presenting different concrete optimisations for the decision of equivalence by session in later sections.

**Definition 3.2.** An optimisation is a pair \( O = (O', O^3) \) with \( O' \) a set of traces of extended processes (universal optimisation), and \( O^3 \) a set of traces of extended twin-processes (existential optimisation).

Intuitively, an optimisation reduces the set of traces that are considered when verifying equivalence: when proving \( P \equiv Q \), only traces of \( T(P) \cap O' \) and \( T(P, Q) \cap O^3 \) will be studied. That is, we define the equivalence \( \equiv = E_0 \sqcup \equiv_0 \) where \( P \equiv E_0 Q \) means

\[
\forall t \in T(P) \cap O', \exists t^2 \in T(P, Q) \cap O^3, t = \text{fst}(t^2) \sim \text{snd}(t^2).
\]

In particular \( \equiv_{all} \) is the equivalence by session, where \( O_{all} = (O'_{all}, O^3_{all}) \) contains all traces. However, of course, such refinements may induce different notions of equivalence, hence the need for correctness arguments specific to each layer of optimisation.

**Proposition 3.6 (transitivity).** If \( O_1 \) is a correct refinement of \( O_2 \) and \( O_2 \) is a correct refinement of \( O_3 \), then \( O_1 \) is a correct refinement of \( O_3 \).

Moreover, we can prove universal and existential optimisations in a modular way:

**Proposition 3.7 (combination).** If \( (O'_1, O^3_1) \) and \( (O'_2, O^3_2) \) are correct refinements of \( (O', O^3) \), then \( (O'_1 \sqcup O'_2, O^3_1 \sqcup O^3_2) \) is a correct refinement of \( (O', O^3) \).

**Proof.** Let \( \equiv_{xx}, \equiv_{ox}, \equiv_{ox} \) and \( \equiv_{oo} \) the equivalences induced by the optimisations \( (O'_1, O^3_1) \), \( (O'_2, O^3_2) \), \( (O'_o, O^3_o) \) and \( (O'_o, O^3_o) \), respectively. As \( \equiv_{ox} = \equiv_{xx} = \equiv_{oo} \) by hypothesis, the result follows from the straightforward inclusions \( \equiv_{oo} \subseteq \equiv_{oo} \) and \( \equiv_{oo} \subseteq \equiv_{oo} \).

Relying on this result, we see a universal optimisation \( O'_u \) (resp. existential optimisations \( O^3 \)) as the optimisation \( (O'_o, O^3_o) \) (resp. \( (O'_o, O^3_o) \)). This lightens presentation as we can now meaningfully talk about universal (resp. existential) optimisations being correct refinements of others.

Finally, when implementing such optimisations in tools, deciding the membership of a trace in the sets \( O'_o \) or \( O^3_o \) may sometimes be inefficient or not effective. In these cases we may want to implement these optimisations partially, using for example sufficient conditions. The following proposition states that such partial implementations still result into correct refinements.

**Proposition 3.8 (partial implementability).** Let us consider the optimisations \( O'_o \subseteq O'_{par} \subseteq O' \) and \( O^3_o \subseteq O^3_{par} \subseteq O^3 \). If \( O'_o \) is a correct refinement of \( O' \) and \( O^3_o \) is a correct refinement of \( O^3 \), then \( (O'_{par}, O^3_{par}) \) is a correct refinement of \( (O', O^3) \).

In the rest of the paper we assume the reader familiar with group theory (group actions, stabilisers), in particular the group of permutations (written in cycle notation). Most of our optimisations are indeed expressed using this terminology.

### 4 PARTIAL-ORDER REDUCTIONS

In this section we present partial-order reductions for equivalence by session. They are inspired by similar techniques developed for proving trace equivalence of determinate processes [BDH15], although they differ in their technical development to preserve correctness in our more general setting. In particular the optimisations we present account for non determinacy and private channels which will be useful when analysing e-voting protocols.
4.1 Labels and independence

Labels Partial-order reduction techniques identify commutativity relations in a set of traces and factor out the resulting redundancy. Here we exploit the permutability of concurrent actions without output-input data flow. For that we introduce labels to reason about dependencies in the execution:

- Plain processes $P$ are labelled $[P]$, with $\ell$ a word of integers reflecting the position of $P$ within the whole process.
- Actions $\alpha$ are labelled $[\alpha]^L$ to reflect the label(s) of the processes they originate from. That is, $L$ is either a single integer word $\ell$ (for inputs and outputs) or a pair of such, written $\ell_1 | \ell_2$ (for internal communications).

Labels can be bootstrapped arbitrarily, say, by the empty word $\epsilon$, and are propagated as follows in the operational semantics. The (Par) rule extends labels:

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\{[P_1 | \cdots | P_n] \} \uplus \{[P] \} \xrightarrow{\tau} \{[P_1 | \cdots | P_n] \} \uplus \{[P] \}
\end{array}
\]

the rules (In) and (Out) preserve labels:

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\{[P] \} \uplus \{[\alpha] \} \xrightarrow{\alpha} \{[\alpha'] \} \uplus \{[P] \}
\end{array}
\]

and so does (Comm), however producing a double label:

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\{[P] \} \uplus \{[Q] \} \xrightarrow{\tau} \{[P'] \} \uplus \{[Q'] \}
\end{array}
\]

In particular, we always implicitly assume the invariant preserved by transitions that extended processes contain labels that are pairwise incomparable w.r.t. the prefix ordering.

Independence Labels materialise flow dependencies. Two actions $\alpha = [\alpha]^L$ and $\alpha' = [\alpha']^L$ are said sequentially dependent if one of the (one or two) words constituting $L$, and one of those constituting $L'$, are comparable w.r.t. the prefix ordering. Regarding input-output dependencies, we say that $\alpha$ and $\alpha'$ are data dependent when $(a, a') = (\xi(ax), c(\xi))$ with $ax$ appearing in $\xi$.

Definition 4.1 (independence). Two actions $\alpha$ and $\alpha'$ are said independent, written $\alpha \not\perp \alpha'$, when they are sequentially independent and data independent.

There is some redundancy in the trace space in that, intuitively, swapping adjacent, independent actions in a trace has no substantial effect. Still, this is rather weak: for example the recipe $proj_1((n, ax))$ is artifically dependent in the axiom ax, preventing optimisations. Such spurious dependencies can be erased using the following notion:

Definition 4.2 (recipe equivalence). Two input transitions

\[
(P, \Phi) \xrightarrow{c(\xi)} A \quad (P, \Phi) \xrightarrow{c(\xi)} A
\]

are said recipe equivalent when $\xi \Phi = E \xi_2 \Phi$. Two traces are recipe equivalent if one can be obtained from the other by replacing some transitions by recipe-equivalent ones.

The rest of this section formalises the intuition that equivalence by session can be studied up to recipe-equivalent rewriting of traces, and arbitrary permutation of their independent actions. Proofs can be found in Appendix C.1.

Correctness of por techniques If $tr = \alpha_1 \cdots \alpha_n$ and $\pi$ is a permutation of $[1, n]$, we write

\[
\pi.tr = \alpha_{\pi(1)} \cdots \alpha_{\pi(n)}.
\]

This is an action of the group of permutations of $[1, n]$ on action words of size $n$. We say that $\pi$ permutes independent actions of $tr$ if either $\pi = id$, or $\pi = \pi_0 o (i \cdot + 1)$ with $\alpha_i \parallel \alpha_{i+1}$ and $\pi_0$ permutes independent actions of $(i \cdot + 1).tr$. Such permutations preserve the group structure of permutations, in the sense of these two straightforward propositions:

Proposition 4.1 (composition). If $\pi$ permutes independent actions of $tr$, and $\pi'$ permutes independent actions of $\pi.tr$, then $\pi' o \pi$ permutes independent actions of $tr$.

Proposition 4.2 (inversion). If $\pi$ permutes independent actions of $tr$, then $\pi^{-1}$ permutes independent actions of $\pi.tr$.

We will use these two properties implicitly in many proofs. But more importantly, the action of permutations on trace words can be lifted to traces:

Proposition 4.3. If $t : A \rightarrow B$ and $\pi$ permutes independent actions of $tr$, then $A^{\pi.tr} \rightarrow B$. This trace is unique if we take labels into account, and will be referred as $\pi.t$.

Together with recipe equivalence, this is the core notion for defining partial-order reductions. We gather them into $\equiv_{por}$ the smallest equivalence relation over traces containing recipe equivalence and such that $t \equiv_{por} \pi.t$ when $\pi$ permutes independent actions of $t$. The result below justifies that quotients by $\equiv_{por}$ result in correct refinements.

Proposition 4.4 (correctness of por). Let $O_1' \subseteq O_2'$ be universal optimisations. We assume that for all $t \in O_2'$, there exists $t' \equiv_{por} t_{ext}$, where $t$ is a prefix of $t_{ext}$ such that $t' \in O_1'$. Then $O_1'$ is a correct refinement of $O_2'$.

4.2 Compression optimisations

We first present a compression of traces into blocks of actions of a same type (inputs, outputs and parallel, or internal communications) by exploiting Proposition 4.4. We formalise this idea by using reduction strategies based on polarity patterns.

Polarities and phases We assign polarities to processes depending on their toplevel actions: public inputs are positive (+1), public outputs and parallels are overwhelmingly negative (-∞), and others are null.

\[
\begin{array}{c|c|c}
\text{polar}(c(x), P) & 1 & c \in Ch_{pub} \\
polar(\bar{c}(u), P) & -\infty & c \in Ch_{pub} \\
polar(d(x), P) & 0 & d \in Ch_{priv} \\
polar(\bar{d}(u), P) & 0 & d \in Ch_{priv} \\
polar(0) & 0 & \\
polar(P | Q) & -\infty & \end{array}
\]

This notion is lifted to extended processes by summing:

\[
polar(P, \Phi) = \sum_{R \in P} polar(R).
\]

In particular, extended processes containing an executable parallel operator or output has polarity $-\infty$, and executing public inputs
makes polarity nonincreasing. We then identify the trace patterns at the core of our partial-order reductions. We say that a trace
\[
t : A_0 \xrightarrow{a_1} \cdots \xrightarrow{a_n} A_n
\]
- is a negative phase when all transitions are outputs or parallels, and \(\text{polar}(A_0) \neq -\infty\),
- is a null phase when \(\text{polar}(A_0) > 0\), \(n = 1\) and the transition is an internal communication.
- is a positive phase when \(\text{polar}(A_0) > 0\), all transitions are inputs, all \(L_i\)'s are equal, and \(\text{polar}(A_0) > \text{polar}(A_n)\).

Rephrasing, a negative phase executes all available outputs and parallels, a null phase is one internal communication, and a positive phase executes a whole chain of inputs. Note that only negative phases may be empty.

**Basic compression** The first optimisation is to only consider traces that can be decomposed into phases. Formally we write \(O_{c,b}'\) the set of traces of the form
\[
t : b_0^+ \cdot b_1^- \cdot b_1^+ \cdot b_2^- \cdot b_2^+ \cdots b_n^- \cdot b_n^-
\]
where each \(b_i^+\) is a positive or null phase, and each \(b_i^-\) is a negative phase. We show in Appendix C.3 that any maximal trace can be decomposed this way after application of a well-chosen permutation of independent actions. Hence by Proposition 4.4:

**Proposition 4.5.** \(O_{c,b}'\) is a correct refinement of \(O_{c,b}''\).

**Determinism of negative phases** Negative phases are non-deterministic by essence, but the underlying combinatorial explosion is artificial in that most of the actions within negative phases are independent: we show that they can actually be executed purely deterministically.

We fix an arbitrary total ordering \(\prec\) on labelled actions. A negative phase \(b^-\), with \(\text{tr}(b^-) = a_1 \cdots a_n\), is said consistent when for all \(i < n\) such that \(a_i \perp a_{i+1}\), we have \(a_i \prec a_{i+1}\). We write \(O_{c,b}'\) the subset of \(O_{c,b}''\) of traces whose negative phases are all consistent.

**Proposition 4.6.** \(O_{c}'\) is a correct refinement of \(O_{c,b}'\).

**Proof.** By Proposition 4.4, it suffices to prove that for all negative phases \(b^-\), there exists \(\pi\) permuting independent actions of \(b^-\) such that \(\pi.b^-\) is consistent. This follows from a well-founded induction on \(\text{tr}(b^-)\) w.r.t the lexicographic extension of \(\prec\) on words of actions. \(\square\)

### 4.3 Reduction optimisations

So far we compressed traces into sequences of phases. Now we show how independent phases can be reordered to reduce even further the complexity. This takes inspiration from the reduced semantics and improper blocks [BDH15].

**Blocks** A block is a positive or null phase followed by a negative phase. Any trace of \(O_{c}'\) is therefore composed of an initial negative phase and a sequence of blocks. Two blocks \(b\) and \(b'\) are said independent, written \(b \parallel b'\), if all actions of the former are independent of all actions of the latter. Analogously to actions, we refer to permutations \(\pi\) permuting independent blocks of traces of \(O_{c}'\). All related notations and results can be cast to blocks by using:

**Proposition 4.7.** Let \(t : b_p \cdots b_n\) a sequence of blocks, \(\text{tr}_t = \text{tr}(b_i)\). If \(\pi\) permutes independent blocks of \(\text{tr} = \text{tr}(t)\), then there is \(\pi'\) permuting independent actions of \(\text{tr}\) s.t.
\[
\pi'.\text{tr} = \pi.\text{tr} = \text{tr}(P) \cdots \text{tr}(P(n)).
\]

Note in particular this corollary of Proposition 4.4 that will be at the core of the results of this section, where \(\equiv_{b}\) is the analogue of \(\equiv_{p}\) where permutation of independent actions is replaced by permutation of independent blocks:

**Corollary 4.8.** Let \(O_{c}' \subseteq O_{c}' \subseteq O_{c}''\). We assume that for all \(t \in O_{c}',\) there exists \(t' \equiv_{b}\) such that \(t' \in O_{c}'.\) Then \(O_{c}'\) is a correct refinement of \(O_{c}''\).

**Improper blocks** Blocks may contain a negative phase that does not bring new knowledge to the attacker through public outputs. Such blocks can always be relegated to the end of traces, intuitively because they are not essential to execute other blocks. Formally, we say that a block
\[
b : (\mathcal{P}, \Phi) \xrightarrow{\text{tr}} (Q, \Phi \cup \{ax_1 \mapsto t_1, \ldots, ax_n \mapsto t_n\})
\]
is improper if
1. all labels appearing in \(\text{tr}\) do not appear in \(Q\), except maybe on null processes; and
2. for all \(i \in [1, n]\), \(t_i\) is deducible from \(\Phi\), that is, there exists a recipe \(\xi_i\) such that \(\xi_i \Phi = E t_i\).

This generalises improper blocks defined in [BDH15, CKR19], that require \(n = 0\). Our finer optimisation captures for example outputs of public error codes in the model of the e-passport in Example 2.2. We write \(O_{c,b}''\), the subset of \(O_{c}'\) of traces not containing an improper block followed by a proper block.

**Proposition 4.9.** \(O_{c,b}''\) is a correct refinement of \(O_{c}'\).

**Proof.** By Corollary 4.8, it suffices to show that for all traces of \(O_{c}'\), there exists a recipe-equivalent trace whose improper blocks are independent of all blocks following them. By Item (2) of the definition, by replacing each occurrence of \(ax_i\) by \(\xi_i\) in all input actions, we obtain a recipe-equivalent trace whose improper blocks are data independent of all blocks following them. Sequential indiscernability is then justified by Item (1). \(\square\)

Note that when restricting the definition to \(n = 0\), we obtain a weaker optimisation than the one presented in [BDH15]. The latter indeed additionally restricts to traces that contain at most one improper block. This, however, relies on determinate-specific arguments that are unsound for equivalence by session in general.

**Lexicographic reduction** Finally, as sequences of independent blocks can be permuted arbitrarily, we define an optimisation that fixes their order. Concretely we let \(\prec\) an ordering on blocks insensitive to recipes, and such that independent blocks are always strictly comparable. We define a predicate Minimal\((t, b)\) that tells...
whether adding the block \( b \) at the end of \( t \) still results in a minimal trace w.r.t.
the lexicographic extension of \( \prec \).

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Minimal}(b^-, b) & \quad b^- \text{ negative phase} \\
\text{Minimal}(b_1 \cdots b_n, b) & \quad \text{if } \neg(b_n \parallel b) \\
\text{Minimal}(b_1 \cdots b_n, b) & \quad \text{if } b_n < b \text{ and Minimal}(b_1 \cdots b_{n-1}, b)
\end{align*}
\]

We say that \( b \) is allowed after \( t \) if Minimal\((t, b')\) for all \( b' \) recipe equivalent to \( b \). This strengthens the optimisation by discarding spurious data dependencies. Then \( \mathcal{O}_{c+ \triangle}^\prime \subseteq \mathcal{O}_c^\prime \) is defined by the following inference rules.

\[
\begin{align*}
\frac{b^- \in \mathcal{O}_{c+ \triangle}^\prime}{t \in \mathcal{O}_{c+ \triangle}^\prime} & \quad b \text{ allowed after } t
\end{align*}
\]

To account for improper blocks, we write \( \mathcal{O}_{\text{por}}^\prime \) the set of traces of the form \( t : b^- \cdot t_p \cdot t_i \), where \( b^- \) is a negative phase, \( t_p \in \mathcal{O}_{c+ \triangle}^\prime \) only contains proper blocks, and \( t_i \in \mathcal{O}_{c+ \triangle}^\prime \) only contains improper blocks. The correctness of this optimisation relies on Corollary 4.8 and is proved in Appendix C.4.

**Proposition 4.10.** \( \mathcal{O}_{\text{por}}^\prime \) is a correct refinement of \( \mathcal{O}_{c+ \triangle}^\prime \).

### 5 Reductions by Symmetry

In this section, we show how to exploit process symmetries for equivalence by session. Such symmetries often appear in practice when we verify multiple sessions of a same protocol as it results into parallel copies of identical processes, up to renaming of fresh names. We first provide a group-theoretical characterisation of internal process redundancy, and then design two optimisations.

#### 5.1 Group actions and process redundancy

Let \( P = P_1 \mid \cdots \mid P_n \) be a plain process and \( \pi \in S_N \), where \( S_N \) denotes the symmetric group, namely the group of all permutations on \([1, n]\). We denote by \( \overline{P} \) and \( \pi \overline{P} \) the tuples of plain processes \( \overline{P} = (P_1, \ldots, P_n) \) and \( \pi \overline{P} = (P_{\pi(1)}, \ldots, P_{\pi(n)}) \).

We assume \( \pi \) an equivalence relation on tuples of processes that is stable under the action of permutations, i.e. for all tuples \( \overline{P}, \overline{Q} \) of size \( n \) and \( \pi \in S_N \)

\[
\pi \overline{P} \equiv \overline{Q} \Rightarrow \pi \overline{P} = \pi \overline{Q}.
\]

Process redundancy is then simply captured by the group stabiliser

\[
\text{Stab}_{\pi}(\overline{P}) = \{ \pi \in S_N \mid \pi \overline{P} = \overline{P} \}.
\]

**Example 5.1.** \( \text{Stab}_{\pi}(\langle P, \ldots, P \rangle) = S_N \) models the case where all parallel subprocesses are identical. On the contrary, the case where \( \text{Stab}_{\pi}(\langle P_1, \ldots, P_n \rangle) = \{ \text{id} \} \) models that there is no redundancy at all between parallel processes. Intermediate examples model partial symmetries: the larger the stabiliser, the more redundancy we have. For example, if \( P \not\equiv Q \), \( \text{Stab}_{\pi}(\langle P, P, Q, Q \rangle) \) is the subgroup of \( S_N \) generated by the permutations (1 2), (3 4) and (3 5).

**Proposition 5.1.** \( \text{Stab}_{\pi}(\overline{P}) \) is a subgroup of \( S_N \).

**Proof.** Consider the function \((\pi, \overline{P}) \mapsto \pi \overline{P} \). It is a group action of \( S_N \) on the set of tuples quotiented by the equivalence relation

\[
\triangleq. \text{ Such an action is well-defined by Equation (1). Stab}_{\pi}(\overline{P}) \text{ is a stabiliser of this action, hence the conclusion.}
\]

This formalisation takes root in classical work in model checking formalising the symmetries of systems by the group of their automorphisms [ES96]. Our optimisations consist of identifying suitable equivalence relations \( \equiv \) and refining the trace space based on the analysis of stabilisers.

#### 5.2 Structural equivalence

We exhibit an equivalence identifying processes that have an identical structure (up to associativity and commutativity of parallel operators) and whose data are equivalent w.r.t. the equational theory and alpha-renaming of private names. This will be the basis of our symmetry-based refinements.

We define **structural equivalence** \( \equiv \) on plain processes as the smallest equivalence relation such that

\[
P | Q \equiv Q | P \quad (P | Q) | R \equiv P | (Q | R)
\]

and that is closed under context (that is, composition of equivalent processes with either a same process in parallel, or an input, output, or conditional instruction at top-level). To account for the equational theory, we extend it to

\[
\sigma, \sigma' \text{ substitutions } P\sigma \equiv E \sigma' \quad \forall x \in X, x\sigma =_E x\sigma'
\]

Besides we add alpha equivalence of private names: intuitively, two agents executing the same protocol are behaving similarly even though they use their own session nonces. Formally if \( A \) is an extended process we define the relation \( \equiv_A^\D \) on tuples of processes

\[
\forall t, P_i \equiv_A Q_i \quad Q : N_{\text{priv}} \rightarrow N_{\text{priv}} \text{ bij. } \quad \emptyset |_{\text{names}(A)} = \text{id}
\]

\[
(P_1, \ldots, P_n) \equiv_A^\D (Q_1, \ldots, Q_n) \emptyset
\]

That is, only names outside of \( A \) (frame included) may be renamed. To conclude, it is straightforward that this relation satisfies the requirements of Section 5.1, i.e.:

**Proposition 5.2.** For all extended process \( A, \equiv_A^\D \) is an equivalence relation stable under the action of permutations (in the sense of Equation (1)).

#### 5.3 Universal symmetry optimisation

We first present a universal optimisation, i.e. a refinement of \( \mathcal{O}_{\text{por}}^\prime \). It captures the idea that, when considering the traces of several parallel protocol sessions, starting the trace by an action from one session or an other does not make a substantial difference. To formalise this idea, let us consider a compressed trace

\[
t : [P]^t \xrightarrow{tr} ([P_1]^t_{i=1}, \Phi_0) \in \mathcal{O}_c^\prime
\]

The goal is to exhibit conditions discarding some potential positive phases following \( t \). Technically speaking, we require that the symmetries observed in \( t \) are reflected in one way or another in \( \forall t, P_i \equiv_A^\D Q_i \). In the formal technical formalisation of these symmetries, we refer to traces \( t^2 \in \forall t, P_i \equiv_A^\D Q_i \) such that \( \text{fst}(t^2) = t \) using the following notations:

\[
t^2 : ([P]^t, Q) \xrightarrow{tr} ([P_1]^t_{i=1}, Q_i), \Phi_0, \Phi_1
\]
Homogeneous symmetry We first define a notion of symmetry within $P$ that is reflected in the matching with $Q$. If $a, b \in \{1, n\}$ and $\pi = (a, b)$, we write $a \leftrightarrow 1 b$ when
\[
\pi \in \operatorname{Stab}_{\equiv a}((P_1, \ldots, P_n))
\]
and for all traces $t^2$ verifying the hypotheses and notations of Equation (2), there exists a trace of the form
\[
([P]^t, Q) \xrightarrow{t^2} ([P_1]^t, Q_\pi(t))_{i=1}^n, \Phi_0, \Phi_1).
\]

Intuitively, the first condition expresses that $P_a$ and $P_b$ have the same traces, and the second ensures that they can be matched by the same sessions of $Q$. In particular for proving the equivalence by session of $P$ and $Q$, executing a block starting in $P_a$ or $P_b$ results into a similar analysis.

Heterogeneous symmetry We now define a notion of symmetry capturing redundancy occurring at the same time in $P$ and $Q$. If $a, b \in \{1, n\}$ and $\pi = (a, b)$, we write $a \leftrightarrow 2 b$ when there exists a permutation of $\mathcal{C}_{pub}$ such that
\[
\pi \cdot (P_1, \ldots, P_{a-1}, P_a, P_{a+1}, \ldots, P_b, P_{b+1}, \ldots, P_n) \equiv a \nu P
\]
and for all traces $t^2$ verifying the hypotheses and notations of Equation (2), we have
\[
\pi \cdot (Q_1, \ldots, Q_{a-1}, Q_a, Q_{a+1}, \ldots, Q_b, Q_{b+1}, \ldots, Q_n) \equiv a \nu Q
\]
These conditions express symmetries up to channel renaming, indeed public channels do not interfere with the data flow of traces and, therefore, two processes that are structurally-equivalent up to bijective renaming of such channels have a similar execution flow.

The optimisation All in all, we model symmetries in equivalence proofs by $\iff$ the smallest equivalence relation containing $\equiv_1$ and $\equiv_2$. The idea of our optimisation is then, when choosing a positive phase to execute after $t$, to consider only one input per equivalence class of $\equiv$.

This representant should however be picked carefully to avoid interference with the lexicographic reduction (Section 4.3). For that we refer again to the ordering on blocks introduced in that section. This ordering can be lifted to a total ordering on the set
\[
\{i \in \{1, n\} \mid \text{polar}(P_i) > 0\}
\]
by writing $i < j$ when $b_i < b_j$ for $b_i$ and $b_j$ arbitrary blocks starting by an action labelled, respectively, $\ell_i$ and $\ell_j$. This ordering is well-defined and total thanks to the assumptions that the original ordering on blocks is insensitive to recipes, and always relate independent blocks.

We thus qualify an input transition on process $P_a$ following the trace $t$ as well-formed if $a$ is minimal w.r.t. $\ll$ within its equivalence class for $\iff$. A trace is well-formed when all such transitions are, and we define the optimisation $O_{\text{sym}}'$ as the set of well-formed traces of $O_{\text{sym}}$. Its correctness is proved in Appendix D.1.

**Proposition 5.3.** $O_{\text{par}}' \cap O_{\text{sym}}'$ is a correct refinement of $O_{\text{par}}'$.

5.4 Existential symmetry optimisation

The goal of this optimisation is to exploit symmetries when applying the matching rule: when several processes are structurally equivalent then we do not need to consider redundant matchings. For instance, suppose that we need to match $P_1 \mid P_2$ with $Q \mid Q$. Just considering the identity permutation would be sufficient, and the permutation $(1, 2)$ should be considered as redundant. Formally, let us consider an instance of the rule (MATCH)
\[
(P^2 \cup \{(P, Q), \Phi_0, \Phi_1\} \xrightarrow{t} (P^2 \cup \{(P_1, Q_\pi(t))\}_{i=1}^n, \Phi_0, \Phi_1))(3)
\]
with $P = P_1 \mid \ldots \mid P_n$ and $Q = Q_1 \mid \ldots \mid Q_n$. We let $\alpha = (\text{snd}(P^2), \Phi_0)$, and define the relation on permutations
\[
\pi \sim \pi' \iff \exists u \in \operatorname{Stab}_{\equiv a}((Q)), \pi' = \pi \circ u.
\]
**Proposition 5.4.** $\sim$ is an equivalence relation.

**Proof.** This essentially follows from Proposition 5.1, i.e. from the fact that $\operatorname{Stab}_{\equiv a}(Q)$ is a group. Reflexivity: a group of permutations contains the identity; symmetry: a group is closed by inverse; transitivity: a group is closed by composition. 

Let us say that an instance of Equation (3) is well-formed when $\pi$ is minimal within its equivalence class for $\sim$, w.r.t. an arbitrary total ordering on permutations. We denote by $O_{\text{sym}}^{\equiv_\sim}$ the set of traces of extended twin-processes whose instances of (3) are all well-formed. The correctness of this optimisation is stated below and proved in Appendix D.2.

**Proposition 5.5.** $O_{\text{sym}}^{\equiv_\sim}$ is a correct refinement of $O_{\text{all}}^{\equiv_\sim}$.

6 SYMBOLIC SETTING

Even though we do not consider unbounded replication, the semantics of our process calculus defines an infinite transition system due to the unbounded number of possible inputs that can be provided by the adversary. To perform exhaustive verification of such infinite systems, it is common to resort to symbolic techniques abstracting inputs by symbolic variables and constraints. We briefly describe in this section how our optimisations are integrated in the symbolic procedure underlying the DeepSec tool.

6.1 DeepSec’s baseline procedure

**Symbolic setting** In the DeepSec tool [CKR18b] and its underlying theory [CKR18a], the deduction capabilities of the attacker are represented by so-called deduction facts $X \vdash \nu u$, intuitively meaning that the attacker is able to deduce the term $u$ by the means of a recipe represented by the variable $X$. Additionally, conditional branching, e.g. if $u = v$ then $\ldots$ else $\ldots$, is represented by equations $u = v$ and disequations $u \neq v$.

To represent infinitely many processes, [CKR18a] relies on symbolic processes $(P, \Phi, C)$ where $P$ and $\Phi$ are, as in our setting, a multiset of processes and a frame respectively. The difference is that the processes and frame may contain free variables: they model the variables bound by inputs and are subject to constraints in $C$. These constraints are a conjunction of deduction facts, equations and disequations. For example, if we consider the process
\[
P = c(x), \text{if } \text{proj}_1(x) = t \text{ then } \tau(h(x))
\]
then after executing symbolically the input and the positive branch of the test, we reach the symbolic process

\[(\emptyset), (ax \mapsto h(x)), X \vdash^3 x \land \text{proj}_1(x) = ? t)\]

A concrete extended process is thus represented by any ground instantiation of the free variables of the symbolic process that satisfies the constraints in \(C\). Such instantiations are called solutions, and therefore form an abstraction of concrete traces treated as symbolic objects and constraint solving.

**Example 6.1.** Let us consider again the simplified model of BAC of Example 2.2. When executing the passport process \(P(k,n)\) until reaching the success token \(ok\), the constraints aggregate as

\[C = X_0 \vdash^3 x_0 \land x_0 \vdash^3 \text{get\_challenge} \land \]

\[X \vdash^3 x \land \text{sdéc}(x,k) = ? n\]

Intuitively the internal constraint solver will gradually deduce that solutions to this constraint need to map \(x\) to a term of the form \(\text{senc}(y_1,y_2,y_3)\), and will add the equations \(y_1 = ? n\) and \(y_3 = ? k\).

**Partition tree** To decide trace equivalence between two plain processes \(P\) and \(Q\), the procedure underlying DeepSec builds a refined tree of symbolic executions of \(P\) and \(Q\), called a partition tree. This finite, symbolic tree intuitively embodies all scenarios of (potential violations of) equivalence, and the final decision criterion is a simple syntactic check on this tree.

More technically, nodes of the partition tree contain sets of symbolic processes derived from \(P\) or \(Q\); that is, a branch is a symbolic abstraction of a subset of \(\mathcal{T}(P) \cup \mathcal{T}(Q)\). It is constructed in a way that each node contains all—and only—equivalent processes reachable from \(P\) or \(Q\) with given trace actions \(tr\). When generating this tree, trace equivalence holds if and only if each node contains at least one symbolic process derived from \(P\) and one from \(Q\).

### 6.2 Symbolic matching

**Subprocess matchings** To make the integration into DeepSec easier, we used an alternative characterisation of equivalence by session that is closer to trace equivalence. In essence, it expresses the structural constraints imposed by twin processes as explicit bijections between labels (as defined in Section 4.1) that we call session matchings. A precise definition is given in Appendix A, with a proof that this is equivalent to the twin-process-based definition.

In practice, our implementation consists of keeping track of these session matchings into the nodes of the partition tree generated by DeepSec. The set of all these bijections is then updated at each new symbolic transition step in the partition tree, among others to satisfy the requirement that matched subprocesses should have the same skeleton.

**Example 6.2.** Consider two initial processes

\[P = c(x).P_0 \mid c(x).P_1 \mid \mathcal{T}(u).P_2\]

\[Q = c(x).Q_0 \mid \mathcal{T}(u').Q_1 \mid c(x).Q_2\] .

In the root of the partition tree, \(P\) and \(Q\) will be labeled by 0, i.e. the root will contain the two symbolic processes

\[([P]_0^0), \emptyset, \emptyset) \quad \quad \quad ([Q]_0^0), \emptyset, \emptyset).\]

There is only a single bijection between their labels, i.e. the identity \(0 \mapsto 0\). Upon receiving this initial node, DeepSec applies the symbolic transition corresponding to our rule (Par), hence generating the two symbolic processes

\[([c(x).P_0]_0^0); ([c(x).P_1]_0^0, [\mathcal{T}(u).P_2]_0^0, \emptyset, \emptyset)\]

\[([c(x).Q_0]_0^0); ([\mathcal{T}(u').Q_1]_0^0, [c(x).Q_2]_0^0, \emptyset, \emptyset)\]

There are then only two possible bijection of labels that respect the skeleton requirement of twin processes:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>0.1 (\mapsto) 0.1</th>
<th>0.1 (\mapsto) 0.3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.2 (\mapsto) 0.3</td>
<td>0.2 (\mapsto) 0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.3 (\mapsto) 0.2</td>
<td>(\triangle)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These bijections are kept within the node of the partition tree and updated alongside the other transformation rules of DeepSec. For obvious performance reasons, we cannot represent them by a naive enumeration of all process permutations. Fortunately, the skeleton requirement ensures an invariant that the set \(S\) of session matchings between two processes \(A\) and \(B\) is always of the form

\[S = \{\pi \mid \forall i. \forall c_i \in C_i, \pi(i) \in D_i\}\]

where the sets \(C_1, \ldots, C_n\) form a partition of the labels of \(A\) and \(D_1, \ldots, D_n\) a partition of the labels of \(B\). In particular, \(S\) can succinctly be stored as a simple association list of equivalence classes.

**Decision of equivalence** Finally, as our trace refinements depend on two sets \(O^\circ\) and \(O^3\), we annotate each symbolic process in the node by \(\forall\), \(\exists\) or \(\forall\exists\) tags. They mark whether the trace from the root of the partition tree to the tagged process is determined to be in \(O^\circ\), \(O^3\) or both respectively. For instance, the two initial symbolic processes in the root of the partition tree are labeled by \(\forall\exists\). We also provide a decision procedure for inclusion by session \(\exists_{\forall}\) that consists of tagging one of the initial processes as \(\forall\) and the other one as \(\exists\).

The decision criterion for equivalence is then strengthened. For equivalence to hold, not only each node of the partition tree should contain at least one process originated from \(P\) and one process originated from \(Q\), but each of them that has the tag \(\forall\) should be paired with at least one other process of the node with the tag \(\exists\).

### 6.3 Integration

From a high-level of abstraction, the integration of the universal optimisations described in Sections 4 and 5 prune some branches of the partition tree—those that abstract traces that do not belong to \(O'^\circ\cup\)\(O'^3\). For instance in Section 4.2, we showed that to prove equivalence by session, we can always perform non-input actions in priority. Therefore on a process \(\mathcal{T}(u).P \mid c(x).Q\), we prevent DeepSec from generating a node corresponding to the execution of the input due to the presence of the output.

The integration of other optimisations is more technical in a symbolic setting, in particular the lexicographic reduction \(O'^\circ\cup\)\(O'^3\) described in Section 4.3. Remember that it discards traces that do not satisfy the predicate Minimal, that identifies lexicographically-minimal traces among those obtained by permutation of independent blocks. Unfortunately, the definition of independence (Definition 4.1) is only defined for ground actions—and not their sym-
bolic counterpart, that intuitively abstracts a set of ground actions. A branch may therefore be removed only if all its solutions violate the predicate Minimal. However, by Proposition 3.8, it is correct to only partially implement such optimisations.

7 EXPERIMENTS

In practice Based on the high-level description of the previous section, we extended the implementation of DeepSec to decide equivalence by session of P and Q. Upon completing an analysis, two cases can arise:

(1) The two processes are proved equivalent by session. Then they are also trace equivalent by Proposition 3.1.

(2) The two processes are not equivalent by session and DeepSec returns an attack trace t, say, in P, as a result.

In the second case, when using equivalence by session as a heuristic for trace equivalence, the conclusion is not straightforward. As discussed in Section 3.2, the witness trace t may not violate trace equivalence (false attack). We integrated a simple test to our prototype, that checks whether this is the case or not. For that we leverage the internal procedure of DeepSec by, intuitively, restricting the generation of the partition tree for checking $P \triangleleft_{tr} Q$ to the unique branch corresponding to the trace t.

If this trace t appears to violate trace equivalence, which is the case for example in our analysis of two sessions of the BAC protocol, we naturally conclude that $P \not\approx_{tr} Q$. Otherwise, the false attack may guide us to discover a real attack: our analysis of session equivalence consider traces with a specific shape (see Sections 4 and 5). Thus, we implemented a simple heuristic that, whenever a false attack is discovered, also checks whether different permutations of actions of this false attack could lead to a true attack. For instance, this heuristic allowed us to disprove trace equivalence in some analyses of $n \geq 3$ sessions of BAC. When our heuristic cannot discover a true attack, the result is not conclusive: the processes may well be trace equivalent or not. We leave to future work the design of a complete decision procedure for trace equivalence that builds on a preliminary analysis of equivalence by session.

Experimental setting We report experiments (Figure 4) comparing the scope and efficiency of the following two approaches for proving trace equivalence:

- The original version of DeepSec as a baseline;
- The analysis leveraging our contributions (preliminary analysis of equivalence by session, test of false attack if it fails, and then the heuristic attempting to reconstruct a true attack).

We describe the benchmarks below in more details. The column # roles is an indicator of the intricacy of the system (number of parallel processes that the model file exhibits).

Benchmarks were carried out on 20 Intel Xeon 3.10GHz cores, with 30 Gb of memory. We ran the toy example described in this paper on a single core to illustrate simply the algorithmic improvements compared to DeepSec. As DeepSec supports parallelisation, we distributed the computation of the other, bigger proofs over 20 cores. The implementation and the specification files are available at https://deepsec-prover.github.io/.

Running example: toy BAC We modelled the simplified analysis of unlinkability in the BAC protocol described in Examples 2.2 and 2.4 as a simple instance to compare our prototype and DeepSec in terms of scope and efficiency. We gather several variants of the analysis:

- 2 sessions: both DeepSec and our prototype are able to find an attack trace
- 3 sessions: DeepSec times out and our prototype finds a false attack. This is due to the fact that, by executing outputs in priority (recall the por in Section 4), more intermediate actions are available to match the trace. However our heuristic manages to reconstruct a true attack trace by delaying some output actions.
- we also consider a variant where we remove the get\_challenge message from the protocol description. Our prototype now reports a false attack for 3 sessions and fails to conclude.

The failure in the last variant is not a limitation of our heuristic: by pushing the limits of the baseline version of DeepSec, we actually obtained after 8 days of computation that trace equivalence held. This is intuitively because the attacker cannot statically distinguish between a fresh nonce n (as output by passports) and a cipher $\text{senc}(n', r, k)$ (as output by readers). In particular, without the get\_challenge, each passport can perform at top level an output action that is indistinguishable from a reader output, leaving much more possibilities for matching traces.

On the contrary if we assume that the adversary can distinguish between passport and reader actions (which can be achieved in the model by using two distinct channels for the passport and the reader processes), our prototype manages to disprove trace equivalence again.

BAC We also studied a more realistic model of BAC [For04]. The baseline version of DeepSec still fails to analyse 3 or more sessions, while our prototype reaches up to 5 sessions. On one side of the equivalence all n systems are distinct (fresh), while on the other side a same system may appear several times: our analysis indicates that, pending on how many identical systems the process contains, the same number of errors may not be observable.

Although not present in the result table, we also implemented inclusion by session (see Section 6.2) as it is sometimes used to define other flavours of unlinkability.

Helios We also consider the Helios protocol for electronic voting [Adi08]. We analyse vote privacy of a version that uses zero-knowledge proofs to ensure the voter knows the plaintext of her vote, thus avoiding copy-attacks [CS13]. Vote privacy is formalised using a classical vote-swapping model, that is, we want to prove the equivalence of two situations where two honest votes have been exchanged.

A reduction result of Arapinis et al. [ACK16] ensures that, for such models, it is sufficient to consider two honest voters and one dishonest voter (that is implicit in the model, embedded in the intruder capabilities) to obtain a proof of the system for an unbounded number of sessions. Such scenarios could already be han-
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Protocol</th>
<th>scenario</th>
<th># roles</th>
<th>DeepSec baseline</th>
<th>DeepSec eq. by session</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Toy BAC</td>
<td>2 identical</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>✓ &lt;1s</td>
<td>✓ &lt;1s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 identical + 1 fresh</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>✓ &lt;1s</td>
<td>✓ &lt;1s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAC</td>
<td>2 identical</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>✓ &lt;1s</td>
<td>✓ &lt;1s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 identical + 1 fresh</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>✓ 8 days (≈ 3)</td>
<td>✗ &lt;1s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 identical + 1 fresh</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>✓ &lt;1s</td>
<td>✓ &lt;1s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 identical + 1 fresh</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>✓ &lt;1s</td>
<td>✓ 2s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 identical + 1 fresh</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>✓ &lt;1s</td>
<td>✓ 3s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 identical + 2 fresh</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>✓ &lt;1s</td>
<td>✓ 1m20s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 identical + 1 fresh</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>✓ &lt;1s</td>
<td>✓ 4s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 identical + 2 fresh</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>✓ 8 days (≈ 2)</td>
<td>✓ 9m22s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 identical + 3 fresh</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>✓ &lt;1s</td>
<td>✓ 11h06m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helios</td>
<td>no revote</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>✓ &lt;1s</td>
<td>✓ &lt;1s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 x A 1 x B</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>✓ 2h41m</td>
<td>✓ 1m2s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 x A 1 x B</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>✓ &lt;1s</td>
<td>✓ 2m40s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 x A 2 x B</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>✓ &lt;1s</td>
<td>✓ 7m40s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 x A 2 x B</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>✓ &lt;1s</td>
<td>✓ 16m36s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7 x A 3 x B</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>✓ &lt;1s</td>
<td>✓ 3h53m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helios</td>
<td>2 honest + 1 dishonest</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>✓ &lt;1s</td>
<td>✓ 3m26s (each)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7 ballots (19 scenarios)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>✓ &lt;1s</td>
<td>✓ 3m26s (total)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scytl</td>
<td>vote privacy</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>✓ &lt;1s</td>
<td>✓ &lt;1s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AKA</td>
<td>anonymity</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>✓ &lt;1s</td>
<td>✓ &lt;1s</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

✓ trace equivalence verified  ✓ trace equivalence violated  ☐ timeout (12 hours)
✗ false attack (disproves session equivalence but unable to conclude for trace equivalence)

Figure 4: Experimental evaluation

dled by automated analysers, e.g. DeepSec [CKR18a]. However, when revoting is allowed, as it is the case for Helios, one needs to consider all scenarios when the tally accepts 7 ballots. In particular, it is not sufficient to consider only re-votes by the adversary, but also arbitrary revotes of the two honest voters. In Figure 4 we listed several scenarios, indexed by how many times the honest voters A and B are sending revotes.

This kind of analysis is out of the scope of many automated analysers. For example, Figure 4 shows that DeepSec fails to prove after 12h of computation any scenarios where more than one honest revote is emitted. In [ACK16] the ProVerif proofs are limited to dishonest revotes. We compiled several intermediary scenarios to give an overview of the verification-time growth using our prototype, but all are subsumed by the last scenario were we allow A to revote 7 times and B 3 times. Indeed, using a simple symmetry argument on A and B this covers all scenarios where honest voters cast a total of 7 ballots. Note however that, strictly speaking, the reduction result of [ACK16] does not bound the number of emitted honest revotes (that may not be effectively received by the ballot box) that have to be considered during an analysis of vote privacy; extensions of this reduction should be considered in the future.

We also experimented an other model of voting privacy inspired by the game-based definition BPRIV [BCG+15]. In this definition the (re)votes are dictated to honest voters by the adversary, which permits to effectively model revotes of arbitrary values. As reported in Figure 4 the prototype handles the 19 queries modelling all revote scenarios for 7 emitted ballots, in a total of a few minutes.

About the modelling of mixnets. The version of Helios we analyse relies on a mixnet, which can be represented in several ways that may trigger or not a false attack. Mixnets are usually modelled as processes receiving the values to mix, and then outputing them in an arbitrary order induced by the inherent non-determinism of concurrency. However this can be performed using two models (where c ∈ C_{priv}):

\text{MixSeq} = (c(x), c(y), \overline{c(x)} | \overline{c(y)})
\text{MixPar} = (c(x), \overline{c(x)} | c(y) | \overline{c(y)})

In the second case, subprocess-matching constraints arise earlier in the trace, triggering a false attack. However, the natural modelling of MixSeq allows to complete a security proof. We observed the same behaviour on other experimentation on voting protocols with mixnets.
Other case studies As side experiments, we also tried our prototype on other model files of similar tools that we could find in the literature. We performed for example an analysis of vote privacy of an e-voting protocol by Sctyl deployed in the Swiss canton of Neuchâtel, based on the ProVerif file presented in [CGT18]. We also studied anonymity in a model of the AKA protocol deployed in 3G telephony networks [AMR12] (without XOR), presented in the previous version of DeepSec [CKR18a].

8 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

In this paper we introduce a new process equivalence, the equivalence by session. We show that it is a sound proof technique for trace equivalence which allows for several optimisations when performing automated verification. This includes powerful partial order reductions, that were previously restricted to the class of determinate processes, and allows to exploit symmetries that naturally arise when verifying multiple sessions of a same protocol. In addition to the theoretical basis we have implemented these techniques in the DeepSec tool and evaluated their effectiveness in practice. The optimisations indeed allowed for efficient verification of non-determinate processes that were previously out of scope of existing techniques.

We also discussed how to handle the false attacks, that are a natural consequence of the fact that equivalence by session is a strict refinement of trace equivalence. We implemented a test to verify automatically, when equivalence by session is disproved, whether the underlying attack is genuine with respect to trace equivalence. When this is not the case, as part of future work it would be interesting to refine the part of the proof that failed, while exploiting that some parts of the system has already been shown to satisfy equivalence.

REFERENCES


A EXPLICIT SESSION MATCHINGS

In this section we present an alternative characterisation of equivalence by session. The process matchings operated by twin processes—in particular in the rule (MATCH) of the semantics—are represented by an explicit permutation with properties mirroring the structure of twin processes.

Twin-process based characterisations makes it easier to define symmetry-based optimisations and limit the manipulation of permutations to the minimum, thus simplifying many proofs. On the contrary, the formalism presented here makes a closer link with the definition of trace equivalence:

• this is the characterisation we use in the implementation, fitting better to the existing procedure of the DeepSec prover for trace equivalence;

• we use it in Appendix B for proving the completeness of equivalence by session for determinate processes.

Session matchings We first characterise the condition under which, given two traces $t, t'$, there exists $t^2$ such that $\text{fst}(t^2) = t$ and $\text{snd}(t^2) = t'$. For that we rely on the notion of labels introduced in Section 4.1 to make reference to subprocess positions. In the rest of the paragraph, we refer to two plain processes in $\rightsquigarrow$-normal form $P, Q$ such that $\text{skel}(P) = \text{skel}(Q)$ and two labelled traces $t \in \mathcal{T}(P), t' \in \mathcal{T}(Q)$ such that $tr(t) = tr(t')$:

$$t : A_0 \xrightarrow{a_1^{l_1}} \cdots \xrightarrow{a_n^{l_n}} A_n \quad t' : B_0 \xrightarrow{a_1^{'l_1'}} \cdots \xrightarrow{a_n^{'l_n'}} B_n$$

We write $L$ and $L'$ the sets of labels appearing in $t$ and $t'$.

Definition A.1. A session matching for $t$ and $t'$ is a bijection $\pi : L \rightarrow L'$ verifying the following properties

1. $\pi(\epsilon) = \epsilon$
2. $\forall i \in \mathbb{I}, \pi(l_i) = l_i'$
3. $\forall t \cdot p \in \text{dom}(\pi), \exists q, \pi(t \cdot p) = \pi(t) \cdot q$
4. for all $i \in [0, n]$, if $\pi(i) = i'$ and $A_i$ and $B_i$ respectively contain a process $[P]$ and a process $[Q]$, then $\text{skel}(P) = \text{skel}(Q)$.

Proposition A.1. The following two points are equivalent:

1. There exists a session matching for $t$ and $t'$.
2. $\exists t^2 \in \mathcal{T}(P, Q), \text{fst}(t^2) = t$ and $\text{snd}(t^2) = t'$.

Proof of $(1) \Rightarrow (2)$. The trace $t^2$ can be easily constructed by induction on the length of $t$:

• Items (1) and (4) of Definition A.1 ensure that the twin-processes in $t^2$ are composed of pairs of processes with the same skeleton as expected,

• Item (2) ensures that pairs of transitions of $P$ and $Q$ can be mapped into transitions of twin-processes, and

• The permutations that are required by applications of the rule (MATCH) can be inferred from Item (3). Indeed, consider two instances of the rule (PAR) in $t$ and $t'$:

$$\left( \left\{ [P_1 | \ldots | P_n]^{l_1} \right\} \cup P, \Phi \right) \rightsquigarrow \left( \left\{ [P_1]^{l_i} \right\}_{i=1}^n \cup P, \Phi \right)$$

Given $\pi$ a session matching for $t$ and $t'$, we consider the permutation $\pi(l \cdot p)$ mapping $i \in \mathbb{I}, n$ to the (unique) $j$ such that $\pi(l \cdot p) = l' \cdot j$. This permutation can be used to construct the instance of rule (MATCH) corresponding to these two (PAR) transitions.

Proof of $(2) \Rightarrow (1)$. Let $t^2$ be a trace given by Item (2). We lift the labellings of $t = \text{fst}(t^2)$ and $t' = \text{snd}(t^2)$ to the twin processes appearing in $t^2$; that is, if $P^2$ is such a process, we may refer to the labellings of $\text{fst}(P^2)$ and $\text{snd}(P^2)$. Thus, each instance of rule (MATCH) in $t^2$

$$\left( \left\{ [P_1 | \ldots | P_n]^{l_1} \right\} \cup [Q_1 | \ldots | Q_n]^{l_2} \right) \cup P^2, \Phi_0, \Phi_1 \rightsquigarrow$$

$$\left( \left\{ [P_1]^{l_i} \right\}_{i=1}^n \cup [Q_2]^{l_i'}, \Phi_0, \Phi_1 \right)$$

can be associated with a permutation $\sigma$ and two labels $l, l'$. We list all such elements $\sigma_0, \ell_1, \ell_1', \ldots, \sigma_p, \ell_p, \ell_p'$ when considering all instances of rule (MATCH) in $t^2$. In particular the $\ell_i'$’s are pairwise distinct and, if $L$ is the set of labels appearing in $t$, we have

$$L = \{ \epsilon \} \cup \bigcup_{i=1}^p (\ell_i \cdot j \in \text{dom}(\sigma_i))$$

An analogous statement can be done for $L'$ the set of labels appearing in $t'$. Therefore the following equations well define a bijection $\pi : L \rightarrow L'$:

$$\pi(\epsilon) = \epsilon \quad \forall \sigma \in \text{dom}(\sigma), \pi(\ell_i \cdot p) = \ell_i' \cdot \sigma(p)$$

A quick induction on the length of $t^2$ shows that $\pi$ is a session matching for $t$ and $t'$.

Link with equivalence As a direct corollary, we give an alternative characterisation of equivalence by session.

Proposition A.2. Let $P, Q$ be plain processes in $\rightsquigarrow$-normal form such that $\text{skel}(P) = \text{skel}(Q)$. The following points are equivalent:
(1) \( P \sqsubseteq Q \)
(2) for all \( t \in \mathbb{T}(P) \), there exist \( t' \in \mathbb{T}(Q) \) and a session matching for \( t \) and \( t' \), such that \( tr(t) = tr(t') \) (labels removed) and \( \Phi(t) \sim \Phi(t') \)

**B FALSE ATTACKS AND DETERMINACY**

In this section we give a detailed proof of the claim of Section 3 that false attacks cannot arise for determinate processes, i.e.

**Proposition 3.2.** If \( P, Q \) are determinate plain processes such that \( P \equiv_r Q \) then \( P \equiv_s Q \).

In the proof, by slight abuse of notation, we may say that an extended process is deterministic if it is also cast the notion of skeleton to extended processes by writing

\[
skel((P, \Phi)) = \skel(P) = \bigcup_{P \in \mathbb{P}} \skel(P),
\]

and to traces with

\[
\skel(A_{a_1} \rightarrow \cdots \rightarrow a_n \Rightarrow A_n) = \skel(A_0) \cdot \skel(A_1) \cdot \cdots \cdot \skel(A_n).
\]

That is, the skeleton of a trace is the sequence of the skeletons of the processes of which it is composed. Thus if

\[
t : A_0 \rightarrow a_1 \rightarrow \cdots \rightarrow a_n \rightarrow A_n \quad \text{and} \quad t' : B_0 \rightarrow \beta_1 \rightarrow \cdots \rightarrow \beta_p \rightarrow B_p
\]

we have \( \skel(t) = \skel(t') \) iff \( n = p \) and for all \( i \in [0, n] \), \( \skel(A_i) = \skel(B_i) \).

**Simplifying equivalence** First we simplify the problem by forcing the application of (Par) rules in priority in traces.

**Definition B.1.** If \( P \) is a plain process in \( \sim_r \)-normal form, we write \( \mathbb{T}_r(P) \) the set of traces where the rule (Par) is always performed in priority, i.e. where the rules (In) and (Out) are never applied to extended processes \( (P, \Phi) \) such that \( P \) contains a process with a parallel at its root (i.e. a process \( P \) such that \( |\skel(P)| > 1 \)).

**Proposition B.1.** If \( P, Q \) are plain processes in \( \sim_r \)-normal form such that \( \skel(P) = \skel(Q) \):

- \( P \equiv_r Q \) iff \( \forall t \in \mathbb{T}_r(P) \) there exists \( t' \in \mathbb{T}_r(Q) \) such that \( t \sim t' \)
- \( P \sqsubseteq Q \) iff \( \forall t \in \mathbb{T}_r(P) \) there exists \( t' \in \mathbb{T}_r(Q), t = \st(t') - \sd(t') \)

**Proof.** The first point is standard. The proof of the second point can be seen as a corollary of the compression optimisations of equivalence by session (see Section 4.2).

**Definition B.2.** An extended process \( A = (P_1, \ldots, P_n, \Phi) \) is \( \tau \)-
deter
imistic if there is at most one \( i \in [1, n] \) such that \( P_i \) has a parallel operator at its root (i.e. \( |\skel(P_i)| > 1 \)).

The \( \tau \)-determinism will be an invariant in proofs by induction on the length of traces. More precisely, if \( A, B \) are extended processes we call \( \mathbb{I}n(A, B) \) the property stating

(i) \( A_1, B_1 \) are deterministic
(ii) \( \skel(A_i) = \skel(B_i) \)
(iii) \( A_1 \sim B_1 \)
(iv) \( A_1, B_1 \) are \( \tau \)-deterministic, and \( A_1 \) contains a process with a parallel operator at its root (i.e. a process \( P_i \) such that \( |\skel(P_i)| > 1 \) if \( B_i \) does.

**Equivalence and inclusion** We prove that trace equivalence coincides with a notion of trace inclusion strengthened with identical actions and skeleton checks.

**Proposition B.2.** If \( P, Q \) are determinate plain processes in \( \sim_r \)-normal form s.t. \( \skel(P) = \skel(Q) \), then the following points are equivalent

(1) \( P \equiv_r Q \)
(2) \( \forall t \in \mathbb{T}_r(P), \exists t' \in \mathbb{T}_r(Q), \begin{cases} tr(t) = tr(t') \\
\Phi(t) \sim \Phi(t') \\
\skel(t) = \skel(t') \end{cases} \)

**Proof of (2) \( \Rightarrow \) (1).** Given \( A, B \) two deterministic extended processes we write \( \varphi(A, B) \) the property stating

\[
\forall t \in \mathbb{T}_r(A), \exists t' \in \mathbb{T}_r(B), \begin{cases} tr(t) = tr(t') \\
\Phi(t) \sim \Phi(t') \\
\skel(t) = \skel(t') \end{cases}
\]

Note that \( \varphi(A, B) \) implies \( \skel(A) = \skel(B) \) by choosing the empty trace. In particular, to prove (2) \( \Rightarrow \) (1), it suffices to prove that for all \( A, B \) determinate, \( \varphi(A, B) \Rightarrow A \equiv_r B \) and \( \varphi(A, B) \Rightarrow \varphi(B, A) \).

The first implication is immediate. As for the second, we prove that for all extended processes \( A_0, B_0 \) such that \( \varphi(A_0, B_0) \) and \( \mathbb{I}n(A_0, B_0) \), and all

\[
t' : B_0 \rightarrow a_1 \rightarrow \cdots \rightarrow a_n \rightarrow B_n \in \mathbb{T}_r(B_0),
\]

there exists

\[
t : A_0 \rightarrow a_1 \rightarrow \cdots \rightarrow a_n \rightarrow A_n \in \mathbb{T}_r(A_0),
\]

s.t. for all \( i \in [0, n] \), \( \mathbb{I}n(A_i, B_i) \). This is sufficient to conclude as \( \mathbb{I}n(P, Q) \) holds for any determinate plain processes \( P, Q \) in \( \sim_r \)-normal form s.t. \( \skel(P) = \skel(Q) \).

We proceed by induction on \( n \). If \( n = 0 \) the conclusion is immediate. Otherwise, assume by induction hypothesis that it holds for any trace of length \( n - 1 \).

> **case 1:** \( a_1 = \tau \).

We know that \( B_0 \) does not contain private channels by determinacy \( \mathbb{I}n(A_0, B_0) \) (i)). Therefore, the transition \( B_0 \rightarrow B_1 \) is derived by the rule (Par). In particular by \( \mathbb{I}n(A_0, B_0) \) (iv), there also exists a transition \( A_0 \rightarrow A_1 \). The conclusion can now follow from the induction hypothesis applied to \( A_1, B_1 \); but to apply it we have to prove that \( \varphi(A_1, B_1) \) and \( \mathbb{I}n(A_1, B_1) \) hold.

> **proof that** \( \varphi(A_1, B_1) \).

Let \( s \in \mathbb{T}_r(A_1) \). Then \( (A_0 \rightarrow A_1) \cdot s \in \mathbb{T}_r(A_0) \) and by \( \varphi(A_0, B_0) \) there exists \( (B_0 \rightarrow B_1') \cdot s' \in \mathbb{T}_r(B_0) \) such that \( tr(s) = tr(s') \), \( \Phi(t) \sim \Phi(t') \) and \( \skel(t) = \skel(t') \). But by \( \tau \)-determinism of \( B_0 \) we deduce that \( B_1 = B_1' \), and \( s' \in \mathbb{T}_r(B_1) \) satisfies the expected requirements.

> **proof that** \( \mathbb{I}n(A_1, B_1) \).

(i) \( A_0 \) and \( B_0 \) are determinate and determinacy is preserved by transitions.
(ii) \( \skel(A_1) = \skel(A_0) = \skel(B_0) = \skel(B_1) \)
(ii) $A_0 \sim B_0$ and the rule $\text{(Par)}$ does not affect the frame.

(iv) $A_0$ and $B_0$ are $\tau$-deterministic and $\tau$-determinism is preserved by transitions (w.r.t. $T_r$). Besides due to the $\sim$-normalisation, we know that neither of $A_1$ nor $B_1$ contain a parall operator, hence the result.

\[ \text{ case 2: } \alpha_1 \neq \tau. \]

By definition $T_r(B_0)$, we know that the rule $\text{(Par)}$ is not applicable to $B_0$: neither to $A_0$ by Inv($A_0, B_0$) Item (iv), which means that traces of $T_r(B_0)$ may start by an application of rules (In) or (Out). Using this and the fact that $\text{ske}l(A_0) = \text{ske}l(B_0)$ (Inv($A_0, B_0$) Item (iii)), we obtain that there exists a transition $A_0 \xrightarrow{\alpha_1} A_1$. The conclusion can now follow from the induction hypothesis applied to $A_1, B_1$; but to apply it we have to prove that $\varphi(A_1, B_1)$ and Inv($A_1, B_1$) hold.

\[ \rightarrow \text{ proof that } \varphi(A_1, B_1). \]

The argument is the same as its analogue in case 1, using the determinacy of $B_0$ instead of its $\tau$-determinism.

\[ \rightarrow \text{ proof that Inv}(A_1, B_1). \]

(i) $A_0$ and $B_0$ are determinate and determinacy is preserved by transitions.

(ii) By applying $\varphi(A_0, B_0)$ with the trace $t_0 : A_0 \xrightarrow{\alpha} A_1$, we obtain a trace $t'_0 : B_0 \xrightarrow{\alpha} B'_1$ such that $\text{ske}l(A_1) = \text{ske}l(B'_1)$.

But by determinacy of $B_0$, the transition $B_0 \xrightarrow{\alpha_1} B_1$ is the only transition from $B_0$ that has label $\alpha_1$, hence $B_1 = B'_1$ and the conclusion.

(iii) Identical proof as that of Item (ii) above, using the fact that $A_1 \sim B'_1$ instead of $\text{ske}l(A_1) = \text{ske}l(B'_1)$.

(iv) Let us write

\[ A_0 = (\{P_0\} \cup \mathcal{P}, \Phi) \]

\[ B_0 = (\{Q_0\} \cup \mathcal{Q}, \Psi) \]

As we argued already at the beginning of case 2, neither $\mathcal{P}$ nor $\mathcal{Q}$ contain processes with parallel operators at their roots. Therefore, we only have to prove that $P_1$ has a parallel operator at its root iff $Q_1$ does. For cardinality reasons, this a direct corollary of the following points:

- $\text{ske}l(P_0) = \text{ske}l(Q_0)$ (same action $\alpha_1$ being executable at top level),
- $\text{ske}l(A_0) = \text{ske}l(B_0)$ (hypothesis Inv($A_0, B_0$)), and
- $\text{ske}l(A_1) = \text{ske}l(B_1)$ (Item (ii) proved above).

\[ \square \]

Proof of (1) $\Rightarrow$ (2). The proof will follow in the steps as the other implication (we construct the trace $t'$ by induction on the length of $t$ while maintaining the invariant Inv).

More formally, we prove that for all extended processes $A_0, B_0$ such that $A_0 \approx_{tr} B_0$ and Inv($A_0, B_0$), and all

\[ t : A_0 \xrightarrow{\alpha_1} \cdots \xrightarrow{\alpha_n} A_n \in T_r(A_0), \]

there exists

\[ t' : B_0 \xrightarrow{\alpha_1} \cdots \xrightarrow{\alpha_n} B_n \in T_r(B_0), \]

s.t. for all $i \in \{0, n\}$, Inv($A_i, B_i$).

We proceed by induction on $n$. We proceed by induction on $n$. If $n = 0$ the conclusion is immediate. Otherwise, assume by induction hypothesis that it holds for any trace of length $n - 1$.

\[ \rightarrow \text{ case 1: } \alpha_1 = \tau. \]

Similarly to the converse implication, there exists a transition $B_0 \xrightarrow{\tau} B_1$ (derived by $\text{(Par)}$) and it suffices to prove that $A_1 \approx_{tr} B_1$ and Inv($A_1, B_1$) hold in order to apply the induction hypothesis and conclude.

\[ \rightarrow \text{ proof that } A_1 \approx_{tr} B_1. \]

Let $s \in T_r(A_1)$. Then $(A_0 \xrightarrow{\tau} A_1) \cdot s \in T_r(A_0)$ and since $A_0 \approx_{tr} B_0$ there is $(B_0 \xrightarrow{\tau} B'_1) \cdot s' \in T_r(B_0)$ such that

\[ (A_0 \xrightarrow{\tau} A_1) \cdot s \sim (B_0 \xrightarrow{\tau} B'_1) \cdot s'. \]

But by $\tau$-determinism of $B_0$ we deduce that $B_1 = B'_1$, and thus $s' \in T_r(B_1)$ and $s \sim s'$. This justifies that $A_1 \approx_{tr} B_1$, and a symmetric argument can be used for the converse inclusion $B_1 \approx_{tr} A_1$.

\[ \rightarrow \text{ proof that Inv}(A_1, B_1). \]

By the exact same arguments as that of the analogue case in the converse implication.

\[ \rightarrow \text{ case 2: } \alpha_1 \neq \tau. \]

Similarly to the converse implication, there exists a transition $B_0 \xrightarrow{\alpha_1} B_1$ and it suffices to prove that $A_1 \approx_{tr} B_1$ and Inv($A_1, B_1$) hold in order to apply the induction hypothesis and conclude.

\[ \rightarrow \text{ proof that } A_1 \approx_{tr} B_1. \]

The argument is the same as its analogue in case 1, using the determinacy of $B_0$ instead of its $\tau$-determinism.

\[ \rightarrow \text{ proof that Inv}(A_1, B_1). \]

This is the proof obligation whose arguments substantially differ from that of the converse implication.

(i) $A_0$ and $B_0$ are determinate and determinacy is preserved by transitions.

(ii) We assume by contradiction that $\text{ske}l(A_1) \neq \text{ske}l(B_1)$. By symmetry, say that $\text{ske}l(A_1) \not\subseteq \text{ske}l(B_1)$ and let $s \in \text{ske}l(A_1) \setminus \text{ske}l(B_1)$. By definition of $T_r(A_0)$, we know that the rule $\text{(Par)}$ is neither applicable to $A_0$ nor $B_0$; in particular, there exists a transition $A_1 \xrightarrow{\alpha} \overset{t}{A}$ derived from rule (In) or (Out) (the one corresponding to the skeleton $s$) such that $B_1 \not\overset{t}{\sim}$.

But by determinacy of $B_0$, the transition $B_0 \xrightarrow{\alpha_1} B_1$ is the only transition from $B_0$ that has label $\alpha_1$. Thus, this yields a contradiction with $A_0 \approx_{tr} B_0$: more precisely the trace $A_0 \xrightarrow{\alpha_1} A_1 \xrightarrow{\alpha} \overset{t}{A}$ is not matched.

(iii) By determinacy of $B_0$, the transition $t'_0 : B_0 \xrightarrow{\alpha_1} B_1$ is the only transition from $B_0$ that has label $\alpha_1$. In particular, using the hypothesis $A_0 \approx_{tr} B_0$, we obtain that $t'_0 \in T_r(B_0)$ is the only trace such that

\[ t_0 : (A_0 \xrightarrow{\alpha_1} A_1) \sim t'_0. \]
In particular $A_1 \sim B_1$.

(iv) Same cardinality argument as the analogue case in the converse implication. □

**Session matchings** Proposition B.2 is the core result of the proof. We now connect it with the equivalence by session by using the characterisation of Appendix A.

**Proposition B.3.** Let $P, Q$ two determinate plain processes in $\rightarrow$-normal form and two labelled traces $t \in \tau_1(A_0)$ and $t' \in \tau_2(Q)$ such that $tr(t) = tr(t')$ and $skel(t) = skel(t')$. Then there exists a session matching for $t$ and $t'$.

**Proof.** We prove that for all $\tau$-deterministic, determine extended processes $A_0$ and $B_0$, and

$$t : A_0 \overset{\tau_1}{\Rightarrow} \cdots \overset{\tau_n}{\Rightarrow} A_n \quad t' : B_0 \overset{\tau_1}{\Rightarrow} \cdots \overset{\tau_n}{\Rightarrow} B_n$$

if $skel(t) = skel(t')$, then there exists a session matching for $t$ and $t'$. We proceed by induction on $n$. If $n = 0$ the session matching is $\pi : e \leftrightarrow e$. Otherwise, let us write

$$A_{n-1} = (\{P \}^{\tau_1}_n \cup \mathcal{P}, \Phi) \quad B_{n-1} = (\{Q \}^{\tau_2}_n \cup \mathcal{Q}, \Psi)$$

By induction hypothesis, let $\pi$ be a session matching for the first $n - 1$ transitions of $t$ and $t'$; in particular, the labels of $A_{n-1}$ are in the domain of $\pi$.

- **case 1:** $\alpha_n \neq \tau$.

  In this case we write

  $$A_n = (\{P' \}^{\tau_1}_n \cup \mathcal{P}, \Phi') \quad B_n = (\{Q' \}^{\tau_2}_n \cup \mathcal{Q}, \Psi')$$

  First of all, we observe that $skel(P) = skel(Q)$ because the same observable action $\tau_n$ can be performed at the root of $P$ and $Q$. In particular, by determinacy (hypothesis), unicity of the process with a given label (invariant of the labelling procedure), and Item 4 of Definition A.1, we deduce that $\pi(t_n) = \pi(t'_n)$.

  Therefore by the hypothesis $skel(A_{n-1}) = skel(B_{n-1})$, we obtain $skel(P') = skel(Q)$. Hence $skel(P') = skel(Q')$ by the hypothesis $skel(A_n) = skel(B_n)$. All in all, $\pi$ is a session matching for the whole traces $t$ and $t'$.

- **case 2:** $\alpha_n = \tau$.

  In this case we write

  $$P = P_1 \mid \cdots \mid P_k \quad A_n = (\{P_i \}^{\tau_1}_n \cup \mathcal{P}, \Phi')$$

  $$Q = Q_1 \mid \cdots \mid Q_k \quad B_n = (\{Q_i \}^{\tau_2}_n \cup \mathcal{Q}, \Psi')$$

  Since determinacy excludes private channels, the last transition of $t$ and $t'$ is derived from the rule (Par). By $\tau$-determinism, this means that $P$ and $Q$ are the only processes in $A_{n-1}$ and $B_{n-1}$, respectively, that contain a parallel operator at their roots. In particular, by Item 4 of Definition A.1, we deduce that $\pi(t_n) = \pi(t'_n)$ and skel($P$) = skel($Q$), and thus $k = k'$. Therefore, there exists a permutation $\sigma$ of $\{1, k\}$ such that for all $i \in \{1, k\}$, $skel(P_i) = skel(Q_{\sigma(i)})$ (although this is not needed for the proof, this permutation appears to be unique by determinacy). Thus if $\pi' : L \rightarrow L'$ is the function extending $\pi$ and such that

  $$\forall i \in \{1, k\}, \pi'(\ell \cdot i) = \pi(\ell) \cdot \sigma(i),$$

  then $\pi'$ is a session matching for $t$ and $t'$. □

Altogether Propositions A.2 to B.3 justify the following corollary (that actually appears to be stronger than Proposition 3.2).

**Corollary B.4.** If $P$ and $Q$ are determine plain processes in $\rightarrow$-normal form, $P \approx_P Q$ iff $P \equiv_s Q$.

**C CORRECTNESS OF POR**

In this section we prove the results related to the partial-order reductions presented in Section 4.

**C.1 Permutability of independent actions**

We give the proof of the core correctness argument, namely that traces can be considered up to permutation of independent actions (Proposition 4.3). First we prove it for traces of two actions.

**Proposition C.1.** If $\alpha \mid \beta$ and $t : A \overset{\alpha \beta}{\Rightarrow} B$, then there exists a trace $u : A \overset{\beta \alpha}{\Rightarrow} B$. It has the property that for all traces $u : A \overset{\alpha \beta}{\Rightarrow} B$ such that $fst(u^2) = u$, there exists $t^2 : A \overset{\alpha \beta}{\Rightarrow} B^2$ such that $fst(t^2) = t$.

**Proof.** Since the labels of $\alpha$ and $\beta$ are incomparable w.r.t. the prefix ordering by independence, the trace $t$ needs have the form

$$A = (P \cup Q \cup R, \Phi) \overset{\alpha \beta}{\Rightarrow} (P' \cup Q' \cup R, \Phi')$$

with $(P, \Phi) \overset{\alpha}{\Rightarrow} (P', \Phi')$ and $(Q, \Phi') \overset{\beta}{\Rightarrow} (Q', \Phi'')$. Now we construct the trace $u$, by a case analysis on $\alpha$ and $\beta$. In each case, we omit the construction of the trace $t^2$ that can be inferred easily.

- **case 1:** $\alpha$ and $\beta$ are inputs or $\tau$ actions.

  In particular $\Phi'' = \Phi'$ and it suffices to choose

  $$u : (P \cup Q \cup R, \Phi) \overset{\beta}{\Rightarrow} (P' \cup Q' \cup R, \Phi') \overset{\alpha}{\Rightarrow} (P' \cup Q' \cup R, \Phi).$$

- **case 2:** $\alpha$ is an input and $\beta$ is an input or a $\tau$ action.

  In particular $\Phi'' = \Phi'$ and $\Phi' \cup \{ax \mapsto m\}$ with $ax \notin dom(\Phi)$ and $ax$ does not appear in $\beta$. Then it suffices to choose the trace

  $$u : (P \cup Q \cup R, \Phi) \overset{\beta}{\Rightarrow} (P \cup Q' \cup R, \Phi') \overset{\alpha}{\Rightarrow} (P' \cup Q' \cup R, \Phi').$$

- **case 3:** $\alpha$ is an input or a $\tau$ action and $\beta$ is an output.

  Similar to case 2.

- **case 4:** $\alpha$ and $\beta$ are both outputs.

  Then $\Phi'' = \Phi'$ and $\Phi' \cup \{ax' \mapsto m'\}$ with $ax' \neq ax$, $\{ax, ax'\} \cap dom(\Phi) = \emptyset$. Then we choose

  $$u : (P \cup Q \cup R, \Phi) \overset{\beta}{\Rightarrow} (P \cup Q' \cup R, \Phi \cup \{ax' \mapsto m'\}) \overset{\alpha}{\Rightarrow} (P' \cup Q' \cup R, \Phi') \overset{\beta}{\Rightarrow} (P' \cup Q' \cup R, \Phi'').$$

Then Proposition 4.3 can be obtained by induction on the hypothesis of $\pi$ permuting independent actions of tr, using Proposition C.1. We actually prove the stronger result:
Proposition C.2. If \( t : A \overset{\pi}{\Rightarrow} B \) and \( \pi \) permutes independent actions of \( tr \), then \( A \overset{\pi.t}{\Rightarrow} B \). This trace is unique if we take labels into account, and is referred as \( \pi.t \). It has the property that for all \( u^2 : A^2 \overset{\pi.t}{\Rightarrow} B^2 \) such that \( fst(u^2) = \pi.t \), there exists \( t^2 : A^2 \overset{\pi.t}{\Rightarrow} B^2 \) such that \( fst(t^2) = t \).

Proof. The uniqueness of \( \pi.t \) is immediate, as a quick induction on the length of traces shows that any labelled trace \( u \) is uniquely determined by the action word \( tr(u) \) (labels included).

We then construct \( \pi.t \) by induction on the hypothesis that \( \pi \) permutes independent actions of \( tr(t) \). Let us write

\[
t : A = A_0 \overset{a_1}{\rightarrow} \cdots \overset{a_n}{\rightarrow} A_n = B.
\]

If \( \pi = id \) it suffices to choose \( \pi.t = t. \) Otherwise let us write \( \pi = \pi_0 \circ (i + 1) \) with \( a_i \parallel a_{i+1} \) and \( \pi_0 \) permutes independent actions of \( tr' = a_p \cdots a_{i-1}a_{i+1}a_i \cdots a_n \). By Proposition C.1, there exists a trace \( u : A_0 \overset{a_1}{\rightarrow} \cdots \overset{a_i-1}{\rightarrow} A_{i-1} \overset{a_i}{\rightarrow} A_i \overset{a_{i+1}}{\rightarrow} A_{i+1} \overset{a_{i+2}}{\rightarrow} \cdots \overset{a_n}{\rightarrow} A_n \) such that for all \( u^2 : A^2 \overset{\pi.t}{\Rightarrow} B^2 \) verifying \( fst(u^2) = u \), there exists \( t^2 : A^2 \overset{\pi.t}{\Rightarrow} B^2 \) such that \( fst(t^2) = t \). Then since \( \pi_0 \) permutes independent actions of \( tr' = tr(u) \), it suffices to choose \( \pi.t = \pi_0.t \) by induction hypothesis.

Then we can easily extend this result to \( \equiv_{por} \).

Proposition C.3. Let \( t : A \overset{\pi}{\Rightarrow} B \) be a trace and \( t' \equiv_{por} t \). Then writing \( tr(t') = tr' \) we have \( t' : A \overset{\pi.t'}{\Rightarrow} B \) and, for all \( u^2 : A^2 \overset{\pi.t'}{\Rightarrow} B^2 \) such that \( t' = fst(u^2) \sim snd(u^2) \), there exists \( t^2 : A^2 \overset{\pi.t}{\Rightarrow} B^2 \) such that \( t = fst(t^2) \sim snd(t^2) \).

Proof. For the sake of reference, let us write \( H(t, t') \) the property to prove. We reason by induction on the hypothesis \( t \equiv_{por} t' \).

- case 1: \( t' = \pi.t, \pi \) permutes independent actions of \( t \).
  Direct consequence of Proposition C.2.
- case 2: \( t' \) is recipe-equivalent to \( t \).
  Let \( u^2 \) with \( t' = fst(u^2) \sim snd(u^2) \). By static equivalence, for any recipes \( \xi_1, \xi_2 \) such that

\[\xi_1 \Phi(fst(u^2)) = E \xi_2 \Phi(fst(u^2)),\]

we also have

\[\xi_1 \Phi(snd(u^2)) = E \xi_2 \Phi(snd(u^2)).\]

In particular, \( t^2 \) can be obtained by operating on the second component of \( u^2 \) the same recipe transformations that have been operated to transform \( t' = fst(u^2) \) into \( t \).

- case 3: (transitivity) \( H(t, s) \) and \( H(s, t') \) for some trace \( s \).
  Let \( u^2 \) with \( t' = fst(u^2) \sim snd(u^2) \). By hypothesis \( H(s, t') \) there exists \( s^2 \) such that \( s = fst(s^2) \sim snd(s^2) \). Hence the result by hypothesis \( H(t, s) \).

And finally we have the Proposition 4.4 that is a corollary of this result.

Proposition 4.4 (correctness of por). Let \( O_1 \subseteq O_2 \) be universal optimisations. We assume that for all \( t \in O_1 \), there exists \( t' \equiv_{por} t_{ext} \) where \( t \) is a prefix of \( t_{ext} \) such that \( t' \in O_1' \). Then \( O_1' \) is a correct refinement of \( O_2' \).

Proof. Let \( \approx_1 = \{ \xi \mid \xi = s \} \) the notion of equivalence induced by \( O_1 \). The inclusion \( \approx_2 \subseteq \approx_1 \) is immediate. Let us then assume \( P \subseteq_1 Q \) and prove \( P \subseteq_2 Q \). Let \( t \in T(P) \cap O_2 \). Without loss of generality, we assume \( t \) maximal, i.e. that there are no transitions possible from its last process. Therefore by hypothesis, there exists \( t' \equiv_{por} t \) such that \( t' \in O_1' \). Since \( P \subseteq_1 Q \), there is \( u^2 \in T(P, Q) \) such that

\[t' = fst(u^2) \sim snd(u^2)\].

Therefore by Proposition C.3, there exists \( t^2 \in T(P, Q) \) such that \( t = fst(t^2) \sim snd(t^2) \).

C.2 Additional results

We provide some utility results on independent permutations of actions. First, about composition of permutations:

Proposition C.4. Let \( t \) be a trace, \( \pi \) permuting independent actions of \( t \), and \( \pi' \) permuting independent actions of \( \pi.t \). Then \( \pi.\pi'.t = (\pi \circ \pi').t \).

Proof. By definition, if \( t : A \overset{\pi}{\Rightarrow} B \), \( \pi.\pi'.t \) is the unique trace of the form \( A \overset{\pi.\pi'}{\Rightarrow} B \), and \( (\pi \circ \pi').t \) is the unique trace of the form \( A \overset{(\pi \circ \pi')}{\Rightarrow} B \). Hence the result since \( \pi.\pi'.tr = (\pi \circ \pi').tr \) by definition of a group action.

This formalises that the group-action properties of \( (\pi, tr) \mapsto \pi.tr \) carry on to traces. Then, we also discuss the domain extension of permutations. If \( \pi \) is a permutation of \( \llbracket 1, n \rrbracket \), we define \( \pi^+_p \) permutation of \( \llbracket 1, n+p+q \rrbracket \) by

\[\pi^+_p(x) = \begin{cases} p + \pi(x-p) & \text{if } p < x \leq n + p \\ x & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}\]

in particular, the following result is immediate:

Proposition C.5 (extension). If \( \pi \) permutates independent actions of \( u, \pi^+_{|w|} \) permutates independent actions of \( uw \).

C.3 Decomposition into phases

In this section we prove correct the refinement at the very basis of our partial-order reductions, namely that all traces can be decomposed into phases (module permutation of independent actions).

Proposition 4.5. \( O^{\pi}_{c,b} \) is a correct refinement of \( O^{\pi}_{all} \).

Proof. By Proposition 4.4, it suffices to prove that for all traces \( t \) that are maximal (i.e. whose last process is irreducible), there exists \( \pi \) permuting independent actions of \( t \) such that \( \pi.t \) can be decomposed into phases.

We prove this by induction on the length of \( t \). If \( t \) is empty the result is immediate: \( \pi \) is the identity and the phase decomposition consists of a unique empty negative block. Otherwise
let us write
\[ t : (A \rightarrow B) \cdot t'. \]
Note in particular that the trace \( t' \) is also maximal. By induction hypothesis, there exists \( \pi' \) permuting independent actions of \( t' \) such that
\[ \pi'. t' = b_0^+ \cdot b_1^+ \cdot b_2^- \cdot b_3^+ \cdots b_n^- \cdot b_n^- \]
where each \( b_i^+ \) is a positive or null phase, and each \( b_i^- \) is a negative phase.

- case 1: \( \alpha \) is an output or a parallel action.

Then \((A \rightarrow B) \cdot b^- \) is a negative phase and it suffices to choose \( \pi = (\pi')_{i=0}^{+} \)

- case 2: \( \alpha = [ t | t_1 | t_2 ] \) (internal communication).

Let us write \( E \) the multiset of actions of the word \( \text{tr}(b^-) \). We partition it into \( E = F \cup G \) where
\[ F = \{ \beta \in E | \alpha \parallel \beta \} \]
\[ G = \{ \langle \alpha \rangle_1 \in E | \ell_1 \prec_{\text{pref}} \ell \text{ or } \ell_2 \prec_{\text{pref}} \ell \} \]
where \( \prec_{\text{pref}} \) refers to the prefix ordering on words. This is indeed a partition of \( E \) thanks to the invariant that any label appearing in \( t' \) is either incomparable with \( \ell_1 \) or \( \ell_2 \), or a suffix of \( \ell_1 \) or \( \ell_2 \). For the same reason, all actions in \( F \) are independent of all actions in \( G \): it is therefore straightforward to construct \( \pi_0^- \) permuting independent actions of \( b^- \) such that
\[ \pi_0^- : b_0^- : B \rightarrow tr_{\ell} G \]
\[ tr_{\ell} F \in F^* \quad tr_{\ell} G \in G^* . \]
Then, we let \( \sigma \) permuting independent actions of
\[ s = (A \rightarrow B) \cdot (\pi_0^- : b^-) \]
such that \( \sigma.s = A \rightarrow B \cdot (\pi_0^- : b^-) \). By definition of \( F \) and \( G \), we have \( \text{pol}(B') \neq \infty \). And by the hypothesis that \( b^- \) is a negative phase, its last process \( C \) has not a polarity of \( -\infty \) neither. Therefore \( A \rightarrow B' \) and \( B' \rightarrow C \) are negative phases.

All in all, it suffices to choose
\[ \pi = \sigma_{i=0}^p o (\pi_0^- ; b^- ; \pi_0^- ; b^-) \quad \text{with } p = \sum_{i=1}^{n} |b_i^-| + |b_i^-| \]

- case 3: \( \alpha = [ c(t) ]^{+} \).

Let us write
\[ A = \{ \text{c}(x). \mathcal{P} | \mathcal{P} \text{.A} \} B = \{ \text{c}(P') | \mathcal{P} \text{.B} \} \]
If the label \( \ell \) does not appear in \( \text{tr}(t') \), then by maximality of \( t \) it needs be that \( \text{pol}(P') = 0 \) and \((A \rightarrow B) \) is therefore a positive phase. In particular \( \pi'. t' \) is already decomposed into phases and it suffices to choose \( \pi = (\pi')_{i=1}^{+} \).

Otherwise assume that \( \ell \) appears in \( \text{tr}(t') \). We write
\[ tr_{\ell} t' = tr_{\ell} (b_i^-) \quad tr_{\ell} t' = tr_{\ell} (b_i^-) \]
We also consider the phase of \( t' \) in which the first action of \( P' \) is executed, i.e. the first phase \( b \) such that \( \ell \) appears in \( tr(b) \). Note that, thanks to the invariant that any label appearing in \( t' \) is either incomparable or a suffix of \( \ell \), \( \alpha \) is independent of all actions of all phases of \( t' \) preceding \( b \).

- case 3a: \( b = b_i^+ \) is a positive or null phase.

Then we fix \( \sigma \) permuting independent actions of
\[ \alpha \cdot tr_{\ell} \text{ with } tr_{\ell} = tr_{\ell} b_0^+ \cdot tr_{\ell} b_1^+ \cdot tr_{\ell} b_{i-1}^+ \cdot tr_{\ell} b_i^- \]
such that, writing \( s = (A \rightarrow B) \cdot b_0^+ \cdot b_1^+ \cdot b_{i-1}^+ \cdot b_i^- \),
\[ \sigma.s : A \rightarrow A' \rightarrow A'' . \]
If \( b = b_i^+ \) is a null phase, \( A' \rightarrow A'' \) is a positive phase. If \( b \) is a positive phase, \((A' \rightarrow A'') \cdot b \) is a positive phase too. In both cases, it suffices to choose
\[ \pi = \sigma_{i=0}^p o (\pi_0^- ; b^- ; \pi_0^- ; b^-) \quad \text{with } p = \sum_{i=1}^{n} |b_i^-| + |b_i^-| \]

- case 3b: \( b = b_i^- \) is a negative phase.

Similarly to case 2, we fix \( E \) the multiset of actions appearing in the word \( \text{tr}(t') \) and we partition it as \( E = F \cup G \)
\[ F = \{ \beta \in E | \alpha \parallel \beta \} \quad G = \{ \langle \alpha \rangle_1 \in E | \ell \prec_{\text{pref}} \ell' \} \]
And again we let \( \pi_i^- \) permuting \( t_i^- \) such that
\[ \pi_i^- : b_i^- : B \rightarrow tr_{\ell} G \]
\[ tr_{\ell} F \in F^* \quad tr_{\ell} G \in G^* . \]
Then we let \( \sigma \) permuting independent actions of
\[ \alpha \cdot tr_{\ell} \text{ with } tr_{\ell} = tr_{\ell} b_0^+ \cdot tr_{\ell} b_1^+ \cdot tr_{\ell} b_{i-1}^+ \cdot tr_{\ell} b_i^- \]
such that, writing \( s = (A \rightarrow B) \cdot b_0^+ \cdot b_1^+ \cdot b_{i-1}^+ \cdot b_i^- \),
\[ \sigma.s : A \rightarrow A' \rightarrow A'' \rightarrow S \rightarrow T . \]
For the same reason as in case 2, \( A' \rightarrow A'' \) and \( S \rightarrow T \) are negative phases. It therefore suffices to choose
\[ \pi = \sigma_{i=0}^p o (\pi_i^- ; b_i^- ; \pi_i^- ; b_i^-) \quad \text{with } p = \sum_{i=1}^{n} |b_i^-| + |b_i^-| \]

C.4 Lexicographic reduction
In this section we prove the correctness of the optimisation \( \mathcal{O}_c^{\text{lex}} \), introduced in Section 4.3. We recall that we assume a total ordering \( \prec \) on blocks that is insensitive to recipes. We write \( \prec_{\text{lex}} \) the lexicographic extension of \( \prec \) on words of same length of blocks (two words of different length are always incomparable w.r.t. \( \prec_{\text{lex}} \)). The core of the proof is to establish a link between \( \mathcal{O}_c^{\text{lex}} \) and \( \mathcal{O}_c^{\text{lex}} \) where minimal means minimal within its equivalence class for \( \equiv_{\text{b-pos}} \) w.r.t. \( \prec_{\text{lex}} \).

**Proposition C.6.** \( \mathcal{O}_c^{\text{lex}} \subseteq \mathcal{O}_c^{\text{lex}} \)

**Proof.** Let \( t \in \mathcal{O}_c^{\text{lex}} \) and prove by induction on the number of blocks of \( t \) that \( t \in \mathcal{O}_c^{\text{lex}} \). If \( t \) is a single negative phase, the conclusion follows from the definition. Otherwise let us write \( t : b^+ \cdot b_1 \cdots b_n \). Since lexicographic minimality is preserved by
prefix, we have $t' \in \mathcal{O}^\nu_{\text{lex}}$ with
\[ t' : b^* \cdot b_1 \cdots b_{n-1} . \]
Then by induction hypothesis we obtain $t' \in \mathcal{O}^\nu_{c+1}$. To conclude, by definition of $\mathcal{O}^\nu_{c+1}$, it now suffices to prove that $b_n$ is allowed after $t'$.

Suppose by contradiction that it is not, and let $b$ replace equivalent to $b_n$ such that Minimal$(t', b)$ does not hold. By a quick induction on the hypothesis Minimal$(t', b)$, we can show that there exists $j \in [2, n - 1]$ such that
\[
(1) \quad b_1 < \ldots < b_{j-1} < b < b_{j-1} .
\]
(2) $b < b_{j-1} .
\]
(3) $\forall j \in [1, n - 1], b_i \not\in b .
\]
In particular $\pi = (i \ i+1 \ \ldots \ n-1 \ n)$ permutes independent actions of $t' \cdot b$ and $\pi \cdot (t' \cdot b) \prec lex t' \cdot b$. Since $< l s$ is insensitive to recipes, this contradicts the minimality of $t$.

Also note that, thanks to Proposition C.5, we also obtain the useful property that $\equiv_{b \cdot \text{par}}$ is closed by context:

**Proposition C.7.** If $u \equiv_{b \cdot \text{par}} u'$ then $\mu v w \equiv_{b \cdot \text{par}} \mu v' w$.  

**Proof.** Easy induction on the hypothesis $u \equiv_{b \cdot \text{par}} u'$.  

Using these two properties, we can eventually prove the correctness of $\mathcal{O}^\nu_{\text{por}}$ by relying on Corollary 4.8.

**Proposition 4.10.** $\mathcal{O}^\nu_{\text{por}}$ is a core refinement of $\mathcal{O}^\nu_{c+1}$.  

**Proof.** Let $\mathcal{O}^\nu$ the set of traces of the form $t : b^* \cdot t_p \cdot t_i$ where $b^*$ is a negative phase, $t_p \in \mathcal{O}^\nu_{\text{lex}}$ only contains proper blocks, and $t_i \in \mathcal{O}^\nu_{\text{lex}}$ only contains improper blocks. By Proposition C.6, $\mathcal{O}^\nu \subseteq \mathcal{O}^\nu_{\text{por}}$. By partial implementability (Proposition 3.8) it therefore suffices to prove that $\mathcal{O}^\nu$ is a core refinement of $\mathcal{O}^\nu_{c+1}$. We rely on Corollary 4.8, i.e. we prove that for any $t \in \mathcal{O}^\nu_{c+1}$ there is $t' \equiv_{b \cdot \text{por}} t$ such that $t' \in \mathcal{O}^\nu_{\text{lex}}$. We write
\[ t = b^* \cdot t_p \cdot t_i \] (notations of the definition)
and let $t'_p$ and $t'_i$ the $\prec lex$-minimal elements of the equivalence classes of, respectively, $t_p$ and $t_i$ w.r.t. $\equiv_{b \cdot \text{por}}$. Naturally $t_p \equiv_{b \cdot \text{por}} t'_p$ and $t_i \equiv_{b \cdot \text{por}} t'_i$. Therefore $t' = b^* \cdot t'_p \cdot t'_i \in \mathcal{O}^\nu_{\text{lex}}$. But by closure under context (Proposition C.7) we also have $t' \equiv_{b \cdot \text{por}} t$.  

**D  Correctness of Symmetries**

In this section we prove the correctness of the optimisations presented in Section 5, i.e. the reduction by symmetries.

**D.1 Universal symmetries**

Let us prove the correctness of the universal optimisation, i.e.

**Proposition 5.3.** $\mathcal{O}^\nu_{\text{por}} \cap \mathcal{O}^\nu_{\text{sym}}$ is a core refinement of $\mathcal{O}^\nu_{\text{por}}$.

First of all we isolate the core property that symmetric processes verify, which will be the key argument for the proofs of this section. Let us consider a compressed trace
\[ t : [ P ]^n \rightarrow (\{ P \}^n s_{i=1}^n \Phi_0) \in \mathcal{O}^\nu_{c} \]
and let $a, b \in [1, n]$ and $\pi = (a \ b)$. We also assume that there exists $\varphi_c$ permutation of $\mathcal{C}_{\text{por}}$ such that
\[
\pi \cdot (P_1, \ldots, P_n) \Phi_0 = (\varphi_c)^\pi \cdot (P_1, \ldots, P_n) \Phi_0
\]

**Proposition D.1.** Let a trace of the form
\[
s = t \cdot \cdot \cdot (P_0, \Phi_0) \sigma \cdot a_{i=1}^n \cdot (P_n, \Phi_n) \sigma
\]
for some substitution $\sigma$ and $L_1 = \ell_b$. Then there exists $\varphi$ permutation of $\mathcal{N}_{\text{por}}$, and $\sigma' = \sigma \cdot \varphi$ and a trace
\[
s = t \cdot \cdot \cdot (Q_0, \Phi_0) \sigma' \cdot \cdot \cdot (Q_n, \Phi_n) \sigma' q
\]
and a bijection of labels such that
\[
(1) \quad \text{if } \ell \in \text{dom}(\pi) \text{ then } L_2 \prec \pi \cdot (\{ Q_\ell \} \sigma' q \text{ (if } i \not\in \{ a, b \}) \text{ and } P_i \equiv \{ Q_i \} \sigma' q \text{ (if } i \in \{ a, b \}).
\]

**Proof.** The case $n = 1$ follows from hypothesis (Equation 4), and the proposition can then be proved by induction on $n$.

In particular we obtain the following two core arguments:

**Proposition D.2.** Assume $a \equiv b$ and that, for all traces $s$ of the form of Equation (1) (with $L_1 = \ell_b$), there exists $s' \in \mathcal{T} (P, Q)$ such that $s = \text{fst}(s') \sim \text{snd}(s')$. Then for all traces $s$ of the form of Equation (1) (with $L_1 = \ell_b$), there exists $s'' \in \mathcal{T} (P, Q)$ such that $s = \text{fst}(s'').$

**Proof.** Let a trace $s$ of the form of Equation (1) (with $L_1 = \ell_b$). With $\varphi_c = \text{id}$ we consider the trace $s'$ given by Proposition D.1 (we will use the same notations). In particular we have $L_1 = \ell_a$. By hypothesis, there therefore exists $u^2 \in \mathcal{T} (P, Q)$ such that $s = \text{fst}(u^2) \sim \text{snd}(u^2)$. Using now the hypothesis that $a \equiv b$, there also exists $u^2 \in \mathcal{T} (P, Q)$ matching the first $|tr|$ actions of $s'$ and whose processes matching $P_a$ and $P_b$ are swapped. From $u^2$ and $u^2$ we can then construct by induction on $n$ a trace $s''$ such that $s = \text{fst}(s'') \sim \text{snd}(s'').$

**Proposition D.3.** Assume $a \equiv b$ and that, for all traces $s$ of the form of Equation (1) (with $L_1 = \ell_b$), there exists $s' \in \mathcal{T} (P, Q)$ such that $s = \text{fst}(s') \sim \text{snd}(s')$. Then for all traces $s$ of the form of Equation (1) (with $L_1 = \ell_b$), there exists $s'' \in \mathcal{T} (P, Q)$ such that $s = \text{fst}(s'') \sim \text{snd}(s'').$

**Proof.** Let a trace $s$ of the form of Equation (1) (with $L_1 = \ell_b$). We consider the trace $s'$ given by Proposition D.1 (we will use the same notations). In particular we have $L_1 = \ell_a$. By hypothesis, and using the characterisation of Appendix A, there exists $u \in \mathcal{T} (Q)$ and a session matching for $s', u$ such that $tr(s') = tr(u)$
and $\Phi(s') \sim \Phi(a)$. Thanks to the hypothesis $a \leftrightarrow b$, we can then apply Proposition D.1 to the trace $u$ too. In particular there exists a trace $u' \in \mathcal{T}(Q)$ such that $tr(t) = tr(u')$ and $\Phi(t) \sim \Phi(u')$, hence the conclusion. \hfill \Box

Using these two propositions we obtain the straightforward corollary (by induction on the hypothesis that $a \leftrightarrow b$) that justifies Proposition 5.3:

**Corollary D.4.** Assume $a \leftrightarrow b$ and that, for all traces $s$ of the form of Equation (\ref{eq:existential_symmetries}) (with $L_1 = L_a$), there exists $s^2 \in \mathcal{T}(P, Q)$ such that $s = \text{fst}(s^2) \sim \text{snd}(s^2)$. Then for all traces $s$ of the form of Equation (\ref{eq:existential_symmetries}) (with $L_1 = L_b$), there exists $s^2 \in \mathcal{T}(P, Q)$ such that $s = \text{fst}(s^2) \sim \text{snd}(s^2)$.

**D.2 Existential symmetries**

In this section we prove the existential optimisation:

**Proposition 5.5.** $\mathcal{O}_{\text{sym}}^3$ is a correct refinement of $\mathcal{O}_{\text{all}}^3$.

For that we introduce a notion of equivalence of traces; this is intuitively the invariant preserved by permutation of structurally-equivalent subprocesses.

**Definition D.1.** We write

$$(\{P_i, Q_i\})_{i=1}^n \equiv_{\alpha} \{P_i, Q_i'\}$$

when $\phi$ is a bijective renaming of private names, $Q_i \equiv_{\phi} Q_i'$ for all $i$, and $\Phi_i \equiv_{\phi} \Phi_i'$. We extend this to traces by writing $A_0^2 \xrightarrow{\alpha_1} A_1^2 \equiv_{\alpha} B_0^2 \xrightarrow{\alpha_1} B_1^2 \ldots \xrightarrow{\alpha_i} A_i^2 \equiv_{\alpha} B_i^2 \equiv_{\alpha} B_i^2$ for all $i > 0$.

**Lemma D.5.** $\equiv_{\alpha}$ is an equivalence relation.

**Proof.** Reflexivity and Symmetry are immediate, but transitivity requires the observation that for any terms $t, t'$ and bijective renaming of private names $\phi$, $t \equiv_{\phi} t'$ entails $t \equiv_{\phi} t'$. \hfill \Box

**Proposition D.6.** The relation $\equiv_{\alpha}$ has the properties:

1. $\forall t^2 \in \mathcal{T}(A^2), \exists s^2 \in \mathcal{O}_{\text{sym}}^3, s^2 \equiv_{\alpha} t^2$
2. if $t^2 \equiv_{\alpha} s^2$, then $\text{fst}(t^2) \sim \text{snd}(s^2)$ iff $\text{fst}(s^2) \sim \text{snd}(t^2)$
3. if $t^2 \equiv_{\alpha} s^2$, then $\text{fst}(t^2) = \text{fst}(s^2)$

**Proof.** The property (i) can be proved by induction on the length of the trace. The main argument is that if $A^2 \xrightarrow{\alpha} B^2$ is ill-formed, then there exists a well-formed transition $A^2 \xrightarrow{\alpha} C^2$ such that $B^2 \equiv_{\alpha} C^2$. The property (ii) follows from the fact that $\Phi \equiv_{\phi} \Phi'$ implies $\Phi \sim \Phi'$, and $\Phi \sim \Phi_{\phi}$ for any bijective renaming of private names $\phi$. The property (iii) is immediate. \hfill \Box

From this the proof of Proposition 5.5 follows:

**Proof of Proposition 5.5.** We write $\equiv$ the notion of equivalence induced by the optimisation $\mathcal{O}_{\text{sym}}^3$. The inclusion $\subseteq \subseteq \subseteq$ is immediate. Let us then assume that $P \subseteq Q$ and prove that $P \equiv Q$. Let $t \in \mathcal{T}(P)$. By hypothesis, there is $t^2 \in \mathcal{T}(P, Q)$ such that $t = \text{fst}(t^2) \sim \text{snd}(t^2)$.

By Proposition D.6 (Item (i)), there exists $s^2 \in \mathcal{O}_{\text{sym}}^3$ such that $t^2 \equiv_{\alpha} s^2$. Thus by Items (i) and (ii), $t = \text{fst}(s^2) \sim \text{snd}(s^2)$. \hfill \Box

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