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Outsiders at the ballot box: operationalizations and political consequences of the insider–outsider dualism

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Abstract

Recently, developed economies have witnessed an emerging dualism between the so-called labor market ‘insiders and outsiders’—two groups facing divergent levels of employment security and prospects. Those on the ‘inside’ occupy stable jobs, while those on the ‘outside’ confront increased levels of social and economic risks. There are, however, various prominent, but divergent, operationalizations of the insider–outsider phenomenon. While some scholars opt for indicators rooted in current labor market status of individuals, others prefer to consider occupational class groups as bases of the insider–outsider divide. As these operationalizations of outsideness capture different profiles of outsiders, we test the extent to which they lead to consistent or inconsistent conclusions about electoral behavior. The article yields two consistent findings that are robust across all the operationalizations: that outsiders are less likely to vote for major right parties than are insiders, and that outsiders are more likely to abstain from voting. Additionally, we find that occupation-based outsiders tend to support radical right parties, while status-based outsiders rather opt for radical left parties—a finding supported by the association between social risk and authoritarian preferences. We test our expectations using multinomial logit models estimating vote choice on the first five waves of the European Social Survey from 2002 to 2010 across western Europe.

Key words: comparative politics, political economy, electoral behavior

JEL classification: P16 political economy
1. Introduction

Recently, developed economies have witnessed an emerging dualism between the so-called labor market ‘insiders and outsiders’—two groups facing divergent levels of employment security and prospects. Those on the ‘inside’ occupy stable jobs, while those on the ‘outside’ confront increased levels of social and economic risks. Research shows that differentiated access to social welfare entitlements (social insurance/assistance, pensions, healthcare, etc.) together with divergent labor market positions of the two groups carry socioeconomic implications (see Davidsson and Naczek, 2009 for a review). Simultaneously, there are various prominent, but divergent, operationalizations of the insider–outsider phenomenon. While some scholars opt for indicators rooted in current labor market status of individuals, others prefer to consider occupational class groups—as proxies of social risk level—as bases of the insider–outsider divide. Consequently, while the presence of an insider–outsider divide in the European societies is well established, it is unclear whether the insider–outsider distinction translates into consistent behavior at the ballot box in light of its diverse operationalizations.

To assess whether the socioeconomic divide between insiders and outsiders translates into consistent political behavior, we test whether and how insider–outsider status operationalized in diverse ways predicts vote choice. Previous work has considered political participation of outsiders primarily as a response to party strategies, deriving hypotheses about the potential weakening of traditional workers’ parties and the strengthening of radical extremes (Lindvall and Rueda, 2013). Prior research has also found that insider–outsider divides have only limited explanatory power for voting behavior as compared with traditional socioeconomic cleavages (cf. Emmenegger, 2009; Corbetta and Colloca, 2013), but also that such divides can be shown to influence vote choice, policy preference and/or political participation in distinct ways (Scholzman and Verba, 1979; Schur, 2003; Rueda, 2006; Häusermann and Schwander, 2011; Lindvall and Rueda, 2013; Marx and Picot, 2013; Amable, 2014; Guillaud and Marx, 2014; Häusermann et al., 2015; Marx, 2014). This article takes a different approach, evaluating insiders’ and outsiders’ voting preferences in cross-national context, using four prominent yet different operationalizations of insiders and outsiders that are found in the literature (a) Rueda (2005); (b) Häusermann and Schwander (2011) and Schwander and Häusermann (2013); (c) Emmenegger (2009); (d) Rehm (2009).

The contribution this article makes is thus two-fold. First, we demonstrate that the existing literature contains discrepancies in the various operationalizations of insiders and outsiders that may bias results, or at least, run the risk of ‘talking past each other’ by relying on different indicators. Second, we utilize these distinct operationalizations in analyses of cross-national voting preferences, which allows us to compare the consistency of four prominent insider–outsider indicators and expand upon the received wisdom in the field. While all four operationalizations of outsidersness capture somewhat different profiles of outsiders, the purpose of this article is to test the effect of these different operationalizations on predicted electoral behavior. We find two consistent findings that are robust across all the operationalizations: that outsiders are less likely to vote for the major right than insiders, and that outsiders are more likely to abstain from voting. Strikingly, we also find that occupation-defined outsiders tend to support radical right parties, while status-defined outsiders tend to opt for the radical left, a finding we attribute to the effect of social risk on individual preferences.
To test the outcomes across the four prominent operationalizations of outsiderness, we employ multinomial logit analyses, extensively checked against alternative models, employing five waves of the European Social Survey (ESS) data from 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, and 2010. While the insider–outsider distinction has been pinpointed as a relevant social divide with important ramifications for the labor market and overall social parity, we find that outsiders’ voting behavior is nuanced, with two consistent results holding across all four operationalizations: overall, outsiders are less likely to vote for the major right and have higher rates of abstention than insiders. In addition, our analysis provides findings that highlight the divergent nature of the various outsider operationalizations. While outsiders operationalized on the basis of current labor market status tend to support major left parties less, rather turning to radical left parties, outsiders defined on the basis of occupational class group conversely tend to lean away from the left in favor of the radical right.

2. What is outsiderness and how is it operationalized?

The distinction between insiders and outsiders lies mainly in the labor market, between those who have stable and secure employment and those who do not [Rueda (2005); see also Lindbeck and Snower (1989) and Saint-Paul (2002) for analyses of the relative power of labor market insiders vis-à-vis outsiders]. However, this dualism is also seen as having emerged within and issuing from the state itself, in the form of dualizing social policy (Palier and Thelen, 2010; Emmenegger et al., 2012). European countries are interesting cases for the study of social and labor market dualization because rather than containing frozen institutional structures that are resistant to change in spite of inherent structural problems, these political systems have undergone piecemeal transformations that, arguably, have resulted in increasing labor market and social welfare inequalities (Clegg, 2007; Davidsson and Naczyk, 2009; Eichhorst and Hemerijck, 2010; Palier and Thelen, 2010; Eichhorst and Marx, 2011).

However, a clear and consistent conceptualization of insiders and outsiders has yet to be established. On the contrary, there exist several competing definitions of insiders and outsiders in contemporary political science/social policy literature, which we employ in this article in order to gain clarity on (a) what the different indicators and underlying concepts entail and how they can be fruitfully compared, and (b) how utilizing different indicators of outsiderness affects the findings—specifically in this article, how four different and prominent operationalizations of outsiders affect vote choice.

The four operationalizations of outsiderness that we test in this article can be separated into two categories: (a) current labor market status and (b) occupational class group, which captures propensity for social risk. We discuss each category in turn. The first labor market status-based operationalization of insiders–outsiders that we consider in this article is by Rueda (2005), who divides insiders and outsiders along one dimension: current employment status (cf. Blanchard and Summers, 1986; Lindbeck and Snower, 1989; Saint-Paul, 1996). In other words, Rueda’s operationalization of insiders and outsiders is based on the actual reported labor market status of individuals. It is a static conception that considers the current job situation, not the past or future situations, nor the probability of unemployment. Rueda thus defines insiders as ‘those with secure employment’, and outsiders as ‘those without’. The author goes on to define insiders as ‘those workers with highly protected jobs, sufficiently protected not to feel greatly threatened by high levels of unemployment’. Outsiders
are defined as ‘either unemployed or hold[ing] jobs characterized by low salaries and low levels of protection, employment rights, benefits, and social security privileges’ (Rueda, 2005, p. 62).

The second labor market status-based operationalization of outsideness that we test in this article comes from Emmenegger (2009), who, like Rueda, distinguishes between insiders and outsiders based on their current labor market status. In line with recent literature that highlights the need to distinguish between different types of outsiders, we utilize Emmenegger’s operationalization (2009) of outsiders, which allows for this differentiation. This measure divides survey respondents into five groups: (1) labor market insiders, who are full-time employees under permanent contract who do not occupy a higher-grade professional, administrative or managerial position; (2) labor market outsiders, who are (a) employees working part-time (or less), (b) hold a temporary contract, or (c) are currently unemployed; (3) ‘upscales’, who hold a higher-grade professional, administrative or managerial position; (4) self-employed; and (5) nonemployed, a group composed of students, housewives/househusbands, retired persons, those helping family members, permanently disabled/sick, or out of the labor force for other reasons (Emmenegger, 2009, p. 137). To keep this measure more comparable with the others that do not explicitly distinguish the self- or nonemployed, our empirical analysis focuses on the first three categories: upscales, insiders and outsiders. In line with Emmenegger, we distinguish between three types of outsiders: (a) those with limited work contracts; (b) those working part-time, defined as working less than 30 hours per week (OECD Labour Market Statistics, 2016); and (c) the unemployed. The Emmenegger measure thus contains five categories.

Alternatively, a separate strand of research emphasizes the risk of precarious employment based on occupational class. This political economy literature has established that exposure to labor market risks shapes political preferences. The distinction can be made between potential risk of falling into un- or under-employment, and realized risk of such status, i.e. being currently unemployed (Iversen and Soskice, 2001; Cusack et al., 2006; Mughan, 2007; Rehm, 2009, 2011). This literature informs our second category of indicators of outsideness.

Consequently, the third indicator examined in this article, based on labor market risk assessment according to occupational class, comes from Häusermann and Schwander (2011; Schwander and Häusermann, 2013), who delineate insider–outsider status according to a risk-based notion of labor market precariousness. These authors conceptualize outsideness not as resulting only from a static snapshot of one’s employment status, but rather as whether an individual belongs to an occupational class group that has above-average rates of unemployment or atypical employment (based on country-specific workforce averages)—i.e. a higher than average risk of vulnerable employment. Whether a person is currently employed or not has less bearing on outsider status, they argue, than the person’s general likelihood of being employed or unemployed over her life course, which is determined by her occupational class group. Therefore, using cross-sectional data, Häusermann and Schwander group insiders and outsiders according to occupations, classifying individuals into insider-occupations and outsider-occupations based on survey evidence of the incidence of unemployment or atypical employment by occupational group. The occupations are classified using the International Labour Organization’s (ILO) International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO) two-digit codes. This way of conceptualizing insiders and outsiders takes social class as the basis for the classification of occupational groups; it
draws on Kitschelt and Rehm (2005) and Oesch’s (2006) division of social classes in postindustrial societies into five classes that share similar work conditions and rates of precariousness (Häusermann and Schwander, 2011). This conceptualization thus assigns risk values not to individuals, but to specific occupational groups by country. Thus, all members of the same group receive the same score. Rather than a general definition that is the same across countries, this class-based conceptualization of outsiderness is a relative measure that varies by country and group.

Moreover, the Schwander and Häusermann measure also incorporates gender and age as defining features of outsiderness, based on the prominent consensus in the literature that postindustrial labor market advantages are structured not only by class, but also by gender and age (Schwander and Häusermann, 2013, p. 253). The authors argue that these should be included as relevant variables in an operationalization of outsiderness, as numerous scholars have shown that insider–outsider divides—that is, labor market dualization—are contingent upon gender- and age-segregation, with women and youth being consistently disadvantaged in the labor market as compared to men and nonyouth workers (Taylor-Gooby, 1991; Esping-Andersen, 1999; Kitschelt and Rehm, 2006; Chauvel, 2009; Esping-Andersen, 2009). This risk-based measure of outsiderness, therefore, takes into account not only postindustrial classes but also gender and age, to yield a combination of four classes, two sexes and two age groups (below/above 40 years old), which results in a total of 17 occupational groups. The group-specific rates of unemployment and atypical employment (i.e. involuntary part-time employment, fixed-term employment and helping family members) are then compared with the workforce-average rates.

The insider–outsider measure is then separated into either a dichotomous measure or a continuous measure. The dichotomous measure is computed by selecting all groups that have a rate of atypical employment or unemployment that is higher than the workforce average, with all individuals in these groups being coded as outsiders. The continuous measure is computed by subtracting the workforce average rate of atypical employment and unemployment from the group-specific rate and using the difference as the degree of outsiderness that is then attributed to all members of the group. We employ the continuous measure in our inferential analyses; however, the binary measure is useful for descriptive comparisons.

Finally, Rehm (2009) measures risk exposure at the occupational level. This measure considers an individual’s risk of unemployment as a function of the rate of unemployment in her occupation (at the first digit ISCO-88 level) in a given country and year, distinguishing between nine different occupational categories. For each occupational category, Rehm calculates the probability of becoming unemployed, based on occupational unemployment rates calculated from EU labor force surveys for every occupational category by country and year (Rehm, 2009).

It is useful here to discuss the theoretical and empirical implications of using the above different measures of insiderness and outsiderness. First, the occupation-based measures (Schwander/Häusermann and Rehm) attribute characteristics to an individual that are derived from her occupational group, while the individual herself may not actually manifest a labor market risk (Schwander and Häusermann, 2013, p. 251). Conversely, this measure would consider a temporary part-time worker as an insider, for example, if he/she were employed in an occupation with many insiders, or low levels of unemployment. Whether one is classified as an outsider or an insider is contingent upon the country-specific...
workforce characteristics; therefore, it is a group-based, country-specific, relative measure of outsiders.

Some potential advantages to these measures are the relative stability of occupational group vs. more transient labor market status, thus arguably providing a stronger bearing on a person’s political preferences. In addition, this measure allows for the heterogeneity of the outsider group, which is comprised in different countries of both high- and low-skilled workers, different economic sectors, age groups, etc. However, this operationalization is also considerably more complex than simple labor market status, and relies, as we have seen, on detailed data that provide information on the occupational sector, as well as on country-specific benchmark averages for determining whether an entire occupational group can be considered to contain insiders or outsiders. This may lead to potential ecological fallacy as individual insider/outsider characteristics are deduced from group risk factors. Thus, these measures may mis-assign individuals due to the characteristics of their group.

The alternative static measures of Rueda or Emmenegger of current labor market status may therefore yield some advantage because of their parsimony and more widely available data. Simultaneously, they are more ephemeral measures than those based on occupation. One could argue that these more simple labor market status measures do not adequately capture the element of risk that characterizes labor market vulnerability in post-industrial societies, in which one’s chances of holding permanent employment are known to vary dramatically according to skill level, gender (due to women’s exit from the labor force upon child-rearing, particularly prominent in conservative welfare regimes), age, employment sector, and so on.

Furthermore, the Schwander and Häsusermann indicator also captures more than insider–outsider labor market divides: it also captures age, gender, and occupation, which, while arguably being fitting determinants of true labor market advantage or disadvantage, are also classical predictors of political behavior. It could be argued, therefore, that this more complex measure is not a suitable comparison with the simpler Rueda or Emmenegger measures. Occupation and gender are indeed substantially more stable than labor market status, which introduces the question of whether stable and transient indicators should be expected to have the same explanatory power.

Indeed, as the Schwander and Häsusermann measure combines occupational risk with considerations of gender and age as the basis for individual risk calculation, it may consequently confound the effects of labor market risk, gender and age on political behavior. Furthermore, this measure is temporally static, based on risk measures from only one year. The Rehm occupation-based measure, on the other hand, considers only general occupation groups. It does not consider gender and age in the definition of outsiders, and is thus independent of them. While perhaps a ‘cleaner’ measure of risk, it could be considered a disadvantage for the very fact that it does not explicitly account for the role of gender and age in determining risk structures. Its advantage, however, is its over-time variation based on particular labor market developments in each country in a given year. Clearly, deciding which operationalization one uses has theoretical and empirical implications, as well as the potential to affect research findings, which we confirm in our analyses below.

Therefore, while all four approaches seek to capture outsiders, their logics differ quite starkly. The striking discrepancy in identifying who falls into the insider and outsider categories, depending on which prominent conceptualization we use, can be seen when examining the data. Under the Schwander and Häsusermann (binary) measure, 82% of outsiders are
female and are on average 47.5 years old. If we create two categories out of Rehm’s continuous measures, considering those individuals who fall below the median level of risk as insiders, and those above as outsiders, we see that only 51% of outsiders are women, and their average age is 49.6 years. Using the Rueda definition, outsiders are 55% female, with a strikingly lower average age of 39.1 years. The Emmenegger outsiders, disaggregated into three groups, underline the diversity. While outsiders with temporary contracts are 47% female with an average age of 36 years; outsiders working part-time are 80% female with an average age of 44 years; and unemployed outsiders are 47% female with an average age of 38.5 years. Thus, we see that a conceptualization of outsiders that relies heavily on gender and age for its composition, as compared to a conceptualization that does not explicitly take those characteristics into account, yields markedly different conclusions about the makeup of this labor market group.

Table 1 compares the outsider measures directly. Note that the table uses the binary Schwander and Häusermann measure, and dichotomizes the Rehm measure into insiders (with risk lower than median) and outsiders (risk higher than median). The table underlines two observations. First is the diversity of the measures. For example, while 13% of the sample from the ESS used in this study are viewed as outsiders by both the Schwander and Häusermann and Rueda operationalizations, about 43% are viewed as insiders by both. On the contrary, almost 10% of the sample are Schwander and Häusermann insiders but Rueda outsiders, and a striking 34% are Schwander and Häusermann outsiders but Rueda insiders. The fact that these two measures ‘misplace’ almost 44% of the sample with respect to each other, underscores their fundamental difference. These values are similar when comparing the Schwander and Häusermann measure with that of Emmenegger. Comparing the Rehm measure to that of Schwander and Häusermann shows that these two measures ‘misplace’ 42% of the sample with respect to each other. The second observation from Table 1 is the relatively close association between the Rueda and Emmenegger measures. While no Rueda outsider is categorized as an Emmenegger upscale or insider, only 10% of Emmenegger outsiders are Rueda insiders, and a vast majority of these fall into the part-time outsider category.

Overall, we see that outsidersness defined on the basis of occupational class (Schwander and Häusermann; Rehm) leads to a distinct classification of individuals that differs from outsidersness defined on the basis of labor market status. The differences between the two occupational measures are primarily due to the inclusion of gender and age as criteria for risk assessment on the part of Schwander and Häusermann, and the time-variant measure of occupational risk by Rehm. The aim of this article is to address the extent to which these distinct conceptions and operationalizations of outsidersness lead to consistent or divergent conclusions about these groups’ electoral behavior. The next section turns to consider the interplay between outsidersness and politics, focusing on the expected voting patterns of outsiders.

3. Outsiders and politics

The literature on insider–outsider politics implies that this new labor market dualization has significant political potential. The literature has primarily focused on the political preferences of insiders and outsiders, consequently deducing their political behavior from their

1 See operationalization section below for measurement details.
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A. E. Rovny and J. Rovny
political outlooks. In so doing, the individual contributions suggest that the insider–outsider divide forms a new basis for political behavior that has the potential to affect electoral outcomes. Simultaneously, a review of the behavioral expectations uncovers limited consensus, and a number of contradictory hypotheses.

One prominent strand of literature focuses on insider–outsider preferences—in particular, for distinct welfare policies across OECD countries, with an emphasis on identifying the desired degree of redistribution and state investment (Häusermann and Schwander, 2011). These authors have shown outsiders to have stronger preferences for state intervention than do insiders, with skill level being an important conditioning factor: low-skilled workers favor redistribution, whereas high-skilled workers prefer social investment in the form of education and employment services (see also Häusermann et al., 2015; Gingrich and Häusermann, 2015).

Additionally, Rehm (2009) has demonstrated that labor market insecurity and risk of unemployment lead to increased demand for redistribution, which establishes a correlation with support for the left. However, while the emphasis on risk suggests a clear line of support for left parties, the insider–outsider literature, separate from the risk literature, has emphasized the element of political exclusion in addition to redistribution. The distinction with the insider–outsider strand of research lies in differentiating the ‘old left’ that no longer represents the interests of the entire working class but rather the interests of those with entrenched, stable, employment—the protected ‘insiders’. The key demarcation here is job insecurity: outsiders’ preferences may be structured by support for redistribution on the one hand, and relaxed employment protection (reduced barriers to employment) on the other.

Furthermore, Fernández-Albertos and Manzano (2016) find that support for the welfare state is conditional upon the level of dualization within the welfare state itself. Where the welfare state is less redistributive, more strongly status-oriented (i.e. social-insurance based), and labor markets are more dualized, economically disadvantaged groups will be less in favor of general welfare state expansion. In contrast, disadvantaged groups are consistently supportive of redistributive social policies as they benefit from these policies.

Thus, the implications for voting behavior of outsiders are mixed: while outsiders would be supportive of increased redistribution, they will be less solidly attached to voting for the major left than insiders, who comprise the left’s traditional constituency. Outsiders may choose to support parties favoring labor market deregulation (i.e. liberal or conservative parties), as labor market flexibility reduces labor market dualism. This may, however, present a conflict of interest, as right-wing voting outsiders would be foregoing their assumed redistributive preferences in prioritizing employment protection deregulation. Therefore, at best, the literature is so far ambiguous about the political leanings of outsiders and the theoretical motivations for these inclinations, a point that we summarize below with competing, and seemingly contradictory, hypotheses about voting behavior.

Next we turn to a discussion of party strategies and outsiders. Explaining the strategies of political parties based on an insider–outsider divide in the workforce has challenged traditional conceptions of Social Democratic parties, while only briefly touching on other major party types. Rueda (2005, 2006) posits that Social Democratic parties consider insiders to be their prime constituency, and indeed will favor this constituency at the expense of outsiders when there exists a conflict between the two labor market groups. He further maintains that outsiders are less politically active than insiders, a claim for which this article finds empirical support. Focusing on Sweden as an exemplary case, Lindvall and Rueda (2013)
suggest that if Social Democratic parties pursue policies that are advantageous to insiders, they lose outsiders’ electoral support, thereby incurring electoral punishment. In this case, the authors find that outsiders in Sweden either vote for the (more radical) Left Party or abstain from voting altogether. Where Social Democrats campaign on policies to attract outsiders, they lose the insider vote to the major right. The distinction between the insider–outsider theory of partisanship and the traditional partisanship model (in which social democratic parties represent labor, and conservative parties represent upscale groups) lies in the assertion that not all labor is equally vulnerable to unemployment. This relative risk of unemployment will differently affect the preferences of the two labor market groups, as well as political parties’ incentives to represent them.

Yet another strand of research on insider–outsider politics underlines the heterogeneity of the outsider group (Taylor-Gooby, 1991; Kitschelt and Rehm, 2006; Emmenegger, 2009; Häusermann and Schwander, 2011). The outsider classification may apply to men and women differently, varying across age, skill level and welfare regime. Emmenegger (2009) argues that the insider–outsider theory of politics ignores several important points. Among these: it fails to consider a long-term perspective; does not adequately address the nuances of electoral politics; and fails to give proper consideration to the fact that political parties offer policy packages. Finally, Emmenegger argues that there are a number of reasons why insiders and outsiders may actually share policy and party preferences—among these are household composition, the inherent power imbalance between capital and labor and the changeability of one’s labor market position.

Research on the party preferences of atypical workers in Germany in 2009 draws a distinction between two types of outsiders: atypical workers (fixed-term contracts, agency work or marginal part-time employment) and the unemployed (Marx and Picot, 2013). These authors’ findings echo the previous literature on insiders and outsiders in that the unemployed are more likely to abstain from voting than insiders, and are more likely to vote for the radical Left Party. Unlike the unemployed, atypical workers were not found to participate less in elections than insiders. These atypical workers were more likely to vote for the Left Party and the Green Party and less likely to vote for the major right than were insiders, again supporting the tendency of outsiders to vote left rather than right. Furthermore, an inclination of outsiders to vote for the party or parties that would lessen the rigidity of employment protection (thereby ‘opening up’ the labor market) was not borne out in these authors’ findings, as the liberal right party (the FDP) did not attract the outsider vote.

Marx (2014) isolates the effect of a specific labor market risk by analyzing only one category of outsiders—temporary workers. Here, temporary workers are found to support the new left parties rather than the old left, as the former are less concerned with protecting the entrenched interests of insiders than are the latter. While restricting the analysis to only temporary workers rather than all types of outsiders limits the comparability of these research findings to previous findings of the insider–outsider literature, it points to the need to distinguish between different categories of outsiders, as political preferences should not be expected to be the same across them.

Finally, the political behavior of outsiders regarding support for radical parties that lie outside the mainstream has become a topic of much recent scholarly and popular attention. Lindvall and Rueda (2013) maintain that when major left parties cater to insiders’ demands, outsiders will be pushed to either abstain from voting or consider other options. These alternative options depend on the party system, but may range from radical left
support as in Sweden in 1998, to extreme right parties that receive voter support of the unemployed, as in France, Finland and several other European countries. So-called ‘losers’ of the labor market (nonstandard and low-skilled workers) may look to radical or protest parties who offer alluring promises to those who feel they have suffered from globalization (Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008). Right-wing populist parties could be seen as attracting outsiders who resent mainstream parties and established political elites (Rueda, 2005; King and Rueda, 2008). Moreover, radical left parties may attract outsiders who seek an overhaul of the economic and political establishment along with radical redistribution and state ownership of business. However, as Marx (2014) notes, it is not clear how support for radical parties fits within the political economy models of party support. Motives for radical fringe party support may be noninstrumental, or for reasons of registering a protest vote, rather than representing an ideologically coherent choice. Moreover, the vote for extreme parties may signal a feeling of threat on the part of outsiders who are afraid of increased numbers of migrants, who have been widely scapegoated by fringe parties as posing direct competition for jobs among especially the low-skilled. Thus it remains unclear how labor market risk among different types of outsiders, as compared with insiders, translates into support for anti-system parties of the right or left.

Therefore, summarizing the above theoretical expectations from the literature into testable hypotheses, we derive the following, at times competing, hypotheses:

H1: Outsiders are more likely to abstain from voting than insiders.
H2: Outsiders are less likely to vote for the major right than are insiders.
H2a: Outsiders are more likely to vote for the major right than are insiders.
H3: Outsiders are more likely to vote for the major left than are insiders.
H3a: Outsiders are less likely to vote for the major left than are insiders.
H4: Outsiders are more likely to vote for radical parties on either end of the ideological spectrum than are insiders.

Paradoxically, the above literature review underscores both expectations that outsiderness impacts political behavior in some way, as well as ambivalence about what exactly this impact should be, and via what mechanisms. The social risks associated with outsider status are expected to drive preferences, and, thus, also political behavior. We therefore test the voting behavior of outsiders using four different operationalizations found in the literature, to see whether and which ones carry explanatory power, and whether these different measures show consistent results across the operationalizations.

4. Data, operationalization and methodology

To test these propositions of previous research in a broad cross-national context, we employ the complete five rounds of the ESS, and include all available western European countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland.

However, for recent research in country-specific contexts, see Marx (2016) and Emmenegger et al. (2015).
The choice behind this data set is motivated by a couple of factors. First, the dataset is considered to be one of the most robust cross-sectional sources of individual-level data in Europe. Second, the dataset includes five rounds carried out in 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, and 2010, thus giving us a broad overview of the first decade of the 21st century. Using the ESS thus provides extensive, high-quality cross-sectional information spanning multiple years, which is highly suitable for the types of analyses that we conduct in this article. On the downside, the ESS data collection is not associated with national elections, and thus may come at various points in the electoral cycle, introducing potential bias. To address this, we control for the time elapsed between the time of interview and the latest national election. We also re-estimate our results on a constrained sample of those respondents who were interviewed for the ESS within 300 days of the last national election.

To assess outsiders’ actions at the ballot box, we estimate multinomial logit (MNL) models predicting five possible vote choices: (a) vote for the radical left, (b) vote for the major left, (c) vote for the major right, (d) vote for the radical right, (e) abstain. Please see Table A19 in the Supplementary Appendix for details concerning the specific parties in each party family.

As our key predictor of vote choice, we use the four different conceptions of outsiders discussed above. Specifically, we use the Schwander and Häusermann (2013) continuous employment biography profile operationalization. This operationalization considers outsider-ness as a function of the risk of being in atypical employment and/or unemployment, which is assumed to be based on occupational group, gender and age. Occupational classes are defined as five categories based on occupational structure (for details, see Häusermann and Schwander 2011). These groups are further disaggregated by gender and age (above or below 40 years of age), which leads to the creation of 17 categories. Then, the authors use EU-SILC data from 2007, and compare the category-specific rates of unemployment and atypical employment with the average rate in the workforce. In the continuous measure the authors ‘subtract the workforce average rate from the group-specific rate and use the difference as value of labour market vulnerability or ‘degree of outsidersness’, that [they] then attribute to all individuals in the specific group’ (Schwander and Häusermann, 2013, p. 254). This continuous measure ranges from −1.68 to 2.30, where values lower than 0 signify lower than average risk of atypical employment or unemployment, while values

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3 We do not use the 2012 ESS wave, as this may introduce idiosyncratic effects caused by the onset of the global financial and sovereign debt crisis.

4 An alternative statistical approach would be to use a multinomial probit (MNP) model. While this model has a number of advantages, such as assigning each respondent only those choices that were actually available to him/her based on the respondent’s country or even electoral district, they are computationally extremely difficult. Other evidence suggests that the simpler MNL model is preferable over the MNP model in many instances (Dow and Endersby, 2004; Kropko, 2008). When we attempted to estimate our model with MNP, the computer failed to find a solution after 30 hours of calculation. Other modeling alternatives to deal with varying choice set are currently being considered, but are complex and unestablished (see Yamamoto, 2010). However, in order to address the problem of estimating vote for choices in countries where they are not present, which affects 5 choices out of 85 total (17 countries with 5 choices each), we re-estimated our model only on those countries where all five estimated choices are available.

5 Please note that we apply the Schwander and Häusermann coding scheme verbatim, as the authors were so kind as to share their code.
greater than 0 signify greater than average risk. Second, we use the Rehm (2009) operationalization of occupational risk. This measure considers individual’s risk of unemployment as a function of the rate of unemployment in her occupation (at the first digit ISCO-88 level) in a given country and year. Third, we use the Rueda operationalization of outsiders. This coding considers as outsiders individuals who have (a) limited contracts, or (b) who are unemployed and seeking work. Insiders are those employed with permanent contracts. This operationalization excludes farmers and students (Rueda, 2006; see also Lindvall and Rueda, 2013). Finally, we use the Emmenegger operationalization, focusing on the ordered categories of (a) upscales: those in paid employment with unlimited contracts and in a privileged position in the labor market, operationalized as being in the top ESeC category; (b) insiders: those in paid employment with unlimited contracts, but not in privileged positions (ESeC ≠ 1); outsiders, who are divided into three groups: (c) those with limited work contracts; (d) those working part-time (less than 30 hours a week); and (e) those unemployed (Emmenegger, 2009).

To control for typical socioeconomic and cultural attributes considered relevant for vote choice, our models include predictors for gender, age, education, household income, union membership, ethnic minority status and religious service attendance. We also control for household composition by including a variable measuring whether an individual lives alone or with a partner.6

Finally, the models control for a number of country-level characteristics. First, given that the level of proportionality of the electoral system may affect voters’ willingness to support parties less likely to enter parliament in less proportional systems, we control for electoral district magnitude. Second, in line with Rueda (2005) we control for the overall level of unemployment in each country, as this is a proxy for the relative size of the outsider group and for the general economic situation in the country. Third, we control for the time elapsed between the data collection (survey interview) and the last national legislative election, in order to capture any electoral cycle effects. Finally, to capture different levels of economic development across our cases, we control for per capita GDP at purchasing power parity and constant 2005 international dollars (World Bank Development Indicators).

We have carried out a number of robustness checks that increase our confidence in our results. As mentioned above, we first reassessed our models using a constrained sample of those respondents who were interviewed within 300 days of a national election. Second, we re-estimated our MNL models on a constrained set of countries where all five vote choices were available. Finally, we re-estimated our results using binary logistic regression. Given its relative simplicity compared with the main MNL models, these models also included country and time period dummy variables. The results of all these models, available in the Supplementary Appendix, corroborate the substantive findings of our primary MNL models.

6 Please note that household effects are also controlled for by virtue of including household, not individual, income.
5. Analyses and results

Our results produce three general conclusions. First, there is a consistent effect of all types of outsiderness on abstention and (lack of) support for the major right. Second, the risk-based (Schwander/Häusermann and Rehm) and the status-based (Rueda and Emmenegger) operationalizations predict divergent effects of outsiderness regarding vote for radical parties. Third, Emmenegger’s disaggregated operationalization of outsiders into more specific subgroups predicts diverse behavior. We consider these results in turn. Table 2 provides an overview of the key results, while Figure 1 to 5 present them graphically.7

We find powerful and consistent evidence that being an outsider, no matter how the concept is operationalized, matters for two outcomes. First, as expected in H1, outsiders are significantly more likely to abstain from the ballot box. Under the Schwander/Häusermann and Rehm continuous operationalizations, going from being an insider (having extremely low level of risk) to being a complete outsider (having an extremely high level of risk) increases the probability of abstention by over 20 percentage points. Under the Rueda binary operationalization, outsiders are 5.6 percentage points more likely to abstain from voting than insiders. Under the Emmenegger categorical operationalization, temporary workers and the unemployed are 4.5 and 7.5 percentage points more likely, respectively, to abstain than insiders. Part-time workers, however, do not behave significantly differently from insiders.

Table 2. Effects of outsiderness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vote Choice</th>
<th>Schwander/Häusermann continuous</th>
<th>Rehm</th>
<th>Rueda</th>
<th>Emmenegger</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Radical Left</td>
<td>−0.088*</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.014*</td>
<td>Temporary</td>
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<td>0.013*</td>
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<td>Part-time</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>−0.008*</td>
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<td>Unemployed</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>0.008</td>
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<tr>
<td>Major Left</td>
<td>−0.006</td>
<td>−0.033</td>
<td>−0.030*</td>
<td>Temporary</td>
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<td>−0.021*</td>
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<td>−0.039*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Major Right</td>
<td>−0.162*</td>
<td>−0.244*</td>
<td>−0.036*</td>
<td>Temporary</td>
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<td>Part-time</td>
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<td>−0.051*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Radical Right</td>
<td>0.053*</td>
<td>0.035*</td>
<td>−0.003</td>
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<td>0.006</td>
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<td>Abstain</td>
<td>0.202*</td>
<td>0.227*</td>
<td>0.056*</td>
<td>Temporary</td>
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<td>0.045*</td>
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<td>Part-time</td>
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<td>Unemployed</td>
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<td>0.075*</td>
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Note: Predicted probability change – the change between the probability to select a given choice as outsiderness shifts from its minimum to maximum while other predictors are held constant. In Emmenegger operationalization we consider the change from insider to the three outsider groups.

*p < 0.05. For details see tables A1 to A5 in the Supplementary Appendix.

7 The detailed results are available in Tables A2 to A5 in the Appendix. Since these tables present multinomial logit coefficient estimates that are hard to interpret, Table A1 in the Appendix includes information on the percentage point change in the probability of making a particular choice (voting for a specific party family or abstaining), while other predictors are held constant.
Second, we find consistent support for H2: outsiders are significantly less likely to support major right parties under all operationalizations. Going from the minimum to maximum on the continuous Schwander/Häusermann and Rehm outsiderness scale decreases the likelihood of supporting the major right by 16.2 and 24.4 percentage points respectively. Under the Rueda binary operationalization, being an outsider reduces the likelihood of voting for the major right by 3.6 percentage points. Under the Emmenegger operationalization, temporary workers and the unemployed are 2.4 and 5.1 percentage points less likely to support the major right than insiders respectively. Part-time workers, however, are 2.6 percentage points more likely to support the major right than insiders, a finding that we discuss more below.

The results concerning hypotheses H3 and H4 differ according to operationalization types. Concerning H3, the risk-based (Schwander/Häusermann and Rehm) operationalizations do not predict any significant effect of outsiderness on major left vote. Under the labor market status (Rueda and Emmenegger) operationalizations, we find that outsiders are significantly less likely to support the major left. Rueda outsiders are 3.0 percentage points less likely to vote for the major left than insiders. Temporary workers, part-time workers, and the unemployed are 2.1, 2.2 and 3.9 percentage points less likely to support the major left than insiders. The Emmenegger operationalization demonstrates further nuance of major left vote, namely that the major left is primarily supported by insiders (as opposed to upcales and all types of outsiders).

Results concerning H4 are also structured by operationalization type. Radical left parties are significantly less likely to be supported by Schwander and Häusermann risk-based outsiders. On the contrary, the radical left is significantly more likely to be supported by outsiders defined by labor market status. Rueda outsiders vote for it 1.4 percentage points more likely than outsiders. Similarly, temporary workers under the Emmenegger operationalization are 1.3 percentage points more likely to vote for the radical left. The unemployed, as well as Rehm outsiderness, do not have a significant effect. Interestingly, part-time workers are 0.8 percentage points less likely to support the radical left.

The radical right, on the contrary, is more likely to be supported by risk-based outsiders. Under the Schwander/Häusermann and Rehm operationalizations, extreme outsiders are 5.3 and 3.5 percentage points respectively more likely to vote for the radical right than extreme insiders. On the contrary, Emmenegger temporary workers are 1.2 percentage points less likely to vote for the radical right than insiders. Part-time workers, the unemployed, and Rueda outsiders do not demonstrate a significant effect on radical right vote.

Finally, the divergent results for the three disaggregated types of Emmenegger outsiders suggest that diverse outsider characteristics lead to varying electoral behavior. Compared to Rueda’s operationalization of outsiders, which also relies on labor market status, it is Emmenegger’s temporary workers that behave much like the Rueda outsiders—they tend to support the radical left significantly more, the major left and right significantly less, the radical right significantly less, and they are significantly less likely to turn out to vote than insiders. The unemployed behave very similarly to Rueda outsiders, but their status does not produce any significant predictions concerning radical left and right vote. However, being unemployed is a more powerful predictor of the other outcomes. The unemployed are more likely to abstain, and less likely to vote for the major left and right than
Rueda outsiders. Importantly, those individuals working part-time do not seem to act like outsiders at all. In fact, in the case of voting for the major left and right, their behavior is exactly the opposite of other outsiders. Part-time workers are significantly less likely to support the major left, significantly more likely to support the major right, and are indistinct when it comes to turn out to vote in comparison to insiders, making the extent to which this group should be considered ‘outsiders’ debatable. Indeed, as mentioned earlier, 80% of the part-time workers in our sample are women, of which many may work part-time voluntarily. Therefore, the key distinction is between voluntary and involuntary part-time work and its relationship to risk/insecurity, something that our data does not allow us to distinguish.

The results concerning support for radical left and right parties point to a pattern suggesting that risk-defined outsiders are more likely to vote for the radical right, while status-based outsiders are more likely to lean towards the radical left. These outcomes merit more detailed analyses focusing on the interplay between labor market status and social/
occupational risk. Given the overlapping nature of the four operationalizations considered here (demonstrated by Table 1), it is possible to define four groups of individuals in our sample: (a) those with good labor market status and low risk; (b) those with good labor market status and high risk; (c) those with poor labor market status and low risk; and finally (d) those with poor labor market status and high risk. \(^8\) We can consequently specify the same vote choice model, predicting electoral behavior with membership in one of these four groups, while maintaining the same socio-demographic and system controls discussed above.

Figure 6 summarizes the results of these analyses, while the details are available in Table A17 in the Supplementary Appendix. Concerning support for the radical right (left

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\(^8\) We define these groups using the Rehm risk-based, and the Rueda status-based operationalizations. Since the Rehm operationalization is continuous, we treat those with lower risk than the median as ‘low risk’, and those with higher risk than the median as ‘high risk’.
panel), it shows that individuals at high risk tend to support the radical right more than individuals at low risk. This effect is particularly pronounced for those with good status and high risk. Compared to individuals with low risk, they are over 1 percentage point significantly more likely to vote radical right. Those with poor status and high risk are more likely to vote for radical right; however, the difference is not statistically significant.\footnote{The statistical tests comparing the predicted probabilities of these groups are the following: Good Status, Hi Risk vs Good Status, Lo Risk: predicted probability difference $= 0.013$, $z = 4.29$, $P < 0.000$. Good Status, Hi Risk vs Poor Status, Low Risk: predicted probability difference $= 0.011$, $z = 2.55$, $P < 0.011$.}

Turning to the radical left, Figure 6 demonstrates that individuals with poor labor market status are significantly more likely to vote for the radical left, whatever their risk level. Going from good

\[\text{Figure 3. Effect of outsiderness on major right vote. Notes: Predicted probabilities with 95\% confidence intervals. Based on models reported in Tables A2–A5 in the Supplementary Appendix.}\]
to poor labor market status increases the probability to vote for the radical left by between 1.2 and 1.8 percentage points. These differences are statistically significant.\(^\text{10}\)

These results thus suggest that individuals in poor labor market standing tend to turn toward left-wing political solutions, likely seeking social protection and state support. On the contrary, those at risk—and particularly those with good labor market status, but at risk of losing it—turn toward radical right forces that focus on issues of immigration. This claim is further substantiated when we predict individual left–right placement and views on

\(^{10}\) The statistical tests comparing the predicted probabilities of these groups are the following:
Poor Status, Lo Risk vs Good Status, Lo Risk: predicted probability difference = 0.013, \(z = 2.36\), \(P < 0.018\).
Poor Status, Hi Risk vs Good Status, Lo Risk: predicted probability difference = 0.012, \(z = 2.16\), \(P < 0.030\).
Poor Status, Lo Risk vs Good Status, Hi Risk: predicted probability difference = 0.018, \(z = 3.05\), \(P < 0.002\).
Poor Status, Hi Risk vs Good Status, Hi Risk: predicted probability difference = 0.018, \(z = 3.37\), \(P < 0.001\).
immigration with the four groups, while maintaining the same controls. The results, reported in Figure 7 (for details, see Table A18 in the Supplementary Appendix), support this reading. Individuals with poor labor market status (and particularly with poor status and low risk), tend to be more left-leaning than those with good status. Even more strikingly, individuals at high risk tend to be significantly more opposed to immigration than individuals at low risk, no matter their labor market status.

6. Conclusion

In this article, we have explored divergent conceptualizations and operationalizations of outsiderness, focusing on their effects on voting behavior. While questions of why outsiderness matters in the labor market and how the insider–outsider distinction has developed in the postindustrial era have garnered substantial attention in recent years, the literature provides a multiplicity of distinct, even divergent, understandings of outsiderness. This article adds to the literature by addressing the effect of the distinct outsider operationalizations on political behavior across Europe. Our results point to several conclusions about outsiderness at the ballot box, as well as about the conceptualization of outsiderness.
First, we identify two broad strands of outsider operationalizations. The first, based on labor market status, addresses insiders/outsiders based on a static snapshot of current labor market situation, whether employed on permanent contracts (insiders) or employed on temporary contracts, part-time, or unemployed (outsiders). The second, rooted in occupational class categories and their collective social risk, identifies outsiders as a function of the occupational group to which they belong, based on comparative rates of atypical employment and unemployment. These two types of operationalizations lead to distinct insider–outsider categories that show divergent characteristics and limited overlap.

Second, despite the divergent operationalizations of outsiderness that lead to distinct outsider categories, we find a pair of powerful and consistent conclusions that apply to all types of outsiders. We find that outsiders are consistently more likely to abstain from voting and consistently likely to deny their support to major right parties. This highlights the negative voting of outsiders: they either shun major right parties or turn away from the voting stations altogether. There seems to be no unifying factor that propels them to make a consistent vote for a given party; rather, they are characterized by their diversity of party preferences.

Third, while we do not see consistent support for the hypothesis that outsiders are more likely to support radical parties on either end of the political spectrum, our results indicate a notable finding. Outsiders defined on the basis of occupational class group/risk propensity (Schwander, Häusermann and Rehm) are more likely to support radical right parties, while outsiders defined on the basis of their current employment status (Rueda, Emmenegger) are more likely to support radical left parties, while avoiding the major left.

Figure 6. Support for radical right and radical left across insider and outsider types. Notes: Predicted probabilities with 95% confidence intervals. Based on MNL model reported in Table A18 in the Supplementary Appendix.
To explain this, our additional analyses conclude that individuals from occupational groups at risk of outsideness are attracted to right-wing populist rhetoric, usually focusing on anti-immigrant themes. On the contrary, individuals who actually face suboptimal labor market status (unemployed, temporarily employed), tend toward left-wing populist rhetoric, focusing on the state’s role in job creation and social support. This underlines not only the diverse character of the outsider group, but primarily the diverse analytical consequences of the different outsider conceptualizations, and their focus on either risk or status. Furthermore, our findings that individuals at risk seek right-wing authoritarian solutions echo insights from political psychology that finds associations between social threat and individual authoritarianism (e.g. Feldman and Stenner, 1997; Duckitt and Fisher, 2003). Our analyses emphasize that the effect of labor market risk on support for right-wing authoritarian parties is largely independent of actual labor market status.

While the labels of ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ are not one-size-fits-all monikers, our findings suggest the importance of distinguishing between status- and risk-based operationalizations of the concept. Future research should further unpack these as to their distinguishing features, as well as how their component parts differ across countries, time, segments of the labor market, and so on. Furthermore, as distinct types of outsiders become more prominent in society, research should focus on how political parties respond (or not) to this social phenomenon, considering the interaction between evolving employment structures, external shocks such as financial crises or increasing migration, and how people at social and labor market risk perceive such developments. These may then translate into distinct electoral

Figure 7. Left–right and immigration preferences of insider and outsider groups. Notes: Predicted values with 95% confidence intervals. Based on OLS models reported in Table A19 in the Supplementary Appendix. Dependent variables are left-right self-placement (lrscale) and views on whether immigrants make a country worse or better place to live (imwbcnt).
behavior or increased rates of retreat from the political arena altogether, posing problems for democratic accountability.

Supplementary material

Supplementary material is available at Socio-Economic Review Journal online.

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