Local Envy-Freeness in House Allocation Problems

Abstract : We study the fair division problem consisting in allocating one item per agent so as to avoid (or minimize) envy, in a setting where only agents connected in a given network may experience envy. In a variant of the problem, agents themselves can be located on the network by the central authority. These problems turn out to be difficult even on very simple graph structures, but we identify several tractable cases. We further provide practical algorithms and experimental insights.
Document type :
Journal articles
Complete list of metadatas

Cited literature [49 references]  Display  Hide  Download

https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02156844
Contributor : Nicolas Maudet <>
Submitted on : Friday, June 14, 2019 - 5:18:22 PM
Last modification on : Friday, October 4, 2019 - 1:59:48 AM

File

manuscript.pdf
Files produced by the author(s)

Identifiers

Citation

Aurélie Beynier, Yann Chevaleyre, Laurent Gourvès, Ararat Harutyunyan, Julien Lesca, et al.. Local Envy-Freeness in House Allocation Problems. Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, Springer Verlag, 2019, 33 (5), pp.591-627. ⟨10.1007/s10458-019-09417-x⟩. ⟨hal-02156844⟩

Share

Metrics

Record views

24

Files downloads

48