Commodity taxation and regulatory competition

Simone Moriconi (1, 2) , Pierre Picard (3) , Skerdilajda Zanaj (4)

1 Unicatt - Università cattolica del Sacro Cuore [Milano]
2 LEM - Lille économie management - UMR 9221
3 X-DEP-ECO - Département d'Économie de l'École Polytechnique
4 CREA - Center for Research in Economic Analysis

The purpose of this paper is twofold. We first investigate whether product market regulations affect commodity taxation in open-to-trade economies, and second, we study the strategic interaction in regulatory measures between trading partner countries. We present a two-country general equilibrium model in which destination-based commodity taxes finance public goods, and product market regulation affects both the number of firms in the market and product diversity. Based on data for 21 OECD countries over the 1990–2008 period, we provide empirical evidence suggesting that product market regulations are strategic complement policies and that domestic regulations have a negative impact on domestic commodity taxation.

Mots clés: Regulation; Commodity tax; Strategic interactions

Domaines: Sciences de l'Homme et Société; Economies et finances

Simone Moriconi, Pierre Picard, Skerdilajda Zanaj. Commodity taxation and regulatory competition. International Tax and Public Finance, 2018, pp.1-47. ⟨10.1007/s10797-018-9521-4⟩. ⟨hal-02110504⟩