Public versus private insurance system with (and without) transaction costs: optimal segmentation policy of an informed monopolist

Abstract : Computer-mediated transactions allow insurance companies to customize their contracts, while transaction costs limit this tendency toward customization. To capture this phenomenon, we develop a complete-information framework in which it is costly to design a new market segment when the segmentation policy (number and design of segments) is endogenously chosen. Both the case of a private and a public insurer are considered. Without transaction costs, these two insurance systems are equivalent in terms of social welfare and participation. With transaction costs, this equivalence is no longer present, and the analysis of this difference is the subject of this article.
Complete list of metadatas

https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02107583
Contributor : Isabelle Celet <>
Submitted on : Tuesday, April 23, 2019 - 4:57:26 PM
Last modification on : Wednesday, April 24, 2019 - 1:35:19 AM

Identifiers

Collections

Citation

Yann Braouezec. Public versus private insurance system with (and without) transaction costs: optimal segmentation policy of an informed monopolist. Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis (Routledge), 2018, 51 (18), pp.1907-1928. ⟨10.1080/00036846.2018.1529402⟩. ⟨hal-02107583⟩

Share

Metrics

Record views

20