Game-Theoretic Decision Making for the Resilience of Interdependent Infrastructures Exposed to Disruptions

Yiping Fang (1, 2) , Enrico Zio (1)

1 SSEC - Chaire Sciences des Systèmes et Défis Energétiques EDF/ECP/Supélec
2 LGI - Laboratoire Génie Industriel - EA 2606

This chapter addresses the challenges associated with assessing and improving the resilience of interdependent critical infrastructure systems under potential disruptive events. A specific set of analytical tools are introduced based on quantitative models of infrastructure systems operation and their functional interdependencies. Specifically, the game-theoretic attacker-defender and defender-attacker defender modeling techniques are applied to assessing the resilience of interdependent CI systems under worst-case disruptions, and advising policymakers on making pre-disruption decisions for improving the resilience of interdependent infrastructures. A case of interdependent power and gas systems is presented to show the proposed model and highlight the significance of protecting interdependent CIs.

Mots clés: Critical infrastructure; Interdependencies; Resilience; Game theoretic models

Domaines: Sciences de l'ingénieur [physics]; Génie civil; Risques; Autre

Yiping Fang, Enrico Zio. Game-Theoretic Decision Making for the Resilience of Interdependent Infrastructures Exposed to Disruptions. Gritzalis Dimitris; Theocharidou Marianthi; Stergiopoulos George. Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience - Theories, Methods, Tools and Technologies, pp.97-114, 2019, 978-3-030-00024-0. ⟨10.1007/978-3-030-00024-0_6⟩. ⟨hal-01967981⟩