An automated and scalable formal process for detecting fault injection vulnerabilities in binaries

Thomas Given-Wilson (1) , Annelie Heuser (1) , Nisrine Jafri (1) , Jean-Louis Lanet (2) , Axel Legay (3, 4)

1 TAMIS - Threat Analysis and Mitigation for Information Security
2 CIDRE - Confidentialité, Intégrité, Disponibilité et Répartition
3 INGI - Département d'Ingénierie Informatique - UCL
4 Inria Rennes – Bretagne Atlantique

Fault injection has increasingly been used both to attack software applications, and to test system robustness. Detecting fault injection vulnerabilities has been approached with a variety of different but limited methods. This paper proposes an extension of a recently published general model checking based process to detect fault injection vulnerabilities in binaries. This new extension makes the general process scalable to real-world implementions which is demonstrated by detecting vulnerabilities in different cryptographic implementations.

Mots clés: Fault Injection; Model Checking; Attack; Encryption; Vulnerability

Domaines: Informatique [cs]

Thomas Given-Wilson, Annelie Heuser, Nisrine Jafri, Jean-Louis Lanet, Axel Legay. An automated and scalable formal process for detecting fault injection vulnerabilities in binaries. Concurrency and Computation: Practice and Experience, 2018, pp.e4794. ⟨hal-01960940v1⟩