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Oil windfalls and export diversification in oil-producing countries: evidence from oil booms

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Abstract

This paper examines the factors behind export diversification in oil countries. Specifically, we investigate the impact of oil booms on export diversification through an empirical framework. The paper finds that economy's export structure before the oil boom determines whether oil windfalls might affect the diversification process. Thus, an oil boom negatively affects export diversification only if countries initially exhibit low levels of diversification. In countries with a high level of diversification before the boom, an oil boom has no impact on diversification. These results are based on a large sample of 134 countries, and are robust to various sensitivity analyses. They are corroborated with data from the manufacturing sector which show that oil booms only reduce diversification in countries with a small manufacturing sector prior to the boom.

JEL Classification: F1; Q32; C23

Keywords: Export diversification; Oil resources; Panel data

I. Introduction

A blueprint for oil countries to protect themselves against volatility and the Dutch disease is to diversify their economies. Diversification can also help transform resource revenue into renewable assets (man-made). However, this recommendation is not buttressed by reality, and the export baskets of many oil countries appear highly concentrated (Gylfason & Wijkman, 2015; Cherif & Hasanov, 2016; Cadot *et al.* 2013; Gelb, 2010).

This paper attempts to provide an explanation for these diversification failures in several oil countries. It provides supporting evidence that diversification in oil countries depends on constraints that already undermine the development of non-resource export activities prior to the resource boom. In other words, it matters whether or not a country is dominated by a single export product before the boom, has an enclave industry or a labor-intensive industry before the boom, and so on. The examples of Malaysia and Indonesia are often cited as successful diversification experiences with oil windfalls. These countries are among the developing countries with the highest level of export diversification before giant oil booms including the one in the 1970s.

This proposition is tested empirically by examining the impact of oil booms on export diversification levels using a large 134-country sample over the 1965-2010 period. Results show that oil booms lead, on average, to greater export concentration when the level of diversification prior to the oil boom is not accounted for. However, when we consider the initial level of diversification, results show that oil booms lead to more concentration only if countries exhibit low levels of diversification before the boom. In countries with a high level of diversification before the boom, the oil boom has no impact on diversification. Furthermore, these results are corroborated by data from the manufacturing sector, which show that oil booms reduce diversification only in countries with a small manufacturing

sector prior to the boom. The results are robust to various sensitivity analyses, including different estimation methods and alternative scenarios.

These results echo three main arguments highlighted by distinct strands of the literature. The first argument is derived from the works of Cherif (2013) and Cherif & Hasanov (2016), notably on the interaction between resource dependence and the initial technology gap. The authors show that this gap is broadening over time, and that the issue of managing the oil boom for diversification is therefore more problematic in countries with low technology initially. In contrast, high tech countries, which were already diversified before the accrual of the oil revenue, have shown better management of booms (Cherif & Hasanov, 2016). The second argument supports the idea that the existence of an entrepreneur class prior to the boom, makes it possible to absorb complementary investments derived from a resource boom. This argument is derived from the theoretical predictions of Baland & Francois (2000) who find a path dependency between the presence of entrepreneurs before the boom and the growth of a country after the boom. Thus, countries that experience a decline in growth after a boom, are those with a lower share of entrepreneurs before the boom. In contrast, countries that manage to sustain growth after a boom are those with a broader base of entrepreneurs before the boom. The third argument, presented in the works of Dunning (2005) and Omgba (2014), points to prior development of non-resource sectors as a key element that can influence the motivation of political elites towards diversification policies. Oil windfalls tend to be oriented towards public consumption, as opposed to investment, when the initial industrial base is small.

This paper takes the analysis one step further by providing the first empirical evidence that can support the aforementioned arguments. It also extends the contribution of the empirical literature on factors that may be correlated with diversification processes (see Imbs and Wacziarg, 2003; Cadot et al. 2010). Nevertheless, the focus of this paper is beyond the

traditional issue of the non-monotonic relationship between economic development and diversification, highlighted by the aforementioned works. Instead, this article focuses on diversification patterns in oil-producing countries, and it attempts to investigate why some oil countries are diversifying while others fail – a question that is not yet addressed by this strand of literature.

In the second section of this paper, we review the literature and present the arguments behind the empirical tests. In the third section, we perform econometric tests that explore the relationship between oil booms and export diversification performance, focusing on export diversification levels prior to the booms. In the fourth section, we conclude with the study's implications.

II. Literature review and theoretical arguments

Historically, certain scholars consider the development opportunities offered by primary commodity production and exports to be limited. The first reason offered for this failure refers to the long-run downward trend of the terms of trade between commodities and manufactured goods (see Prebisch, 1950; Singer, 1950). To address these adverse effects of commodity dependence, developing countries should diversify their exports.

Two other elements – related to literature on the resource curse¹ – have been used to advocate the necessity of economic diversification for resource-rich countries. These include Dutch disease and the volatility of commodity prices.²

Dutch disease refers to the apparent relationship between dependence on natural resources, real exchange rate appreciation, and poor economic growth. The phenomenon can be

¹ The resource curse refers to the fact that resource-dependent countries tend to exhibit poor performances compared to those that do not depend on natural resources (see Sachs and Warner, 1995)

² One can also add the exhaustible nature of oil reserves to this list.

summarized as follows: a boom (in quantity or price) within a country's natural resource sector leads to increased overall consumption within the country, resulting from an increase in revenue. This in turn, creates an increase in non-tradable sector prices, while the prices of tradable goods, which are determined by international markets, remain unchanged. This results in an appreciation of the real exchange rate and a loss of competitiveness for a nation's economy (Corden & Neary, 1982; Sachs & Warner, 1995; Apergis et al., 2014).

The volatility that usually accompanies commodity prices also creates significant macroeconomic wealth management challenges for resource-based economies. Indeed, these economies are more vulnerable to external shocks, where instability in the terms of trade plays an important role. Volatility in commodity prices generates volatility in fiscal revenues, in turn fueling instability in expenditures. Spending volatility is even more damaging as the adjustments are asymmetric. Expenditures can easily be increased during boom periods, but when the effects of the boom have faded, it may be very difficult to lower them. In addition, commodity price volatility can also affect long-term growth because strongly fluctuating prices can increase uncertainty and risk, which discourages investment (Budina *et al.*, 2007).

It is worth noting that the aforementioned economic mechanisms of the resource curse can be exacerbated by the voracity effect of the elites (Tornell & Lane, 1999). Indeed, an oil boom may lead to an increase in the demand for direct transfers towards elites in the different regions of the country. Public spending by the central government can therefore increase and misallocate resources. The rigidity of these expenditures to reduction during the bust period, can lead to the accumulation of excessive debt, which in turn is conducive to economic collapse (Robinson et al., 2006; Budina et al., 2007).

While acknowledging the negative impacts of the aforementioned factors, including volatility and Dutch disease, on the economic performance of oil countries, numerous scholars question their relevance to explain limited export diversification (Hausmann et al., 2010; Cherif &

Hasanov, 2016). For example, Hausmann et al. (2010) argue that, in the case of Algeria, these factors do not explain why this large oil country exhibits high export concentration levels. In a broader examination of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, which are highly endowed with oil, Cherif and Hasanov (2016) concur that the standard policy recommendations for diversification may fall short, since diversification of these countries mainly depends on the initial technology gap and the importance of oil revenue. Taken as a whole, these findings suggest that policies aimed at counteracting the constraints outlined above may not be sufficient for successful export diversification in oil countries. This paper supports these views.

More specifically, we argue that the position of an oil country in connection with its diversification performance before the resource boom may predict the impact of oil windfalls on the future diversification of its economy. To be clear on this point, we do not argue that oil resources do not cause economic, political, or social problems. Instead, we argue that oil wealth is a problem for the diversification process if a tendency towards concentration already exists in the economy. In contrast, if a country already possesses a broader basket of export products before the oil boom, the windfall will be absorbed. As mentioned in the introduction, three main arguments can explain this proposition (see the works of Cherif, 2013; Cherif & Hasanov, 2016; Baland & Francois, 2000; Dunning, 2005; Omgba, 2014). Among these, we give an illustration based on the presence of an entrepreneurial class before the boom.

This class may act in two ways. It can influence the orientation of oil windfalls towards the private sector, and it can simultaneously absorb complementary investments derived from the resource boom.

In the case of Indonesia for instance, Dunning (2005) demonstrates that the country had a well-established entrepreneurial class as well as a significant agricultural sector long before the oil boom of the 1970s. The existence of a non-oil sector had long motivated political elites

to scale-up investments in its direction. This intensified during the oil boom, since they were able to use resource windfalls and did not have interest in being politically challenged by the entrepreneurial class (Dunning, 2005). In Malaysia, Jomo & Rock (1998) highlight the presence of such a class of entrepreneurs before the oil boom of the 1970s. Thus, at the time of its independence in 1957, Malaysia already had a manufacturing sector that contributed to 11% of GDP. Even its primary sector already had a diverse range of export products including tin, rubber and palm oil (Jomo and Rock, 1998). This pre-established non-oil sector made it possible to catalyze the dynamics of diversification, including the possibility of absorbing additional investments from oil revenues into non-oil sectors during the boom.

Unlike Malaysia or Indonesia, Gabon has a very high degree of export concentration today (Omgba, 2014) despite the fact that it also experienced an oil boom in the 1970s. As was the case in the other two countries, the Gabonese elite had an incentive to use the massive oil revenue influx to diversify the economy. Thus, with the aim of fighting against the volatility of oil resource exhaustibility, Gabonese political elites created an investment fund in 1974 (*Provision pour Investissements diversifiés*) to invest part of the oil windfall in perennial activities, hoping to lead the country towards economic diversification (Ondo Ossa, 1984). However, this initiative led to a political and economic disaster, resulting in elite capture. The limited industrial base and shortage of entrepreneurs did not permit the economy to adequately diversify the additional investment derived from oil revenue (Omgba, 2014). So, in the absence of an entrepreneurial class, that could increase political dividends for the elites through this diversification policy, it has become less attractive for the current Gabonese political elites to sustain this policy. Investments are being diverted from their original purpose and used instead for redistribution and public consumption, which are more attractive to elites. This concentration of resources in consumption and redistribution, and the absence of an implanted non-oil sector, will allow the emergence of a state bourgeoisie that

concentrates economic and political power, and does not have an interest in supporting diversification policies.

To sum-up, through these illustrations, we support the position that an oil country's diversification performance before the resource boom may predict the impact of the boom on economic diversification. However, since other factors may come into play to explain this divergence of diversification schemes, a careful empirical analysis is needed. That is the purpose of the following section.

III. Empirical analysis

III.1. Data

Our sample includes 187 countries over the 1965 - 2010 period.³ Table A1 in the appendix provides a list of countries split into oil producing countries (treatment group) and non-oil producing countries (comparison group) in 1965. An oil country is one that produced oil in 1965. A non-oil country is a country that did not produce oil in 1965. The classification between oil producing and non-oil producing countries is derived from the petroleum database BP (2015), which consists of a list of oil-producing countries and their yearly production since 1965.


Our outcome of interest is export diversification. The export diversification index used in this paper is the Theil index, one of the most frequently used diversification indices in related studies (see Cadot *et al.* 2013). We take advantage of a recent IMF database (2014) that includes a comprehensive diversification database with Theil indices for 186 countries, mostly less developed ones, from 1962 to 2010. Data and computations are described in IMF (2014). A higher value on the Theil diversification index indicates lower diversification.

³ Because of missing control variable data, most of our regressions include only 134 countries.

The oil boom variable (treatment variable) is a dummy variable equal to one for the years between 1974 and 1980 and the years between 2004 and 2010. These two periods represent the years covering the first and the second giant oil price shocks (see Kilian, 2009; Smith, 2015). Oil prices are drawn from BP (2015). Figure 1 depicts oil price trend including the two periods of giant price shocks.

Traditional covariates for diversification such as GDP per capita, investment, population density, and openness are from World Development Indicators (2015). In many regressions, we also control for geographical and historic factors. These factors include the legal origin, which is a dummy variable taking 1 when the legal origin is French, and 0 otherwise (from La Porta *et al.* 2008); and the capital city's distance from the equator (from Rodrik *et al.* 2004). We also check for the inclusion of oil production (from BP (2015)) in successive regressions. Table A2 presents summary statistics of variables used in this paper for the sample period (1965-2010).

Figure 1: The evolution of oil prices




Source: Authors' construction using data from BP (2015)

III.2. Econometric strategy

As stated above, the purpose of this paper is to study the impacts of positive oil price shocks on diversification in oil countries. Before establishing the econometric equations, we first examine the data by drafting three simple figures (Figure 2, Figure 3 and Figure 4). Figure 2 shows the export diversification trends for both oil producing and non-oil producing countries over the 1965-2010 period, utilizing the whole sample. The overall tendency is to diversify in both sub-samples. Nevertheless, this figure also displays a relationship between export diversification in oil countries and oil price shocks.

Figure 2: Export diversification trends between oil producing and non-oil producing countries




Source: Authors' construction using data from IMF (2014)

We investigate this point more deeply in Figures 3 and 4, which present the trends of export diversification between oil producing countries and non-oil producing countries, depending on diversification levels in 1965. Figure 3 exposes these trends for countries with a high level of diversification in 1965, which are countries above the diversification index's median in 1965. Although the concentration of exports increased slightly in the early 1980s, Figure 3 shows that after the oil booms of the 1970s, oil countries seem to exhibit better diversification performance than their non-oil counterparts.

In Figure 4 we undertake a similar exercise as the one in Figure 3, differentiated by the fact that we consider countries with low levels of diversification in 1965, which are countries with diversification indices below or equal to the diversification index's median in 1965. Contrary to Figure 3, Figure 4 shows a different pattern of export diversification for oil countries with low levels of diversification in 1965. One can see a reduction in diversification (an increase of export concentration) during the two giant oil booms. Clearly, in Figure 4, the trend of oil producing countries is above the one of non-oil countries, suggesting that those countries are not able to absorb oil windfalls.


Put together, the three figures produce some insights. First, the great export concentration in oil countries when compared to non-oil countries (Figure 2), might be primarily driven by the diversification performance of oil countries with high concentration levels in 1965 (Figure 4). Indeed, Figures 3 and 4 show that the diversification performance among oil countries is not homogeneous. Second, during boom periods, export diversification reacts to oil price shocks (price effect) in both groups of oil countries (high and low levels of diversification in 1965). However, it seems that it is the oil countries that have not diversified economies before the boom episodes that are lagging behind in their diversification process.

Figure 3: Index diversification trends between oil and non-oil producing countries with high levels of diversification in 1965



Source: Authors' construction using data from IMF (2014)

Figure 4: Index diversification trends between oil and non-oil producing countries with low levels of diversification in 1965



Source: Authors' construction using data from IMF (2014)

We formalize the visual evidence observed in Figure 2 by estimating the following regression:⁴

$$ED_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Boom_t * oilcountries_i + \beta_2 oilcountries_i + \beta_3 Boom_t + \delta X_{it} + \mu_t + \epsilon_{it} \quad (1)$$

In order to formalize the relationship observed in Figures 3 and 4, which constitute our main research question, we estimate the following regression:

$$ED_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Boom_t * oilcountries_i * lowdivers1965_i + \beta_2 Boom_t * oilcountries_i + \beta_3 Boom_t * lowdivers1965_i + \beta_4 Oilcountries_i * lowdivers1965_i + \beta_5 oilcountries_i + \beta_6 Boom_t + \beta_7 lowdivers \in 1965_i + \delta X_{it} + \mu_t + \epsilon_{it} \quad (2)$$

Where ED_{it} is the export diversification index in country i for year t , $Boom_t$ is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 in year t during oil boom years (1974-1980 and 2004-2010) and 0 otherwise. The variable $oilcountries_i$ is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for oil producing countries in 1965 and 0 otherwise; $lowdivers1965_i$ is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if country i has a low level of export diversification in 1965 (the export concentration in country i in 1965 is higher than or equal to the export concentration index median for the sample in 1965), and 0 if country i has a high level of export diversification (the export concentration in country i in 1965 is lower than the export concentration index median in 1965).⁵ X_{it} is a vector of control variables, μ_t is a time effect common to all countries in year t .⁶ The error term ϵ_{it} is a country time-varying error and is assumed to be

⁴ A similar approach has been used by Black *et al.* (2005), which evaluates the economic impact of the coal boom and bust in the United States. More recently, Smith (2015) used the same approach to examine the impact of the oil price boom and subsequent bust in the 1970s, on non-oil economic activity in oil-dependent countries.

⁵ In the difference-in-differences estimation framework, Galiani *et al.* (2005) used a similar approach to assess the heterogeneous treatment effects of privatization on child mortality by the initial level of socio economic status.

⁶ We chose to use the year 1965 for the classification of countries with high level export diversification and low level export diversification because we have more observation on the export diversification index in 1965 than in 1962. In 1965, we have export diversification index data on 145 countries whereas in 1962 we have export diversification index data on 140 countries. Therefore, our sample starts in 1965.

distributed independent of μ_i . Stated this way, the estimation method retained herein is the pooled OLS.

Pooled OLS estimations allow us to use cross-section and time dimensions. Nevertheless, it should be noted that pooled OLS do not control for unobserved heterogeneity, which can be a source of endogeneity concerns. Indeed, endogeneity can come from the omission of a relevant variable in the econometric specification. We reduce this risk by controlling for the variables listed in the literature when those variables are observable, and we include a time dummy in all estimates to control for common shocks. The problem of endogeneity could also arise with unobserved heterogeneity. A fixed effects estimator can be used to solve this problem; however, due to the structure of the data, this paper does not use fixed effects estimator.

A key assumption that is made in this paper is that the two giant oil booms identified in the literature are exogenous to individual oil producing countries and their export diversification. Basically, this assumption is related to the absence of time-varying unobserved covariates that are correlated with both factors that lead to oil booms and export diversification. In fact, Kilian (2009) presents evidence that historically, the main determinants of oil price shocks are the combination of global aggregate demand shocks and precautionary demand shocks, rather than oil supply shocks. This evidence is in line with the assumption of exogeneity of oil price shocks to oil producing countries. Smith (2015) also discusses the exogenous nature of the oil price shocks during the 1970s.

Finally, as pointed out by Bertrand et al. (2004), standard errors resulting from the use of repeated cross sections (or a panel) on individuals, states, or countries in treatment and control groups for several years before and after treatment, might be inconsistent because of the serial correlation problem. Thus, we address the concern of inconsistent standard errors due to serially correlated observations by following the two corrections proposed by Bertrand et al.

(2004). First, we allow for an arbitrary variance-covariance structure within countries over time by computing the standard errors clustered at the country level. Second, we remove the time series dimension by aggregating the data into two periods: pre- and post-intervention. Specifically, we collapse the time series information into a pre-oil boom period and a post-oil boom period.

III.3. Results

III.3.1 Main results

III.3.1.1 The Average effect

Table 1 presents different specifications for estimating the impact of oil booms on export diversification, as outlined in equation 1. Results in column 1, which do not include control variables, show that oil booms reduce export diversification (accentuate export concentration) by 0.224. In column 2, we control for the level of economic development (see Cadot et al., 2011). Although the coefficient (i.e. the extent of the impact) of oil booms is reduced, it is still statistically significant and has the expected sign. In column 3, in addition to the controls included in column 2, we also control for a different subset of variables, including investment, legal origin, population density, and trade openness. Results still indicate that oil booms reduce export diversification in oil producing countries. Furthermore, in column 4, we estimate equation 1 and include only those variables that are statistically significant as controls. The specification in column 4 is our preferred specification.

In short, our preferred specification (column 4) shows that oil booms reduce export diversification in oil producing countries by 0.340. Thus, in relative terms, oil booms are associated with a 8.2% reduction in export diversification in oil producing countries.⁷

A 8.2% reduction in export diversification represents 0.27 of a standard deviation of the export diversification index in 1965. This reduction is pretty substantial for the distribution of

⁷ The mean export diversification index in 1965 is 4.146

export diversification in 1965, which has a small variance. However, this effect size may mask heterogeneous effects of the oil boom on export diversification as shown in the above figures. This is because this effect size encompasses both the effect of the oil boom on export diversification in low level export diversification countries in 1965, and the one of the high level export diversification countries in 1965. The following section differentiates this effect.

Table 1: Effects of oil shock on export diversification

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Boom*oilcountries	0.224*** (0.060)	0.341*** (0.082)	0.312*** (0.089)	0.340*** (0.091)
Oilcountries	0.257 (0.268)	0.243 (0.265)	0.324 (0.247)	0.156 (0.262)
Oilshock	-0.495*** (0.078)	-0.217** (0.106)	-0.383** (0.162)	-0.348** (0.158)
LnGDP_capita		-0.164 (0.550)	-0.353 (0.505)	0.092 (0.518)
(LnGDP_capita)_squared		-0.012 (0.035)	-0.003 (0.032)	-0.029 (0.032)
Investment			-0.007 (0.006)	0.005 (0.006)
Legal origin			0.462*** (0.164)	0.356** (0.167)
Population_density			-0.000 (0.000)	
Openness			0.007*** (0.002)	
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Countries	187	176	169	170
Observations	8,214	6,599	5,614	5,663
R-squared	0.030	0.224	0.327	0.284

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country level.

* Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, and *** significant at 1%.

The mean of export diversification in 1965 is 4.146.

Source: Authors' estimates

III.3.1.2 The heterogeneity effect of the booms

Now, we turn to Table 2, which reports the results of the main research question of this paper, namely the existence of different effects depending on the level of diversification prior to the boom. Specifically, Table 2 presents the results from different specifications of equation 2, which estimate the impact of oil booms on export diversification in oil producing countries by accounting for the level of export diversification in 1965. Results in column 1, which include

control variables used in Table 1 (column 4), show that oil booms reduce export diversification by 0.465 in oil producing countries only when accompanied by low levels of diversification in 1965. In contrast, oil booms have no effect on export diversification in oil countries with high levels of diversification in 1965. In column 2, we add a geographical control (distance to equator), results found in column 1 remain unchanged. It is worth noting that the size of the effect represents a 11.21% reduction in export diversification and 0.37 in terms of standard deviation of the export diversification index in 1965.

One can argue against these results by stating that they are simply driven by the resource endowment. An increase in the oil price may lead to more concentration in countries that are heavily endowed in oil, or which export more oil. We tackle this possible concern in columns 3. In column 3, we control for oil production in order to capture the oil endowment. Again, the results remain unchanged. Even if oil production is significant, the size of the effect of the oil booms on export diversification in oil producing countries with low levels of diversification is similar to what we find in column 1. Furthermore, as an alternative specification, we integrate other proxies for institutional quality, namely democracy (Polity 2) and a corruption variable (from ICRG, 2014). The results for democracy (Column 4) and for corruption (Column 5) suggest that good institutional quality reduces export concentration. While one may assert that the results with the institutional variables might be biased because the quality of institutions might have been influenced by oil over time, it is worth noting that controlling for institutional quality does not change our main result.⁸ The oil boom increases export diversification only in countries with low levels of diversification in 1965. The specification in column 3 is our preferred specification.

Furthermore, in order to facilitate the interpretation of our results, in Table 3, we report marginal effects of oil boom for different types of countries (oil rich and diversified, oil rich

⁸ See, for example, Libman (2013) for the mixed effect of democracy, and the positive effect of strong bureaucracy in terms of impact of natural resources on growth, particularly in the case of Russia.

and non-diversified etc.) with the corresponding standard errors using delta method. Table 3 shows that oil booms reduce export diversification only in oil producing countries with a low export diversification in 1965.

Table 2: Effect of oil boom on export diversification by level of diversification in 1965

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Boom*oilcountries*lowdivers in 1965	0.465*** (0.145)	0.462*** (0.154)	0.480*** (0.152)	0.317* (0.162)	1.805** (0.753)	0.480*** (0.152)	0.488*** (0.145)
Boom*oilcountries	0.002 (0.074)	-0.008 (0.070)	-0.047 (0.072)	-0.035 (0.066)	-0.003 (0.103)	-0.047 (0.072)	-0.025 (0.078)
Oilcountries*lowdivers in 1965	0.782** (0.387)	0.787* (0.409)	0.719* (0.383)	0.725** (0.323)	0.940** (0.423)	0.719* (0.383)	0.834** (0.362)
Boom*lowdivers in 1965	-0.134 (0.085)	-0.140* (0.082)	-0.159** (0.077)	-0.120 (0.088)	-0.304** (0.146)	-0.159** (0.077)	-0.155* (0.080)
Oilcountries	-0.004 (0.253)	-0.088 (0.228)	-0.738** (0.306)	-0.686** (0.285)	-0.396 (0.421)	-0.738** (0.306)	-0.502 (0.337)
Boom	-0.350*** (0.120)	-0.389*** (0.117)	-0.604*** (0.137)	-0.667*** (0.150)	-0.149 (0.113)	-0.604*** (0.137)	-0.490*** (0.146)
Lowdivers in 1965	1.172*** (0.133)	1.052*** (0.146)	1.006*** (0.152)	0.844*** (0.131)	0.855*** (0.182)	1.006*** (0.152)	1.128*** (0.134)
LnGDP_capita	-0.144 (0.400)	-0.527 (0.332)	-0.471 (0.308)	-0.233 (0.319)	-1.186*** (0.416)	-0.471 (0.308)	0.110 (0.408)
(LnGDP_capita)_squared	-0.011 (0.025)	0.020 (0.021)	0.016 (0.019)	0.004 (0.019)	0.057** (0.026)	0.016 (0.019)	-0.029 (0.025)
Investment	0.000 (0.005)	0.001 (0.004)	-0.000 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.015 (0.010)	-0.000 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.006)
Legal origin	0.249* (0.145)	0.225* (0.133)	-0.023*** (0.006)	-0.024*** (0.006)	0.157 (0.168)	-0.023*** (0.006)	
Dist Equat of capital city		-0.020*** (0.005)	0.201 (0.125)	0.137 (0.123)	0.074 (0.050)	0.201 (0.125)	
Lnoil_production			0.115*** (0.043)	0.106*** (0.040)	-0.597* (0.356)	0.115*** (0.043)	0.087* (0.046)
Democracy(Polity2)				-0.034*** (0.009)			
Boom*oilcountries*lowdivers in 1965* Corruption					-0.597* (0.356) -0.183*** (0.050)		
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Countries	134	134	134	118	111	134	134
Observations	5,008	5,008	5,008	4351	2756	5008	5008
R-squared	0.561	0.593	0.612	0.674	0.563	0.612	0.564

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country level.

* Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, and *** significant at 1%.

The mean of export diversification in 1965 is 4.146.

Source: Authors' estimates

Table 3: Marginal effects of oil boom for different types of countries

Different types of countries	Marginal effects
The marginal effect of oil boom on export diversification index in oil rich countries and non-diversified countries	0.432*** (0.136)
The marginal effect of oil boom on export diversification index in oil rich countries and diversified countries	-0.650*** (0.151)
The marginal effect of oil boom on export diversification index in non-oil rich countries and non-diversified countries	-.762*** (0.154)
The marginal effect of oil boom on export diversification index in non-oil rich countries and diversified countries	-0.603*** (0.137)

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses using delta method.

Coefficients presented in Table 3 are from linear combinations of different coefficients presented in Table 2. For example, the marginal effect of oil boom on export diversification index in oil rich countries and non-diversified countries is obtained through a linear combination of two coefficients "Boom*oilcountries*lowdivers in 1965 and Boom*oilcountries (see coefficients in Column 3 (our preferred specification) of Table 2)"

* Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, and *** significant at 1%.

Source: Authors' estimates

III.3.2 Testing a channel

The preceding results report that oil countries' diversification performance is related to diversification levels prior to a resource boom. These results beg the question of whether it is diversification that matters, or the presence of other factors that might be responsible for diversification in the first place.

Table 4 reports a test that evaluates whether our results are explained by the importance of the manufacturing sector before the boom. Data on manufacturing sectors are from the World Development Indicators (2015). The countries that have a large manufacturing sector ($Largemanufacturing_{in1970}$) are identified as those in which the variable manufacturing sector as percentage of GDP is above the median value. Table 4 shows that the coefficient associated with the interactive term $Largemanufacturing_{in1970} * Boom * oilcountries$ is not significant. This suggests that oil shocks do not harm the diversification process in oil countries with a large manufacturing sector prior to the boom. However, the interactive term $Boom * oilcountries$ is positive and significant. This latter result suggests that oil shocks reduce diversification only in countries with a small manufacturing sector prior to the boom. While one should be cautious about the interpretation of the manufacturing variable results, since some countries might exhibit large manufacturing shares without a consequent

entrepreneur class (E.g., ex-Soviet Union), it is worth noting that the results are consistent with the arguments highlighted in section 2. Specifically that the presence of an entrepreneurial class prior the boom makes it possible to absorb supplementary investments that may derive from the resource boom⁹.

Table 4: The importance of initial industrialization

	(1)
Largemanufacturingin1970*Boom *oilcountries	-0.226 (0.186)
Boom *oilcountries	0.369** (0.143)
Largemanufacturingin1970*Oilcountries	-0.621 (0.399)
Largemanufacturingin1970*Boom	0.038 (0.075)
Oilcountries	-0.063 (0.428)
Boom	-0.742*** (0.174)
Largemanufacturingin1970	-0.817*** (0.205)
LnGDP_capita	-0.609 (0.476)
(LnGDP_capita)_squared	0.024 (0.030)
Investment	-0.003 (0.008)
Dist Equat of capital city	-0.016** (0.007)
Legal origin	0.181 (0.149)
Lnoil_production	0.088* (0.049)
Year fixed effects	Yes
Countries	101
Observations	3830
R-squared	0.572

* Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, and *** significant at 1%
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country level.

⁹ One should also note that the manufacturing sector has been found to be strongly correlated with long-term growth (see Gylfason & Wijkman, 2015).

III.3.3 Considering the busts

The objective of this paper is to evaluate export diversification patterns of oil countries during boom episodes. However, it is well known that oil prices are volatile, boom episodes are usually followed by bust periods, and it therefore makes sense to ask what would be the consequence to export diversification during bust episodes. Thus, in Table 5, we analyze whether oil busts affect export diversification. Using Figure 1 of this paper (which shows the evolution of oil price) as a basis, we have retained two bust periods that are in accordance with the literature (see Smith 2015). The first period runs from 1981 to 1986 and the second period from 1987 to 2003. We also combine the two busts (column 1). In columns 1, 2, and 3, we do not control for the level of the diversification in 1965, and find that the bust has no effect on export diversification. However, when we control for the level of diversification in 1965 (columns 4, 5, and 6), we find that the bust has a positive effect on diversification. This result may suggest that, during the bust, the authorities of oil countries may understand that they had to look for other sources of income, since oil revenues could dry up. This decline in oil revenues may therefore be conducive to the adoption of diversification strategies (for some country cases, see Cherif and Hasanov, 2016).

Table 5: Effects of bust on export diversification

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Bust81_2003*oilcountries	-0.081 (0.120)			0.039 (0.149)		
Bust81_2003	-0.067 (0.167)			-0.550*** (0.148)		
Bust81_2003*oilcountries*lowdivers in 1965				-0.239 (0.214)		
Bust81_86*oilcountries		0.065 (0.134)				
Bust81_86*oilcountries*lowdivers in 1965					-0.333 (0.221)	
Bust81_86		-0.103 (0.168)			-0.710*** (0.149)	
Bust87_2003* oilcountries			-0.112 (0.122)			-0.122 (0.152)
Bust87_2003*oilcountries*lowdivers in 1965						-0.087 (0.205)
Bust87_2003			-0.101 (0.168)			-0.590*** (0.151)
Oilcountries	0.305 (0.280)	0.254 (0.265)	0.308 (0.281)	-0.769** (0.300)	-0.796** (0.310)	-0.713** (0.306)
LnGDP_capita	0.097 (0.521)	0.091 (0.520)	0.099 (0.522)	-0.481 (0.306)	-0.486 (0.308)	-0.471 (0.306)
(LnGDP_capita)_squared	-0.030 (0.032)	-0.029 (0.032)	-0.030 (0.033)	0.017 (0.019)	0.017 (0.019)	0.016 (0.019)
Investment	0.005 (0.006)	0.005 (0.006)	0.005 (0.006)	-0.000 (0.004)	-0.000 (0.004)	-0.000 (0.004)
Legal origin	0.357** (0.168)	0.357** (0.168)	0.357** (0.168)	0.201 (0.125)	0.203 (0.125)	0.201 (0.125)
Dist Equat of capital city				-0.023*** (0.006)	-0.023*** (0.006)	-0.023*** (0.006)
Lnoil_production				0.115*** (0.043)	0.115*** (0.043)	0.117*** (0.043)
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Countries	170	170	170	134	134	134
Observations	5,663	5663	5,663	5008	5008	5008
R-squared	0.281	0.281	0.282	0.612	0.612	0.612

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country level.

* Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, and *** significant at 1%.

The mean of export diversification in 1965 is 4.146.

Source: Authors' estimates

IV. Robustness checks

IV.1 Competing hypotheses

Additional issues that may surround previous results can be linked to the potential automaticity of these results. Particularly, one might conclude that shocks to oil prices will automatically make countries' exports more concentrated on oil. We tackle this point by separating the countries according to their initial dependence on oil rents. The countries with high oil dependency (Highoilrent in 1970) are the ones for which the variable oil rent as a

percentage of GDP is above the median value. Column 1 of Table 6 shows the results of the interactive term ($\text{Highoilrent in 1970} * \text{Boom} * \text{oilcountries}$) that indicates a non-significant coefficient associated with this variable. This corroborates previous results, buttressing the assertion that the underlying effect is not automatic.

On the other hand, this paper highlights the presence of a path dependency mechanism with respect to the initial diversification levels of resource countries. In doing so, one can argue that this result is not only a question of diversification, and could be automatically found in other path dependency dimensions. To account for this potential objection, we introduce an interactive term with the legal origin variable, $\text{Legalorigin} * \text{Boom} * \text{oilcountries}$. The results presented in Column 2 of Table 6 demonstrate that this interactive term is not significant. Again, this suggests that the underlying effect is not automatic.

Table 6: Competing hypotheses

(1)		(2)	
Highoilrent in 1970*Boom *oilcountries	0.123 (0.118)	Legalorigin*Boom *oilcountries	0.088 (0.173)
Boom *oilcountries	-	Boom *oilcountries	0.222* (0.128)
Highoilrent in 1970*Oilcountries	-0.551 (0.511)	Legalorigin*Oilcountries	0.450 (0.436)
Highoilrent in 1970*Boom	0.074 (0.087)	Legalorigin*Boom	-0.124* (0.068)
Oilcountries	-	Oilcountries	-1.087*** (0.387)
Boom	-0.811*** (0.201)	Boom	-0.662*** (0.167)
Highoilrent in 1970	-0.728** (0.356)	Legalorigin	0.089 (0.127)
LnGDP_capita	-0.535 (0.550)	LnGDP_capita	-0.312 (0.402)
(LnGDP_capita)_squared	0.023 (0.036)	(LnGDP_capita)_squared	0.005 (0.026)
Investment	-0.000 (0.010)	Investment	0.004 (0.004)
Dist Equat of capital city	-0.033*** (0.009)	Dist Equat of capital city	-0.032*** (0.006)
Legal origin	0.288* (0.169)		
Lnoil_production	0.227*** (0.082)	Lnoil_production	0.159*** (0.051)
Year fixed effects	Yes	Year fixed effects	Yes
Countries	105	Countries	170
Observations	4,108	Observations	5663
R-squared	0.428	R-squared	0.425

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country level.

* Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, and *** significant at 1%.

The mean of export diversification in 1965 is 4.146.

Source: Authors' estimates

IV. 2 Placebo tests, controlling for country specific time trends and addressing potential issues related to serial correlation

The key assumption of our identification strategy is the existence of parallel trends in export diversification between oil producing countries, and non-oil producing countries, during pre-

oil boom periods. We test this assumption by performing two placebo tests. Specifically, we test the impact of a placebo oil boom on export diversification for years prior to the two oil booms. Thus, in order to perform these placebo tests, we create a dummy variable equal to 1 for years 1965 to 1972 and 1982 to 2002, and 0 otherwise.

The first placebo test assesses whether or not the export diversification trend is parallel during the pre-oil boom periods between oil producing countries and non-oil producing countries. For this test, if the variable capturing the placebo effect (*placeboboom *oilcountries*) is not significantly different from zero, this will confirm our assumption that the export diversification trend is not significantly different in pre-oil boom periods between oil producing countries and non-oil producing countries. The second placebo test assesses whether within each group of countries, namely countries with high export diversification in 1965 and countries with low export diversification in 1965, export diversification exhibits a parallel trend during the pre-oil boom periods between oil producing and non-producing countries. For this second placebo test, if the variable capturing the placebo effect in countries with a low level of diversification in 1965 (*Placeboboom*oilcountries*lowdivers in 1965*) is not significantly different from zero, it means that there is a parallel trend in export diversification for pre-oil boom periods between oil producing countries and non-oil producing countries in the first group of countries. Similarly, if the variable capturing the placebo effect in countries with a high level of diversification in 1965 (*Placeboboom *oilcountries*) is not significantly different from zero, it means that export diversification demonstrates a parallel trend in pre-oil boom periods, between oil producing countries, and non-oil producing countries, in this second group of countries.

Furthermore, we estimate equation 2 by allowing for country-specific time trends, which would help to soak up any unobserved time-varying shocks and policies across countries in any given year, between 1965 and 2010, which might affect export diversification. Finally, we

collapse the time series information into a pre-oil boom period and post-oil boom period, as suggested by Bertrand et al. (2004) to address the potential issue of serial correlation. In particular, to obtain the data for the pre-oil boom period, we collapse time series data before the oil booms (years 1965 to 1973 and years 1981 to 2003) by group of countries (oil producing countries and non-oil producing countries). Similarly, to obtain data for the post-oil boom period, we collapse time series data during the oil booms (years 1974 to 1980 and years 2004 to 2010) by group of countries (oil producing countries and non-oil producing countries).

Table 7 presents results of our placebo tests, the estimation of the effect of oil booms taking into account country-specific time trends, and the estimation of the effect of oil booms when collapsing the time series information into pre- and post-oil boom periods. Column 1 shows that the interaction term capturing the placebo effect of oil booms on export diversification is not significantly different from zero. The effect size of this interaction effect is close to 0. This result suggests that the parallel trends assumption is verified between oil producing and non-oil producing countries, during the pre-oil boom periods. Column 2 shows that the first interaction term capturing the placebo effect of oil booms on export diversification in countries with low levels of export diversification in 1965, and the second interaction term encapsulating the placebo effect of oil booms in countries with a high levels of export diversification, are both not significantly different from zero. These results confirm that the parallel trends assumption is verified in the pre-oil boom periods between oil producing countries and non-oil producing countries with low levels of export diversification in 1965, and between oil producing countries and non-oil producing countries with high levels of export diversification in 1965. Column 3 shows that controlling for country specific time trends does not alter our main results. Oil booms reduce export diversification only in oil producing countries with a low export diversification in 1965. Finally, column 4 also shows

that our main results remain unchanged when collapsing the time series data into a pre-oil boom period and post-oil boom period. More precisely, oil booms reduce export diversification only in oil countries with low levels of diversification in 1965. Oil booms have no effect on export diversification in countries with high levels of diversification.

Table 7: Effect of placebo oil booms, controlling for country specific time trends and estimates from two periods (a pre-oil boom period and post-oil boom period)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
PlaceboBoom*oilcountries*lowdivers in 1965		0.072 (0.230)		
PlaceboBoom*oilcountries	-0.012 (0.142)	-0.035 (0.173)		
Boom *oilcountries*lowdivers in 1965	0.480*** (0.152)	0.548** (0.227)	0.467*** (0.153)	0.297** (0.117)
Boom *oilcountries	-0.058 (0.143)	-0.080 (0.171)	-0.040 (0.071)	-0.053 (0.086)
Oilcountries*lowdivers in 1965	0.719* (0.383)	0.646 (0.438)	0.718* (0.387)	1.005*** (0.271)
Boom *lowdivers in 1965	-0.159** (0.078)	-0.159** (0.078)	-0.150* (0.077)	-0.185 (0.154)
Oilcountries	-0.726* (0.370)	-0.703* (0.392)	-0.719** (0.312)	-0.582*** (0.224)
Boom	-0.601*** (0.146)	-0.601*** (0.146)	-1.101*** (0.256)	-0.000 (0.097)
Lowdivers in 1965	1.006*** (0.152)	1.006*** (0.152)	1.010*** (0.159)	1.081*** (0.131)
LnGDP_capita	-0.471 (0.308)	-0.472 (0.308)	-0.478 (0.309)	-0.607** (0.256)
(LnGDP_capita)_squared	0.016 (0.019)	0.016 (0.019)	0.017 (0.019)	0.027* (0.016)
Investment	-0.000 (0.004)	-0.000 (0.004)	0.000 (0.004)	0.002 (0.005)
Dist Equat of capital city	-0.023*** (0.006)	-0.023*** (0.006)	-0.023*** (0.006)	-0.024*** (0.003)
Legal origin	0.201 (0.125)	0.201 (0.125)	0.205 (0.125)	0.158** (0.073)
Lnoil_production	0.115*** (0.043)	0.115*** (0.043)	0.112** (0.044)	0.102*** (0.027)
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country specific time trends	No	No	Yes	No
Countries	134	134	134	134
Observations	5008	5008	5008	266
R-squared	0.613	0.612	0.615	0.705

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country level.

* Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, and *** significant at 1%.

Source: Authors' estimates

IV.3 Sample definition

One possible concern regarding the previous results is related to the fact that some countries in the sample might drive those results. For example, the role of Saudi Arabia as the swing producer in the oil market is an ongoing controversy, therefore we find it relevant to assess whether its presence in the sample influences the results. It also appears relevant to assess whether the presence of developed countries influences the results. The economies of certain developing countries, such as China and India, have performed tremendously well, and have diversified during the last three decades. Therefore, these countries might appear as outliers in this study. In the same vein, some countries may change institutional status during our periods of analysis. For example the ex-Soviet Union members, and more largely the Socialist economies until 1991, for which the causal mechanism of the effect of oil booms could be different due to a different way the economy is organized. Table 8 presents the results of the estimations that take into account the aforementioned cases. In column 1, we exclude Saudi Arabia. In column 2, we exclude Australia, Canada, United Kingdom, Italy, and United States of America. In column 3, we exclude China and India. In column 4, we exclude ex-USSR. In column 6, we exclude the Socialist economies until 1991.¹⁰

In addition to the aforementioned cases, we push the analysis forward by questioning the definition of oil countries. Indeed, some countries discovered oil after 1962 and hence moved from the control group into the treatment group. In column 5 (Table 8), we reintegrate those cases, such as Cameroon, Chad, Kazakhstan, Oman, Syria, Tunisia, Vietnam, and Yemen which became oil producers after 1962. Finally, in column 7 (Table 8), we present our results

¹⁰ This includes Albania Armenia Azerbaijan Belarus Bulgaria Croatia Czech Republic Estonia FYR Macedonia Georgia Hungary Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Latvia Lithuania Moldova Mongolia Poland Romania Russia Slovak Republic Slovenia Tajikistan Turkmenistan Ukraine Uzbekistan.

with a different oil exporter sample where we exclude Argentina, Australia, Brazil, China, Egypt, India, Italy, Peru, Thailand, Uzbekistan, and the U.S. in the sample of oil exporters and we include Kazakhstan, Niger, Norway, Oman, Yemen, Equatorial Guinea, Sudan, and Syria that might qualify as oil exporters. All the results of Table 8, which account for aforementioned questionable cases, do not modify our original conclusions.

Table 8: Effect of oil shocks on export diversification in different samples

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Boom *oilcountries*lowdivers in 1965	0.488*** (0.166)	0.491*** (0.160)	0.466*** (0.151)	0.480*** (0.152)	0.815*** (0.199)	0.490*** (0.153)	0.400** (0.169)
Boom *oilcountries	-0.044 (0.072)	-0.069 (0.083)	-0.040 (0.076)	-0.047 (0.072)	-0.371** (0.161)	-0.048 (0.072)	0.051 (0.104)
Oilcountries*lowdivers in 1965	0.585 (0.385)	0.563 (0.423)	0.633* (0.379)	0.719* (0.383)	0.413 (0.388)	0.720* (0.387)	0.152 (0.515)
Boom *lowdivers in 1965	-0.158** (0.078)	-0.157** (0.077)	-0.157* (0.080)	-0.159** (0.077)	-0.231*** (0.084)	-0.169** (0.078)	-0.136* (0.080)
Oilcountries	-0.693** (0.305)	-0.631* (0.352)	-0.572* (0.314)	-0.738** (0.306)	0.047 (0.240)	-0.750** (0.308)	0.568 (0.428)
Boom	-0.587*** (0.138)	-0.589*** (0.135)	-0.597*** (0.139)	-0.604*** (0.137)	-0.351** (0.146)	-0.606*** (0.139)	-0.374*** (0.133)
Lowdivers in 1965	1.008*** (0.151)	1.025*** (0.151)	0.990*** (0.149)	1.006*** (0.152)	1.128*** (0.147)	0.996*** (0.157)	1.154*** (0.144)
LnGDP_capita	-0.457 (0.311)	-0.604* (0.327)	-0.667** (0.306)	-0.471 (0.308)	-0.536 (0.334)	-0.493 (0.304)	-0.591* (0.339)
(LnGDP_capita)_squared	0.015 (0.019)	0.026 (0.020)	0.025 (0.020)	0.016 (0.019)	0.021 (0.021)	0.018 (0.019)	0.023 (0.021)
Investment	0.001 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.004)	0.002 (0.003)	-0.000 (0.004)	0.000 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)	0.001 (0.004)
Dist Equat of capital city	-0.022*** (0.006)	-0.023*** (0.006)	-0.019*** (0.005)	-0.023*** (0.006)	-0.020*** (0.005)	-0.024*** (0.006)	-0.016*** (0.005)
Legal origin	0.233* (0.126)	0.219* (0.129)	0.138 (0.124)	0.201 (0.125)	0.225* (0.131)	0.207 (0.129)	0.259* (0.132)
Lnoil_production	0.107** (0.043)	0.121*** (0.045)	0.120*** (0.045)	0.115*** (0.043)	0.040 (0.044)	0.117*** (0.044)	-0.000 (0.035)
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Countries	133	130	132	134	134	129	134
Observations	4,965	4,812	4,910	5,008	5,008	4,875	5,008
R-squared	0.610	0.600	0.624	0.613	0.600	0.607	0.605

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country level.

* Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, and *** significant at 1%.

Source: Authors' estimates

IV.4 Alternative measures of oil dependence and exclusion of the shock of the 1970s

Instead of classifying all countries as either oil producing or non-oil producing, we undertake a systemic approach using the net oil exports variable, which can reveal for an oil country whether it is a net oil importing country or a net oil exporting country. The variable is drawn from Ross and Mahdavi (2015). Results in column 1 of Table A3 (in Appendix) confirm that

oil exports increase export concentration. When, we directly interact the oil export variable with low levels of diversification in 1965, without making the distinction between oil producing countries and non-oil producing countries, results (column 2) show that oil exports increase export concentration only in countries with low levels of diversification in 1965. It is worth noting that the oil export variable results in several missing points (we lose 2,019 observations) and might be more affected by the endogenous problems than the variable Boom. Despite these possible restrictions, the results in column 2 of Table A3 show that oil dependence increases export concentration only if the country initially contains a low level of diversification. Furthermore, these results are also confirmed when considering only countries with a positive net export value. Column 3 of Table A3 supports our previous findings of the effect of oil booms in oil dependent countries (countries with a positive value net oil exports). Results from column 1 (Table A4) also support the importance of the initial level of diversification, the interactive term - oil boom *positive value net oil exports*low diversification in 1965 is significant and positive, suggesting that our previous findings are not rejected.

In addition, there is a common discussion concerning the difference between resource abundance and resource dependency. Some countries like Australia can be abundant in oil but less dependent on it, while others like Chad may have relatively little oil but be heavily dependent on it as a resource. As the variable oil rent is available, we use two categorizations. In the first stage, we distinguish oil dependent countries according to their situation around the median. As a reminder, that is to say that a high oil rent country is one with oil rent levels above the median. In the second stage, we use the World Bank classification to categorize a country as a resource dependent country or not. For the World Bank, a country is a resource dependent country if oil rents are about 3–5 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) (see World Bank, 2014). Thus, we calculate the average oil rents in percentage of GDP over our

study period, and then we use this average to classify countries as resource dependent or not. Results from the first stage show that the interaction between high oil rents and initial low diversification is positive and significant (column 4 of Table A4). This corroborates the findings of Cherif and Hasanov (2016) that show that diversification in oil countries does also depend on the importance of oil revenue. When we interact high oil rents, initial low diversification and oil boom (see column 5 of Table A4) the coefficient is significant and positive, supporting the previous findings of this paper, that even in the case of high oil rents, booms matter for initial low diversification countries.

In the second stage, after using the World Bank classification, results confirm that oil booms increase export concentration (see column 4 of Table A3). Results also confirm that this export concentration is only present in countries with little diversification in 1965 (see column 2 of Table A4).

Finally, concerns could also be raised about the assumption of the exogeneity of the oil shocks, especially the 1970s boom. To address these possible concerns, we excluded the 1970s shock. When excluding the 1970s shock (see column 5, Table A3), our first step result confirms that the oil boom reduces export diversification in oil producing countries. Regarding the heterogeneity of oil countries, the second step result confirms that the oil boom increases export concentration only in countries with low levels of diversification in 1965 (see column 3, Table A4). The coefficient of interest is even higher (0.660) than what we found when combining the 1970s and 2000s (0.480) time periods. As previously found, this once again reiterates that oil booms reduce export diversification only in oil countries with low initial levels of diversification. Oil booms have no effect on export diversification in countries with high levels of diversification.

IV.4 The case of sub-Saharan Africa

An assumption behind the previous econometric tests is that oil price shocks are exogenous to oil producing countries. As discussed above, Kilian (2009) presents evidence that historically, the main determinants of oil price shocks are a combination of global aggregate demand shocks and precautionary demand shocks, rather than oil supply shocks. Therefore, this assumption is credible for the present study. However, the idea that some countries may hold a certain degree of power in setting the price of oil is heavily debated in the literature (see Hamilton, 2008).

We undertake additional checks on the uncertain influence of market power on our results. We focus our empirical tests on the sub-Saharan African countries in our sample. Indeed, despite Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and Angola's membership in the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), there is no supportive evidence that these countries dictate the pricing of oil. We argue that African oil producers are more price takers than price makers, so a giant oil shock would certainly be exogenous to them.

Moreover, sub-Saharan African countries are comparable in many respects. For example, many African countries gained their political independence in the 1960s, and they are mainly specialized in products from primary sectors, making a focus on this group of countries warranted. Table A5 (in appendix) presents the results of our sub-sample of African countries. Previous results are not rejected in this sub-sample.

IV. Conclusion

In a large sample of countries, we examine the impact of oil booms on export diversification levels. We demonstrate that oil booms lead, on average, to more concentration when the level of diversification prior to the oil booms is not accounted for. However, when we consider the

initial level of diversification, results show that an oil boom leads to more concentration only if countries exhibit low levels of diversification before the boom. In countries with high levels of diversification before the boom, an oil boom has no impact on diversification. The results are corroborated with data from the manufacturing sector, which show that an oil boom reduces diversification only in countries with a small manufacturing sector prior to the boom.

These results suggest that the lack of diversification in oil countries is not a result of oil windfalls, but rather existing impediments to the take-off and sustainability of diversification processes that existed before the advent of oil windfalls. Consequently, oil countries that have a larger range of export products prior to oil booms are the most likely ones to absorb oil windfalls, and as a result succeed in the management of oil booms. Instead of focusing all of the attention on adopted policy during boom episodes, attention could also be paid to understanding the factors behind the economy's structure before boom episodes.

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Appendix

Table A1

Table A1: List of countries by oil producing status in 1965

Oil producing countries	non-oil producing countries			
Algeria	Afghanistan	Ethiopia	Mauritania	Tajikistan
Angola	Albania	Faeroe Islands	Mauritius	Tanzania
Argentina	Andorra	Fiji	Moldova	Togo
Australia	Antigua and Barbuda	Finland	Mongolia	Tonga
Azerbaijan	Armenia	France	Morocco	Tunisia
Brazil	Aruba	French Polynesia	Mozambique	Turkey
Canada	Austria	Gambia, The	Myanmar	Uganda
China	Bahamas, The	Georgia	Nepal	Ukraine
Colombia	Bahrain	Germany	Netherlands	United Kingdom
Congo, Rep.	Bangladesh	Ghana	New Caledonia	Uruguay
Ecuador	Barbados	Greece	New Zealand	Vietnam
Egypt, Arab Rep.	Belarus	Greenland	Nicaragua	Yemen, Rep.
Gabon	Belgium	Grenada	Niger	Zambia
India	Belize	Guatemala	Norway	Zimbabwe
Indonesia	Benin	Guinea	Oman	
Iran, Islamic Rep.	Bermuda	Guinea-Bissau	Pakistan	
Iraq	Bolivia	Guyana	Panama	
Italy	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Haiti	Papua New Guinea	
Kuwait	Bulgaria	Honduras	Paraguay	
Libya	Burkina Faso	Hong Kong SAR, China	Philippines	
Malaysia	Burundi	Hungary	Poland	
Mexico	Cabo Verde	Iceland	Portugal	
Nigeria	Cambodia	Ireland	Rwanda	
Peru	Cameroon	Israel	Samoa	
Qatar	Cayman Islands	Jamaica	Sao Tome and Principe	
Russian Federation	Central African Republic	Japan	Senegal	
Saudi Arabia	Chad	Jordan	Serbia	
Thailand	Chile	Kazakhstan	Seychelles	
Trinidad and Tobago	Comoros	Kenya	Sierra Leone	
Turkmenistan	Congo, Dem. Rep.	Kiribati	Singapore	
United Arab Emirates	Costa Rica	Korea, Dem. Rep.	Slovak Republic	
United States	Cote d'Ivoire	Korea, Rep.	Slovenia	
Uzbekistan	Croatia	Kyrgyz Republic	Solomon Islands	
Venezuela, RB	Cuba	Lao PDR	Somalia	
		Latvia	South Africa	
	Cyprus	Lebanon	Spain	
	Czech Republic	Liberia	Sri Lanka	
	Denmark	Lithuania	St. Kitts and Nevis	
	Djibouti	Macao SAR, China	St. Lucia	
	Dominica	Macedonia, FYR	St. Vincent and the Grenadines	

	Dominican Republic	Madagascar	Sudan
	El Salvador	Malawi	Suriname
	Equatorial Guinea	Maldives	Sweden
	Eritrea	Mali	Switzerland
	Estonia	Malta	Syrian Arab Republic

Source: Authors' construction

Table A2: Descriptive statistics

Variables	Mean	Std. Dev	Min	Max	Obs
Diversification index	3.644	1.269	0.960	6.437	8,165
Oil producing countries in 1965	0.182	0.386	0	1	9,114
Oil production	296.889	1142.253	0	11416.33	9,014
Log GDP	7.856	1.599	4.227	11.316	6,750
Log GDP square	64.281	25.729	17.874	128.070	6,750
Investment(%GDP)	22.093	10.152	-2.424	219.069	5,961
Population density	242.603	1265.12	0.102	21595.35	8,877
Openness(%GDP)	74.191	49.676	0.308	531.737	6,663
Dist from Equ. of capita city	25.193	17.017	0	64	8,869
legal origin is of French origin	0.455	0.498	0	1	8,820

Source: Authors' calculation

Table A3: Effects of oil shock on export diversification using different classifications of oil exporters and excluding the shock of 1970

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Boom*oilcountries					0.507*** (0.170)
Oilcountries					0.167 (0.269)
Boom*oilrents%GDP>3%				0.344*** (0.086)	
Oilrents%GDP>3%				0.717*** (0.213)	
Boom*Net oil exports value>0			0.300*** (0.082)		
Net oil exports value>0			0.769*** (0.173)		
Boom			-0.337** (0.160)	-0.352** (0.156)	-0.296 (0.180)
Net oil exports value	2.03e-11*** (0.000)	9.36e-12 (0.000)			
Net oil exports value*lowdivers in 1965		1.21e-11*** (0.000)			
LnGDP_capita	-1.044** (0.423)	-1.290*** (0.339)	-0.545 (0.479)	-0.297 (0.527)	0.074 (0.514)
(LnGDP_capita)_squared	0.044 (0.027)	0.068*** (0.021)	0.009 (0.030)	-0.004 (0.032)	-0.028 (0.032)
Investment	0.004 (0.007)	0.002 (0.004)	-0.000 (0.006)	0.002 (0.005)	0.005 (0.006)
Legal origin	0.442*** (0.152)	0.346** (0.138)	0.338** (0.153)	0.266* (0.158)	0.355** (0.167)
Dist Equat of capital city		-0.018*** (0.005)			
Lnoil_production		0.051* (0.030)			
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Countries	156	127	156	170	170
Observations	3,436	2950	5297	5663	5663
R-squared	0.389	0.607	0.400	0.353	0.285

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country level.

* Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, and *** significant at 1%.

The mean of export diversification in 1965 was 4.146.

Source: Authors' estimates

Table A4: Effects of oil shock on export diversification using different classifications of oil exporters and excluding the shock of 1970

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Boom*lowdivers in 1965*					0.418***
Higmoilrent in 1970					(0.152)
Boom*lowdivers in 1965					-0.131
					(0.097)
Higmoilrent in 1970*Boom					0.008
					(0.070)
Higmoilrent in 1970* lowdivers in 1965				1.055***	0.928**
				(0.395)	(0.379)
Higmoilrent in 1970				-0.720***	-0.713***
				(0.261)	(0.255)
Boom*oilrents%GDP>3%*lowdivers in 1965		0.440***			
		(0.160)			
Boom*Oilrents%GDP>3%		0.078			
		(0.105)			
Oilrents%GDP>3%*lowdivers in 1965		-0.061			
		(0.340)			
Boom*lowdivers in 1965		-0.191**			
		(0.083)			
Oilrents%GDP>3%		0.554**			
		(0.239)			
Boom* Net oil exports value>0*lowdivers in 1965	0.546***				
	(0.155)				
Boom*Net oil exports value>0	0.017				
	(0.090)				
Net oil exports*lowdivers in 1965	0.018				
Value >0	(0.332)				
Boom*lowdivers in 1965	-0.217**				
	(0.091)				
Net oil exports value>0	0.542***				
	(0.191)				
Lowdivers in 1965	1.120***	1.161***	1.038***	0.810***	0.847***
	(0.178)	(0.154)	(0.157)	(0.202)	(0.196)
Boom_excl70*oilcountries*lowdivers in 1965			0.660**		
			(0.269)		
Boom_excl70*oilcountries			-0.074		
			(0.165)		
Oilcountries*lowdivers in 1965			0.747*		
			(0.388)		
Boom_excl70*lowdivers in 1965			-0.440***		
			(0.116)		
Oilcountries			-0.740**	-0.047	-0.040
			(0.306)	(0.364)	(0.362)
Boom_excl70			-0.615***		
			(0.175)		
Boom	-0.383***	-0.395***			-0.580***
	(0.133)	(0.128)			(0.155)
LnGDP_capita	-0.715**	-0.735**	-0.475	-0.596	-0.578
	(0.326)	(0.343)	(0.307)	(0.392)	(0.392)
(LnGDP_capita)_squared	0.032	0.035	0.017	0.025	0.024
	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.025)	(0.025)
Investment	-0.001	-0.002	0.000	-0.006	-0.006
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Legal origin	0.226*	0.225*	0.200	-0.020***	0.206
	(0.133)	(0.132)	(0.125)	(0.006)	(0.145)
Dist Equat of capital city	-0.019***	-0.020***	-0.023***	0.210	-0.020***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.145)	(0.006)
Lnoil_production	0.003	0.001	0.115***	0.107**	0.105*
	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.044)	(0.053)	(0.053)
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Countries	127	134	134	99	99
Observations	4798	5008	5008	3,947	3,947
R-squared	0.620	0.611	0.615	0.623	0.625

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country level.

* Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, and *** significant at 1%.

The mean of export diversification in 1965 was 4.146.

Source: Authors' estimates

Table A5: Effect of oil shock on export diversification in the Sub-Saharan African sample

	SSA
Boom *oilcountries*lowdivers in 1965	0.327* (0.186)
Boom *oilcountries	-0.051 (0.135)
Oilcountries*lowdivers in 1965	-0.290 (0.352)
Boom *lowdivers in 1965	-0.429** (0.163)
Oilcountries	-0.373 (0.414)
Boom	0.204 (0.189)
Lowdivers in 1965	0.920*** (0.167)
LnGDP_capita	0.671 (1.001)
(LnGDP_capita)_squared	-0.074 (0.072)
Investment	-0.003 (0.002)
Dist Equat of capital city	-0.003 (0.011)
Legal origin	0.580*** (0.161)
Lnoil_production	0.414*** (0.066)
Year fixed effects	Yes
Countries	37
Observations	1,316
R-squared	0.617

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country level.

* Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, and *** significant at 1%.

Source: Authors' estimates