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, She received her M.Sc. in mathematical engineering from Politecnico di Milano, Francesca Fossati is currently a Ph.D. student at LIP6, 2015.

, 2010; the M.S. degree in network and computer science from the University of Pierre and Marie Curie in 2011 and the PhD degree in computer science and networks from University Pierre and Marie Curie, 2014.

, He is a member of LAMSADE, a laboratory of Paris Dauphine University. He graduated in Environmental Science in 1999 from the University of Genoa, Italy, and he was awarded from the same university with a Ph.D. in Applied Mathematics in 2006, 2008.

, He was associate professor at LIP6, UPMC from 2010 to 2018. His current interests cover novel routing and switching architectures and network virtualization, Stefano Secci is full professor of networking at Cnam (Conservatoire national des arts et métiers), 2005.