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Voting: You Can't Have Privacy without Individual Verifiability

Abstract : Electronic voting typically aims at two main security goals: vote privacy and verifiability. These two goals are often seen as antagonistic and some national agencies even impose a hierarchy between them: first privacy, and then verifiability as an additional feature. Verifiability typically includes individual verifiability (a voter can check that her ballot is counted); universal verifiability (anyone can check that the result corresponds to the published ballots); and eligibility verifiability (only legitimate voters may vote). We show that actually, privacy implies individual verifiability. In other words, systems without individual verifiability cannot achieve privacy (under the same trust assumptions). To demonstrate the generality of our result, we show this implication in two different settings, namely cryptographic and symbolic models, for standard notions of privacy and individual verifiability. Our findings also highlight limitations in existing privacy definitions in cryptographic settings.
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Contributor : Joseph Lallemand Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Saturday, August 18, 2018 - 3:25:03 PM
Last modification on : Monday, May 16, 2022 - 5:58:02 PM
Long-term archiving on: : Monday, November 19, 2018 - 12:31:35 PM


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  • HAL Id : hal-01858034, version 1



Véronique Cortier, Joseph Lallemand. Voting: You Can't Have Privacy without Individual Verifiability. [Research Report] CNRS, Inria, LORIA. 2018. ⟨hal-01858034⟩



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