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Predictive models can overcome reductionism in cognitive neuroimaging

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Abstract
Understanding the organization of complex behavior as it relates to the brain requires modeling the behavior, the relevant mental processes, and the corresponding neural activity. Experiments in cognitive neuroscience typically study a psychological process via controlled manipulations, reducing behavior to one of its component. Such reductionism can easily lead to paradigm-bound theories. Predictive models can generalize brain-mind associations to arbitrary new tasks and stimuli. We argue that they are needed to broaden theories beyond specific paradigms. Predicting behavior from neural activity can support robust reverse inference, isolating brain structures that govern mental processes. The converse prediction enables modeling brain responses as a function of a complete description of the task, rather than building on oppositions.

Keywords: machine learning, cognitive models, psychology, brain imaging

Perception and action build upon an array of mental processes, which have been characterized in detail by the psychological sciences. However, unifying these psychological processes to model the relation between brain and behavior in any given situation remains a great challenge (Newell, 1973). The principal challenge lies in finding the appropriate representation of the components of behavior or cognition. Cognitive neuroscience builds upon controlled experiments to isolate these components and link them to brain activity. But quantifying the effects of any manipulation requires that the psychological or behavioral components of interest be clearly specified (Poldrack and Yarkoni, 2016; Krakauer et al., 2017). Isolating components of mental processing leads to studying them only via oppositions, and this reductionism prevents the building of broad theories of the mind.

We believe that predictive modeling provides new tools to tackle this formidable task. The accumulation of a broad range of shared data in cognitive neuroimaging provides a widely varied set of observations of brain and behavior. Using these data, models can be built that accurately describe multiple experiments, going beyond the surface description of tasks to identify associations between brain systems and underlying mental processes that span across tasks. Whereas cognitive neuroscience has typically focused on particular theoretical oppositions, this approach instead builds models that generalize beyond specific tasks, based on the methodology of machine learning with a focus on out-of-sample prediction rather than the detection of specific experimental effects (Yarkoni and Westfall, 2016).

Data-driven approaches are often distinguished from hypothesis-driven research, with the implication that data-driven work is necessarily theory-free. However, we argue that data-intensive methods can actually provide the basis for building broader theories, which abstract away from the specifics of any particular experimental approach and thus have the potential to generalize to a much larger range of phenomena.

1. Prediction allows generalization to arbitrary new tasks and situations

Predictive models give a specific prediction, forecasting a target quantity numerical or categorical on new data. In the framework of statistical machine learning, they contain tunable parameters that are adjusted to learn the association between data and target (James et al., 2013). Performance can then be tested on unseen data. Predictive models provide powerful tools to learn brain-mind associations from recordings of neural activity (Varoquaux and Thirion, 2014; Pereira et al., 2009; Lebedev and Nicolelis, 2006). Compared to traditional computational neuroscience models, they allow generalization to new tasks and situations. Hence, they can provide conclusions that are not paradigm-bound, as cognitive neuroscience largely has been.

Broad generalizations can bridge very different situations. For instance Knops et al. (2009) showed that learning brain-activity patterns that discriminate right from left saccades would classify mental additions as rightward saccades and subtractions as leftward. Whether or not
Causal questions are central to interpreting results of a neuroimaging experiment: when is it a consequence of the observed behavior, and when is it a mere side effect, such as activity in primary visual areas. Generalization across experimental paradigms shows that the observed neural activity is a consequence of a psychological manipulation, rather than the converse. Comparing which brain structures are activated in a standard analysis to which ones support decoding can rule out structures that mediate a function but do not cause it (Weichwald et al., 2015). In stimuli-driven experiments, detecting a structure in both models suggests that it is a direct consequence of the stimulus, for instance activity in the fusiform face area for face-recognition tasks, rather than a non-specific side effect, such as activity in primary visual areas.

3. Formal representations of tasks and behavior are important

Modeling brain activity beyond a specific paradigm needs robust and general descriptions of stimuli, tasks, and behavior (Turner and Laird, 2012; Poldrack et al., 2011b). Building such descriptions faces two challenges: capturing all the relevant mental processes in a task, and formalizing their relationships. The psychological manipulations of a task inform on the main mental processes it recruits. Yet, it is necessary to go beyond the primary effect of interest: a visual n-back experiment is not only a memory experiment, but also a visual one (Schwartz et al., 2013). Relating mental processes across studies raises many subtle questions, for instance whether to distinguish between autobiographical and episodic memory. Taxonomies or ontologies give a formal framework to capture this knowledge (Poldrack and Yarkoni, 2016).

However, using cognitive ontologies in brain mapping is a chicken-and-egg problem, given that neuroimaging should also inform these ontologies, via the links between mental processes that it reveals. Data-driven semantic techniques hold promise to build representations of cognitive neuroscience concepts informed by brain data (Poldrack et al., 2012; Yeo et al., 2015; Bolt et al., 2017). Used across the literature, they can overcome variations in terminology and link mental processes that elicit similar activity or build more open-ended encoding or decoding models (Yarkoni et al., 2011; Rubin et al., 2017; Dockès et al., 2018).

4. Encoding models extract better representations of tasks

Encoding models, which predict brain data from the task (Naselaris et al., 2011), can go beyond describing a task with a small set of labels and capture details and interplay in its components. Because they allow for the use of much richer and less constrained descriptions of tasks, they can ground a model of brain function beyond specific experimental paradigms. To model psychological manipulations, encoding studies rely on machine-learning techniques that are well suited to complex and high-dimensional representations. Their testing procedure measures how well a representation of the stimuli or task can predict brain activity on unseen data, unlike standard

Figure 1: Brain decoding finds patterns in brain-activity data that discriminate given conditions on unseen data. The corresponding brain-mind association can then be generalized to a new paradigm, or new stimuli, by applying the decoder.

2. Generalization to arbitrary tasks supports reverse inference

Associating neural activity in a brain structure or network to a predicted behavior that generalizes to arbitrary tasks fully characterizes the function of this structure. Bound to a given paradigm, such characterization would be an invalid reverse inference, as the experiment only shows that the observed neural activity is a consequence of a psychological manipulation, rather than the converse (Poldrack, 2006). Decoding studies, which predict behavior from observed activity, provide evidence for reverse inferences. However, to characterize function beyond simple oppositions, decoding must be applied across a very broad sampling of behavior and cognition. Analyzing many different studies jointly provides a practical solution to sample such a variety of mental states (Poldrack, 2011). Generalization across experimental paradigms shows that identified brain structures are not a mere consequence of experimental details of the task (Schwartz et al., 2013).

Causal questions are central to interpreting results of a neuroimaging experiment: when is the activity of a structure a cause of the observed behavior, and when is it a consequence? Comparing which brain structures are activated in a standard analysis to which ones support decoding can rule out structures that mediate a function but do not cause it (Weichwald et al., 2015). In stimuli-driven experiments, detecting a structure in both models suggests that it is a direct consequence of the stimulus, for instance activity in the fusiform face area for face-recognition tasks, rather than a non-specific side effect, such as activity in primary visual areas.

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Fitting an encoding model

Given a model that builds complete representations of stimuli, rich tasks provide the information to predict brain responses as a function of stimuli.

Modeling new stimuli

The encoding model can be applied to stimuli with different properties. It yields brain responses that characterize corresponding mental processes.

Figure 2: Encoding models capture the full details of brain responses given a rich description of the stimuli or tasks. This behavior-to-brain association can then be generalized to new stimuli or tasks, to characterize mental processes.

analyses in brain imaging which use general linear models to detect significant effects of oppositions in brain activity (Poldrack et al., 2011a).

4.1. Encoding models replace crafting stimuli

Progress in visual neuroscience provides a striking example of the success of encoding models. Historically, our understanding of the human visual system has been driven by experiments crafting stimuli to reveal the selectivity of a hierarchy of brain modules (Grill-Spector and Malach, 2004), from spots and slab that revealed edge detectors in the visual area V1 (Hubel and Wiesel, 1959) to more complex shapes mapping mid-level regions (Logothetis et al., 1995), to semantic regions, studied via stimuli such as faces or scenes (Haxby et al., 2001; Kanwisher et al., 1997). These experiments have been very successful in providing a conceptual model of the human visual system. Yet, no single experiment could ground this model of visual processing. Rather, it relied on combining interpretations across studies of disparate and non-ecological stimuli.

On more ecological stimuli, rich encoding models can reveal the properties of the primary visual cortex (Kay et al., 2008; Miyawaki et al., 2008), transforming them into a representation that maps well to brain responses (Nasellari et al., 2011). To go beyond primary areas, rich statistical models of natural images are needed. Artificial neural networks developed for computer vision build representa-
tions of the images used as stimuli that predict well brain responses. They outperform computational-neuroscience models of vision to explain the workings of mid-level areas (Khaligh-Razavi and Kriegeskorte, 2014; Yamins et al., 2014). They build a hierarchy of intermediate representations, from low-level edge detectors to more semantic information, that maps well to the full hierarchy of human visual processing (Güçlü and van Gerven, 2015; Eickenberg et al., 2017). These results extend to high-level areas the hypothesis that V1 is tuned to Gabor filters because these form good statistical representations of natural images (Olshausen et al., 1996).

The latest studies do not require hand crafting stimuli to elicit controlled responses in a given region. They provide a full mapping of the computational steps of human vision from natural stimuli, and they jointly model all stimulus features important to brain responses, such that their model of brain response is more general than the paradigm used in a given experiment. Eickenberg et al. (2017) showed that a model learned from subjects watching natural images could generate both retinotopic maps, or face versus scene contrasts.

The study of other sensory systems has followed similar trends with similar successes. Encoding models have mapped the functional modules of the auditory cortex from spectrograms (Santoro et al., 2017), or with hierarchical representations isolated by artificial neural networks used to process sounds on computers (Kell et al., 2018). Perceptual sciences lend themselves well to rich encoding models: as neuroimaging experiments can use rapid successions of trials with stimuli that are easily characterized across a broad set of features, providing large data accumulation.

4.2. Precise models of responses to stimuli capture high-level processes

Data-intensive encoding models can also map more complex psychological functions. In particular, encoding models can accurately capture semantic representations of language in the brain at the level of words (Mitchell et al., 2008), short texts (Wehbe et al., 2014), and stories (Huth et al., 2016). Finely-tuned models of stimuli responses provide excellent windows to attentional (Çukur et al., 2013; Hausfeld et al., 2018) or perceptual decision (Gwilliams and King, 2017) mechanisms. They relate better to experimental data than more conceptual models such as drift diffusion models (Gwilliams and King, 2017). Finally, using complex stimuli, such as a full movie, enables an ecological study of processes such as episodic memory (Baldassano et al., 2017).

In all these settings, encoding using predictive models enable the study of sensory and cognitive processes without reducing the experiment to one simple opposition or variation. As a result, predictions hold across paradigms (Eickenberg et al., 2017).
5. Prediction is a guiding principle to modeling stimuli

A key challenge for modeling in cognitive neuroscience is to generate rich representations of stimuli. Given data and a task to perform on it, artificial intelligence models extract representations that are optimal for information processing. These representations provide a good basis to study brain responses because they give a complete view of the task, but also because both artificial intelligence and human cognition capture the statistical regularities of our world. To model stimuli, minimizing prediction error is a guiding principle to extract relevant representations. Both the ventral stream in the visual cortex and artificial neural networks in computer vision strive to maximize object recognition (Yamins and DiCarlo, 2016). Prediction of neighboring words is central to both cognitive and computational linguistic (Willems et al., 2016). Predictive coding forms a full conceptual framework in cognitive science (Rao and Ballard, 1999).

6. Generalization will ground broader theories

Scientific endeavors strive for conclusions that generalize, predicting features of new situations. While cognitive neuroscience has often focused on informal generalizations, machine-learning techniques will bring more precise predictions and more general models. Generalization across paradigms is key to achieving broader theories, in decoding to isolate the neural supports of mental states or in encoding to build complete descriptions of behavior.

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