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To cite this version:

HAL Id: hal-01856412
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01856412v4
Submitted on 2 Dec 2018

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Predictive models avoid excessive reductionism in cognitive neuroimaging

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Understanding the organization of complex behavior as it relates to the brain requires modeling the behavior, the relevant mental processes, and the corresponding neural activity. Experiments in cognitive neuroscience typically study a psychological process via controlled manipulations, reducing behavior to one of its component. Such reductionism can easily lead to paradigm-bound theories. Predictive models can generalize brain-mind associations to arbitrary new tasks and stimuli. We argue that they are needed to broaden theories beyond specific paradigms. Predicting behavior from neural activity can support robust reverse inference, isolating brain structures that support particular mental processes. The converse prediction enables modeling brain responses as a function of a complete description of the task, rather than building on oppositions.

Keywords: machine learning, cognitive models, psychology, brain imaging

Perception and action build upon an array of mental processes, which have been characterized in detail by the psychological sciences. However, unifying these psychological processes to model the relation between brain and mind in any given situation remains a great challenge (Newell, 1973\textbullet). The principal challenge lies in finding the appropriate representation of the components of cognition and behavior. Cognitive neuroscience builds upon controlled experiments to isolate these components and link them to brain activity. But quantifying the effects of any manipulation requires that the psychological or behavioral components of interest be clearly specified (Poldrack and Yarkoni, 2016; Krakauer et al., 2017\textbullet). Isolating components of mental processing leads to studying them only via oppositions, and this reductionism prevents the building of broad theories of the mind.

We believe that predictive modeling provides new tools to tackle this formidable task. The accumulation of a broad range of shared data in cognitive neuroimaging provides a widely varied set of observations of brain and behavior. Using these data, models can be built that accurately describe multiple experiments, going beyond the surface description of tasks to identify associations between brain systems and underlying mental processes that span across tasks. Whereas cognitive neuroscience has typically focused on particular theoretical oppositions, this approach instead builds models that generalize beyond specific tasks, based on the methodology of machine learning with a focus on out-of-sample prediction rather than the detection of specific experimental effects (Yarkoni and Westfall, 2017).

Data-driven approaches are often distinguished from hypothesis-driven research, with the implication that data-driven work is necessarily theory-free. However, we argue that data-intensive methods can actually provide the basis for building broader theories, which abstract away from the specifics of any particular experimental approach and thus have the potential to generalize to a much larger range of phenomena.

Prediction allows generalization to arbitrary new tasks and situations

Predictive models give a specific prediction, forecasting a target quantity numerical or categorical based on new data. In the framework of statistical machine learning, they contain tunable parameters that are adjusted to learn the association between data and target, usually with some penalty for model complexity (James et al., 2013). Performance can then be tested on unseen data. Predictive models provide powerful tools to learn brain-mind associations from recordings of neural activity (Varoquaux and Thirion, 2014; Pereira et al., 2009; Lebedev and Nicolelis, 2006). Compared to traditional computational neuroscience models, they allow generalization to new tasks and situations. Hence, they can provide conclusions that are not paradigm-bound, as cognitive neuroscience largely has been.

Broad generalizations can bridge very different situations. For instance Knops et al. (2009) showed that learning brain-activity patterns that discriminate right from left saccades would classify mental additions as rightward saccades and subtractions as leftward. Whether or not brain-mind associations generalize can be tested across paradigms, and such tests highlight universal components of psychological processes. Studying memory encoding,
Predictive models versus classic neuroimaging analyses

By predictive models we refer to mathematical models of the data that explicitly minimize prediction error, typically relying on methods from machine learning. They differ from standard neuroimaging statistical methods in several ways. First, their validity is established by successful predictions from new data, and not by isolating significant differences across observations. This test is sound without the need for modeling assumptions, such as Gaussian noise. As a consequence, predictive models often are more complex, departing from maximum-likelihood estimates and fitting more unknown variables than available observations (Wasserstein et al., 2016; James et al., 2013).

For neuroimaging, this additional complexity opens the door to modeling more effects jointly, and therefore building models that describe more than an isolated dimension of cognition. Also, given that a model is validated by its predictions, rather than by its goodness of fit on the data used to fit the model, validation can be done using different constructs than those used to build the model, for instance using high-level descriptions of cognition instead of features of the experiments or brain signals. Testing for out-of-sample properties, as when measuring prediction, helps avoiding some pitfalls of in-sample model testing using p-values, such as circularity or trivial effects (Wasserstein et al., 2016).

Polyn et al. (2005) used a classifier to generalize from perception to memory retrieval to show that both processes share a common neural substrate. In research on pain, neural evidence supports separating physical and emotional pain, as brain activity can robustly discriminate them across studies (Wager et al., 2013). Generalization to arbitrary tasks supports reverse inference

Associating neural activity in a brain structure or network to a predicted behavior that generalizes to arbitrary tasks provides a deeper understanding of the computations supported by the structure. Bound to a given paradigm, such characterization would be an invalid reverse inference, as in an experiment only neural activity is observed as a consequence of a psychological manipulation, rather than causing a mental state (Poldrack, 2006). Decoding studies, which predict behavior from observed activity, provide evidence for reverse inference. However, to characterize function beyond simple oppositions, decoding must be applied across a very broad sampling of behavior and cognition. Analyzing many different studies jointly provides a practical solution to sample such a variety of mental states (Poldrack, 2011). Generalization across experimental paradigms shows that identified brain structures are not a mere consequence of experimental details of the task (Varoquaux et al., 2018). Causal questions are central to interpreting results of a neuroimaging experiment: what in the observed brain activity is a consequence of the task, versus a cause of the behavior or the mental state? Comparing which brain structures are activated in a standard analysis to which ones support decoding can rule out structures that mediate a function but do not cause it. In stimuli-driven experiments, detecting a structure in both models suggests that it is a direct consequence of the stimulus, for instance activity in the fusiform face area for face recognition, rather than a non-specific side effect, such as activity in primary visual areas. Such side effect cannot support decoding (Weichwald et al., 2015).

Formal representations of tasks and behavior are important

Modeling brain activity beyond a specific paradigm needs robust and general descriptions of stimuli, tasks, and behavior (Turner and Laird, 2012; Poldrack et al., 2011b). Building such descriptions faces two challenges: capturing all the relevant mental processes in a task, and formalizing their relationships. The psychological manipulations of a task provide information regarding the main mental processes it recruits. Yet, it is necessary to go beyond the primary effect of interest: a visual n-back experiment is not only a memory experiment, but also involves visual processing, decision making, and many other functions (Varoquaux et al., 2018). Relating mental processes across studies raises many subtle questions, for instance whether to distinguish between autobiographical and episodic memory. Taxonomies or ontologies give a formal framework to capture this knowledge (Poldrack and Yarkoni, 2016).
However, using cognitive ontologies in brain mapping is a chicken-and-egg problem, given that neuroimaging should also inform these ontologies, via the links between mental processes that it reveals. Data-driven semantic techniques hold promise to build representations of cognitive neuroscience concepts informed by brain data (Pol­drack et al., 2012; Yeo et al., 2015; Bolt et al., 2017). Used across the literature, they can overcome variations in terminology and link mental processes that elicit similar activity or build more open-ended encoding or decoding models (Yarkoni et al., 2011; Rubin et al., 2017; Dockès et al., 2018).

### Encoding models extract better representations of tasks

Encoding models, which predict brain data from the task (Naselaris et al., 2011), can go beyond describing a task with a small set of labels and capture details and interplay in its components. Because they allow for the use of much richer and less constrained descriptions of tasks (Wu et al., 2006), they can ground a model of brain function beyond specific experimental paradigms. To model psychological manipulations, encoding studies usually rely on machine-learning techniques that are well suited to complex and high-dimensional representations. Their testing procedure measures how well a representation of the stimuli or task can predict brain activity on unseen data, unlike standard analyses in brain imaging which use general linear models to detect significant effects of oppositions in brain activity (Poldrack et al., 2011a).

### Encoding models replace crafting stimuli

Progress in visual neuroscience provides a striking example of the success of encoding models. Historically, our understanding of the human visual system has been driven by experiments crafting stimuli to reveal the selectivity of a hierarchy of brain modules (Grill-Spector and Malach, 2004), from spots and slab that revealed edge detectors in the visual area V1 (Hubel and Wiesel, 1959) to more complex shapes mapping mid-level regions (Logothetis et al., 1995), to semantic regions, studied via stimuli such as faces or scenes (Haxby et al., 2001; Kanwisher et al., 1997). These experiments have been very successful in providing a conceptual model of the human visual system, but no one single experiment could ground this model of visual processing. Rather, it relied on combining interpretations across studies of disparate and non-ecological stimuli.

On more ecological stimuli, rich encoding models can reveal the properties of the primary visual cortex (Kay et al., 2008; Miyawaki et al., 2008), transforming them into a representation that provides the ability to accurately predict brain responses to complex stimuli (Naselaris et al., 2011). To go beyond primary areas, rich statistical models of natural images are needed. Deep artificial neural networks developed for computer vision build representations of the images used as stimuli that accurately predict brain responses, outperforming computational-neuroscience models of vision to explain the workings of mid-level areas (Khaligh-Razavi and Kriegeskorte, 2014; Yamins et al., 2014). They build a hierarchy of intermediate representations, from low-level edge detectors to more semantic information, that maps well to the full hierarchy of human visual processing (Güçlü and van Gerven, 2015; Eickenberg et al., 2017). These results extend to high-level areas the hypothesis that V1 is tuned to Gabor filters because these form good statistical representations of natural images (Olshausen et al., 1996).

The latest studies do not require hand crafting stimuli to elicit controlled responses in a given region. They provide a full mapping of the computational steps of human vision from natural stimuli, and they jointly model all stimulus features important to brain responses, such that their model of brain response can generalize beyond the paradigm used in any given experiment. For example, Eickenberg et al. (2017) showed that a model learned from subjects watching natural images could generate both retinotopic maps and face versus scene contrasts.

The study of other sensory systems has demonstrated similar success. Encoding models have mapped the functional modules of the auditory cortex from spectrograms (Santoro et al., 2017), or using a hierarchy of represen-
Data-intensive encoding models can also map more complex psychological functions. In particular, encoding models can accurately capture semantic representations of language in the brain at the level of words (Mitchell et al., 2008), short texts (Webbe et al., 2014), and stories (Huth et al., 2016). Finely-tuned models of stimuli responses provide excellent windows to attentional (Çukur et al., 2013; Hausfeld et al., 2018) or perceptual decision (Gwilliams and King, 2017) mechanisms. They relate better to experimental data than more conceptual models such as drift-diffusion models (Gwilliams and King, 2017). Finally, using complex stimuli, such as a full movie, enables an ecological study of processes such as episodic memory (Baldassano et al., 2017•). In all these settings, predictive modeling using encoding models enables the study of sensory and cognitive processes without reducing the experiment to one simple opposition or variation. As a result, predictions hold across paradigms and generalize to novel paradigms (Eickenberg et al., 2017•).


• Makes the case that, in addition to detailed models of neural activity, decomposition of behavior is needed to understand brain function, hence careful behavioral work must complement neural manipulations.


Logothetis, N.K., Pauls, J., Poggio, T., 1995. Shape representation in the inferior temporal cortex of monkeys. Current Biology 5, 552.


• This paper lays out a methodology to identify brain-behavior associations containing encoding and decoding, where encoding is used with a representational model of behavior, and decoding shows clear evidence of the association.

Newell, A., 1973. You can’t play 20 questions with nature and win: Projective comments on the papers of this symposium

• Highlights the difficulty of giving an integrated picture on results on different mental processes involved in vision.


• This review show how decoding can be used on large-scale databases to ground formal reverse inference, capturing how selectively a brain area is activated by a mental process.


• This study uses topic-extraction techniques applied to a large database of neuroimaging results to identify the conceptual structure of mental functions and their mapping to brain systems and the relations between mental disorders.


• This study shows that fMRI can predict the level of physical pain in a way that is specific to physical pain, as opposed to social pain. The study relies on predictive models used across several pain-related experiments.


• This study shows that models of neural response based on computer-vision artificial networks explain brain activity better than classic theoretical-neuroscience models of vision.


• Reviews the uses of artificial neural networks, developed for computer vision and artificial intelligence communities, to model neural responses in higher visual cortical areas.


• This paper argues that psychology’s focus on explaining the causes of behavior provides theories with little ability to predict future behaviors with any appreciable accuracy. It proposes to use principles from machine learning for greater understanding of behavior.