Automated Verification of E-Cash Protocols

Abstract : Electronic cash (e-cash) permits secure e-payments by providing security and anonymity similar to real cash. Several protocols have been proposed to meet security and anonymity properties of e-cash. However , there are no general formal definitions that allow the automatic verification of e-cash protocols. In this paper, we propose a formal framework to define and verify security properties of e-cash protocols. To this end, we model e-cash protocols in the applied π-calculus, and we formally define five relevant security properties. Finally, we validate our framework by analyzing, using the automatic tool ProVerif, four e-cash protocols: the online and the offline Chaum protocols, the Digicash protocol, and the protocol by Petersen and Poupard.
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ICETE 2015 - 12th International Joint Conference on e-Business and Telecommunications, Jul 2015, Colmar, France
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Contributeur : Jannik Dreier <>
Soumis le : lundi 16 juillet 2018 - 15:06:51
Dernière modification le : mercredi 12 décembre 2018 - 13:42:01
Document(s) archivé(s) le : mercredi 17 octobre 2018 - 14:25:40

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  • HAL Id : hal-01840596, version 1

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Jannik Dreier, Ali Kassem, Pascal Lafourcade. Automated Verification of E-Cash Protocols. ICETE 2015 - 12th International Joint Conference on e-Business and Telecommunications, Jul 2015, Colmar, France. 〈hal-01840596〉

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