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Conference papers
Automated Verification of E-Cash Protocols
Abstract : Electronic cash (e-cash) permits secure e-payments by providing security and anonymity similar to real cash. Several protocols have been proposed to meet security and anonymity properties of e-cash. However , there are no general formal definitions that allow the automatic verification of e-cash protocols. In this paper, we propose a formal framework to define and verify security properties of e-cash protocols. To this end, we model e-cash protocols in the applied π-calculus, and we formally define five relevant security properties. Finally, we validate our framework by analyzing, using the automatic tool ProVerif, four e-cash protocols: the online and the offline Chaum protocols, the Digicash protocol, and the protocol by Petersen and Poupard.
Cited literature [22 references]
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01840596
Contributor : Jannik Dreier <>
Submitted on : Monday, July 16, 2018 - 3:06:51 PM
Last modification on : Thursday, March 26, 2020 - 1:17:01 AM
Document(s) archivé(s) le : Wednesday, October 17, 2018 - 2:25:40 PM
Contributor : Jannik Dreier <>
Submitted on : Monday, July 16, 2018 - 3:06:51 PM
Last modification on : Thursday, March 26, 2020 - 1:17:01 AM
Document(s) archivé(s) le : Wednesday, October 17, 2018 - 2:25:40 PM
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