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THE INUKTITUT MARKER la

RENÉ-JOSEPH LAVIE, DIDIER BOTTINEAU,
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In Inuktitut, la is a morpheme that marks direct speech. A syllable la also occurs within several verbal morphemes, notably in imperative forms and in negative forms. The distribution of la in the verbal paradigms has remained unexplained to our knowledge.

Here we show that, in those two contexts, la, despite the fact that it has different grammatical properties, has a common semantic value: the fragment of discourse to which la is postposed, is construed as emanating from a discourse source distinct from the speaker. This is true of la both as a free, productive morpheme and as intervening in verbal suffixes in which it is integrated.

The opposition between the indicative and attributive modes has remained poorly understood until now. In our discussion, we clarify it in terms of the interpretation of la and also explain the distribution of la in negative verbal forms and in imperatives.

Theoretically, we take la as evidence that the speaker can present speech as emanating from a different source. This is not specific to Inuktitut and has been labeled “enunciation” and “polyphony.” We review the “polyphony theory” and show how the facts of Inuktitut fit well into it.

[Keywords: Inuktitut, reported speech, imperative, negation, polyphony]

1. Introduction.

1.1. Scope, purpose, and intent. Inuktitut is the name for the varieties of Inuit language spoken in the eastern Canadian Arctic. This paper is based on data from Nunavik and South Baffin Island. Unless otherwise stated, the data we analyze are from Schneider (1972; 1979; 1985), Dorais (1975a; 1975b; 1988), Lowe (1976; 1988a; 1988b), and the “Hansard corpus” (introduced below).

In Inuktitut, la is a morpheme that marks direct speech. A syllable la also occurs integrated within verbal morphemes. In the positive imperative mode, it occurs only in the 1S form. In negative verbal endings, it is required in the indicative, imperative, and interrogative modes, but not in the attributive. This distribution of la in the verbal paradigms is precise and intriguing; it has remained unexplained to our knowledge.

1 This paper has benefited from comments by O. Ducrot, P. Larrivée, H. Nølke, F. Pascal, and two anonymous reviewers, whom we thank here. Special thanks to L. Matthewson, whose rigorous scrutiny of this paper resulted in decisive improvements. We of course remain solely responsible for the views expressed here.

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We propose an explanation that connects to the function of *la* as the marker of direct speech. In those two contexts, we show that *la*, despite the fact that it has different grammatical properties, has a common semantic value: the fragment of discourse to which *la* is postposed is construed as emanating from a discourse source distinct from the speaker. This is true of *la* both as a free, productive morpheme and as intervening in verbal suffixes in which it is integrated.

The opposition between the indicative and attributive modes has remained poorly understood until now. Our discussion clarifies it in terms of the interpretation of *la*.

At times, we use the term “marker” (“the marker *la*”) in order not to preclude the qualification of *la* as a morpheme; this is because *la* is a full-fledged morpheme in some uses but not in others.

Theoretically, we find that the common semantic value that is shared among them is best described in the terms of the polyphony theory (introduced below). We take *la* as evidence that the speaker can present speech as emanating from a different source. This is not specific to Inuktitut and has been labeled “enunciation” and “polyphony.” We review the “polyphony theory” and show how the facts of Inuktitut fit well into it.

1.2. Basic facts about Inuktitut. Inuktitut is polysynthetic: a word may consist of many morphemes with no limit set in principle as to their number. After an obligatory lexical base, as many “infixes” as desired may occur to modify the meaning of the base, verbalize a noun, nominalize a verb, alter the argument schema (the valency), quantify, mark tense, aspect, or modality, mark negation, and so on; infixes have many diverse functions. The word is completed by a final morpheme; the morpheme marks case + number for nouns or mode + person for verbs.

The morphemes occurring in the middle area are called “infixes” in the Inuktitut domain by Schneider (1972), Dorais (1975a; 1975b), Spalding (1979), and others; the cognate notion is “postbase” in other Eskimo-Aleut domains (e.g., Alaska, West Greenland). Contrary to generally established usage in linguistics, the term “infix” in Inuktitut studies, and in this paper, does not refer to the insertion of material within a morpheme, but instead to the insertion of a morpheme (an infix) between morphemes within a word. Using “affix” would be confusing because it would comprise the nominal and verbal endings of the words, which we want to exclude; therefore, we compromise by adopting “infix,” despite its partial inappropriateness.

In the examples we use, the reader will find many discrepancies between the constituent morpheme forms and the form the morpheme has in a complete word. This is due to the fact that phonological and morphophonological phenomena are pervasive in Inuktitut. For the relevant rules, we provide brief reminders where applicable; a summary of the rules is provided in Appendix B.
In Inuktitut, the morphemes that assemble in a polysynthetic word are constrained by the noun–verb category; this is important in some of the discussion that follows. Morphemes are tagged with letters: N for “noun” and V for “verb.” Each morpheme has two such tags: on the left, the category accepted from the predecessor, and on the right, the category the morpheme renders to its successor (if any). The two letters constitute the morpheme’s “category profile.” For example, verbalizers have the category profile (NV). Morpheme assembly is constrained by category as follows: a morpheme rendering N cannot be followed by a morpheme accepting V and, symmetrically, a morpheme rendering V cannot be followed by a morpheme accepting N. The following complementary conventions apply: a hyphen (-) stands for either N or V; thus, for example, an infix within the category profile (-V) accepts either N or V and renders V. It is “ambicategorial” on its left. A morpheme may be independently left- and right-ambicategorial. The category profile consisting of a double equal sign (= =) means that the infix with this category profile accepts either N or V and renders the same category; we call such morphemes “category passers.” Most quantifiers, for example, are category passers. Note that category passing (= =) is distinct from ambicategoriality (e.g., -V).

In the process of word construction from left to right, the resulting category of the assembly in progress may thus alternate between N and V, possibly several times, until the last morpheme provides the conclusive category for the complete word.

1.3. A plea for a synchronic approach. We adopt a synchronic approach based on distributional and semantic analysis, and make no claims about the diachronic origin or origins of la. We leave it open that la might result etymologically from distinct functional or lexical entities. This might be the case given its variety of uses; however, even if this is true, this does not preclude a synchronic, structural analysis. There are many similar examples in many languages, a notorious one being English -ing. Jamet (2009:3) summarizes the question as follows (our translation):

It is generally accepted that [English] -ING has two origins in old English: -ung and -ende; Lancri, meanwhile, sees three possible origins for -ING, adding what used to be the marker of the inflected infinitive, namely the form

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2 In this paper the following abbreviations are used: ATTR attributive mode; CC two successive consonants; DFS different source (the semantic value of la); ECI Eastern Canadian Inuit; IMP imperative mode; IND indicative mode; INT interrogative mode; NEG negative; NV the category profile of a verbalizer infix; PERF perfective (a dependent verbal mode of Inuktitut); POS positive; VV (i) the category profile of an infix accepting V and rendering V or (ii) two successive vowels; 1d first-person dual; 1p first-person plural; 1s/3s a double-agreement verbal ending, with 1s ergative and 3s absolutive; = = the category profile of an infix passing category.
-enne. She schematizes the diachronic processes resulting in Modern English -ING as follows (Lancri 2001:92):

1) -ING/-UNG which is a lexical (nominal) derivation suffix with two functions:
   (1.1) Nominal or adjectival base, son of . . . (cyn-ing → king ‘descendant of the lineage, of the noble race’) for the creation of masculine names.
   (1.2) + verbal base = activity (ræd-ing → reading, from readan, read) for the creation of feminine action names.
2) (beon / wesan) + -ENDE which marks the present participle.
3) (to) + -ENNE which marks gerund or inflected infinitive.

The rest of Jamet’s paper analyzes contemporary English -ing as unitary, with shades of meaning. He analyzes them on a continuous cline ranging from “verbal-discursive-predicational” to “nominal-language–determined-notional.”

Analyses like this one corroborate the idea that, from a usage-based point of view, speakers largely ignore the origins of the grammatical forms and tend to interpret and reorganize grammatical systems according to analogical levelings and remotivations. The possibility that modern Inuktitut la might have distinct origins in diachrony could not constitute an argument to invalidate a synchronic analysis.

2. La as a morpheme marking direct speech. The base function of la is to mark direct speech.

2.1. Direct reported speech. In the following two examples of direct reported speech, la operates as quotative marker postposed to the quoted fragment.

(1) qaigit! -lavara (S79)³
   qai git -la vara
   V VV -V VV
   ‘I say to him: “Come!”’

(2) kikiattauli -laqattatut (S79)
   kikiak taq/jaq u li la qattaq tu t
   V VN NV VV -V VV VN = =
   to nail passiv. to be IMP 3s la repetition ATTR 3p
   ‘They repeated: “Let him be crucified!”’

³ Examples from Schneider (1979) are tagged with S79, examples from Schneider’s dictionary (1985) with S85.
⁴ Inuktitut verbs have double-agreement forms that undergo double person marking. 1s/3s stands for “first-person singular of the ergative and third-person singular of the absolutive.”
With \textit{la}, the speaker ascribes the quoted fragment to a source of speech that he presents as distinct from himself; this is the essence of speech reporting, or quoting.

In these examples, (i) the space + hyphen preceding \textit{la} denote a prosodic pause, possibly a long one, which is heard in the realization, and (ii) morphophonological rules do not apply; we observe \textit{qai-git! -lavara} and not \textit{*qaigilavara}; the final \textit{t} of \textit{qaigit} is not deleted as might be expected if \textit{la} operated as infixes normally do (see below).\textsuperscript{5} These particularities are not to be found in all uses of \textit{la}; they characterize its use as a direct speech marker.

The examples presented are related to direct speech. Indirect speech is marked by the “enclitic” \textit{guuq}, rather than by the use of \textit{la}; an investigation into the Hansard corpus\textsuperscript{6} reveals that indirect speech can also be marked by the use of the lexical base \textit{uqaq} ‘to speak, to say’.

2.2. \textit{La} as producing “delocutive” verbs. Here is now an example in which (i) no prosodic pause occurs and (ii) a morphophonological rule applies.

\begin{equation}
\text{(3) ataataalalirit} \ (S79) \\
\text{ataata-ak} \quad \text{la} \quad \text{liq} \quad \text{git} \\
\text{N} \quad \text{-V} \quad \text{VV} \quad \text{VV} \\
\text{father, vocative case}\textsuperscript{7} \quad \text{la} \quad \text{inchoative} \quad \text{IMP 2S} \\
\end{equation}

‘Please father [him]’.

The \textit{liq} infix, associated with the imperative suffix, makes the imperative less compelling (‘please . . . ’).

In a way, this polysynthetic word involves saying ‘father’, so that \textit{la}, here again, involves two discourse sources: the utterer (or “locutor”) and the one supposed to say ‘father’. However, the word has two overt distinctive characters with respect to the marking of direct speech (above): (i) morphophonological rules apply (the \textit{k} of \textit{ataataak} is elided by the initial \textit{l} of \textit{la}); and (ii) there is no prosodic pause. These two features indicate that the relationship between \textit{ataata-ak} and \textit{la} is a close relationship—a closer one than

\textsuperscript{5} In this use, forms like \textit{-lajuq}, \textit{-lagattatut} are half-infix, half-word, according to Schneider (1979:41).

\textsuperscript{6} The “Hansard corpus” is an Inuktitut–English aligned corpus of four years (1999–2002) of collected debates and proceedings of the Legislative Assembly of Nunavut (Hansard). It can be downloaded from <http://assembly.nu.ca/old/english/hansard-third.htm>. It records spoken language as used by the representatives elected to the assembly, with Inuktitut as their mother tongue. The corpus is parliamentary language, occasionally vivid. It provided about two-thirds of our examples; we are indebted to the many contributors who established and translated it into English, and to Benoît Farley in particular.

\textsuperscript{7} Whether the vocative is actually a declension case in Inuktitut is arguable, but we need not go into further details for the purposes of this article.
when just quoting. This word then does not mean ‘say: “Father”’ (what ataataak-la-lirit would be); it is a derived verb: the verb ‘to father’ in the imperative form. It means: ‘address [him] using “father,” father [him], address [him] as is done generally when one uses “father”’. It is a delocutive verb. In this case, la is used to perform a delocutive derivation.

In a first step, ‘fathering’ is not a predicate the subject of which would be the interlocutor to whom this order is given; it is what one would do in general. It is a pretended, undefined entity that is supposed to say ‘father’ in general and then, in a second step, the order of behaving like that is given to the interlocutor as an occurrence of the speech act. The speech act is an occurrence, and it draws on a partial construction ataatala- ‘to father’, the agent of which is unspecified as is the agent of an English infinitive.

Glossing ataatala- with ‘say “father”’ would be inaccurate; better glosses would be ‘saying “father”’ or ‘to say “father”’. The overall gloss of ataatadalirit then is ‘please do [to him] to say “father”’, that is, ‘please father [him]’.

For the time being, let us keep in mind that the analysis of this word and that of direct speech report are in part similar (in both, la ascribes a piece of discourse to an entity distinct from the speaker) and in part different (here the ascribee is general, pretended, undefined). We come back to this below.

2.3. Example qaujijulavunga. The following example is from the Hansard corpus; although less direct, the interpretation of la in it is compatible with the value of la thus far established.

(4) qaujijulavunga (H)9

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>qauji</th>
<th>ju</th>
<th>la</th>
<th>vu</th>
<th>nga</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>VN</td>
<td>-V</td>
<td>VV</td>
<td>=</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

’to know’

The partial word qaujiju- is an attributive-mode incomplete word not marked for person. It is distributionally nominal and means ‘knower’. The entire word means ‘I wonder’.10 In order to better understand the precise

8 Benveniste (1958) proposed calling “delocutive” a verb that is derived from a word as used to address someone. Usually, the meaning of a derived expression is built on the meaning of the base. In delocutive derivation, by contrast, the meaning of the derived expression is built on the meaning of an enunciation of the base expression. For example, baby → to baby ‘treat as a child’ is not delocutive, while baby → to baby ‘call someone baby’ is delocutive. In this case, to baby does not mean ‘to utter the word baby’ but rather ‘to utter the word baby to refer to someone’ (Ducrot and Schaeffer 1995:735–37 [summarized]).

9 Examples from the Hansard corpus are tagged with H.

10 In the Hansard corpus, four such structures with slight variations are to be found, all in the indicative first-person singular.
function of -la in this word, let us compare it with qaujijuuvunga, which would be a minimal contrast.

(5) qaujijuuvunga

\[
\begin{array}{cccc}
\text{qauji} & \text{ju} & u & \text{vunga} \\
\text{V} & \text{VN} & \text{NV} & \text{VV}
\end{array}
\]

to know ATTR to be IND-1S

‘I know (I am knower)’.

The word qaujijuuvunga is a verb in the indicative mode, ‘I know’ (lit., ‘I am knower’). The point requiring explanation is this: how is it that using la, instead of u, introduces the shade of meaning ‘wonder’ instead of ‘know’? In other words, how can ‘wonder’ be made up of ‘know’ and la?

We suggest the following explanation: (a) The word qaujjulaavunga encompasses ‘I am knower’: the grammatical subject of vunga is coindexed with the thematic role agent of qauji ‘know’. (b) However, la prescribes that the proposition ‘I am knower’ originates from a discourse source (s2) presented as distinct from the speaker (s1). So the speaker has another one other than himself (a pretend one) stating that he (the speaker) knows. (c) Following Grice’s maxim of quantity (express all that is necessary and just that [Grice 1975]), the speaker cannot be expressing ‘I know’ because if he meant that, he would have put it simply with qaujijuuvunga, or a synonymous form qaujijumavunga. (d) Alternately, he might have said ‘I do not know’ (qaujjijumanngilanga), but this is not what he did. (e) So the implicature is: “the speaker is concerned with his own knowledge, he intends to express something about his knowledge, but can be neither positive nor negative about it.” (f) Concerning explicit knowledge,11 a presupposition is that when you know something, then you know you know it: unawareness of your own knowledge and opinions could only be contradictory. (g) Following (e) and (f), a listener can only conclude: “this man states that he is concerned with his own knowledge about such and such a thing; however, he cannot tell whether he knows or ignores it; that is, the thing in question is not known; he wonders about it.”12

Could the speaker be using an interrogative form? The interrogative 1s verbal ending is -vunga, similar to the indicative 1s. However, a search of the Hansard corpus reveals no conjunction of this ending with the verb

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11 We are concerned here with explicit knowledge, i.e., knowledge about which the subject can report and make statements, excluding tacit knowledge and unconscious knowledge.
12 We are not suggesting that an Inuktitut speaker computes explicitly in this fashion each time he produces or receives qaujijuavunga. He may have done so at a time, or his ancestors may have done so. However, the stability of the structure, and its learnability, may well rely on the background possibility that exists, to compute in this way occasionally.
qauji-: it seems that one cannot question one’s own knowledge by the same means as when one says ‘do I go’, ‘do I understand’, ‘do I ask’, etc.

In sum, the trick in *qaujilajuinnaugatta* amounts to escaping the dilemma in *(f)* above associated with one’s own knowledge by delegating to s2 the duty of making a statement about it. We see that the meaning-value ‘wonder’ is not associated with any particular constituent morpheme, nor is it the effect of their compositional association; rather, it results from a decipherment process involving an implicature.

Recall that, from the examples discussed previously, the function of *la* is that of ascribing the fragment of discourse that precedes it to an entity distinct from the speaker (direct speech). The same analysis is available in this case: the speaker s1 subcontracts to a pretend distinct entity s2 the making of a statement about s1’s knowledge. This alone, the s1–s2 dissociation, accounts for the meaning shift from ‘know’ to ‘wonder’. This explanatory construction cannot be proved more positively. It remains a proposal at this stage; the remainder of the paper will accrue more evidence in support of the claim, i.e., in support of the proposition that *la*, in many uses, marks a source of speech that is presented as distinct from the speaker.

2.4. Example *qaujilajuinnaugatta*. In example (6), morpheme order contrasts minimally with morpheme order in example (4). This minimal pair provides an opportunity to show how morpheme order has a specific effect on meaning.

(6) *qaujilajuinnaugatta* (H)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>qauji</th>
<th>la</th>
<th>ju</th>
<th>innaq</th>
<th>u</th>
<th>ga</th>
<th>tta</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>-V</td>
<td>VN</td>
<td>==</td>
<td>NV</td>
<td>VV</td>
<td>==</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

to know  
la  
ATTR  
restrictive, just  
to be  
PERF  
1P

‘as we all know/as we know all too well’ (lit., ‘as we just are ones saying: “know”’)

With the restrictor *innaq*, this sequence can be glossed as meaning: ‘we are nothing else but ones saying “know”’, in the sense that, in this occurrence, we are to be understood as doing nothing other than saying “know.”

In example (4), the attributive *ju* precedes *la*; in (6), it follows it. The different morpheme orders denote with precision a difference in meanings: *qaujiju* ‘say: “be knowing”’; *qaujilaju* ‘be saying: “to know”’.14

13 For a clear discussion of the value of *innaq*, see Denny (1981): *innaq* is a restrictor of qualities; it is opposed to *tuaq*, which is a restrictor of occurrences. We see that Inuktitut makes a distinction that English does not make: in English, *only* restricts qualities (*only a man*) and occurrences (*only one man*).

14 The glosses with English gerunds (‘be saying, be knowing’) are an effort to reflect the fact that *ju* marks the attributive mode, which is distributionally nominal.
2.5. La in the literature. Schneider’s grammar (1972:39) displays the la-containing negative indicative forms (discussed in 4 below) with no special attention to the fact that negative attributive forms do not contain la.

Schneider mentions three kinds of contexts containing la: (i) contexts like -laqattatut (1979:41), already discussed above (example 2); (ii) contexts like -laivuq15 ‘noting, acknowledging as a fact’ or uqiksalaiivutit ‘so you thought it was light’, a case of irony toward oneself (1979:38); and (iii) the la-containing combination -lanngituq (1979:38). Schneider (1972; 1979) does not document or discuss la independently.

In Dorais (1975a; 1975b; 1988), occurrences of la are to be noted in negative verbal endings within long paradigms of forms without specific consideration of their structure.

In modern Eastern Canadian Inuit (ECI),16 Fortescue, Jacobson, and Kaplan (1994:404) mention a la infix, a “postbase” in the book, with the meaning ‘say (once or several times)’. Concerning the la of interest in this article, we are not aware of modern sources reporting the shade of meaning ‘once or several times’ in Inuktitut, and our analyses so far have not led us to posit that shade of meaning. The modern la in ECI is related to a proto-form *la(R) with cognates in seven more of the dialectal divisions of the book (Fortescue et al. 1994:404). The proto-form *la(R) is associated with the meaning ‘repeatedly’, which is not attested today in Inuktitut for la with a single l.17 The meaning documented for the proto-form excludes ‘say’; yet, on the same page, a meaning ‘say’ (without the shade ‘repetition’) is reported in Western Canadian Inuit. In other respects, the negative verbal ending -nngilaq (‘he does not’, highly relevant for us, as will be seen in 4 below) is

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15 The functions of la in -laivuq, uqiksalaiivutit, and -lanngituq are analyzed in Lavie et al. (2008).

16 The term Eastern Canadian Inuit (ECI), as defined in Fortescue, Jacobson, and Kaplan (1994:xiii), encompasses the dialectal scope of this paper plus North Baffin and Labrador.

17 Indeed, Schneider (1979:41) mentions a meaning ‘frequentative, many times, numerous’; however, he associates it with a geminate morpheme-initial l (Schneider writes DLA, which is a possible rendering of the modern orthography lla); this geminate ll leads one to surmise a distinct morpheme. As a counter to this, one might object that Schneider’s rule (see Appendix A) might apply to change the geminate ll to a single l. This rule would have to apply in all instances, as there is no evidence for an ll-initial form, even in cases where the structural description for Schneider’s law is not met. Therefore, we analyze that Schneider’s DLA and our la are two distinct morphemes in Inuktitut. Lowe (1976:69) mentions a llak morpheme (Lowe writes DLAK) with the meanings ‘one stroke, a little, short while, rapidly done’. This is the best that can be proposed in modern Inuktitut to match the proto-form *la(R) with a meaning ‘once or several times’; however, la and llak are two distinct morphemes. Given the dialectal data in Fortescue et al. (1994), there is a possibility that some Eskimo-Aleut dialects conflate two morphemes that Inuktitut keeps distinct. Sorting this out far exceeds this article’s scope, intent, and format.
international journal of american linguistics

listed on page 417, along with a cognate in Seward Peninsula Inuit, without particular consideration as to the presence of la in it.

2.6. Reporting speech vs. summoning a discourse source: the polyphonic stance. Examples (1) qaigit! -lavara and (2) kikiattaudi -laqattatut are direct speech reports: words issued by some entity (e2) are reported by the speaker (e1) and la is the quotative marker. Entity e2 belongs to the world, it is a person or a group of persons; in (2), e2 is distinct from e1 and in (1), qaigit -lavara, it coincides with it: e1 and e2 are coreferent. In either case there is a claim of referentiality: the issuer of the quoted words (i.e., e2) belongs to the world; he/she/they is/are supposed to be identified or potentially identifiable.

There is no such claim of referentiality in (3) ataataalalirit and (4) qaujijuvalunga. Here, a discourse fragment is pretended to be held by an entity e2 that is a pretend entity, largely undefined, possibly generic; the speaker e1 summons a virtual character e2 to help produce defined effects and he ascribes a piece of discourse to him (to it?). Here, e2 is always presented as distinct from e1, the reason for this being that the special effects in question must always involve e1 considering the discourse ascribed to e2 from the outside, and then he accepts it, or opposes it, or adopts another type of attitude. For example, in (4), qaujijuvalunga, the pretended dissociation between e1 and e2 is necessary in order to avert a logical impossibility.

Phenomena like (3) and (4) have been called “polyphonic” by Ducrot (1984), building on intuitions of Bakhtin (1929) and Bally (1932). Polyphony is also rooted in the work of Benveniste (1958). The word “polyphony” is appropriate because such phenomena involve the coexistence of more than one “voice” (more than one discourse source). Polyphony is deemed general in the world’s languages and has been analyzed in the structures of several of them. In Appendix B, we provide an overview of polyphony theory.

We have begun—and will continue below—to show that Inuktitut la is a polyphonic marker: it ascribes the fragment that precedes it in a word to a discourse source that the speaker presents as different from himself. As it happens in Inuktitut, la as a quotative marker and la as a polyphonic marker are homophones (they do not share all their grammatical properties, however). This coincidence is not found in languages generally. The differences in their grammatical properties forbid one from simply merging them into one linguistic unit, but it is remarkable that the phonology, and the semantic function, coincide as they do: in either case, when using la, the speaker presents the fragment of discourse that precedes la as emanating from a source.

18 For details on this, and on more polyphonic functions that we conjecture, see Lavie et al. (2008).
that is an entity distinct from himself. From here on we tag this value with DIFS (DIFFERENT SOURCE).

Be it quotative or polyphonic, so far in this paper la has appeared as a full-fledged morpheme displaying productivity: it occurs within the polysynthetic word where it can be preceded and followed by many different morphemes.

We now want to move on to some verbal paradigms (the imperative, indicative, and attributive modes) where a syllable la can be found, not an autonomous morpheme in this case. In these paradigms the distribution of la appears to be precise, but it has not been addressed in the literature, as far as we are aware. Could there be a connection between a marker of direct speech and facts of distribution in verbal paradigms? Let us explore this question.

3. La in positive imperatives. Here we look at single-agreement\textsuperscript{19} imperatives. This section covers the positive imperatives only: negative imperative forms are investigated together with all negative forms in 4 below.

In the imperative paradigm for verbs agreeing with one argument (table 1), we note that the first-person singular contains la: takulanga ‘let me see!’; while no other person does: takuli ‘let him see!’, etc.\textsuperscript{20} It should be noted that 1s imperatives are a problem in many languages, notably in the Indo-European family. In French and English, for example, 1s imperatives do not properly exist: you have to use different tricks like 1p, voyons! or let us see!, and both can be subjected to an analysis whereby the giver of the order and the receiver are distinct entities. To put it simply, I cannot strictly give an order to myself.

What we find in Inuktitut is similar in principle although different in form. Much as in example (4), an intervening source is set on stage, using la, so the speaker can hide behind it. Once this is done, the speaker can give an order to himself—not quite the same self, however. The impossibility for the order-giver and the order-receiver to be strictly coreferent is shared with many languages, but Inuktitut explicitly marks the process by which it is circumvented.

\textsuperscript{19} In Inuktitut, verbs may agree with one argument (in the absolutive case) or with two arguments (one in the absolutive case and one in the ergative case). We use “single-agreement” and “double-agreement” rather than “intransitive” and “transitive.”

\textsuperscript{20} The same anomaly occurs in the interrogative mode. We make the point about the imperative only, and let the reader adapt it to the interrogative mode.

\begin{table}
\centering
\caption{Paradigm of the Imperative Mode (Single-Agreement)}
\begin{tabular}{cccccccc}
  \hline
  & 1s & 1d & 1p & 2s & 2d & 2p & 3s & 3d & 3p \\
  \hline
  \hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}
The case of Inuktitut also deserves a further comment on the prohibition of “morphological” reflexives (independently established in Inuktitut). The prohibition of morphological reflexives takes place among participants of a double-agreement verb, i.e., between “coarguments”; the prohibition states that two coarguments cannot be coreferent. I cannot say ‘I see myself’ by the same means as I say ‘I see you’; I need to use an alternative construction involving imminik, which means ‘myself’, ‘yourself’, ‘himself’, etc.

In takulanga ‘let me see’, there is a prohibition in a single-agreement verb; it holds between the unique participant of the verb (1st receives an order) and the speaker (the speaker gives an order: he issues the speech act). The speaker, once dissociated in this way, can be seen as a kind of interlocutor (or “allocutor”) to himself; he is the interlocutor of the order-receiver. Both happen to be coreferent and it appears that a prohibition is at stake: the order-giver and its interlocutor, the order-receiver, although they are coreferent in the world, cannot be coreferent in discourse. The prohibition must be circumvented by a trick: the intervention of la in langa. Thereby, the speaker is disguised behind another discourse source, the unwanted coreference falls, and the order can be uttered.

This calls for a generalization of the prohibition rule. The prohibition rule used to hold among participants only; it must now also encompass the interlocutor.

Basque has an explicit “allocutor” system, i.e., morphological marks for the person whom you address (Bottineau and Roulland 2007a); these are distinct from the marking of the persons of the verb’s argument schema and occur in addition to it. In Inuktitut, there is only one case only for the presence of an allocutor: grammatically speaking, the only possible allocutor is the speaker and the phenomenon arises only when the speaker gives an order to the speaker (we hardly dare write “to himself”).

If we generalize the prohibition rule to the allocutor in this way, the domain of the prohibition now encompassing the participants AND THE ALLOCUTOR, it is remarkable that we have a case exactly like that found in Basque. Basque also prohibits coreference between coarguments, AND it prohibits coreference between a participant and the allocutor (Bottineau and Roulland 2007b).

We have now explained the distribution of la in the imperatives in a way that is compatible with its uses reviewed in 2 above. So far, our discussion has been limited to positive verbs, but we find some more interesting phenomena in negations.

4. La in negations. The investigation focuses on the Inuktitut independent modes: indicative, attributive, interrogative, and imperative. Negating the verbal form of all four independent modes encompasses the insertion of
the negation infix *nngit* immediately to the left of the positive verbal ending. However, the morphology of the negation also involves the occurrence of *la* in all independent modes except for the attributive. We deem this an explicandum: as far as we know, it has not been addressed in the literature.

4.1. Inuktitut verbal paradigms. Table 2 is the paradigm of the independent modes (single-agreement verbs). The difference of meaning between the indicative and the attributive is difficult to explain to nonnative speakers: each author has his own explanation; we shall come back to that.

Morphologically, the indicative forms are verbal (V) but the attributive ones are nominal (N), which is surprising as they are verbs in many other respects; we come back to that too. This fact is important and we shall explain why it is so and include it in the explanatory construction.

In table 3, we schematize the above paradigms by ignoring the person morphemes and concentrating instead on what happens to the mode morpheme in the negations. The remarkable fact that calls for explanation is that the *attr* neg forms conserve the mode morpheme *tu*, while the three remaining

---

**Table 2**

**Paradigm of the Independent Modes (Single-Agreement)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Positive</th>
<th>Negative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>taku-</strong></td>
<td><strong>attr</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1S</td>
<td>vunga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1D</td>
<td>vuquk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1P</td>
<td>vugut</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2S</td>
<td>vuitit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2D</td>
<td>vuakit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2P</td>
<td>vusi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3S</td>
<td>vuq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3D</td>
<td>vuuk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3P</td>
<td>vut</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*takuvuq* ‘he sees’; *takujuq* ‘he, the one seeing’.
*takunngilaq* ‘he does not see’; *takunngituq* ‘he, the one not seeing’.

---

21 Paradigms are documented in this way by all modern authors and the Hansard corpus contains no occurrence of *-ngipunga* or similar combinations for the other persons. It should be noted, however, that Schneider (1972:39), along with *takunngilaq* (*ind neg 3S* ‘he does not see’, as per table 2) mentions once “en passant” the form *-nngipu* (*ind neg 3S* ‘he does not’, a non-*la* variant). This is questionable; Lowe (1988b:144) writes (our translation): “a form like *-nngipu*, if it exists at all, is exceptional. To our knowledge, Schneider is the sole author mentioning it, and he provides no illustrative example. In his grammar he provides first the *-nngi* forms, then the *-nngip* form [just one], as if the latter were unusual. All other authors always have the negation (*-nngit*-) followed with *-tu-, not with *-pu-.*’ As we have no attestation, we leave the *-nngipu-* possibility out of consideration.
independent modes substitute it with la. In the following discussion, we explain the odd behavior of the ATTR by contrasting it with the IND.

4.2. Setting up a road map for explanation. In either case, the indicative or the attributive, the infix nggit, commonly documented as the negation infix, participates in the negative forms. In the attributive, nggit is just inserted in the positive form and this produces the negative one. In the indicative, however, nggit is inserted but something more is happening: the morpheme pu22 of the indicative is replaced by la. So we have an important question: what exactly is the role played by la in the negative indicative and how is its occurrence motivated?

Compare takunngilavunga ‘I do not see’ (as per the above paradigm), with qaujijulavunga ‘I wonder’ (example 4 above). Both contain -la- before the verbal ending. In qaujijulavunga, we established that la sets a source of discourse (we called it e2) that is distinct from the speaker (called e1). Later, we saw that la has the same function in the imperative takulanga ‘let me see’.

Could it be then that la does the same thing in the negative indicatives? The fact that takunngilavunga and qaujijulavunga both contain -la- suggests something in this direction. We make this suggestion a hypothesis.

HYPOTHESIS H: in takunngilavunga ‘I do not see’ (and in all negative indicatives), the marker la sets a source of discourse that is different from the speaker.

---

22 Both pu and vu are alternations of the same morpheme: the marker of the indicative; pu follows a consonant and vu follows a vowel (see the “p/v alternation” in Appendix A). Hereafter, we write only pu to denote the context-dependent realizations pu or vu.
As there is no direct way to prove \( H \) true or false, we take an indirect course instead: we derive the consequences of \( H \) and see whether we can verify them.

The marker \( \text{la} \) is needed in the negative indicative and not in the negative attributive. That is, setting a source of discourse different from the speaker

---

TABLE 4
CHARACTERIZATIONS OF THE IND-ATTR OPPOSITION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Indicative</th>
<th>Attributive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Event scope (Dorais 1988:58)</td>
<td>Refers to a precise event</td>
<td>More general than the indicative, more encompassing scope</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Event scope (Ortiz 1993:94)</td>
<td>Precise state, close involvement in the action</td>
<td>General state, no involvement in the action, distant outlook</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durability (Dorais 1988:58)</td>
<td></td>
<td>An enduring situation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lowe (1988b:160)</td>
<td>Actual, effective, testified, real, particular, momentary, assertive</td>
<td>Virtual, potential, foreseeable, distance from reality, general, permanent, less assertive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Witnessing (Dorais 1988:58 and Lowe 1988b:145)</td>
<td>An event that has generally been witnessed by the speaker</td>
<td>Not directly witnessed by the speaker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evidentiality(^1)</td>
<td>Events overlapping with the utterance</td>
<td>Events not overlapping with the utterance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Novelty (Paillet)(^2)</td>
<td>New information</td>
<td>Already known information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Answers to questions (Andersen and Johns 2005:8)</td>
<td>More vivid</td>
<td>Less vivid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final word category</td>
<td>Verb (V)</td>
<td>Noun (N)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency estimate (South Baffin)</td>
<td>~ 50%</td>
<td>~ 50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency count in the Hansard corpus (South Baffin)</td>
<td>~ 15%</td>
<td>~ 85%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\) In most Canadian dialects, the choice between using indicative or participial ["attributive" for us] mood in main clauses . . . is conditioned by some form of evidentiality, where evidentiality may broadly be defined as including events whose time and location overlaps with that of utterance" (Anderson and Johns 2005:8).

\(^2\) Paillet is an unpublished manuscript, as reported by Kalmar (1982:56). Kalmar comments: "it is also most often true, that when we place the focus again on a participant we do not give any new information. Paillet concludes from this that the attributive expresses already known information whereas new information requires the indicative."
is needed in the negative indicative but not in the negative attributive. Therefore, the indicative mode and the attributive mode must differ with respect to the source of discourse each of them entails.

Consequence C1: the indicative mode and the attributive mode differ with respect to the source of discourse each of them entails.

The difference in behavior arises only with negation, not in the positive utterances. Therefore, negation is sensitive to the source of discourse in a way that nonnegation is not.

Consequence C2: negation is sensitive to the source of discourse in a way that nonnegation is not.

One way to satisfy C1 and C2 is to assume propositions P1 and P2.

Proposition P1: the Inuktitut indicative mode entails that the discourse source is the speaker, and the attributive mode entails that the discourse source is not the speaker.

Proposition P2: negating entails that the source is not the speaker.

Let us now examine the reasons to adhere to P1 and P2.

4.3. Assessing P1: share of the indicative, share of the attributive. If you ask when in Inuktitut you should use the indicative or the attributive, you get a variety of answers; these are summarized in table 4 for clarity.

Table 4 shows that the current characterizations of the IND-ATTR opposition: (i) are noncontradictory among themselves but (ii) have different, heterogeneous wordings. (For convenience, table 5 is a restatement of P1.)

If we look at table 4 with P1 in mind, we see that (i) all the partial characterizations are compatible with it, and (ii) the proposed characterization, P1, unifies them all well, with each now appearing as an aspect of P1.

With regard to “Answer to questions (more vivid, less vivid),” it is appropriate to remind ourselves of an occasion in which alleged vividness boils down simply to discourse source difference (see entry “source” in Appendix B):

The exclamative (How clever Peter is!) does not contrast with the indicative (Peter is clever) by being more vivid, “language of life against that of thought” (Bally 1932). In the indicative, an utterance is presented as the effect of free will. The exclamative utterance, by contrast, is triggered by the representation of the object: it is the cleverness of Peter itself that forces one to speak. The utterance communicates a qualification of its production, given as the very
effect of that of which it informs; and this qualification of speech by its cause is a part of the meaning of the utterance. (Ducrot 1984:186; our translation)

Let us now turn to the N–V difference between the attributive and indicative modes. A word in the indicative mode is a verb under all assumptions generally associated with the notion of verb. In the attributive mode things are not as clear: after the tu morpheme of the attr, many N-compatible morphemes can be added: (i) infixes that expect an N on their left, resulting in a possible resumption of the polysynthesis process and (ii) some of the declension morphemes (those of the spatial cases, not of the structural cases). These two facts lead one to construe the attributive “verbs” as distributionally nominal, despite the fact that they also bear person inflection. Moreover, in the broader syntax of the sentence, a word in the attributive mode, even inflected for person, may occasionally be a noun-like dependent of another word that is its head. Indeed, attributive words are “nouns” in several respects.

At this point, it is useful to recall this conclusion reached by Ducrot (1984:232) and deemed valid cross-linguistically: “The role of nominalization is to promote an enunciator [a discourse source, in the vocabulary that we selected] to which the speaker is not assimilated.” This is compatible with the high frequency of nominalizations in scientific discourse: when scientists present a content in a nominalized form, they leave it to be understood as originated by instances other than themselves and in this way avert the suspicion of subjectivity.

All this coherence allows us to regard P1 with confidence because (i) it is compatible with all the partial characterizations of the indicative-attributive contrast as of now, and unifies them well; and (ii) it is compatible with an independently established correlation between nounhood and the fact that the discourse source is distinct from the speaker.


In a reference-based approach to meaning established by Frege (1892), the meaning of an assertive, positive statement is, in a nutshell, its reference and its reference is the set of the world’s states of affairs that make the statement true. The meaning of the corresponding negative statement is the complement of the previous set. This course of thinking is typical of the philosophy of language and can cause explanatory difficulties: (1) it draws on a totality that is unattainable to speakers’ knowledge; (2) it fails in the face of vague predicates: their truth conditions are not clear; (3) it meets difficulties in the face of counterfactuals and fiction: if meaning were based on truth, a counterfactual proposition or a fictional proposition would be meaningless, which challenges the intuition we have about meaning; thence possible worlds and other complications.
By contrast, Ducrot’s approach to negation is not reference-based; it is based on discourse source considerations. Negating a positive assertion, in this view, consists of two things: (a) positing a positive assertion made on behalf of a source distinct from the speaker; and (b) considering that the speaker takes a definite attitude toward that assertion-source ascription: he opposes to it.

What we discussed can now be reconstructed as follows. Inuktitut overtly manifests this theory by explicitly handling steps (a) and (b).

In step (a), either the verb mode (attributive) entails in the first place that the source is not the speaker, so that no additional marker is required, and the negation morpheme *nngit* is sufficient; or the verb mode (indicative) entails that the source is indeed the speaker, so that the negated section has to be, as it were, “disconnected,” which is the role *la* performs. In step (b), the morpheme *nngit* marks the attitude of opposition.

If Ducrot’s theory is right—we refer the reader to the references for detailed arguments—then it fits nicely with the facts of Inuktitut. However, it is apparent, we hope, that the distribution of *la* in Inuktitut confirms Ducrot’s negation theory as much as the theory itself explains the behavior of *la*. The corroboration goes both ways.

4.5. **Examples illustrating the explanatory construction.** From P1 and P2, we can now backtrack to the road map for explanation established in 4.2 above. We do this in a set of four examples, showing why the negative indicative contains *la* and the negative attributive does not:

(7) *tikippuq* (positive indicative)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tikit</th>
<th>Pu</th>
<th>Q</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>VV</td>
<td>= =</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>arrive</td>
<td>IND</td>
<td>3s</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

‘he has arrived’

(8) *tikinngilaq* (negative indicative)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tikit</th>
<th>Nngit</th>
<th>La</th>
<th>Q</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>VV</td>
<td>-V</td>
<td>= =</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>arrive</td>
<td>NEG</td>
<td>DIFS</td>
<td>3s</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

‘he has not arrived’

(9) *tikittuq* (positive attributive)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tikit</th>
<th>Tu</th>
<th>Q</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>VN</td>
<td>= =</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>arrive</td>
<td>ATTR</td>
<td>3s</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

‘he has arrived’ (him, the arrived one)
(10) **tikinngituq** (negative attributive)

\[
\begin{array}{cccc}
\text{tikit} & \text{ngit} & \text{tu} & \text{q} \\
V & VV & VN & = = \\
\text{arrive} & \text{NEG} & \text{ATTR} & 3s
\end{array}
\]

‘he has not arrived’ (him, the nonarrived one)

In the indicative mode (7), following P1, the source is the speaker. P2 tells us that a to-be-negated statement must be ascribed to a source distinct from the speaker. Since the positive statement in the indicative equates the source with the speaker, when negating it, as in (8), this ascription has to be undone. This is what the morpheme **la** (different source, DIFS) does; it undoes the ascription to the speaker.

In the attributive mode (9), following P1, the fragment **tikit**- ‘to come’ is not ascribed to the speaker in the first place. Therefore, when negating an attributive utterance (10), there is no ascription to be undone: the source is already different from the speaker, and so **la** is not necessary; the mode morpheme **tu/ju** is not overridden.

The difference between the negative morphologies of both modes is thus explained simply and in coherence with the other previously identified uses of **la**.

**4.6. “Soft” imperatives with **lauq**.** Any imperative, with simple- or double-agreement, can be “softened” by inserting **lauq** in it. Thus, for example, **takuli** ‘let him see!’ becomes **takulaurli** ‘kindly let him see!’.

The “soft” imperative **takulaurli** is analyzed as containing **la**: the introduction of **la** simply amounts to the speaker ascribing the order to a source different from the speaker. Is the given order actually made softer with this? This is somewhat hypocritical to be sure, since the speaker does not present himself as the one issuing the order.\(^{23}\)

Lowe (1998b) also proposes a unified analysis of **lauq** as a past tense infix and as a softening of the imperative.\(^{24}\) For him, “the overall semantic value of the suffix is proposed to involve relationships of above/below. This would relate to both temporal and deferential uses.” Lowe considers that all the uses of **lauq** encompass “a fact of position” and, in this way, he unifies them. This accords with our analyses inasmuch as “position” can be assimilated with discourse source identity or difference. The advantage of our proposal over Lowe’s is that we unify the value of **la** in two out of the three uses that he considers, plus several more. Its inconvenience is that the value and function of **uq** in this **lauq** are not made clear here (on this and similar hypocoristic uses of tenses in French, Spanish, and Basque, see Lavie et al. 2008).

\(^{23}\) Remember, however, the etymology of hypocritical: **hypokrinesthai** ‘play a character’.

\(^{24}\) Lowe also considers, while we do not, the use of **lauq** in verbs in a dependent mode.
4.7. Negative imperatives preferably contain *lauq*. In the negative imperatives, the insertion of *lauq* is preferable in the entire negative imperative paradigm (Dorais 1988:63, 72); it is mandatory in Ungava (Schneider 1972:44), for example: *takunngi laurli* ‘let him not see’.

There is not much to add with respect to the “softening” of the positive imperatives covered in the previous section except that negative imperatives are more at risk of being rude because they are negative; this would explain why the ENTIRE PARADIGM now HAS to be softened by ascribing the negative order to a pretend source behind which the speaker will hide. The same trick is reused.

4.8. Local conclusion. The distribution of *la* in negations has been explained in a way that is compatible with the value of *la* (i) as a marker of direct or indirect speech and (ii) as used in the imperative mode.

In all these cases, *la* prescribes a specific discourse-source assignment. As a rule, in speech, the source of discourse is the speaker. On many occasions, however, there are reasons to say that a different source is construed as the originator of discourse; it is so construed by the speaker himself, who organizes his speech in this way, and it is so understood by the hearer. Facts supporting this are numerous and can be found in many languages. They have been theorized as polyphony theory, a brief summary of which is found in Appendix B.

Among the phenomena examined in 2, 3, and 4, we showed that the Inuktitut morpheme *la* prescribes that the discourse source that applies to the part of the word that precedes *la* is NOT THE SPEAKER.

5. *La* in other integrated morphemes. We further hypothesize that *la* appears with a similar value as a component of some other integrated morphemes. In them, it has lost freedom of association and, as a result of morphological integration, the analysis is not as straightforward as those in 2, 3, and 4. These morphemes are: (1) the tense markers *lauju*, *lauq*, *langa*, and *laaq*; (2) *pallai* ‘it appears that’; (3) *laqi* ‘since’; and (4) *ilaaq* ‘I mean’. Data and analyses for these can be found in Lavie et al. (2008), which also contains some theoretical perspectives concerning polyphony, which the case of Inuktitut suggests.

6. Conclusions. In Inuktitut verbal endings, the marker *la* occurs in imperatives and in the negative forms of some independent modes. For all its occurrences, we have provided a coherent explanation, drawing on polyphony theory (see Appendix B). As a result, the semantic contrast between the indicative mode and the attributive mode has been clarified. The explanation provided is compatible with the function of *la* as a marker of indirect speech.
Generally, what \textit{la} does is to ascribe the part of a word that precedes it to a source of discourse to which the speaker does not assimilate. This possibility is the central tenet of polyphony theory.

Even when productivity is canceled, that is, in integrated infixes, \textit{la} remarkably retains a value that remains compliant with its value as a productive morpheme. In the integration of the compound morphemes, the compositionality of meaning is preserved.

In the case of negation, we have established that Inuktitut provides distinct morphemes for the basic functions of the polyphonic theory of negation: (i) source ascription and (ii) the opposition attitude adopted by the speaker.

The overtness of polyphonic marks in Inuktitut is all the more noticeable because not all languages mark these functions as overtly or, in a given language, some phenomena have overt polyphonic marks while others do not. A common belief is that polyphonic phenomena are implicit in nature or resort to pragmatics and, as such, that they do not belong to grammar. In contrast to this view, in Inuktitut—as this paper shows—polyphonic phenomena in verbs and elsewhere share the same marker, \textit{la}. This constitutes a reason to analyze Inuktitut using polyphony theory and, further, to grant credit to the theory itself. It is an encouragement to carefully seek in various languages overt marks, specialized for source ascription, or for the denotation of speakers’ attitude.

The overtness of the polyphonic marks in Inuktitut might have to be connected with polysyntheticity. Polysynthesis, a remarkably flexible frame, acts as an enabling basis favoring minute specialization of the marks: we knew this already for aspectral and modal marks; we hope we have demonstrated that this quality extends to polyphonic marks.

Finally, it is doubtful that Inuktitut is the only dialectal area featuring polyphonic marks in the Eskimo-Aleut group. We hope perhaps future work by specialists of other areas of the group will bring more information to light.

\textbf{APPENDIX A}

\textbf{INUKTITUT PHONOLOGICAL AND MORPHOPHONOLOGICAL RULES}

In Inuktitut, phonological and morphophonological phenomena are abundant and complex. In the vast majority of polymorphemic words, the canonical forms of morphemes undergo alterations when combined into words.

Phonology and morphophonology are relevant in this paper because (i) generally, they are a condition for the proper identification of morphemes in the Inuktitut examples we use and (ii) specifically, the rules apply in some uses of \textit{la} (e.g., its de-locutive derivation function) and not in others (e.g., its use as a direct speech marker).

Table 6 provides a summary of the rules relevant to this paper.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rule</th>
<th>Schemas</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assimilation by ( m )</td>
<td>( km \rightarrow mm )</td>
<td>( iqaluk \rightarrow iqalynmik )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>regressive, obligatory</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assimilations by ( l ),</td>
<td>( kl \rightarrow ll )</td>
<td>( inuk-lu \rightarrow inulu )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>regressive, obligatory</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( pl \rightarrow ll )</td>
<td>( inu-up-lu \rightarrow inuulu )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( tl \rightarrow ll )</td>
<td>( ini-it-lu \rightarrow iniulu )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assimilations by ( p ),</td>
<td>( kp \rightarrow pp )</td>
<td>( sinik-puq \rightarrow sinippuq )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>regressive, obligatory(^1)</td>
<td>( tp \rightarrow pp )</td>
<td>( tikit-pit \rightarrow tikippit )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assimilations by ( t ),</td>
<td>( kt \rightarrow tt )</td>
<td>( pisuk-tuq \rightarrow pisuttuq )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>regressive, obligatory(^2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assimilations of ( p ) by ( k )</td>
<td>( kp \rightarrow kk )</td>
<td>( sinik-tuq \rightarrow sinikkuq )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>or ( q ),</td>
<td>( qp \rightarrow qq )</td>
<td>( qai-llaq-punga \rightarrow qailaaqpunga )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>progressive, optional, rare</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voicing of ( q ),</td>
<td>( qm \rightarrow rm )</td>
<td>( siqiniq-mut \rightarrow siqinirmut )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>obligatory</td>
<td>( qn \rightarrow rn )</td>
<td>( uqausiq-nik \rightarrow uqausirmik )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( qf \rightarrow rl )</td>
<td>( nanu-lu \rightarrow namurlu )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( qf \rightarrow rf )</td>
<td>( qanuq-jjuuaq \rightarrow *qanurjuuqaq \rightarrow qanurjuuqaq(^3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morpheme-initial velar or</td>
<td>( C-k \rightarrow k )</td>
<td>( tikit-kasaq-puq \rightarrow tikikasaqpuq )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>uvular deletes preceding</td>
<td>( C-g \rightarrow g )</td>
<td>( tikit-giaq \rightarrow tikigiaq )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>morpheme-final consonant</td>
<td>( q-g \rightarrow r )</td>
<td>( irniq-ga \rightarrow irmis )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( qf \rightarrow ng )</td>
<td>( najak-nga \rightarrow najanga )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( q-f \rightarrow q )</td>
<td>( panik-gaq-tuq \rightarrow paniqagtuq )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( C\rightarrow r )</td>
<td>( qatsit-raaq-pa \rightarrow qatsirauqa )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morpheme-initial vowel</td>
<td>( C-V \rightarrow V )</td>
<td>( uqaq-usiq \rightarrow uqausiq )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>deletes preceding</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>morpheme-final consonant</td>
<td>( arnaq-u-vuq \rightarrow arnauvuq )</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prohibition of VVV</td>
<td>( V_1V_2V_3 \rightarrow )</td>
<td>( gallunaaq-it \rightarrow *gallunaa-it )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>through vowel deletion(^4)</td>
<td>( V_1V_2 )</td>
<td>( gallunaa )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( umiaq-up \rightarrow *umia-up \rightarrow umiap )</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prohibition of VVV</td>
<td>( g )</td>
<td>( kuuk-aaluk \rightarrow *kuu-aaluk \rightarrow kuugaaluk )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>through epenthesis of . . .</td>
<td>( ng )</td>
<td>( gallunaaq-u-mmmt \rightarrow gallunaaq-u-mmmt )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( j )</td>
<td>( gallunaaqgummat )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prohibition of CCC</td>
<td>( C_1C_2C_3 \rightarrow )</td>
<td>( tariuq-kkut \rightarrow tariukkut )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( C_2C_3 )</td>
<td>( nusuk-qqaaq \rightarrow nusuqqaq )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prohibition of VVC-C(^5)</td>
<td>( VVC_1-C_2 \rightarrow )</td>
<td>( tariuq-mut \rightarrow tariuumut )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( VV \rightarrow C_2 )</td>
<td>( kuuk-mik \rightarrow kuummik )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( p/v ) alternation. Domain: ( pu-vaq ) (indicative mode); ( pak/vak, palliap/valliap, pallai/vallai, etc. (infixed)</td>
<td>( C-p/v \rightarrow )</td>
<td>( ilinniaq-(p/v)unga \rightarrow ilinniappunga )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( Cp )</td>
<td>(Schneider’s rule then applies and deletes ( q ))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( V-p/v \rightarrow Vv )</td>
<td>( taku-(p/v)unga \rightarrow takuvunga )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Elderly speakers take the assimilation by $p$ as optional.

Elderly speakers take the assimilation by $t$ as optional.

The rule in point applies first, leading to the transient form $*qanurrjuag$; it is not yet acceptable because it contains CCC, so then the *CCC rule (below) applies, giving $qanurrjuag$.

In the examples for $*VVV$, a first, transient form is produced by the rule “initial vowel deletes preceding final consonant” (previous rule); this form contains VVV, which is then reduced by the rule in point.

Not systematic; suspended if the lexical base is monosyllabic (nothing happens to #(C)VVC-V).

Schneider’s rule is the last rule to apply. In the examples in the rightmost column, we provide intermediate (incorrect) forms to help explain the way to the final result.

### APPENDIX B

**OVERVIEW OF POLYPHONY THEORY**

The polyphony theory of enunciation, which forms the theoretical foundation for our analysis, is well known in some European countries and little known elsewhere. We provide here a sketch of the theory\(^{25}\) as the set of its basic propositions. The sketch is limited to the concepts that are relevant to this paper; in the available metalanguages, we select the terms that we use.\(^{26}\)

Enunciation is that part of language which concerns the modes of involvement of the speaker himself in the discourse. Enunciation goes alongside, but is distinct from, the content—or referential meaning—that is conveyed by a discourse. Enunciation is notably concerned with what various traditions name metalinguistic demonstration, mention, quotation, and autonymy—but it goes beyond that. Polyphony theory is a theory of enunciation understood in this sense.

The speaker is the person who speaks. If we wanted to be more accurate, we should distinguish between (i) the referential author (Sterne or Proust, as historical individuals; Mary, who is talking to me), that is, the speaker properly said, and (ii) the image, built within the utterance, of the author of the utterance. The latter is clearly distinguished in polyphony theories and is termed “locutor”; in this paper, however, the risk of ambiguity is low and we use “speaker” for simplicity.

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> TABLE 6—continued

| $t$/$j$ alternation, Domain: | C-$t$/$j$ → Ct | $t$ikit-$($t$)junga → tikittunta
| $tu$/$ju$ (attributive mode): | V-$t$/$j$ → Vj | $taku-$($t$)junga → takujunga
| taq/jaq . . . (a few infixes) | tusaq-$($t$)jaq-$u$-$v$uaq → tusaqtauvuaq
| | niri-$($t$)jaq-$u$-$v$uaq → nirijauuaq

| Schneider’s rule\(^6\) | CCVC\(_1\)C\(_2\) → CCVC\(_2\)
| | $niuvirvik$-$m$ik → $niuvirvim$-$m$ik → $niuvirvim$ik
| | CCVVC\(_1\)C\(_2\) → CCVVC\(_2\)
| | unnuaua-$kk$ut → $*unnua-kk$ut → unnuakut

---

1. Elderly speakers take the assimilation by $p$ as optional.
2. Elderly speakers take the assimilation by $t$ as optional.
3. The rule in point applies first, leading to the transient form $*qanurrjuag$; it is not yet acceptable because it contains CCC, so then the *CCC rule (below) applies, giving $qanurrjuag$.
4. In the examples for $*VVV$, a first, transient form is produced by the rule “initial vowel deletes preceding final consonant” (previous rule); this form contains VVV, which is then reduced by the rule in point.
5. Not systematic; suspended if the lexical base is monosyllabic (nothing happens to #(C)VVC-V).
6. Schneider’s rule is the last rule to apply. In the examples in the rightmost column, we provide intermediate (incorrect) forms to help explain the way to the final result.

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\(^{26}\) The key terms, theoretical in nature and defined in Appendix B, are used consistently in the paper. Parasynonyms promoted by various authors, and not used in this paper, are mentioned in footnotes. The selection of meta-terms that we propose should not be viewed as a sign of allegiance to any sub-school; we merely wish to reduce ambiguity within the scope of this article.
A fragment\textsuperscript{27} can be an utterance, longer, or even smaller, down to a single word. The proponents of polyphony theory do not define “fragment” with precision. What best characterizes the notion “fragment” is that fragments are bounded at the points where source ascription changes (the circularity is apparent only).

A fragment is ascribed to a source.

A source\textsuperscript{28} is an enunciative instance to which fragments can be ascribed. The speaker and the interpreter construe fragments as ascribed to sources. The construal may be nonexplicit (tacit). A source is best viewed as a place marker, a mere slot; it can be associated with a discursive being (which is then the filler for the slot) or left unspecified (associated with nothing; the slot remains unfilled).

The discursive being with which a source may be associated can be an individual: the speaker, the allocutor, or a third person that is not a speech-act participant (Mary, any identified character in a narration). There are also collective discursive beings,\textsuperscript{29} generally symbolized by ONE, with shades of meaning, however: the general opinion, the LAW, the doxa, received ideas.\textsuperscript{30}

One might object that what really matters in the end is the association between the fragment and discursive being, and that the notion of source is fuzzy and could be dispensed with. However, this intermediary notion “source” is needed to support two kinds of statements: (i) it must be possible to present the source as determined or undetermined, and (ii) it must be possible to prescribe that the source is distinct from the speaker. Both statements have bearing on a slot (the source), before it will eventually be filled (by a discursive being).

A source may be used over a long time or for a very short time (just the lapse of a word). At a given point in a text or in an interlocution, there may be as many sources as needed.

Ascription of a fragment to a source can be the subject of a negative prescription like “the speaker ascribes such fragment to a source to which he does not assimilate.” This is particularly important for us as we show in the paper that this is specifically what the Inuktitut marker la prescribes.

The speaker has command over the sources that he sets on stage. The speaker is the one who ascribes fragments to sources. The reader or listener has the job of recognizing what the sources are and which fragments are ascribed to which source. The speaker also indicates whether he assimilates himself, or not, to a given source, and what attitudes he adopts with respect to the source-fragment ascription.

\textsuperscript{27} Fragment or content. If we wanted to be more precise, we should say that a fragment raises viewpoints, and a viewpoint in turn is associated with a source. However, this refinement is not indispensable in the scope of this paper and it will suffice for us to say that the fragment itself is associated with a source.

\textsuperscript{28} Source or enunciator, or enunciative instance, or voice.

\textsuperscript{29} Nolke, Fløttum, and Noren (2004:39).

\textsuperscript{30} ONE is based on the English indefinite pronoun. As a discursive being, ONE was introduced by Berrendonner (1981); since then, it has been adopted by several proponents of the polyphony theory.
ATTITUDES are the various stances the speaker may adopt with respect to the fragments qua ascribed to sources. The speaker is the sole entity that may adopt attitudes; it would make no sense in the theory to say that a source in turn adopts attitudes. The range of possible attitudes is where authors vary most. For the needs of this paper, we distinguish two attitudes: (1) Acceptation—The speaker accepts the fragment as ascribed to a source and supports it, be this source assimilated to the speaker or not. The speaker accepts the corresponding content in such a way that he may proceed from there; he may further build his position on it. (2) Opposition—The speaker opposes the source-fragment ascription. Opposition is used in the polyphonic analysis of the negation (see 4.4).

Polyphony theory so constituted is the main tool we use in our approach to Inuktitut la and the variety of its uses that we analyze.

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DORAIS, LOUIS-JACQUES. 1975a. Inuit uqausingit, manuel de langue inuit (Nouveau Québec). Laval: Association Inuksiutit Katimajit, Université de Laval, Québec.


31 The sources do not have illocutionary force, only the locutor has (Ducrot 1984:215).

32 This position, which we support, is not a matter of consensus among the polyphonists; Nølke, notably, has a different view.


