Chapter 10 : Coordination of Replenishment Policies: Game Theory and Uncertainty in Supply Chains

Abstract : One of the contributions of this chapter is a method based on game theory to study when companies prefer a replenishment policy. Technically, it has several contributions, such as the method that depends on attitudes towards risk and client satisfaction, and the definition of a cost at risk (CaR) based on a performance indicator called value at risk (VaR). The chapter illustrates the methods with a case study comparing three different replenishment policies. Here, α is a representative of traditional replenishment policies based on optimization and using no information sharing (IS), β is a policy designed to reduce the bullwhip effect by exploiting slow IS, and γ is an improvement on β in which IS is instantaneous. The motivation for applying the method to compare α, β and γ is the comparison of two different paradigms: optimization and stream management. The chapter discusses the results obtained with these three policies.
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Submitted on : Wednesday, June 6, 2018 - 3:07:47 PM
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Daniel Llerena, Thierry Moyaux, Armand Baboli. Chapter 10 : Coordination of Replenishment Policies: Game Theory and Uncertainty in Supply Chains. Valérie Botta‐Genoulaz; Jean‐Pierre Campagne; Daniel Llerena; Claude Pellegrin. Supply Chain Performance: Collaboration, Alignment and Coordination, ⟨Wiley; ISTE Ltd⟩, pp.341-361, 2013, 9781848212190. ⟨hal-01809231⟩

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