Plant Breeders' Rights, Patents, and Incentives to Innovate

Adrien Hervouet (1) , Corinne Langinier (2)

1 GAEL - Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquée de Grenoble
2 University of Alberta

Both patents and Plant Breeders' Rights (PBRs) can protect plant innovations. Unlike patents, PBRs allow farmers to save part of their harvest to replant. We analyze the impact of this exemption on prices and innovation in a monopoly setting. In a PBR regime, a monopolist might let farmers self-produce, and he over-or under-invests compared to socially optimal investments. Under a PBR and patent regime, large (small) innovations are more likely to be patented (protected with PBRs), but self-production is not completely prevented, private investments are often socially optimal, and incentives to innovate are boosted. However, overall effects on welfare are ambiguous.

Mots clés: plant breeders' rights; durable good; innovation; patents; seed saving

Domaines: Economies et finances; Agriculture, économie et politique

Adrien Hervouet, Corinne Langinier. Plant Breeders' Rights, Patents, and Incentives to Innovate. Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 2018, 43 (1), pp.118-150. ⟨10.22004/ag.econ.267613⟩. ⟨hal-01808195⟩