Truthful Mechanism for private parking slots sharing problem

Pengyu Yan (1) , Heng He (1) , Feng Chu (2) , Debing Ni (3) , Cynthia Chen (3)

1 UESTC - School of Management and Economics [Chengdu]
2 IBISC - Informatique, Biologie Intégrative et Systèmes Complexes
3 Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering

Parking presents a major challenge in world-wide metropolitans, due to the fact that the demand for parking far exceeds the supply in metropolitans. Motivated by industrial practice and existing literature, this study proposes a real-time reservation and pricing mechanism for a shared parking service system. In our designed a real-time reservation system, drivers looking for slots around a central area are matched with suitable parking slots considering restricts of drivers’ travels and the availability of the shared parking slots. To achieve an optimal system efficiency, not only an optimal matching solution but also flexible trip plans for drivers need to schedule. To efficiently solve the matching and scheduling formulation, a pseudo-polynomial heuristic algorithm is developed in this study. We then exam a common time-based pricing method charging drivers based on a fixed price per time unite under an incomplete information setting. It is shown that such a pricing method induces self-interested divers’ misreporting of their demands and lead to the loss of the system efficiency. Therefore, a novel truthful pricing method is proposed to avoid drivers from misreporting as well as satisfy some important economic properties in mechanism design theory.

Mots clés: Private parking sharing; Real-time reservation; Pseudo-polynomial heuristic algorithm; Truthful Mechanism

Domaines: Recherche opérationnelle [math.OC]

Pengyu Yan, Heng He, Feng Chu, Debing Ni, Cynthia Chen. Truthful Mechanism for private parking slots sharing problem. POMS 29ᵗʰ Annual Conference, May 2018, Houston, TX, United States. ⟨hal-01769887⟩