Truthful Mechanism for private parking slots sharing problem

Abstract : Parking presents a major challenge in world-wide metropolitans, due to the fact that the demand for parking far exceeds the supply in metropolitans. Motivated by industrial practice and existing literature, this study proposes a real-time reservation and pricing mechanism for a shared parking service system. In our designed a real-time reservation system, drivers looking for slots around a central area are matched with suitable parking slots considering restricts of drivers’ travels and the availability of the shared parking slots. To achieve an optimal system efficiency, not only an optimal matching solution but also flexible trip plans for drivers need to schedule. To efficiently solve the matching and scheduling formulation, a pseudo-polynomial heuristic algorithm is developed in this study. We then exam a common time-based pricing method charging drivers based on a fixed price per time unite under an incomplete information setting. It is shown that such a pricing method induces self-interested divers’ misreporting of their demands and lead to the loss of the system efficiency. Therefore, a novel truthful pricing method is proposed to avoid drivers from misreporting as well as satisfy some important economic properties in mechanism design theory.
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Conference papers
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https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01769887
Contributor : Frédéric Davesne <>
Submitted on : Wednesday, April 18, 2018 - 2:03:01 PM
Last modification on : Monday, October 28, 2019 - 10:50:22 AM

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  • HAL Id : hal-01769887, version 1

Citation

Pengyu Yan, Heng He, Feng Chu, Debing Ni, Cynthia Chen. Truthful Mechanism for private parking slots sharing problem. POMS 29ᵗʰ Annual Conference, May 2018, Houston, TX, United States. ⟨hal-01769887⟩

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