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L. E. Var and L. H. , (y) {Indis(x Var ? x)?Equal(x, x)} (H3) {H(H; y; ?)?Indis(t; V ; V )} x := H(y) {Indis(t; V, x; V , x)} provided L H ? V , even if t = y (H4) {H(H; y; ?)?Indis(t; V, L H , y; V , y)} x := H(y) {Indis(t, H5) {H(H; t; V, y)} x := H(y) {H(H; t

. Proof, All the proofs for hash function computation are essentially the same as the proofs for block cipher evaluation. This is due to our choice of using an adversary that does not have access to the random oracle when trying to distinguish distributions (see Section 3)