(In)Corruptibility of Routing Protocols

Raphaël Jamet (1) , Pascal Lafourcade (2)

1 VERIMAG - IMAG - VERIMAG
2 LIMOS - Laboratoire d'Informatique, de Modélisation et d'Optimisation des Systèmes

Analyses of routing protocols security are nearly always supported by simulations, which often evaluate the ability to deliver messages to a given destination. Several competing definitions for secure routing exist, but to our knowledge , they only address source routing protocols. In this paper, we propose the notion of corruptibility, a quantitative computational definition for routing security based on the attacker's ability to alter the routes used by messages. We first define incorruptibility, and we follow with the definition of bounded corruptibil-ity, which uses two routing protocols as bounds for the evaluated protocol. These definitions are then illustrated with several routing algorithms.

Domaines: Cryptographie et sécurité [cs.CR]

Raphaël Jamet, Pascal Lafourcade. (In)Corruptibility of Routing Protocols. Foundations and Practice of Security - 7th International Symposium, FPS 2014, Nov 2014, Montréal, Canada. ⟨hal-01759919⟩