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Article Dans Une Revue Journal of Automated Reasoning Année : 2011

Automated Proofs for Asymmetric Encryption

J. Courant
  • Fonction : Auteur
· M Daubignard
  • Fonction : Auteur
C. Ene
  • Fonction : Auteur
Pascal Lafourcade
· y Lakhnech
  • Fonction : Auteur

Résumé

Many generic constructions for building secure cryptosystems from primi-tives with lower level of security have been proposed. Providing security proofs has also become standard practice. There is, however, a lack of automated verification procedures that analyze such cryptosystems and provide security proofs. In this paper, we present a sound and automated procedure that allows us to verify that a generic asymmetric encryption scheme is secure against chosen-plaintext attacks in the random oracle model. It has been applied to several examples of encryption schemes among which the construction of Bellare–Rogaway 1993, of Pointcheval at PKC'2000.

Dates et versions

hal-01759799 , version 1 (02-12-2018)

Identifiants

Citer

J. Courant, · M Daubignard, C. Ene, Pascal Lafourcade, · y Lakhnech. Automated Proofs for Asymmetric Encryption. Journal of Automated Reasoning, 2011, 46 (3-4), pp.261 - 291. ⟨10.1007/s10817-010-9186-x⟩. ⟨hal-01759799⟩
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