Typing messages for free in security protocols

Abstract : Security properties of cryptographic protocols are typically expressed as reachability or equivalence properties. Secrecy and authentication are examples of reachability properties while privacy properties such as untraceability, vote secrecy, or anonymity are generally expressed as behavioural equivalence in a process algebra that models security protocols. Our main contribution is to reduce the search space for attacks for reachability as well as equivalence properties. Specically, we show that if there is an attack then there is one that is well-typed. Our result holds for a large class of typing systems, a family of equational theories that encompasses all standard primitives, and a large class of deterministic security protocols. For many standard protocols, we deduce that it is sufficient to look for attacks that follow the format of the messages expected in an honest execution, therefore considerably reducing the search space.
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Submitted on : Thursday, March 22, 2018 - 5:17:16 PM
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  • HAL Id : hal-01741172, version 1

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Rémy Chrétien, Véronique Cortier, Antoine Dallon, Stéphanie Delaune. Typing messages for free in security protocols. [Research Report] LSV, ENS Cachan, CNRS, INRIA, Université Paris-Saclay, Cachan (France). 2018, pp.1-49. ⟨hal-01741172⟩

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