Strategic disclosure of opinions on a social network

Abstract : This paper starts from a simple model of strategic reasoning in situations of social influence. Agents express binary views on a set of propositions, and iteratively update their views by taking into account the expressed opinion of their influencers. We empower agents with the ability to disclose or hide their opinions, in order to attain a predetermined goal. We study classical game-theoretic solution concepts in the resulting games, observing a non-trivial interplay between the individual goals and the structure of the underlying network. By making use of different logics for strategic reasoning, we show how apparently simple problems in strategic opinion diffusion require a complex logical machinery to be properly formalized and handled.
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Submitted on : Friday, March 16, 2018 - 4:55:46 PM
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  • HAL Id : hal-01736247, version 1
  • OATAO : 18887



Umberto Grandi, Emiliano Lorini, Arianna Novaro, Laurent Perrussel. Strategic disclosure of opinions on a social network. 16th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2017), May 2017, Sao Paulo, Brazil. pp. 1196-1204. ⟨hal-01736247⟩



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