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Edmond PRÉTECEILLE

Has Ethno-Racial Segregation Increased in the Greater Paris Metropolitan Area?*

ABSTRACT

Changes in the intensity of ethno-racial segregation in the greater Paris metropolitan area over the last three census periods are analyzed. First, immigrants strictly speaking (persons who themselves immigrated) were studied in terms of national origin; to this group were added all second-generation immigrants that could be identified by means of census information. Scale used is neighborhoods and municipalities in the greater Paris metropolitan area. Dissimilarity and isolation indices as well as concentrations by commune (municipality) show that the most intensely segregated immigrants are from North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa and Turkey, that segregation is increasing at a moderate rate, and that it is significantly more pronounced than socio-economic segregation while remaining well below racial segregation levels observed for United States cities. The vast majority of immigrants studied live in neighborhoods where they represent a minority, meaning they are living in residentially mixed situations, not ghettos.

Since the Chicago School, urban segregation has been a classic theme of sociological research. In France it has been handled primarily in terms of social segregation—segregation of social classes, socio-economic or socio-occupational categories. France thus contrasts on this point with the United States, where most research has focused on ethno-racial segregation, primarily between Blacks and Whites, though Park in his initial program (1925: 9-12) attached as much importance to the issue of social classes as racial segregation and though an important article by Duncan and Duncan (1955a), one of the very first statistical studies of segregation, bears on socio-economic segregation. This contrast, which exceeds the question of segregation and raises the issue of dominant modes of social categorization, reflects, as Chenu notes (see Chauvel et al. 2002), major differences in how the issue is viewed or thematized (Schulteis 1998) in social science research in the two societies.

Since the late 1970s, however, an increasing number of research studies have been done in France on the urban situation of immigrants, and many monographs on deprived neighborhoods—e.g., Dubet and Lapeyronnie’s

* My thanks to Hugues Lagrange, Marco Oberti, Loïc Wacquant and the two anonymous Revue readers for their helpful remarks.
1992 study—have stressed the strong presence of immigrants in those neighbor-
hoods. Attention to ethno-racial discrimination processes\(^{(1)}\) has led to probing not only those particular situations and the conflicts they give rise to (Lagrange and Oberti 2006) but also the intensity and possible accentuation of ethno-racial segregation in major French cities.

One important reason for examining the problem in ethno-racial terms is that the political and policy debate in France has already cast it in those terms, and urban policy of the last twenty years has been shaped by the concern to combat intensified urban segregation. While the political-institutional debate usually does not go beyond promoting social mix, that term is often a euphe-
mism for ethno-racial residential mix.\(^{(2)}\) In fact, that kind of residential mix only became the official goal of public policy after a considerable increase in the proportion of immigrants from North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa living in state-subsidized housing projects—groups who had been largely excluded from public housing until the late 1960s.\(^{(3)}\)

The widespread view in France is that social but more particularly ethno-racial segregation has been intensifying, and that this has led to the development of genuine ethnic ghettos in areas in the outskirts of Paris with a high concentration of state-subsidized housing projects, and that this in turn was one cause of the November 2005 riots.\(^{(4)}\) France’s “social mix” policy, which is based on this reading of the situation, has called for greater disper-
sion of state-subsidized housing among the various municipalities (cf. the 1991 “urban development guideline” law and the “solidarity and urban renewal” law of 2000), and its “cities” policy has continued along the same line, calling for greater social mix in neighborhoods understood to be “in trouble,” the so-called “zones urbaines sensibles.” This has now translated into moves to reduce proportions of poor and immigrant households when resettling people in neighborhoods that are the focus of current urban renewal policy.

In an earlier study of the Paris metropolitan area (Préteceille 2006a), I combined the detailed socio-occupational categories defined by the Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques (INSEE) with unem-
ployment and socio-economic “precari ousness” variables to study social segregation, and showed that it is actually changing in quite a different way from the widely-held view just summarized. In fact, the segregation index for most social categories is decreasing. It is rising only for business managers and private sector professionals and for manual workers. Social mix, then, is

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\(^{(1)}\) See below for a discussion of what is meant by the term “ethno-racial.”
\(^{(2)}\) See, for example, Kirszbaum (1999).
\(^{(3)}\) Pinçon (1976) showed that in 1968, only 5.5% of working (or job-seeking) foreign-
ners were living in public housing in the greater Paris area, versus 15.3% of working (or job-seeking) French persons.
\(^{(4)}\) The November 2005 riots started in Clichy-sous-Bois after two youngsters chased by the police hid in a transformer and were electrocuted to death. Rioting subsequently spread to other neighborhoods throughout the country and lasted several weeks. Images of cars aflame in France were diffused by the media worldwide.
holding stable, but bipolarization may be observed at the extremes due to the increasing exclusiveness of wealthy neighborhoods and the sharp increase in percentage of jobless or socio-economically insecure in the poorest neighborhoods. These results refute the widespread understanding in terms of “urban dualization,” “generalized separatism,” and “middle class secession,” but of course they say nothing of trends in ethno-racial segregation. While some monographic neighborhood studies show greater concentrations of immigrants and some local observations note a high proportion of “colored” populations in some areas, we have no overall analysis of changes in immigrant concentrations that might give these sporadic observations greater general relevance or validate the opinions—mistakenly considered facts—of most political actors and journalists.

In this article I provide a statistical analysis of changes in level of immigrant segregation in the greater Paris metropolitan area. Regardless of their limitations, statistics are indispensable if we wish to move beyond particular cases and grasp an overall dynamic. Since Guillon’s pioneering study (1992), several research contributions have shed light on the situation of immigrants in the Paris urban area; see Rhein 1998, the *Atlas des populations immigrées en Île-de-France* (INSEE-FASILD 2004) and Safi’s doctoral thesis (2007). My purpose here is to answer the question in the title of the article by means of a systematic analysis of how the situation has changed. It should be recalled that the greater Paris metropolitan area is a particularly important case study for understanding the situation of immigrants in French society as a whole. In 1999, the area accounted for more than 40% of all immigrants living in mainland France, and for an even higher proportion of new immigrants, who have more difficulties finding housing and employment. The gap between the income and living conditions of people residing in the area’s wealthy neighborhoods and those living in its poorest ones is greater than for all other French cities. And some districts in the outskirts of Paris have been among those most publicized for incidents between the police and young people of immigrant background.

To analyze segregation in the greater Paris metropolitan area, it is important first of all to specify the categories used—the task of the first part of this article. In the second part I analyze changes in the size of the various immigrant groups. In the third I study changes in spatial distribution inequalities, measured by a dissimilarity index. In the fourth, I consider the same question for a wider population that includes immigrants’ children, part of the “second

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(5) The most recent data available to me were from the 1999 census, the last of its kind. Detailed data from the surveys conducted since 2004 for the new census process are not yet available; only aggregate figures have been published. And the new census data will raise serious methodological problems for the study of urban segregation, particularly change in segregation levels, since only a sample of communes, districts or neighborhoods is surveyed each year and the samples rotate over a period of five years. The data available for describing a city for one given census year will therefore be a combination of local results collected over five years’ time.
generation.” In the fifth I examine immigrants’ relative levels of isolation. And in the sixth, I analyze the degree of concentration in different areas.

“Ethno-Racial” Categories and Urban Spaces

The study of ethno-racial segregation derives from the hypothesis that imputed racial or ethnic characteristics, or actual cultural characteristics, can cause processes of differentiated residential distribution that spatially distance certain groups from other groups. The question then arises as to what statistic variables should be chosen to describe the residential population as a function of this hypothesis. But the hypothesis itself is more complex than may appear.

Residential segregation may be the effect of discrimination in access to housing. Several case studies of the selection and management policies of social housing institutions and of private landlords’ and real estate agents’ behavior have demonstrated that discrimination exists, though it has not been possible to deduce its frequency, intensity or the effects it has on urban composition. In France, discrimination based on skin color or supposed belonging to a particular ethnic group, imputed on the basis of name, clothes, country of origin, or other traits, cannot be analyzed statistically and is probably underestimated because there are no official statistical categories for measuring such characteristics (see Simon and Stavo-Debauge 2004). Races do not exist as biological differences that might explain social differences, but if there are enough racists in society going about with the belief that the Black or Arab race exists and consequently discriminating against persons assumed to belong to those “races,” this results in categorization that exists through its own practical effects. Should researchers use categories thus defined or imposed in their analyses of social phenomena? Should those categories be used by the state in systematic collection of public data on its population? These are heated issues in current French debate on approaches to ethno-racial categorization in the social sciences (see the set of studies edited by Martiniello and Simon 2005) and on the eventuality of introducing “ethnic statistics” into French public statistics and public policy to combat discrimination (see the recent report by the COMEDD committee chaired by Héran 2010).

(6) As I have argued elsewhere (Préteceille 2004), variables and spatial units alike should be chosen on the basis of predetermined theoretical hypotheses about what processes produce segregation, and at a scale that is relevant for analyzing the social practices and interactions at issue.

(7) Despite claims and “demonstrations” to the contrary by some scientists, particularly in the US, in publications that have received heavy media attention; e.g., Herrnstein and Murray (1994), or recent declarations by Watson, 1962 Nobel laureate in medicine, about Africans’ “inferior intelligence.”
Moreover, discrimination itself results from highly diverse practices. There is an entire set of discriminatory practices, ranging from organized actions, policies that may in fact be instituted by public agencies (city governments, public housing agencies), practices of economic agents (real estate agents, lending businesses such as those in the US that used “redlining”)—all of which may treat service users differently on the basis of more or less explicit racial criteria—to “diffuse” discrimination of the sort that results from a series of “microdecisions”\(^{(8)}\) made by many individual actors, each of whom is only slightly racist. Discrimination can also be indirect, meaning for our purposes that discrimination operating in a different sphere of social practices—on the labor market, for example—affects place of residence. There is no reason to think that in France, a country where—in direct contrast to the United States—racial categorization has not been consolidated as a legitimate public representation of reality, the implicit categorizations operative in these different types of discrimination processes are homogeneous, congruent or stable over time.

Ethno-racial differentiation of residential space can also result from processes of self-aggregation, processes that may be qualified as “ethnic” in a vague way, in the sense that there may be a variety of cultural reasons for them: linguistic (living near people who speak your language—this applies especially to new immigrants who speak the receiving country’s language poorly or not at all); religious (living near places of worship where you can practice your religion); etc. But the reasons may also be economic (your ethnic group’s social network may be in a position to help you find work or housing) or family-related (living near family members invigorates family social ties, resource exchange, mutual assistance—this reason is hardly limited to immigrants), etc. But in this case, the way that the group one wishes to belong to and the individuals belonging to that group categorize themselves may reasonably be assumed different from the way a discriminator who means to keep “the other” at a distance categorizes them. Not to mention the fact that, as several socio-anthropology studies have shown, the social identities people draw upon are complex and change over time.

The literature on migration processes has long focused on this sort of self-grouping. The now classic 1985 study by Portes and Bach, for example, showed the extent of the development of “ethnic enclaves” in some US cities. In France there is a growing inclination among some politicians to impute immigrant segregation to immigrant desire for “communitarian withdrawal,” implying immigrant refusal to become integrated—a view contradicted by many survey results, such as the MGIS Survey (Tribalat 1996) and the results obtained by Brouard and Tiberj (2005). While it seems a kind of political delusion to claim that the phenomenon of segregation as a whole results from communitarianist desires—the classic move of “blaming the victim”—it is true that some spatial groupings do at least in part reflect such immigrant

\(^{(8)}\) Schelling’s interpretation (1978).
desires; e.g., groups that settle as property owners in a particular neighborhood.

While the matter of theoretically defining suitable categories for analyzing ethno-racial segregation is, as we have seen, an extremely complex one, the practical options available in France for studying the issue are quite limited. The only source that allows for statistically analyzing social differentiation of residential space—since such analysis must be done at a small spatial scale—is the census, and the only relevant information it contains is household member nationality and country of birth.\(^{(9)}\) I will be using this information here, and adding birth in French “départements” or “territoires” outside mainland France—the so called DOM-TOMs (e.g., Martinique and Guadeloupe, Reunion Island, etc.). Immigrants’ national origin will therefore be used as a proxy variable for ethno-racial characteristics likely to cause residential segregation. Though the choice is constrained, this variable is not such a bad solution, and it is highly preferable to extremely composite ethno-racial categories such as “Blacks,” “Arabs,” “Asians.” First, unlike those categories, it does not give credence to racist prejudices; second, it allows for detailing immigrant origins finely enough that the categorization will closely approximate immigrants’ original cultural identities and enable us to identify distinct migration processes.

But there are problems and limitations to this solution. One major—and underestimated—problem is that though this information is collected, it is not necessarily readily accessible. INSEE has declared its detailed information on immigrant origin “sensitive,” and it can only be obtained through special permission and for spatial units of 5,000 or more inhabitants.\(^{(10)}\) The main problem here is that there may be categories of French citizens or people born in mainland France—i.e., people who are not immigrants—who are nonetheless subject to discrimination on the basis of skin color or ethnic identity imputed on the basis of name. This applies primarily to what are called the “second generation”; i.e., following Borrel and Simon’s definition (2005), persons born in mainland France to at least one immigrant parent. The census only allows researchers to identify as “second generation” persons who are still living with their immigrant parents.

Not all nationalities could be accounted for, both because the number of nationalities represented was so high and because of the statistical constraints.\(^{(11)}\) I ultimately opted for the category definitions in Figure 1—either relatively large groups or sets of smaller ones from major world regions. I have also

\(^{(9)}\) Parents’ national origin and how long they have been living in France are collected by other surveys, but not by the census.\(^{(10)}\) Public institution moves to withhold information may reasonably be understood to have the opposite effect of the “neutralization” aimed at, as they leave people free to fantasize about immigrant invasion and reinforce demands for “ethnic statistics.”\(^{(11)}\) Segregation is studied by comparing residential distributions of given groups within a set of spatial units. Data reliability decreases due to sampling when for some groups there are very small numbers in many spatial units, and comparison becomes technically difficult when some groups are very small relative to others.
distinguished between immigrants and French natives from outside mainland France (the Départements et Territoires d’Outre-Mer or DOM-TOMs), who once again are not immigrants but are likely to undergo racist discrimination because of skin color.

This way of framing the field to be taken into account when measuring ethno-racial segregation raises the problem of how accurately immigrants are being counted.\(^\text{(12)}\) The problem exists for both legal immigrants (see, among others, Ngwe 2006) and illegal ones, though it is different for the two cases. Héran (in Buffet 2006) has estimated that in the late 1990s there were approximately 300,000 illegal immigrants living in France. If we estimate that half of them are living in the greater Paris metropolitan area, then we have to increase the overall number of immigrants in 1999 by 150,000, i.e., 9\% of immigrants living in the greater Paris metropolitan area. However, the figure is very likely higher for growing immigrant groups—the groups that most illegal immigrants are likely to belong to. For those groups, then, we have to take this uncertainty factor into account in interpreting the results presented below.

In determining the spaces and spatial breakdowns to be studied, I had to operate under the constraints of limited access to information and how that information is defined. Ideally, we should be able to study the entire Paris urban area using INSEE’s spatial breakdown into what can be considered the most adequate units for analyzing segregation; i.e., IRISes, neighborhoods of approximately 2,000 inhabitants.\(^\text{(13)}\) But because INSEE applies the regulations of the Commission Nationale Informatique et Libertés, researchers can only access information on immigrants’ original nationalities for what are called TRIRISes\(^\text{(14)}\) and communes (municipalities) of at least 5,000 inhabitants. Since only municipalities and not TRIRISes can be used for earlier censuses, I studied the 340 municipalities in the outskirts of Paris for which 1999 data was available, and the municipality of Paris as traditionally divided into 80 districts.\(^\text{(15)}\) Since I had to leave aside municipalities with populations below 5,000, I could only study 90\% of the total population of the

\(^{12}\) According to INSEE, the results of the census surveys done in 2004 and 2005, combined with other sources, indicate that the number of immigrants given for 1999 was actually higher, but there is no indication of how much higher; see Borrel (2006).

\(^{13}\) For a discussion of relevant spaces and scales, see Préteceille (2006a). IRIS (Îlots Regroupés pour l’Information Statistique) are small standardized units that were first used by INSEE in releasing data from the 1999 census. They are the smallest areas of analysis possible, and correspond reasonably well to what can be considered the scale of everyday neighborhood experience. They are slightly smaller on average than US census tracts.

\(^{14}\) A TRIRIS is usually a set of three adjacent IRISes and encompasses at least 5,000 residents.

\(^{15}\) Paris is divided into 20 arrondissements, which are administrative units, and each arrondissement is divided into 4 districts (quartiers). These districts have had stable boundaries over time and can therefore be used to analyze changes. They are useful in comparisons with other municipalities since the municipality of Paris is so much bigger. Due to the minimum size constraint, I had to combine Paris districts 1 and 3; and 4, 5 and 6.
Île-de-France region\(^{(16)}\), and 96% of its immigrant population. Consequently, segregation between immigrants and French-born residents is slightly underestimated, as immigrants are sharply underrepresented in the small municipalities that could not be studied, most of which are to be found in the less dense “outer ring” of greater Paris area suburbs and in the outlying semi-urban area.

**Changes in Immigrant Group Numbers**

Before analyzing the degree of segregation of the various immigrant groups, it is useful to have a general overview of their respective proportions and changes in those proportions. The figures for the greater Paris metropolitan area (Figure 1 and figures in Table A-1 in the Appendix) show that the number of French persons born in mainland France and living in the Île-de-France region rose 4.7% from 1982 to 1990 and 2% from 1990 to 1999, for a total of 8.36 million. For French persons born in the DOM-TOMs and living in Île-de-France the situation was different: their numbers increased sharply, then fell, for a total of 191,000 persons in 1999.

Between 1982 and 1999 the total number of immigrants rose from 1.3 to 1.6 million.\(^{(17)}\) The increase was greater from 1982 to 1990 than from 1990 to 1999; it was also much greater than for the non-immigrant population. Though the total weight of the immigrant population increased only slightly—from 13.3% to 14.7% over that period—population composition by origin changed considerably.

The Portuguese are the biggest group of European immigrants; their numbers fell slightly over the period. Italians and Spaniards fell sharply. Eastern Europeans also fell slightly, while Northern Europeans increased. The overall weight of European immigrants fell perceptibly—from 6.7% to 5.3% of all inhabitants of the greater Paris metropolitan area.

The largest North African immigrant group was from Algeria, but their numbers remained stable over the period, as did those for immigrants from Tunisia, whereas number of Moroccan immigrants rose sharply; there are now three-quarters as many Moroccan as Algerian immigrants. The overall proportion of North African immigrants rose slightly, from 3.9% to 4.2%.

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\(^{(16)}\) The “region” in France is the first subnational tier of government; the country is divided into 22 regions. In 1999, the Île-de-France region coincided fairly closely with the Paris metropolitan area.

\(^{(17)}\) This is according to the official definition: persons born non-French outside France. That definition encompasses foreign-born foreigners and foreign-born persons who have acquired French citizenship, but not French-born foreigners or French-born persons who have acquired French citizenship, and obviously not foreign-born French persons.
The number of immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa increased more than any other group, doubling between 1982 and 1999. In 1999 there were more of these immigrants than immigrants from Morocco and almost as many as those from Algeria. But the total weight of sub-Saharan African immigrants is still low: less than 2% of the total population.

In 1982 France had very few immigrants from Turkey, the Middle East, India and Pakistan, etc. Their numbers too rose sharply over the period, though each of the three groups is still smaller than the Tunisian group, for example. The number of immigrants from Latin America was approximately the same as for Turkey, etc., but did not rise as much. Lastly, East and Southeast Asian immigrants increased sharply, exceeding Tunisians and Spaniards in 1999. This set of immigrants, most of whom belong to groups other than

(18) Unless otherwise indicated, the data used in this article are from my analysis of the 1982 and 1990 census files and, for the 1999 census, my analysis of specially constructed census tables—all material made available to me by the Centre Maurice Halbwachs-ADISP. Special thanks to Alexandre Kych for his precious assistance in drawing up that set of tables.
those implicated in post-colonial migrations, more than doubled in absolute numbers, and its relative weight in the total population rose from 1.7% to 3.1%—substantially more than sub-Saharan African immigrants.

This simple description of the structure of the immigrant population in the Paris metropolitan area already gives quite a different picture from the one that dominates public and media debate, where the “immigration problem” is essentially posed in terms of migration flows from Northern and sub-Saharan Africa. In 1999, those two immigrant groups combined accounted for no more than 6.1% of the total population of the greater Paris metropolitan area and 41% of its total immigrant population, and their combined weight had only moderately increased from 1982, when it stood at 36%. There has been only a slight fall in the number of European immigrants; they now account for 5.3% of the total population. Meanwhile the combined total for the other groups exceeds 3% and has gone up more in absolute terms than the figure for sub-Saharan African immigrants.

Changes in Immigrant Spatial Distribution Inequalities

The primary aspect of segregation, the one that greatly conditions the degree to which relations between immigrants and non-immigrants are even possible, as well as the two groups’ (unequal) access to city resources, is unequal residential distribution. Since Duncan and Duncan’s pathbreaking study (1955b), researchers have tended to study this dimension by means of the dissimilarity index, which compares spatial distributions for the two groups. The advantage of this approach is that it involves a simple, intuitive interpretation—percentage of one group that would have to move in order for the two groups to be distributed similarly—that can then be compared with a substantial quantity of published results.

To measure segregation and changes in it, I first used the categories and spaces indicated before to calculate a dissimilarity index that would allow for comparing distribution of each immigrant group and of French persons from the DOM-TOMs with distribution of the reference group, i.e., French persons born in mainland France (see Table 1).

(19) See Massey and Denton’s classic article (1988) for an analysis of the various segregation dimensions and a detailed presentation and discussion of the various indexes, including the dissimilarity index.
It is important to explain how the reference group was defined, because the results partially depend on it. I chose to define it as the set of French persons born French in mainland France and not living with an immigrant parent. This is a narrower definition than “non-immigrant,” as it excludes identifiable members of the second generation and allows for a reference group that will also work for the second set of calculations, where second generation members were added to immigrants (see below). If we were only interested in the ethnic aspect in the anthropological sense, this group would be too narrow because the linguistic, cultural and family integration process transforms identities and involves a gradual integration process whereby many members of the second generation come to belong more fully to the main ethnic group than to their immigrant parent’s ethnic group. But since we are interested here in segregation as a possible result of ethno-racial discrimination, it is clear that these same persons may be subject to discrimination on the basis of skin color, name, imputed identity, regardless of their degree of cultural integration. This explains the above definition. The set of immigrants plus non-immigrant children living with at least one immigrant parent can be understood to correspond to the population of households whose head or spouse is an immigrant likely to undergo ethno-racial discrimination that may affect his or her residential situation—discrimination that also obviously determines the situation of any child(ren) living with that parent.

The strongest dissimilarity index in 1982 and 1990 was for immigrants from the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Their numbers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ID</th>
<th>1982</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>1999</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>French persons born in the DOM-TOMs</td>
<td>0.284</td>
<td>0.287</td>
<td>0.295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States, Canada, New Zealand, Australia</td>
<td>0.544</td>
<td>0.503</td>
<td>0.468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Europe</td>
<td>0.309</td>
<td>0.313</td>
<td>0.308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe</td>
<td>0.295</td>
<td>0.281</td>
<td>0.259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>0.186</td>
<td>0.193</td>
<td>0.186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>0.246</td>
<td>0.231</td>
<td>0.202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>0.197</td>
<td>0.187</td>
<td>0.197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>0.317</td>
<td>0.319</td>
<td>0.334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>0.368</td>
<td>0.360</td>
<td>0.332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>0.349</td>
<td>0.327</td>
<td>0.333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>0.357</td>
<td>0.333</td>
<td>0.330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>0.431</td>
<td>0.448</td>
<td>0.470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>0.439</td>
<td>0.370</td>
<td>0.312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India, Pakistan, etc.</td>
<td>0.349</td>
<td>0.338</td>
<td>0.340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East and Southeast Asia</td>
<td>0.347</td>
<td>0.346</td>
<td>0.344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>0.403</td>
<td>0.315</td>
<td>0.261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>0.607</td>
<td>0.476</td>
<td>0.467</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
are low, and we can reasonably assume that the strong segregation level for
this group reflects above all their belonging to high social categories, which
are the most sharply segregated socio-occupational ones (Préteceille 2006a).

Immigrants from Italy, Spain and Portugal have the lowest indexes—around
0.2 in 1999, and these have either fallen or remained stable. Immigrants from
Eastern Europe have a slightly higher index, but it is significantly decreasing.

The four groups of immigrants from Northern Africa and sub-Saharan
Africa have similar indexes—close to 0.33 in 1999 and sharply higher than
immigrants from Italy, Spain or Portugal. However, scores within this group
have changed in slightly different ways: the index for Algerians underwent a
slight increase in the 1980s and a sharper one in the 1990s, for a total increase
of 5.5%; the index for Tunisian immigrants fell regularly, for a total decrease
of 9.7% from 1982 to 1999; the index for immigrants from Morocco fell in
the first period and increased slightly in the second, losing a total of 4.4%; for
sub-Saharan African immigrants it fell sharply in the first period and slightly
in the second for an overall decrease of 7.6%.

As noted, these four groups are at the center of public debate on immigra-
tion. The immigrants stigmatized by racist discourse in France and suspected
of endangering the republican model by “communitarian withdrawal” into
“ghettos” are North African or African immigrants, a fact which highlights
the weight of the post-colonial dimension in the construction of French social
representations of immigrants. In fact, this group is a minority and the propor-
tion of these immigrants in the total population is only slightly increasing. It
is therefore particularly important to note that the degree of segregation of
these four immigrant groups fell or remained nearly stable in the 1980s, then
remained nearly stable or only slightly increased in the 1990s. There was
indeed an inflection in the last decade of the twentieth century, but for some
of these groups, the segregation intensification was very slight. Note also
the disparities among the four groups, namely for the two whose numbers
rose the least, Algeria and Tunisia: segregation of Algerian immigrants
increased slightly while falling for Tunisian immigrants. If we look now at
the two groups that grew the most—Morocco and sub-Saharan Africa—we
see that segregation of Moroccan immigrants increased very slightly in the
1990s while sub-Saharan immigrant segregation fell very slightly.

(20) These results are slightly different
from the ones I published earlier (Préteceille
2006b, 2007), which showed a slightly lower
degree of segregation and a slight fall in segre-
gation for those categories. The difference is
primarily due to the more restrictive definition
of the reference group used here in calculating
the indexes; i.e., French persons born French in
mainland France and excluding children living
with immigrant parent(s). As explained, this
new definition is decidedly more relevant for
assessing the situation of groups likely to be
discriminated against on ethno-racial grounds.
This in turn demonstrates that it is not enough
to take into account individuals' nationality and
place of birth. Nonetheless, the difference
amounts more to an inflexion—though a signi-
ficant one—than a dramatic change: a shift
from a slight fall to a slight rise in segregation
for several groups.
It is likely that the dissimilarity index of the respective groups would rise slightly if we took into account illegal immigrants, since they are likely to live either with other members of the same group (family or friends) or near them. But in order for that to indicate a rising trend in segregation for the four groups, the number of illegal immigrants not counted by the census would have to have increased sharply in the 1990s compared to previous decades. We have no indication that this happened, though the hypothesis cannot be discarded due to the tightening of restrictions on legal immigration and number of visas delivered.

Turkish immigrants (next in the table) show the highest dissimilarity index for 1999: over 40% higher than for all North African immigrant groups. And in contrast to those groups, the index for immigrants from Turkey rose sharply in both periods, 1982-1990, 1990-1999.

There were fewer immigrants from the Middle East than Turkey, and their numbers did not rise as fast. In 1982 they were slightly more intensely segregated than Turkish immigrants, but their dissimilarity index has fallen sharply, bringing them to the same level as the North African groups. The Middle Eastern immigrant group is quite heterogeneous, encompassing immigrants from Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, etc., and the fall in segregation for the group as a whole may mask increased segregation for several subgroups.

The number gap for the next two groups—immigrants from India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, etc., and immigrants from China, Southeast Asia and Japan—is very wide: few immigrants in the first group, substantially more in the second. Both groups increased considerably, reaching a total close to that for sub-Saharan African immigrants. For both groups, segregation level either remained stable or fell slightly, depending on the period, and in 1999 was slightly higher than for North African immigrants.

Numbers for the last group, immigrants from Latin America, were very low in 1982, and this group was sharply segregated. Over the two periods their numbers nearly doubled, but the dissimilarity index fell sharply, ending well below that for North African immigrants. It can be assumed that early in the period, these were small, close-knit communities—Chilean, Argentine and Brazilian political refugees—whereas recent migration has probably been for economic reasons.

Lastly, we should note the relatively high dissimilarity index for French persons born in the DOM-TOMs—higher than for European immigrants and only slightly below the index for North African immigrants. These are French citizens who attended French schools and have French-sounding names, so this result can only support the hypothesis (though not demonstrate it—I will return to this point) that this group is racially discriminated against on the basis of skin color.(21) Moreover, degree of segregation for this group

---

(21) The way the group is defined actually results in an excessive estimate of the number of dark-skinned persons likely to suffer discrimination, as it includes children of French persons of European origin who settled in the DOM-TOMs but have now returned to mainland France.
increased slightly in the 1980s and even more in the 1990s—just as it did for Algerian immigrants.

How are we to comparatively assess ethno-racial segregation in the greater Paris metropolitan area? The compulsory reference is the United States, but here we encounter a disparity in scale. Published results for American cities have usually been calculated on the basis of census tracts, units of approximately 4,000 inhabitants. This gave a Black/White dissimilarity index of 0.81 for Chicago in 2000 and 0.82 for New York; for Hispanics and Whites the figures were 0.62 for Chicago, 0.67 for New York; the Asian/White index was 0.44 for Chicago and 0.50 for New York.

I calculated Paris dissimilarity indexes at the TRIRIS scale (> 5,000 inhabitants; once again, this INSEE-defined unit is slightly larger on average than a US census tract); for some groups, however, I was able to work at the IRIS scale. By interpolating from these values (see Appendix, Figure A-1), I estimate the dissimilarity index between the most intensely segregated immigrant groups—from North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa—and the reference group (French persons born in mainland France) for units similar in size to US census tracts to be approximately 0.40—one half the Black/White dissimilarity index for New York or Chicago; two-thirds the Hispanic/White index and four-fifths the Asian/White index for those cities. This means that even the moderately rising French dissimilarity indexes are incomparable to the situation of African-Americans in the largest American cities and even to the situation of Latin American immigrants and their children (“Hispanics”).

**Immigrants and the Second Generation**

Do these results change if we take into account the second generation? As mentioned, French census information only allows for identifying members of that generation still living with their parents. The national survey samples that we have for studying the second generation are too small to allow for analyzing spatial distributions. On the basis of data from the Études des histoires familiales survey, Borrel and Simon have estimated the second generation—defined, it will be recalled, as all French persons with at least one immigrant parent—at 7.7% of the total population, a figure close to that for first generation immigrants: 7.4% (2005: 435). They note that the Italian second generation is the largest group, and that the Italian, Spanish and Portuguese groups together account for 46% of the second generation. Children with at least one Algerian parent account for 14.1% of the second generation, and the entire North African and sub-Saharan African second generation

(22) See, for example, Massey and Denton (1993) and studies by Logan and his research team: http://www.s4.brown.edu/cen2000/.

(23) These estimates were made in the framework of a research agreement with INSEE’s Direction Régionale Île-de-France.
account for 33.1% of the total—1.5 million persons in 1999, slightly below the total for the first generation, i.e., 1.69 million for all of France.

However, the second generation age group structure differs by immigrant group, reflecting both how long ago the group immigrated, type of migration by period, and group birth rate. The more recently a group arrived, the greater the proportion of young people in its second generation. Borrel and Simon (2005: 436) estimate that 15% of Spaniard immigrants’ children and 8% of Italian immigrants’ children are young people, whereas the figure for sub-Saharan African immigrants’ children is 84%. For the most recent immigrant groups—from Portugal, Morocco, sub-Saharan Africa, India-Pakistan and Asia—the second generation is made up primarily of young people, many of whom still live with their parents.

I therefore conclude that the measure I have been able to take of numbers of second generation children living with their parents in the greater Paris metropolitan area is clearly an underestimation for the earlier immigration groups (including Algerians) but is more accurate for more recent groups. Figure 2 shows changes in this subset for the previously defined immigrant groups.

**FIGURE 2.** Second Generation Living with Parents by Immigrant Group (Île-de-France)
Clearly, the groups with the most children living with an immigrant parent are the largest immigrant groups: Portuguese, North Africans and sub-Saharan Africans. It is for those groups that the proportion of this segment of the second generation (i.e., children still living with parents) compared to the first generation is heaviest—on average over 60%.

Over the period this situation developed as follows: number of children living with Northern European immigrant parent(s) fell; number of children living with Portuguese immigrant parent(s) remained stable; for all other groups, number of children living with immigrant parent(s) rose. The sharpest rises were in the Moroccan and sub-Saharan groups, where second-generation-living-with-parent increased more than first-generation immigrants.

The growth rate for second generation living with immigrant parents was very high (and higher than first-generation numbers) for all recent immigrant groups. The lowest figure for the 1990-1999 period was for the Moroccan group—48%; for the sub-Saharan, Turkish and Indo-Pakistani groups it was over 100%.

Table 2 presents dissimilarity indexes for the same groups, calculated this time for immigrants plus second generation living with immigrant parents. The reference group is the same as for Table 1.

The first thing to note is that these indices differ only slightly from those obtained for the previous group definition; the ratios between the values obtained with this new generation and without it range from 0.87 to 1.04. In 1999, the new index was slightly higher for the Portuguese, North African and sub-Saharan groups (ratio of 1.04), the Turkish group (1.03) and the Moroccan and Indo-Pakistani groups (1.02). It was much lower for the Northern European (0.88), Eastern European (0.91), Spanish (0.90), Middle Eastern (0.91) and Latin American (0.94) groups.

Over the period, we again observe a falling trend for immigrants of European origin, with the exception of the Portuguese, where the relative variation over the period—5.7%—is similar to what it was for the earlier definition.

The relative increase observed before for other first generation immigrants becomes somewhat higher with the wider definition for the Algerian group (7.1%/4.9%), the Moroccan group (5.1%/1.9%), the Turkish group (8.4%/4.9%) and the Indo-Pakistani group (5.1%/0.4%). For the sub-Saharan and Asian groups we see a slight rise in the index, in contrast to a slight fall for the prior definition.
TABLE 2. – Dissimilarity Indexes for Immigrant Groups in the Greater Paris Metropolitan Area, Including Second Generation Living with Parents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ID</th>
<th>1982</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>1999</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States, Canada, New Zealand, Australia</td>
<td>0.518</td>
<td>0.473</td>
<td>0.431</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Europe</td>
<td>0.277</td>
<td>0.279</td>
<td>0.272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe</td>
<td>0.262</td>
<td>0.253</td>
<td>0.237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>0.194</td>
<td>0.197</td>
<td>0.187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>0.214</td>
<td>0.206</td>
<td>0.181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>0.199</td>
<td>0.194</td>
<td>0.205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>0.326</td>
<td>0.325</td>
<td>0.348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>0.346</td>
<td>0.343</td>
<td>0.327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>0.337</td>
<td>0.324</td>
<td>0.340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>0.346</td>
<td>0.343</td>
<td>0.345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>0.426</td>
<td>0.447</td>
<td>0.484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>0.402</td>
<td>0.337</td>
<td>0.283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India, Pakistan, etc.</td>
<td>0.331</td>
<td>0.329</td>
<td>0.346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East and Southeast Asia</td>
<td>0.324</td>
<td>0.338</td>
<td>0.344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>0.381</td>
<td>0.295</td>
<td>0.246</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Overall, taking into account second generation living with parents does not significantly modify the segregation levels found for first-generation immigrants. However, we do find a slightly sharper rising trend in the dissimilarity index—relative variation over 5%—between 1990 and 1999 for groups of Turkish, Algerian, Portuguese, Moroccan and Indo-Pakistani origin (decreasing order).

These results may be considered robust despite the fact that the second generation was only partly included, since the majority of the second generation are young people in these recent immigration groups (except perhaps for the Algerian group). Moreover, given the second generation’s relative upward socio-occupational mobility, and therefore the fact that members of the second generation not living with their parents are somewhat less likely to experience socio-economic segregation, it is reasonable to assume that if we could take into account that other part of the second generation, this would slightly reduce the observed segregation level rather than increase it.

Segregation, then, did intensify moderately but significantly over the 1990s for recently arrived groups, except for the Asian group, for whom the rise was very slight, and the sub-Saharan group, for whom it has remained nearly stable.

(24) According to Meurs, Pailhé, and Simon (2005), the unemployment rate for the second generation is slightly below that for the first generation (controlling for the difference in age structure), and the second generation have higher educational attainment. However, the authors also found second-generation upward socio-occupational mobility to be much weaker than for French persons of French origin.
Immigrant Groups’ Relative Degrees of Residential Isolation

The second dimension of immigrant group segregation is degree to which a group is either isolated or exposed to other groups, particularly the dominant ethno-racial one. I have studied this by means of the isolation index, with measures probability of having neighbors belonging to one’s own group (Massey and Denton 1988). (25)

The index is, by construction, sensitive to group size even when adjusted. It is therefore not surprising to find extremely low values for the US, etc. and Latin American groups. For the four European immigrant groups—with the exception of Portugal—it is also very low. And for all these groups, we see it either remained stable over the period or fell. The index is also low and stable for the Middle East group (see Table 3).

The Portuguese and Tunisian groups have a slightly higher index—around 0.010—which fell very slightly over the period.

TABLE 3. — Isolation Indexes (26) of Immigrant Groups in the Greater Paris Metropolitan Area, Including Second Generation Living with Parents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Modified isolation index</th>
<th>1982</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>1999</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States, Canada, New Zealand, Australia</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Europe</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>0.018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India, Pakistan, etc.</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East and Southeast Asia</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td>0.020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(25) The extremely interesting debate between Simpson (2004, 2005) and Johnston, Poulsen, and Forrest (2005) on segregation in British cities highlights the necessity of taking these different dimensions into account. My results are incomparable with theirs, however, because the city of Bradford that they studied is so much smaller than the greater Paris metropolitan area, as is their spatial unit, the “enumeration district.”

(26) The classic isolation index was modified to take account of group size; see Johnston, Poulsen and Forrest (2005: 1222).
In 1999, five groups—from Algeria, Morocco, sub-Saharan Africa, Turkey and Asia—had an isolation index of around 0.020; i.e., twice as high as the one for the Portuguese and Tunisian groups. That index remained stable for the Algerian group, whose numbers rose slightly;\(^{(27)}\) it rose moderately for the Moroccan group, whose numbers increased sharply; and rose sharply for the remaining three groups—sub-Saharan African, Turkish and Asian—whose numbers also rose sharply.

To get an idea of the significance of these indices relative to American cities, I estimated them by interpolation (as I did for the dissimilarity indexes) for units of a size comparable to a US census tract (see Figure A-2 in the Appendix). For the sub-Saharan and Moroccan groups the value of the index can be estimated at slightly over 0.050; slightly lower for the Algerian and Portuguese groups. For Blacks in New York in 2000 the index is 0.60; in Chicago 0.73—i.e., in both cases over ten times higher than the highest figure for Paris. For Hispanics, the American figure is over eight times as high: 0.46 in New York, 0.48 in Chicago; and for Asians it is three times as high: 0.26 in New York, 0.15 in Chicago (see Logan).

As mentioned, group size does explain a part of these differences. Blacks account for 24% of the New York population and 19% of the Chicago population. If we calculate the isolation index at US census tract scale for the North African and sub-Saharan groups combined—i.e., 6.1% of the population of the greater Paris metropolitan area—it rises to 0.135. But it is more relevant to compare this figure with the figures for Asians in the US, since the overall proportion of that group in American cities is closer to what it is in Paris and thus much smaller: Asians account for 5% of Chicago’s population and 9.8% of New York’s, and they are considered much less “segregated” than Blacks or Hispanics. We see, then, that our revised isolation index for the combined North African and sub-Saharan groups in France—0.135—is about the same as for Asians in Chicago (0.15) and half as high as for Asians in New York (0.26). And we can conclude that the isolation of immigrant groups in the greater Paris metropolitan area is low compared to the situation of Blacks and other ethnic minorities in US cities, though it is increasing for rapidly growing groups.

**Concentration in Certain Neighborhoods?**

Concentration of certain groups in certain spaces is another dimension of segregation. My use of the term here is different from Massey and Denton’s (1988), who understood it to refer to the proportion of city space occupied by a given minority group. In the greater Paris metropolitan area, where segregation is moderate and people are therefore likely to live in a somewhat mixed

\(^{(27)}\) Totals of Figures 1 and 2.
neighborhood, it is likely that this moderate segregation level, as measured by the dissimilarity index, for example, is due to an averaging out of situations that may be quite different from each other, and that some neighborhoods may be characterized by much higher concentrations of immigrants.

To study this aspect synthetically, I examined not the different “origin” groups, as that would exceed the scope of this article,\(^{(28)}\) but rather the immigrant population as a whole. A preliminary study of the spatial distribution of the various groups does show residence location particularity for the following groups: immigrants from the United States and Northern Europe; from Portugal; from Italy and from Spain.\(^{(29)}\) However, as mentioned, the debates on ethno-racial “ghettoization” in France focus primarily on North African and sub-Saharan immigrants and otherwise on Turkish, Indian and Pakistani, Chinese and Southeast Asian immigrants. I therefore combined all those groups, after checking that their residential distributions were reasonably similar.\(^{(30)}\) Furthermore, in studying this composite group, henceforth referred to as “non-European immigrants,” I have once again combined immigrants and second generation children living with their immigrant parent(s).

Municipalities and Paris districts were ranked by proportion of this “non-European” population in their overall population. Percentage range boundaries were defined on the basis of average proportion in 1999: 15\%. Table 4 shows the distribution of these spatial units for the same percentage ranges in 1990 and 1999.

Clearly, the transition matrix from 1990 situations to 1999 situations is sharply diagonal—stability predominates—with an overall shift toward the higher percentage ranges. That shift makes sense given the overall increase in the weight of this composite immigrant population: from 12.1\% to 14.9\%. However, it can be seen that the shift primarily occurs toward adjacent squares to the right of the diagonal, meaning that the proportion of immigrants increased almost everywhere, regardless of whether it was low, moderate or high to begin with in 1990. There are only eight instances of falling proportions, and only six instances of a two-square jump, i.e., a sharp increase.

\(^{(28)}\) I am currently working on a detailed study of spatial distributions of the various immigrant groups.\(^{(29)}\) The correspondence analysis of the table presenting numbers by immigrant group and municipality shows a clear opposition on this point between French persons born French in mainland France and immigrant groups, with the exception of the afore-cited groups.\(^{(30)}\) This is another difference between the situation in Paris and ethno-racial segregation in US cities: immigrant neighborhoods in Paris tend to host immigrants of many different origins, as was established decades ago for Belleville or La Goutte d’Or, and similar mix has been found outside central Paris.
TABLE 4. – Distribution of Municipalities and Districts by Percentage of Immigrants (and Immigrants’ Children) in 1990 and 1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>0%-7.4%</th>
<th>7.5%-14.9%</th>
<th>15%-22.4%</th>
<th>22.5%-29.9%</th>
<th>30%-37.4%</th>
<th>37.5%-44.9%</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>203</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>57</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>420</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In neither 1990 nor 1999 did non-European immigrants as defined above account for more than 50% of the population of any Paris metropolitan area municipality or Paris district. In 1990, such immigrants accounted for more than 30% of the population (i.e., more than twice the average proportion in 1999) of eight spatial units. One such unit—Lognes—is in the Seine-et-Marne département; there were two in the Yvelines (Mantes-la-Jolie, Chanteloup-les-Vignes); one in Seine-Saint-Denis (Clichy-sous-Bois); two in the Val-d’Oise (Garges-lès-Gonesse, Sarcelles); one in the Hauts-de-Seine (Gennevilliers) and one in the city of Paris (La Goutte-d’or). In 1999, the figure rose to 24: eight more municipalities in the département of Seine-Saint-Denis (La Courneuve, Villette, Aubervilliers, Bobigny, Saint-Denis, Stains, Pierrefitte-sur-Seine, Épinay-sur-Seine); two more in the Yvelines (Trappes, Les Mureaux); one more in the Val-d’Oise (Villiers-le-Bel); one in Essonne (Grigny); one more in the Hauts-de-Seine (Villeneuve-la-Garenne) and three additional Paris districts (La Chapelle, La Villette, Pont-de-Flandre). Altogether these 24 municipalities or districts where non-European immigrants represent more than 30% of the population accounted for 20% of the non-European immigrant population in 1999.

At the municipality/district scale, then, there are no cases of heavy concentration: in no municipality do non-European immigrant residents constitute a majority. But there is no reason to think this result can be transposed to neighborhood scales. At the TRIRIS scale (1,126 units with an average of 7,856 residents each), I had access to data for 1999 only. And here we do find 14 spatial

(31) Once again, in studying change from 1990 to 1999, the only data I had access to was at the commune scale. This led to underestimating segregation in large municipalities that encompass sharply contrasting districts or neighborhoods. And the difficulty could only be resolved for 1999 by using detailed data for the TRIRISes (and aggregate data for certain IRISes). But once again, I could not use data at those scales retroactively for 1990 (though this was theoretically possible, since INSEE does have a table of correspondences between its 1990 residential units and IRISes, which is what allowed me to construct and analyze INSEE’s social categories at the IRIS scale for 1990) (Préteceille 2003, 2006a).

(32) This small municipality is exceptional because the majority of its immigrant residents are from Asia, whereas the others comprise a mix of immigrants of different origins, as indicated earlier.
units where non-European immigrants account for more than 50% of the population. The maximum is 70% for a TRIRIS in Clichy-sous-Bois (département of Seine-Saint-Denis). There is one other such TRIRIS in Clichy-sous-Bois; three in Mantes-la-Jolie, two in Aulnay-sous-Bois, one in Garges-lès-Gonesse, one in La Courneuve, one in Les Mureaux, one in Corbeil-Essonnes, one in Stains, and two in Sarcelles.

However, these 14 TRIRISes represent only 4.8% of the total non-European immigrant population of the greater Paris metropolitan area, and only 1.34% of the greater Paris metropolitan area population altogether. Heavy concentration does exist at the TRIRIS scale, but it concerns only a tiny fraction of both the non-European immigrant population and the area’s population at large.

### Table 5. – TRIRIS Distribution by % of Non-European Immigrants (and Immigrants’ Children) in 1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% ranges</th>
<th>Number of TRIRISes</th>
<th>Non-European immigrants</th>
<th>Total population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0%-7.4%</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>114,276</td>
<td>2,153,597</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.5%-14.9%</td>
<td>371</td>
<td>305,543</td>
<td>2,891,839</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15%-22.4%</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>305,443</td>
<td>1,681,571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.5%-29.9%</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>254,743</td>
<td>989,951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30%-37.4%</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>197,719</td>
<td>586,665</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37.5%-44.9%</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>123,165</td>
<td>307,551</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45%-52.4%</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>77,698</td>
<td>160,142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52.5%-60%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>18,467</td>
<td>32,385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; 60%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>27,727</td>
<td>42,370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,126</td>
<td>1,424,781</td>
<td>8,846,071</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If we consider the overall distribution (same percentage ranges as in Table 4), we see that 29% of these immigrants live in TRIRISes where their weight is below the 15% average while 69% live in TRIRISes where it is below 30%.

Unfortunately, researchers do not have access to this kind of data at the IRIS scale, the most relevant one for studying urban neighborhoods as experienced by their inhabitants. I could do no more than calculate proportion of immigrants (not including their children) from places other than Italy, Spain and Portugal. In only 31 of 4,779 IRISes with over 400 inhabitants in 1999 did such immigrants represent more than 50% of the total population; they accounted for 2.5% of this immigrant population. The only way to take second-generation-living-with-parent(s) into account (as done for the
TRIRISes) was to estimate by applying the average rate observed for that group; i.e., a ratio of 1.59 for non-European-immigrant-population-plus-second generation to non-European-immigrant-population. In approximately 10 IRISes, this generates a proportion over 100%—these estimates are therefore excessive. However, in proceeding thus, we find 340 IRISes in which over 50% of the population are non-European immigrants-plus-second-generation; those IRISes in turn account for 20% of that composite non-European population. Since we are dealing in overestimations here, we can only conclude that the vast majority of the non-European immigrant population live in neighborhoods (IRISes) in which they are not the majority, though for a small but non-negligible sub-group, representing between 2.5% and 20% of that total immigrant population, they are the majority.

Since we have no data for 1990 at either the TRIRIS or IRIS scale, we obviously cannot analyze change over the decade. However, if we compare the proportion of immigrant residents per IRIS (all groups combined) with the proportion of such residents in municipalities in 1999, we find a correlation of 0.744, meaning a strong correspondence between the two levels. We can therefore reasonably hypothesize that infra-municipal change is fairly closely aligned with change at the municipal level itself.

The number of non-European immigrants (and their children) in the area studied grew by 330,000 persons from 1990 and 1999, a growth rate of 28.9% between the two censuses. Nearly half of this increase (46.9%) occurred in municipalities where non-European immigrants represented less than 15% of the resident population in 1990. Virtually the same percentage of the increase (46.6%) occurred in municipalities where that immigrant population was slightly overrepresented in 1990 (15% to 30%). And only 6.5% of the increase occurred in municipalities where that immigrant population was already heavily represented—over 30%—in 1990. At the scale of the municipality or Paris district, most of the growth in the non-European immigrant population occurred through a spreading of that population into spaces where it became only slightly to moderately concentrated; little of it corresponded to further concentration of already concentrated residential areas, and for those areas, the growth rate was lower than for that of the immigrant population at large (25.3% versus 28.9%). Clearly the discourse in France on ethno-racial “communitarian self-regrouping” expresses a fantasy rather than describing reality, erroneously taking for a general trend a phenomenon in which no more than a small percentage of residential spaces and immigrants are implicated.

(33) At the TRIRIS scale, the correlation between immigrant and immigrant-plus-second-generation-living-with-parent(s) numbers is extremely high—0.96—while the dispersion coefficient is low: 12%. But the fact that applying the same average rate at the IRIS scale generates proportions over 100% for approximately 10 IRISes means that the dispersion rate is necessarily much higher.

(34) Correlation based on the 4,063 IRISes of at least 500 inhabitants that are part of communes made up of at least two IRISes.
Moderate but Increasing Segregation that Affects the Entire Paris Metropolitan Area

For immigrants from North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa, Turkey, East and Southeast Asia, India and Pakistan, segregation in the sense of a difference between how they are spatially distributed and how French persons born French in mainland France\(^{(35)}\) are distributed is much more pronounced than for immigrants of European origin. In 1999 it was 1.7 times greater. And segregation for these groups did increase, moderately, especially in last decade of the twentieth century. Turkish immigrants are the most intensely segregated group, and the group whose degree of segregation increased the most over the period; their numbers are relatively low but increasing fast.

These general results, which also take into account the majority of the second generation for all these groups (except for the group which began migrating earliest: Algerians), seem robust at municipality and Paris district scale. If it were possible to take into account illegal immigrants, this would likely result in somewhat stronger segregation and perhaps greater intensification of segregation over time, but it would not significantly change the general order of magnitude established by this research. Likewise if it had been possible to take into account the very small municipalities in the outer ring of Paris suburbs and the semi-urban areas, this would have accentuated immigrant segregation, since few immigrants live in those places, but it would not necessarily have resulted in increased segregation intensity over the period.

For the first years of the twenty-first century all we have is aggregate data for the greater Paris metropolitan area as a whole (dated January 1, 2005).\(^{(36)}\) They show that from 1999 to 2005, the number of immigrants living in Île-de-France increased by 19%—a much higher increase than for non-immigrant residents (2.3%) and slightly above the growth rate for France as a whole (15%). Given the acute tension on the housing market, it is unlikely that this inflow of immigrants has spread evenly throughout the Paris metropolitan area, and likely instead that the moderate intensification in segregation observed in the preceding decade has been reinforced.

However, it will be no easy task to update this analysis when the new data are available. First, the data on small spatial units to be included in the new census material will have been collected over five different years, implying a greater margin of error for analysis of segregation levels and changes in them. Second, the relative weight of young people living with immigrant parent(s) falls with length of time the group has been present in France, and this will decrease the relevance of the method used here to study the second generation for the new census and are available on the INSEE site: www.insee.fr.

\(^{(35)}\) And not living with an immigrant parent.

\(^{(36)}\) These results are from the first annual waves for the new census.
generation. In order to keep the origin categories used here, we would need to know the origin(s) of census respondent’s parents, but the new census form, like its predecessor, does not include this question.

At the municipality and Paris district scale at which I was able to analyze change over the period, we found no more than a few cases of intense concentration of immigrants. It will be recalled that in no municipality in 1999 did non-European immigrant residents (including second generation living with immigrant parents) account for over 50% of the resident population. At the TRIRIS scale in 1999, less than 5% of all immigrants lived in units where they represented the majority. At the IRIS scale, I could only estimate that proportion by excess: at the very most, 20% of all immigrants lived in units where they represented the majority. Regardless of scale, then, heavy concentrations of immigrant residents represent no more than a small minority of residential situations in the greater Paris metropolitan area. Clearly it is a mistake to affirm, as is currently done in France, that immigrants, even non-European ones, are living in “immigrant ghettos”: to do so is to project onto an entire population a situation that, proportionally, quite seldom occurs.

The notion of ghetto applies well to American cities characterized by an extremely high Black/White dissimilarity index, indicating that the vast majority of each group is residentially separated from the other: 80% of Blacks living in New York would have to move in order for Blacks to be distributed as Whites at the census tract scale. But the term cannot be accurately applied to the situation in the greater Paris metropolitan area, where, at the same scale, only 40% of immigrants from North Africa or sub-Saharan Africa would have to move to produce a distribution similar to that for French persons born in mainland France. The majority of Blacks living in New York live in neighborhoods where Blacks constitute the majority, whereas in Paris this is true for only a small minority of immigrants. As Wacquant put it (2006: 170), it would be a “sociological misinterpretation” to use the “ghetto” notion as a model for conceiving the overall socio-spatial structure in France.

My results also invalidate a classic explanation for immigrant segregation, inherited from the Chicago School, whereby segregation intensity is linked to how recently the immigrant group in question arrived. France’s Portuguese immigrants arrived no earlier than the country’s North African immigrants, yet they are much less intensely segregated; Algerians immigrated to France earlier than Moroccans, yet they show a slightly higher level of segregation.

Segregation is also often explained in socio-economic terms: immigrants are segregated because they belong to unskilled occupational categories, runs this argument; they therefore have lower incomes and are not as well integrated as others in the labor market. If we compare 1999 segregation indexes for socio-occupational categories to those for immigrant groups, we see that the latter for immigrants from North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa are more than 20% higher than for unskilled industrial workers and more than

(37) At the same scale and for the same geographical frame. The segregation index is the dissimilarity index estimated for a reference group defined as the entire given population.
50% higher than for semi-skilled industrial workers, the two most highly segregated socio-occupational categories. While much immigrant segregation is surely due to immigrants’ social class situation, the breadth of the observed gap can only bolster up the hypothesis that these immigrants are discriminated against on ethno-racial grounds. Here the case of French persons born in the DOM-TOMs is particularly striking. The segregation index for this category, calculated under the same conditions, is 0.238; that is, higher than the index for unskilled industrial workers, whereas in 1999, only 16.6% of these French citizens were manual workers while 39.8% were white collar workers and 13% were working in mid-level occupations—more than half, then, were working in two of the least segregated major socio-occupational categories (indices below 0.150).

However, while my results bolster up the ethno-racial discrimination explanation they do not suffice to validate it. Immigrants in a given socio-occupational category may be more or less skilled, have more or less linguistic, cultural and other resources, and thus find themselves more or less occupationally disadvantaged relative to more or less recent immigrants and non-immigrants. Moreover, if we consider Waldinger’s path-dependency interpretation for the US—namely that recent immigrants only get jobs of the type available at the time they arrive; i.e., jobs that do little to skill them, and that their employment careers are persistently affected by the economic situation at the moment they arrive on the labor market (Waldinger 1996; Waldinger and Bozorgmehr 1996)—relevant for France, then immigrants to France may also be at a disadvantage for having arrived relatively recently on the job market. Likewise, relatively recent immigrant group arrival may help explain higher group unemployment rates: “last in, first out.” Statistical study of segregation cannot answer this question for France, since the census does not include variables that would allow for describing ethno-racial groups in finer socio-occupational detail. To answer this question—one that is assuming importance in more general debates on social stratification and inequality trends—we would need to consult more detailed surveys (that then could not be directly related to the spatial distribution aspect).

In any case, the wide gaps I have indicated work in favor of the hypothesis of an ethno-racial discrimination effect, which is then added on to the inequalities just mentioned. But as specified in the introduction, this effect may itself operate in various ways: discrimination at work or in access to employment indirectly affects residential situation, whereas discrimination in access to housing directly affects it.

Once again, if we want to determine the respective weights of the various effects, we must have detailed analyses of the processes by which the inequalities and discrimination affecting immigrants are constructed. Such analyses, quantitative but above all qualitative, have been published in several studies of poor neighborhoods in France. However, my results here contrast with the implicit or explicit suggestion in those studies that the

(38) I analyze this point in detail in an article in progress.
majority of non-European immigrants, particularly young people of the second generation, are living in “neighborhoods of exile.” The analyses presented here show, on the contrary, that while situations of heavy residential concentration do exist and cannot be considered insignificant given the intensity of the difficulties that develop in them, they concern only a small minority of immigrants—just as I showed earlier (Préteceille 2006a) that while the socio-economic situation in some poorer neighborhoods has gotten significantly worse and that this cannot be neglected, only a minority of neighborhoods are implicated in that phenomenon.

For a French reader, the list of municipalities that do show a relatively high level of segregation seems to evoke the list of neighborhoods most directly implicated in the 2005 riots (Lagrange 2006). It would be interesting to check this more systematically by comparing the map of neighborhoods involved in the riots with the map of TRIRISes showing the highest immigrant concentrations. If that correspondence were to be observed, this would reinforce Lagrange and Oberti’s hypothesis (2006) that situations of particularly intense segregation had an effect of their own on the broader social tensions that led to those riots.

However, it seems to me that by focusing too exclusively on extreme situations of that sort, we render predominant situations invisible and make immigrant segregation seem like relegation to ghetto neighborhoods, when in fact most immigrants in France experience a more moderate, relative type of segregation—discrimination from non-immigrants within mixed neighborhoods in which they are a minority. It is this moderate yet very real type of segregation, more intense than socio-economic segregation (i.e., the type that is recognized as excessive in French public debate) that is the predominant phenomenon, though once again, it is masked by the fact that we focus almost exclusively on extreme situations.

Overemphasizing extremes also leads to interpreting the effects of immigrant segregation primarily in terms of separation and a “break in the social tie,” a break symmetrically imputed either to the dominant group’s refusal to integrate immigrants or to immigrants’ refusal to become integrated. In fact, analysis of what I have shown to be moderate segregation that nonetheless affects urban Paris area society as a whole should move us to reflect on the urban inequalities affecting most immigrants to varying degrees and the close interaction between those inequalities and socio-economic ones, as well as relations between immigrants and non-immigrants by urban context, by variation in weight of the various groups, by local socio-economic structure(s), living conditions and quality of public services, and by local policy practices.

Emphasizing extreme situations that apply only to a minority of immigrants means neglecting the moderate but nonetheless real difficulties of the majority of immigrants and the problems those difficulties cause for their social integration. Those problems may be less intense and spectacular than the ones characterizing extreme situations, yet they remain obstacles to social cohesion and they affect everything from relations among neighboring social groups within a district, neighborhood or the workplace to relations between those groups and
institutions—all relations likely to be eroded by moderate but widespread discriminatory decisions or acts and the feelings of injustice they slowly but inexorably generate. It is surely the shared experience of segregation and ethno-racial discrimination (despite the fact that that experience varies in intensity by immigrant group and individual), especially when it comes to access to employment and relations with the public authorities, including the police, that led a majority of immigrants and their children to share the frustration of the rioters of 2005 and to understand their rage,\(^{(39)}\) when in fact the vast majority of those immigrants do not live in particularly difficult neighborhoods themselves.

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*Translation: Amy Jacobs*

**APPENDIX**

**TABLE A-I. – Population of Île-de-France by National Origin and Place of Birth**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origins</th>
<th>1982</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>1999</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Born French in mainland France</td>
<td>7,829,260</td>
<td>8,196,012</td>
<td>8,361,769</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born French outside France</td>
<td>390,084</td>
<td>398,251</td>
<td>353,332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born French in the DOM-TOMs</td>
<td>173,588</td>
<td>198,483</td>
<td>191,116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acquired French nationality and foreign-born-in-France</td>
<td>342,192</td>
<td>378,547</td>
<td>432,930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States, Canada, New Zealand, Australia</td>
<td>14,160</td>
<td>19,036</td>
<td>21,872</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Europe</td>
<td>79,828</td>
<td>85,851</td>
<td>85,614</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>121,372</td>
<td>112,554</td>
<td>107,173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>101,204</td>
<td>86,353</td>
<td>69,358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>97,824</td>
<td>81,143</td>
<td>62,796</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>274,628</td>
<td>267,952</td>
<td>258,006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>209,096</td>
<td>204,229</td>
<td>215,371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>78,220</td>
<td>82,966</td>
<td>82,474</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India, Pakistan, etc.</td>
<td>107,040</td>
<td>135,669</td>
<td>163,882</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East and Southeast Asia</td>
<td>84,680</td>
<td>135,278</td>
<td>205,256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>21,256</td>
<td>40,198</td>
<td>49,065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>30,672</td>
<td>48,840</td>
<td>52,278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>16,160</td>
<td>42,520</td>
<td>60,972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of immigrants</td>
<td>77,532</td>
<td>109,883</td>
<td>132,753</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born French in mainland France</td>
<td>21,096</td>
<td>34,544</td>
<td>44,534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born French outside France</td>
<td>1,176</td>
<td>1,766</td>
<td>585</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total**                                     | 10,071,068 | 10,660,075 | 10,951,136 |
**Total immigrants**                          | 1,335,944  | 1,488,782  | 1,611,989  |

\(^{(39)}\) According to a 2006 Pew Institute survey, 63% of the French Muslims questioned said they felt sympathy for the rioters (Pew Research Center 2006: 13).
Figure A-1 shows dissimilarity index variation for immigrant groups as a function of average spatial unit size studied. Three index levels are clearly visible: approximately the same for European immigrants; much higher for North African and sub-Saharan immigrants (the ratio between the two is fairly constant: 1.7, regardless of spatial unit size), and an even higher one for immigrants from Turkey. Index increase by size is non-linear (except perhaps for the Portuguese and sub-Saharan groups); the index rises approximately 12% when we move from the municipality to the TRIRIS scale and another 13% from the TRIRIS to the IRIS scale. Only Turkish immigrants show a dissimilarity index anything like the index for Blacks (and at much lower numbers) in relatively integrated, small American cities (e.g., San Diego, California, where the index is 0.54, and Austin, Texas, 0.52).

(40) For the IRIS-related estimates, the reference population—French persons born French—is underestimated relative to the others. However, the geographic frame is considerably larger, including many more peripheral metropolitan spaces, and this works to increase the index (see above). The hypothesis here is that these two effects cancel each other out.
Figure A-2 indicates isolation index variation for the different immigrant groups by average spatial unit size. There are two main modalities: weak variation in the Italian and Spanish groups; strong variation—four times as strong—in the Algerian, Moroccan and sub-Saharan groups. Due to its size, the Portuguese immigrant group is in the strong variation set, though the dissimilarity index shows them to be much less segregated than immigrants from North Africa. Conversely, the isolation index for Tunisian immigrants, whose numbers are much lower, falls between the two modalities, as does the index for Turkish immigrants. The rise in isolation index with spatial unit size is sharper than for the dissimilarity index.

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