How to prevent type-flaw attacks on security protocols under algebraic properties

Abstract : Type-flaw attacks upon security protocols wherein agents are led to misinterpret message types have been reported frequently in the literature. Preventing them is crucial for protocol security and verification. Heather et al. proved that tagging every message field with it's type prevents all type-flaw attacks under a free message algebra and perfect encryption system. In this paper, we prove that type-flaw attacks can be prevented with the same technique even under the ACUN algebraic properties of XOR which is commonly used in "real-world" protocols such as SSL 3.0. Our proof method is general and can be easily extended to other monoidal operators that possess properties such as Inverse and Idempotence as well. We also discuss how tagging could be used to prevent type-flaw attacks under other properties such as associativity of pairing, commutative encryption, prefix property and homomorphic encryption.
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Contributor : Pascal Lafourcade <>
Submitted on : Tuesday, February 13, 2018 - 9:51:36 AM
Last modification on : Friday, July 6, 2018 - 10:08:02 AM
Long-term archiving on : Monday, May 7, 2018 - 6:02:13 PM


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  • HAL Id : hal-01707737, version 1
  • ARXIV : 1003.5385



Sreekanth Malladi, Pascal Lafourcade. How to prevent type-flaw attacks on security protocols under algebraic properties. 2018. ⟨hal-01707737⟩



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