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=. , ?. N-pub-2-i, and ?. {1, there exists ? 1 , t 1 , . . . , t m , ? m and f ? F c such that ? = f(? 1

1. and .. ?. {1, ? m , we have that for all j we conclude that (??, t?) is consequence of S?? ? S . In case 3, if ? ? t ? S then ?? ? t? ? S?? and so the result directly holds, Else ? ? t ? ? and so by hypothesis ?? ? t? ? Conseq(S?? ? S )

?. .. {1 and ?. Conseq, S be two sets of solved deduction facts Let ? = {X i ? u i } n i=1 such that all X i are pairwise distinct. For all ?, for all ? ? Conseq(S ? ?), if for all, Lemma 24. Let SS? ? S ) then ?? ? Conseq(S? ? S )

?. {1, we directly have by definition that (??, t) is a consequence of S? ? S