BDI logics for BDI architectures: old problems, new perspectives

Abstract : The mental attitudes of belief, desire, and intention play a central role in the design and implementation of autonomous agents. In 1987 Bratman proposed their integration into a belief-desire-intention (BDI) theory that was seminal in AI. Since then numerous approaches were built on the BDI paradigm, both practical (BDI architectures and BDI agents) and formal (BDI logics). The logical approaches that were most influential are due to Cohen&Levesque and to Rao&Georgeff. However, three fundamental problems remain up to now. First, the practical and the formal approaches evolved separately and neither fertilized the other. Second, only few formal approaches addressed some important issues such as the revision of intentions or the fundamentally paraconsistent nature of desires, and it seems fair to say that there is currently no consensual logical account of intentions. Finally, only few publications study the interaction between intention and other concepts that are naturally connected to intention, such as actions, planning, and the revision of beliefs and intentions. Our paper summarizes the state of the art, discusses the main open problems, and sketches how they can be addressed. We argue in particular that research on intention should be better connected to fields such as reasoning about actions, automated planning, and belief revision and update.
Liste complète des métadonnées

Littérature citée [66 références]  Voir  Masquer  Télécharger
Contributeur : Open Archive Toulouse Archive Ouverte (oatao) <>
Soumis le : jeudi 25 janvier 2018 - 13:44:46
Dernière modification le : mercredi 12 septembre 2018 - 17:46:03
Document(s) archivé(s) le : vendredi 25 mai 2018 - 07:39:02


Fichiers produits par l'(les) auteur(s)




Andréas Herzig, Emiliano Lorini, Laurent Perrussel, Zhanhao Xiao. BDI logics for BDI architectures: old problems, new perspectives. Künstliche Intelligenz, 2017, vol. 31 (n° 1), pp. 73-83. 〈10.1007/s13218-016-0457-5〉. 〈hal-01692711〉



Consultations de la notice


Téléchargements de fichiers