Persuasion with limited communication resources

Abstract : We consider a Bayesian persuasion problem where the persuader communicates with the decision maker through an imperfect communication channel. The channel has a fixed and limited number of messages and is subject to exogenous noise. Imperfect communication entails a loss of payoff for the persuader. We show that if the persuasion problem consists of a large number of independent copies of the same base problem, then the persuader achieves a better payoff by linking the problems together. We measure the payoff gain in terms of the capacity of the communication channel.
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Soumis le : lundi 13 novembre 2017 - 11:40:29
Dernière modification le : mercredi 15 novembre 2017 - 01:12:16

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PersuasionCapacity.pdf
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  • HAL Id : hal-01633656, version 1

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Mael Le Treust, Tristan Tomala. Persuasion with limited communication resources. 2017. 〈hal-01633656〉

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