Utility misperception in a vertically differentiated duopoly

Abstract : When choosing between two goods, consumers anticipate the utility they expect to derive from each product. However, such anticipations are subject to several sources of error, such as quality or price misperception and overoptimism about one’s capacity to use a product. The present paper studies the effect of inaccurate utility anticipations on consumer choice and ultimately on the market outcome in a vertically differentiated duopoly. I come to the conclusion that utility misperception can lead consumers to make suboptimal decisions ex post, although the choice seemed rational at the time of purchase. I show that in a vertically differentiated duopoly, firms are subject to two opposite incentives regarding consumer education. Moreover, the firms’ incentives to educate consumers are not necessarily aligned with the socially efficient outcome. Therefore, this paper also explores several policies aimed at mitigating the negative consequences of consumer misperception.
Type de document :
Article dans une revue
Review of Law and Economics, De Gruyter, 2017
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Contributeur : Economix Parisnanterre <>
Soumis le : jeudi 5 octobre 2017 - 10:20:17
Dernière modification le : mercredi 4 juillet 2018 - 23:14:06


  • HAL Id : hal-01610889, version 1



Sophie Bienenstock. Utility misperception in a vertically differentiated duopoly. Review of Law and Economics, De Gruyter, 2017. 〈hal-01610889〉



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