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RECRUITING CREWS IN THE FATIMID NAVY (909-1171)

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ABSTRACT

Recruiting crews for the fleet was always problematic for medieval rulers. The Isma'i'le Fatimids were no exception. In spite of every kind of adversity, from civil war to Sunni resistance and the crusades, they succeeded in building one of the most powerful navies of their time (the tenth-twelfth centuries). The recruitment system, based mostly on financial attraction of crews and the organization of navies, partly explains both the success and the final failure of the Fatimids.

Keywords

Crew, Egypt, Fatimids, Fleet, Navy, North Africa, Syria, Slavs

The actions of fleets navigating under the white pavilion of the Fatimids made a significant impact on Mediterranean maritime history. However, the history of the men serving on the bridge of different ships remains largely unwritten.¹ The study of recruitment of crews and of their composition will open up a piece of this history.²

The Fatimid dynasty ruled over what were essentially two territories. From Ifriqiya first of all between 909 and 969, in keeping with their religious doctrines, the aim of the dynasty was to take control of Egypt in order to march on Bagdad and drive out the Abbassids.³ From 969 on, the Fatimids conquered **(p.5)** Egypt as well as part of the provinces of Palestine and Syria and temporarily imposed their domination over the holy cities of the

¹ Ibn Khaldūn tells us that under the Fatimids and the Umayyads of al-Andalus, the Mediterranean Sea was considered a Muslim lake. Ibn Khaldūn, *Discours sur l'histoire universelle, al-Muqaddima*, ed. and French trans. V. Monteil (Arles: Sinbad, Actes Sud, 1997), 397.

² We shall consider the term crew in a general sense: all the men who were employed on a Fatimid ship, sailors, rowers, captains, soldiers... .

³ Farhat Daftary, *The Ismā'īlīs; Their History and Doctrines* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 144-255.

Hajj. In the face of difficulties, the Fatimids abandoned their imperialist designs on Bagdad.⁴ They concentrated more modestly on the maintenance of their domination in Egypt and on the coastal band of Syria and Palestine. They had to face a civil war (1062-1073) and then the arrival of the crusaders (1099) who deprived them of their eastern shores. In spite of all, the Fatimids always had at their disposition an important and effective fleet for fighting off enemy navies, whether they were Muslim, Byzantine, or European.⁵ According to a particular period, their naval strategy and the organization of the fleet evolved. Essentially offensive from 909 until the conquest of the Syro-Palestinian littoral in the 990s, the fleet then assumed a more passive role. The Fatimids' aggressive use of the fleet would only reappear after the fall of most of the Fatimid coastal cities into the hands of the crusaders between 1100 and 1110.⁶

During its existence the dynasty only rarely relied on the local Sunnite populations, though they were in the majority in both Ifriqiya and Egypt. Instead, the Fatimids sought faithful participants among the minority Christian and Jewish populations or among the multiple slaves and freedmen under Fatimid rule. This practice, as well as the religious

⁴ Al-Mu'ayyad fi-l-Dīn al-Shirāzī, *Ṣīrat al-Mu'ayyad fī-l-Dīn dā'īa l-du'āt*, ed. Muhammad Kamil Husayn (Cairo: Dar al-Katib al-Misri, 1949), 178-84; Verona Klemm, *Memoirs of a Mission, The Ismaili Scholar, Statesman and Poet al-Mu'ayyad fī'l-Dīn al-Shirāzī* (London: The Institute of Ismaili Studies, Tauris Publishers, 2003), 85-6.

⁵ For a chronological summary of Fatimid naval activities see Yaacov Lev, "The Fatimid Navy, Byzantium, and the Mediterranean Sea, 996-1036," *Byzantion*, 54 (1984), 220-52; William J. Hamblin, "The Fatimid Navy during the Early Crusades: 1099-1124," *The American Neptune*, 46 (1986), 77-83; David Bramoullé, "Activités navales et infrastructures maritimes; les éléments du pouvoir fatimide en Méditerranée orientale (969-1171)," in *Ports et navigation en Méditerranée au Moyen Âge*, Actes du colloque de Lattes, Nov. 2004 (forthcoming).

⁶ Jaffa is lost in 1099; Haifa in 1100; Arsuf and Caesarea in 1101; Acre in 1104; Tripoli in 1109; Sidon and Beirut in 1110. Tyre fell in 1124 and Ascalon resisted until 1153.

differences and Fatimid fiscal pressure, occasioned some frustrations that could take the form of popular revolts that were more or less violent and difficult to bring under control.⁷

(p. 6) In this context of relative hostility the problem of recruitment of the soldiers necessary for the realization of Fatimid political objectives was acute. This issue has been the subject of several studies.⁸ The Fatimids appealed widely to mercenaries or foreign slaves to fill their staffing needs. If questions regarding the Fatimid navy and army were inevitably intertwined, the recruitment of sailors and their organization were undoubtedly governed by specific rules. The survival of troops transported on board ship depended on the quality of the navy and thus on the success of the Fatimid endeavors. It would thus be interesting to understand how the Fatimids succeeded in putting together a naval organization capable of finding men to crew the ships but also to know who these men were to whom part of the fate of the dynasty was confided.

Sailors have only marginally caught the attention of Arab authors. The texts of geographers and chroniclers furnish, for the one group, information of a very general sort about the coastal populations, and, for the other, information relative to the leaders of the naval expeditions. On the other hand, certain documents draw on Fatimid administrative archives. The quality of information increases perceptibly in this case. A third category of

⁷ Heinz Halm, *The Empire of the Mahdi, The Rise of the Fatimids*, trans. by Michael Bonner (Leiden, New-York: E.J. Brill, 1996), 239-47; Thierry Bianquis, "La prise de pouvoir par les Fatimides en Egypte (357-363/968-974)," *Annales Islamologiques*, 11 (1972), 49-108 (68-70); Elyahu Ashtor, "Républiques urbaines dans le Proche-Orient à l'époque des Croisades," *Cahiers de Civilisation Médiévale*, 18/2 (1975), 117-28 ; Moshe Gil, "The Sixty Years War (969-1029 C.E.)," *Shalem*, 3 (1981), 1-55 (in Hebrew); *A History of Palestine*, 634-1099 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 358, 366-70, 418-20.

⁸ Beshir J. Beshir, "The Fatimid Military Organisation," *Der Islam*, 55 (1978), 37-53; Yaacov Lev, "The Fatimid Army," *Asian and African Studies*, 14 n°2 (1980), 165-92; "Army, Regime and Society in Fatimid Egypt (358-487/968-1094)," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 19 (1987), 337-65; "Regime, Army and Society in Medieval Egypt, 9th-12th Centuries," *War and Society in the Eastern Mediterranean, 7th-15th Centuries*, ed. Y. Lev (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 115-52; William J. Hamblin, *The Fatimid Army during the Early Crusades* (Ph.D. thesis, University of Michigan, 1985); Seta B. Dadoyan, *The Fatimid Armenians* (Leiden, New-York: E.J. Brill, 1997).

documents only offers information for the Maghrebi period of the dynasty (909-969). In question are the collections of Sunni saints' lives that, on occasion, related information that concerned sailors. The nature of these sources requires that they be used with great care. Finally, the letters of the Geniza of Cairo are of great help in regard to coastal life and naval experience in the Fatimid period.

The pioneering works of Aly M. Fahmy, relative to the elaboration of a Muslim navy in the first centuries of Islam, have notably revealed that the Arab conquerors relied heavily on local Egyptian populations to construct and arm the fleets.⁹ Nonetheless, the Fatimid navy received scanty treatment. **(p. 7)** The dispersal of the sources and their thanklessness for the topic of this article explain amply why modern research concerning the Fatimid navy treats only the naval operations with almost no focus on ships' crews.¹⁰ The question of the origin of the mariners was never really addressed in spite of many works on the Muslims navies and the Fatimid navy in particular. Nonetheless, following the example of the research of Christophe Picard on Muslim navigation in the Atlantic Ocean, a deeper analysis of the texts and especially of the vocabulary employed allows the establishment of hypotheses that are capable of shedding new light on the problem of recruitment of sailors and of their role.¹¹ If this study is complicated by the divergence of terms that could exist in a geographic area or a chronological era, the problem can be overcome because the historians of the late Middle

⁹ Aly M. Fahmy, *Muslim Naval Organisation in the Eastern Mediterranean*, (Cairo: National Publication and Printing House, Egypt, 1948), and *Muslim Sea Power in the Eastern Mediterranean*, (Cairo: National Publication and Printing house, Egypt, 1980).

¹⁰ Aḥmad M. Al-ʿAbbadī, Al-Sayyid ʿAbd al-Azīz Sālam, *Tārīkh al-Baḥriyya al-Islāmiyya fī Miṣr wa-l-Shām*, (Beirut, 1972), 63; Ḥassan I. Ḥassan, *Tārīkh al-Dawla al-Fāṭimiyya*, 3rd ed. (Cairo: 1964), 100-8, 250-7; Abbas Hamdani, "Some Considerations of the Fatimids as a Mediterranean Power," *Congress Studi Arabi e Islamici* (Ravello: ,1966), 385-6; Yaacov Lev, "The Fatimid Navy," 220-52; William J. Hamblin, "The Fatimid Navy," 77-83; Ayman F. Sayyid, *Al-Dawla al-Fāṭimiyya fī miṣr, tafsīr jadīd* (Cairo: Dār al-miṣriyya al-lubnāniyya, 1996), 725-39.

¹¹ Christophe Picard, *L'océan Atlantique musulman. De la conquête arabe à l'époque almohade*, (Paris, Maisonneuve et Larose, 1997), 323-36; *La mer et les musulmans d'Occident au Moyen Age*, (Paris, Presse Universitaire de France, 1997), 121-36.

Ages drew their information, word for word, from certain of their counterparts whose works have today disappeared.

Thus, in keeping with the spirit of changes in strategy in the utilization of the fleet and with the multiple problems encountered by the Fatimids until their disappearance in 1171, the sources permit a study of recruitment of sailors and of their ethnic origins and their organization. Moreover, in certain rare instances, the composition of the troops destined for one or another naval operation was the object of a particular mention and allows us to establish a comparison with what we know of the composition of Fatimid troops in general. Finally, when the texts evoke sailors, in particular, they always choose the powerful representatives, in this case the leaders of the fleet. It is thus possible to understand the structure and the ethnic origin of command in the Fatimid navy. **(p. 8)**

1- Recruitment of Sailors

For all the dynasties, the recruitment of experienced sailors has always been a problem. Maritime occupations seem paradoxically to have attracted little interest in the population, even that along the coasts. The risk of perishing far from one's people and without tombs was too great. At the time of the installation of the Fatimid dynasty in Ifriqiya in 909, the region had already the experience of two centuries of Muslim naval operations.¹² These had culminated under the Aghlabid emirs. During this period, a maritime society had the time to develop in Ifriqiya with special knowledge and a naval tradition.

Interest in the creation of an effective navy appeared rapidly among the new masters of Ifriqiya and Sicily. The Fatimids, like the Aghlabids before them, approached the populations that they supposed possessed maritime aptitude, talents that the latter had demonstrated since the eighth century through actions of piracy carried out in the region of

¹² Ifriqiya is an area that corresponds approximately to modern Tunisia.

Algiers, or more to the west, that of Nakur.¹³ The coastal populations of Ifriqiya, which was the zone under the best control of the central power based at Mahdiya or at Kairouan, were the most suited to Fatimid needs. The sources indicate that the population of Ifriqiya was composed of Arabs who had arrived during the conquest and of Berbers. Nonetheless, the text also mention the presence of Christians related to the Byzantines (*Rūm*), the last witnesses of the Byzantine presence in North Africa, at Kairouan, Sousse, Barqa, and of other Christians labeled '*ajam*'.¹⁴ The latter term designated non-Arab populations, and it could refer to the descendants of the thousands of Coptic families deported from Egypt in 698 to work at the new arsenal of Tunis.¹⁵ The *Rūm* were numerous in the Fatimid army in Ifriqiya and in Egypt.¹⁶ (p. 9) The Christian populations were found especially along the coasts of Ifriqiya. The north of the region, the peninsula of Cap Bon, notably, appears to have constituted an important source of recruitment of sailors of the Fatimid navy. In his collection of the lives of pious Sunnites, Al-Mālikī indicated in an indirect way that the regions of Saffura or even of Tunis were centers of recruitment from the time of the first caliph al-Mahdī (909-934).¹⁷ The Andalousian geographer al-Bakrī (d.1094) described the numerous anchorages and ports that were to be found along this coast. He evoked notably the fishing

¹³ Georges Marçais, "Les villes de la côte algérienne et la piraterie au Moyen Age," *Annales de l'Institut d'Etudes Orientales d'Alger*, 13 (1955), 118-42. Mohammed Talbi, *L'émirat aghlabide 184-296/800-909* (Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose, 1966), 391-2, 431-2.

¹⁴ Ya'qubī, *Les pays*, French trans. G. Wiet (Cairo:, 1937), 213-15.

¹⁵ Paul Sebag, "Les expéditions maritimes arabes du VIII^e siècle," *Les Cahiers de Tunisie*, 8 (1960), 73-82. Muhammad Talbi, *L'émirat aghlabide 184-296/800-909*, 2 vols. (Paris: Librairie d'Amérique et d'Orient A. Maisonneuve, 1966), 2, 386-537; "Le christianisme maghrébin de la conquête musulmane à sa disparition : une tentative d'explication," in *Conversion and Continuity : Indigenous Christian Communities in Islamic Lands, Eighth to Eighteenth Centuries*, ed. Michael Gervers and Ramzi Jibran Bikhazi, *Papers in Medieval Studies*, 9 (1990) 313-51.

¹⁶ Idris 'Imād al-Dīn, '*Uyūn al-Akhbār*', ed. M. Ghalib, (Beirut: Dar Al-Andalus, 1986), 5, 114; Jere L. Bacharach, "African Military Slaves in the Medieval Middle East: the Cases of Iraq (869-955) and Egypt (868-1171)," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 13 (1981), 471-95 (477-78).

¹⁷ Al-Mālikī, *Kitāb Riyāḍ al-Nufūs*, ed. B. Al-Bakkush, 3 vols. (Beirut: Dar al-Gharb al-Islami, 1981-1983), 2, 381.

along these coastal sites as well as the piracy, particularly in the vicinity of the port of Bône.¹⁸ His account recorded the existence of populations with knowledge of the sea that might have thus been recruited to serve in the official fleets.¹⁹ However, the Berber revolt against the Fatimids, led by Abū Yazīd between 944 and 946, had serious consequences for the region. The populations of Cap Bon were often targets, and the sources echoed with numerous massacres that took place there.²⁰ These difficulties contributed certainly to the departure of a portion of the inhabitants from this zone because the geographer Ibn Ḥawqal, spending time in the area around 950, described it as basically depopulated. He confirmed nevertheless the reputation for courage and endurance « on the land as on the sea » of the men of the maritime region of Saffura, including the cities of Anbaluna, Bizerte, and Mitija.²¹ **(p. 10)** The presence of recruiting sergeants in the zone from the 950s is certainly the sign of the return of population.²² Nonetheless, it was as much the demographic consequences of the revolt of Abū Yazīd as the multiple campaigns of recruitment that forced the recruiters to seek men elsewhere. In 976, ‘Abd Allah b. Muḥammad al-Kātib, governor of Ifriqiya for the Fatimids installed in Egypt since 969, visited Mahdiya. He ordered the seizure of mariners (*bahrīyīn*)

¹⁸ Al-Bakrī *Description de l’Afrique septentrionale*, ed. and trans. Mac Guckin De Slane (Algiers: 1911-1913 ; Reprint, Paris: A. Maisonneuve, 1965), text, 57-9; trans., 165-9.

¹⁹ It seems that the chapters concerning North Africa in al-Bakrī’s description were copied from Muḥammad Ibn Yūsuf al-Warrāq who was dead ca. 974.

²⁰ Idris ‘Imād al-Dīn, ‘*Uyūn al-Akḥbār*, 5 :197-258; Ibn Ḥammād, *Histoire des Rois ‘Obaidites (Les Caliphes Fatmides)*, ed. and trans, M. Vonderheyden (Algiers and Paris :1927), 20-39; Farhat Dachraoui, *Le Califat Fatimide au Maghreb, 296-362/909-973*, (Société Tunisienne de Diffusion : Tunis, 1970), 165-82; Heinz Halm, *The Empire of the Mahdi*, 298-314.

²¹ Ibn Ḥawqal, *Kitāb Ṣurat al-ard*, ed. G.H. Kramers, *Descriptio Ditionis Moslemicae* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1938-1939), French translation: G.H. Kramers and G. Wiet, *Configuration de la terre*, 2 vols. (Paris-Beirut: A. Maisonneuve, 1964), text, 75; trans.,1, 70.

²² *Ṣirat Ustādh Jawdhar*, ed. Muḥammad K. Ḥusayn and Muḥammad ‘Abd al-Hadi Sha‘ira (Cairo:,1954); French trans. M. Canard, *Vie de l’Ustadh Jaudhar* (Algiers: Publications de l’Institut d’Etudes Orientales de la Faculté des Lettres d’Alger, 1958), text, 122; trans., 186.

who were in the vicinity as well as of all those who were at Kairouan and elsewhere.²³ The sailors were to equip a fleet charged with aiding the Fatimids who were at that time in difficulty in the East.²⁴ The author made clear that the men, terrified, were hiding in their homes for fear of being grabbed for the fleet. The memory of mariners who departed in 969 with the Fatimid fleet, then of those who left in 973 and never returned because they disappeared at sea, inspired little seafaring vocation among the men of Ifriqiya. The presence of mariners at Mahdiya is logical enough, but how could one conceive of a similar group at Kairouan, more than fifty kilometers from the coast?

The study of the vocabulary utilised in the course of the account invites several hypotheses. Lacking winds, the fleet was immobilized, and all those who were on board approached the land, pillaged what they found, and fled.²⁵ In his account, Ibn ‘Idhārī utilized the terms *nawāṭīya* and *baḥrīya* side by side. These words, traditionally considered as synonyms and supposedly utilized one for the other with the meaning of mariners or sailors, were (p. 11) employed here to designate all the members of crews taking flight.²⁶ It seems evident that the two words designated different realities and could not be considered as having the same worth. The study of the context and the comparison with other known authors living between approximately 950 - 1050 makes it possible to refine the meaning of these two

²³ Ibn ‘Idhārī (d. after 1313), *Kitāb al-Bayān al-Mughrib fī Akhbār mulūk al-Andalus wa-l-Maghrib*, ed. G.S. Colin and E. Levi-Provençal, 2 vols (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1948-1951); French trans. E. Fagnan, *Histoire de l’Afrique et l’Espagne intitulée al-Bayano-l-Mogrib*, 2 vols (Algiers : 1901-1904), text, 1, 229-30 ; trans., 1, 334.

²⁴ Ibn al-Dawādārī, *Kanz al-Durar wa-Jāmi‘ al-Ghurar*, ed. D. al-Dīn al-Munajjid (Cairo: , 1961), 6,143. Yaḥyā Ibn Sa‘īd, *Histoire de Yahya d’Antioche*, ed. and trans., I. Kratchkhosky et A.A. Vassiliev, *Patrologie Orientale*, 23/3 (1932), 351-2; *Tārīkh al-Qarāmita*, ed. S. Zakkar, (Beirut: 1971), 59.

²⁵ Ibn ‘Idhārī made abundant use of the Ifriqiyān historian Ibn al-Raḥīq al-Qayrawānī (d. after 1027), considered by Ibn Khaldūn as the best specialist on the history of Ifriqiya. See Mohammed Talbi, “Ibn al- Raḥīq,” *Encyclopedia of Islam*, (Leiden: E.J. Brill, new edition), 3, 902b.

²⁶ Ibn ‘Idhārī, *Bayān*, text, 1, 229-30; trans., 1, 334. “*haraba jamī‘u man fihā min al-nawāṭīya wa al-baḥrīya*.”

terms. Ibn ‘Idhārī, as well as Jawdhar, d’Abū al-Qāsim al-Labīdī (d.1048), or Abū Bakr Al-Mālikī (d. second half of the eleventh century), employed the term *baḥrīya*, associated with the verb or the adverb formed from the root Ḥ-SH-D, to mean regroup or recruit, generally through force.²⁷ Conversely, the term *nawātīya* only appeared rarely in regard to that of *baḥrīya*, but it was never used in the context of the press. It is thus possible to argue that in the Fatimid navy of the tenth century, and probably later, men qualified as *nawātīya* constituted the body or kernel of the professional mariners qualified and employed fulltime in the official navy.²⁸ They were undoubtedly responsible for the most technical maneuvers, in regard to the sails or the oars, those that necessitated the best training. They might also sustain the other men on board. Ibn al-Ṭuwayr (1130-1220), member of the Fatimid and then the Ayyubid administrations, seems to confirm the existence of this system during the Egyptian phase of the dynasty. Under his pen, the *nawātīya* become oarsmen.²⁹ But the text permits the interpretation that they served on those ships that required a certain skill that could not be acquired except through regular exercises and repeated maneuvers that, in turn, could not be performed except by men who had (p. 12) time and specific embarkations, that were, in a word, professionals. Al-Maqrīzī (d.1449), specialist of the history of the Fatimids, twice

²⁷ Ḥirāt Jawdhar, text, 122, trans., 186; Al-Mālikī, *Kitāb Riyāḥ al-Nufūs*, 2, 381; Al-Labīdī, *Manaqib d’Abu Ishaq al-Jabanyānī* ed. and French trans. Hadi R. Idris (Paris: Presse Universitaire de France, 1959), text, 51; trans. , 240; Ibn ‘Idhārī , *Bayān*, text, 1, 229-30; trans., 1, 334.

²⁸ Ibn Ḥayyān, historian from tenth-century Muslim Spain, used the two words together in the same sentence about the Umayyad fleet under ‘Abd al-Raḥmān III: “*al-baḥrīyūn wa al-nawātīya*”. See Ibn Ḥayyān, *Kitāb al-muqtabis fī tārikh rijal al-Andalus*, ed. Pedro Chalmeta (Madrid:, 1979), 87.

²⁹ Ibn al-Tuwayr, *Nuzhat al-Muqlatayn fī akhbār ad-dawlatayn*, ed. Ayman F. Sayyid, Bibliotheca Islamica n° 39 (Beirut: Steiner, 1992), 96; Maqrīzī , *Itti’āz al-Hunafā’ bi-Akḥbār al-A’imma al-Faḥīmīyyīn al-Khulafā’*, vol. 1, ed. J. al-Dīn al-Shayyāl, (Cairo, 1967), vols. 2 and 3, ed. M.H.M. Ahmad, (Cairo, 1971-1973), 2,109.

evoked the *nawāṭīya*. He associated them each time with naphtha launchers (*mashā'ilīya*) who we know served in Egypt on military galleys, notably, the *'ushāriyāt*. These ships, of modest size and very maneuverable, made up the body of the official Fatimid fleet in Egypt.³⁰ These small craft and their crews participated in parades organized each year on the Nile.³¹ Such naval jousts, performed in front of a crowd, the dignitaries of the regime and the caliph, reproduced battles on the high seas and were not possible without crews that were seasoned and trained for such action. They could not permit improvisation or failure. The *baḥrīya*, as for them, even if they were recruited out of priority in coastal regions for reasons of efficacy, were used especially for their muscular force. Significantly, they were hired only in a temporary fashion, for the duration of the expedition, and did not serve except on ships where no particular skills were required. They were then returned to civilian life, providing they had not perished on the seas. This difference in specialization, the role on board, and the time of engagement explain thus that in 976 some mariners (*baḥrīya*) were recruited in all localities and notable at Kairouan. It is necessary to mention that the term *baḥrī* could also be used as a generic term designating mariners in a general sense, without the concern for specialization, thereby rendering more difficult an understanding of the texts.

In spite of their lacunae, the texts are in accord regarding the system of recruitment in Ifriqiya and in Egypt: conscription by force that is called the press. In Ifriqiya, from the time of the caliph al-Mahdī (910-934), campaigns of recruitment were organized. The sources, notably the anti-Shiite authors, remarked on the presence of sergeant recruiters in the region of Tunis. These same sources insist on the violent character of the campaigns of recruitment

³⁰ These boats were also used on the Nile as pleasure boats for the caliph, and they were propelled by twenty oars. See Maqrīzī, *Itti'āz*, 2: 294; Ibn Mammāṭī, *Kitāb al-Qawānīn al-Dawāwīn*, ed. A.S. Atiya (Cairo: , 1943), 340; Aly M. Fahmy, *Muslim Naval Organisation*, 150-1.

³¹ Ibn al-Tuwayr, *Nuzhat al-Muqlatayn*, 96.

in the zone of Cap Bon under the caliphs al-Manṣūr (946-953) and al-Mu‘izz (953-975). This brutality is confirmed in a letter from the Fatimid chamberlain Jawdhar to his master al-Mu‘izz. In the letter Jawdhar criticized the behavior of a sergeant recruiter who was terrorizing the populations of Cap Bon. He obtained the intervention of the caliph in favor of the local populations. Once recruited, the men were then led, sometimes in chains, to Mahdiya, the (p. 13) principal naval base of Fatimid Ifriqiya where they were listed on a role that served notably to establish their salary.³² In Egypt, the press was, it seems, always utilized for the Fatimid army. Al-Maqrīzī describes, in effect, a relatively comparable system. The episode is nevertheless reported in a work relative to Egypt in general and without mention of date. This omission of chronology permits a doubt to linger as to the existence of such a system under the Fatimids. It may be a reference to the period post 1181. In his text, the author indicated that the local Egyptian populations were not recruited for the fleet because their lack of skills was well known. Thus, he emphasized, the Maghribi (*maghāriba*) represented the privileged targets of the recruiters because they were considered good sailors. These men, whose name seems to indicate that they were natives of the Maghreb, could escape this forced service if they paid the legal alms (*zakat*). Those who did not pay, thus the poorest, were thrown into prison until the season of maritime navigation.³³ This episode, certainly authentic, could, in fact, refer to the Ayyoubid period (after 1171), the époque at which the Almohad navy was particularly effective in the western Mediterranean while the Egyptian navy experienced a clear decline.³⁴ Moreover, the sources that evoke the Fatimids

³² Al-Mālik ī, *Riyaṣ al-Nufūs*, 2: 381; Al-Labīdī, *Manaqib*, text, 51; trans., 240; ʿIṣrāt Jawdhar, text, 122; trans., 186.

³³ Al-Maqrīzī, *Khīṭaṭ*, 2: 231, 312-13. A similar system is described in the eighth-century Egypt. Those who did not want to go to the navy were supposed to provide financial compensation. On this aspect see Aly M. Fahmy, *Muslim Naval Organisation*, 101.

³⁴ A. Ehrenkreutz, "The Place of Saladin in the Naval History of the Mediterranean in the Middle Ages," *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 75 (1955), 100-16; Christophe Picard, *La mer et les musulmans*, 75-96.

in Egypt traditionally utilized the term *maghāriba* to designate the Berber troops of the Maghreb who had participated in the conquest of Egypt and then Syria from 969 on. Those in question were the Berbers Kutāma who were not known for their special aptitude in the matter of navigation. Thus it is difficult to determine with precision the origin of these Maghribi, but it does not seem possible to consider them exclusively the descendants of the Berbers Kutāma. Perhaps they were rather the unfortunate compatriots of the victorious Almohad mariners.

Whatever the reality, the references to the press, in the end relatively infrequent, jibe poorly with the increasing efficacy of the Fatimid fleet, (p. 14) particularly from the reign of d'al-Manṣūr and especially that of his son. Sicily was dominated by the new governor al-Ḥasan b. 'Alī al-Kalbī.³⁵ It seems that from 954, a permanent fleet was based at Palermo, the principal Fatimid naval base outside Ifriqiya, because al-Mu'izz ordered the governor of Sicily to keep the navy on permanent alert.³⁶ The texts even mention naval frogmen who permitted a victory over the Byzantines.³⁷ How can one imagine that men recruited by force, separated from their families, could have had the necessary motivation to secure so many decisive battles for the fleet after 950? In Egypt the problems were similar. The answer lies perhaps in the establishment of a professional navy with more numerous and better trained personnel. During his voyage to Palermo about 970, Ibn Ḥawqal noted that the port was located in the quarter of the Slavs (*ḥarat al-ṣaqāliba*).³⁸ Several studies have shown that these Slavs, slaves or freedmen, played a considerable role at the heart of the Fatimid

³⁵ Farhat Dachraoui, *Le califat fatimide*, 214-17, 241-4.

³⁶ Farhat Dachraoui, *Le califat fatimide*, 224.

³⁷ Abū al-Fida, *Kitāb al-Mukhtasar fī Akhbār al-Bashar*, ed. M. Amari in *Biblioteca Arabo Sicula* (Lipsia: ,1857), 408. Nuwayrī, *Nihāyat al-arab*, ed. M. Amari in *Biblioteca Arabo Sicula* (Lipsia: , 1857), 438-41.

³⁸ Ibn Ḥawqal, *Ḥurāt al-arab*, text, 119; trans., 1: 118.

dynasty.³⁹ All the key posts, from general to chamberlain, were confided at one moment or another to a Slav. Certain Slavs, operating on behalf of the dynasty, had earlier served the Aghlabid emirs, driven out by the Fatimids in 909. The others were purchased from the Venetians who had procured them on the Dalmatian coast, or they were seized directly by the Muslims themselves.⁴⁰ Finally, some Slavs were captured on board Byzantine ships where they served in large numbers. Their geographic origins and their role on board enemy ships, as well as their status as slaves or freedmen, suggests that they could have constituted a corps of professional sailors since the time of caliph al-Manṣūr.

In Egypt, the origin of mariners is clouded, and the only relatively precise indications are valid for the eleventh century alone. From their installation in Egypt and along the Syro-Palestinian coasts, the Fatimids controlled an extended littoral and active port cities, all the more zones that represented havens of (p. 15) potential recruitment for a war fleet. Nonetheless, no text mentions campaigns of recruitment on the Syro-Palestinian coasts. If a certain ‘Allaqa the sailor (*al-baḥrī*) caused a revolt in the city of Tyre about 994, there is no evidence that he was a man serving in the fleet.⁴¹ In Egypt things are no clearer. Between 993 and 998, the Fatimid fleets were active against the Byzantines and against the maritime cities of Syria that were at the time in open rebellion. Four times, however, the fleets were defeated or foundered. This poor luck explains perhaps that the texts mention the presence of groups of slaves (*jamā‘at min al-‘abīd*) on the ships during the expedition of 998. The period

³⁹ Ivan Hrbek, “Die Slawen im Dienste fatimiden,” *Archiv Orientalni*, 21 (1953): 543-81. A Slavonic quarter was built in Cairo too. See Ayman F. Sayyid, *La capitale de l’Égypte jusqu’à l’époque fatimide* (Beyrouth: Steiner, 1998), 77-9.

⁴⁰ Al-Nu‘mān, *Kitāb Iftitāḥ al-Da‘wa*, ed. F. Dachraoui (Tunis: PUBLISHER, 1975), 207, 257; *Ṣīrat Jawdhar*, text, 41-2; trans., 57 note 42; Ibn ‘Idhārī, *Bayān*, 1, 123, 127.

⁴¹ Yahya Ibn Sa‘īd, *Histoire de Yahya d’Antioche*, ed. I. Kratchkovsky, French trans. F. Michaux, G. Troupeaux, *Patrologie Orientale* 47, fasc. 4, (Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols, 1997), 181-2; Ibn al-Qalānisī, *Dhayl Tārīkh Dimashq*, ed. H.F. Amedroz (Leiden: PUBLISHER, 1908), 50-1.

corresponds as well with military reforms that resulted in an important influx of African slaves, Turks, and Daylamites.⁴² The term ‘*abīd*’ is very ambiguous, but in Egypt it was traditionally used to designate black slaves who were natives of the Sudan, notably soldiers of the infantry. One can imagine that in a case of emergency the Fatimids did not have the time to recruit crews and used these men both as oarsmen and as soldiers.⁴³

In spite of these imprecisions, the sources point nonetheless to a professional navy. The allusions of al-Maqrīzī to the *mashā’ilīya* and the *nawā’īya*, the existence of naval jousts, seem to confirm such a force. Moreover, Ibn al-Tuwayr indicates that there existed an office (*dīwān*) of *Jihād* still called the office of naval construction (*dīwān al-‘amā’ir*). This office counted five thousand registered recruits (*mudawwana*).⁴⁴ This relatively vague term regrouped undoubtedly all those who worked for the office of naval construction: from artisans to captains and including the mariners and perhaps the soldiers assigned expressly to the navy. The precise origins of these *mudawwana* are not clear. The Copts, Christians native to Egypt, were long familiar with water transport and with naval construction.⁴⁵ They thus could be (p. 16) recruited by the Fatimids to serve in the arsenals and in the navy as had been the case in previous centuries.⁴⁶ The most capable sailors, the captains, have left no

⁴² Jere L. Bacharach, “African Military Slaves in the Medieval Middle East: the Case of Iraq (869-955) and Egypt (848-1171),” 471-95.

⁴³ Yahya Ibn Sa‘īd, *Histoire*, 23/3 (1932), 447-9, 454; Ibn al-Qalānīsī, *Dhayl Tārīkh Dimashq*, 50-1.

⁴⁴ Ibn al-Tuwayr, *Nuzhat al-Muqlatayn*, 94-5; Maqrīzī, *Kitāb al-Mawā’iz wa al-I’tibār fī dhikr al-khiṭa’ wa al-āthār*, ed. Ayman F. Sayyid, 5 vols. (London: Al Furqan Islamic Heritage Foundation, 2002-2004), 3, 611-13; Al-Qalqashandī, *Subḥ al-A‘shā fī ṣinā‘at al-inshā’*, ed. Muḥammad H. Shams al-Din, 15 vols. (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiya, 1987), 3, 596-7.

⁴⁵ J.L. Fournet, J. Gascou, “Moines pachômiens et batellerie,” *Alexandrie médiévale 2, Etudes Alexandrines*, 8 (2002) (Cairo: Institut Français d’Archéologie Orientale, 2002), 23-45.

⁴⁶ Aly M. Fahmy, *Muslim Naval Organisation*, 98-103.

greater trace in the sources. The texts evoke them often with the plural, *rū'asā* (sing. *rā'is*).⁴⁷ During the Fatimid expedition of 919-920 that counted eighty ships, one hundred seventeen captains (*rū'asā*) were captured.⁴⁸ These figures suggest that there were two captains per ship, and the the others were drown, unless the term designated both the captain and his adjutants on board.

Moreover, the system of the press does not fit well with the hyperactivity and especially with the resistance of the Fatimid fleet after 1099. In fact, between 969 and 1099, the sources mentions less than twenty Fatimid naval expeditions. When authors cited the number of units engaged, they only rarely noted more than twenty-five ships, thus never more than three thousand five hundred oarsmen, if one assumes that the vessels were all *shawānī*. Between 1099 and 1171, twenty-eight Fatimid naval expeditions appeared in the Christian and Muslim documentation. The fleets counted regularly from forty to more than fifty ships and sometimes as many as seventy or eighty small craft.⁴⁹ All these facts point to the twelfth century as a period of intense naval activity for the Fatimid dynasty. The growing size of the fleets sent by the Fatimids, their relative successes against Christian ships at a period when the dynasty witnessed its coastal possessions passing to the enemy, that is the zones where mariners could be found, these matters suggest that the system in place was quite effective and that it was less dependent on force than the sources thought.

The Egyptian naval force included among other ships as many as fifty war small galleys called *'usharīyāt* that had each of them a captain and accredited sailors (*li-kul min-hā rā'is wa nawātī*), as well as other ships destined for transport. The *'usharīyāt* required twenty

⁴⁷ Al- Kindī, *Wulāt Miṣr*, ed. . Naṣṣār (Beirut: Dar Sader, 1959), 294; Maqrīzī, *Itti'āz*, 3, 102.

⁴⁸ Al- Kindī, *Wulāt*, 294.

⁴⁹ David Bramoullé, "Activités navales et infrastructures maritimes.»

oarsmen per ship, thus a total of one thousand men for the fifty ships mentioned.⁵⁰ One hundred forty rowers embarked on board a *shīnī* (pl. *shawānī*) that was the type of galley with decks that was most often (p. 17) used by the Fatimids.⁵¹ These figures do not mention the number of sailors who maneuvered the sails or the tiller, but the total number of men necessary for the correct operation of one of these ships was undoubtedly higher. In 1125, Christian historians mentioned a Fatimid fleet composed of twenty-two triremes, undoubtedly the *shawānī*, and of fifty-three other vessels.⁵² Thus, this one expedition mobilized more than three thousand oarsmen for the *shawānī* alone. The five thousand men officially enrolled on the register of the *dīwān al-‘amā’ir* could not have sufficed to equip the whole fleet, especially if the term of *mudawwana* served to designate, at the same time, artisans, oarsmen, or sailors, let alone soldiers. Thus, the fact that a fleet and its crews were lost at sea in the 1120s caused the Egyptian navy a blow that ruined its future.⁵³ Nonetheless, the fleets remained active after this disaster.

Taking into account the strategies of naval combat, it is possible to understand better the Fatimid maritime resistance. In Egypt, the fleets served essentially as troop transports. The principal means of fighting on the high seas was to use small projectile naphtha ships the characteristics of which corresponded to the *‘usharīyāt*.⁵⁴ But the combat on the high seas

⁵⁰ Ibn al-Ṭuwayr, *Nuzhat al-Muqlatayn*, 94. He talks about “*shawānī al-‘arbiya wa-l-shalandiyāt wa-l-mustṭahāt*”. Each of these names refers to a specific kind of war galley about which we do not know much. See Aly M. Fahmy, *Muslim Naval Organisation*, 130-1.

⁵¹ Ibn Mammāṭī, *Kitāb al-Qawānīn al-Dawāwīn*, 340; Aly M. Fahmy, *Muslim Naval Organisation*, 150.

⁵² Fulcher of Chartres, *A History of the Expeditions to Jerusalem, 1095-1127*, ed. H.S. Fink, trans. F.R. Ryan, (Knoxville: , 1969), 296. William of Tyre, *Guillaume de Tyr et ses continuateurs, Histoire Générale des Croisades par les auteurs contemporains*, ed. P. Paris, 2 vols. (Paris : Librairie Firmin-Didot, 1879-1880), 2, 32.

⁵³ The Crusaders captured 2000 seamen and rowers. See Fulcher of Chartres, *Expeditions to Jerusalem*, 187-8, and William of Tyre, *Histoire Générale des Croisades*, 1, 464-6.

⁵⁴ Aly M. Fahmy, *Muslim Naval Organisation*, 135-6. Vassilios Christides, “New Lights on Navigation and Naval Warfare in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean (6th-14th A.D.),” *Nubica*, 3/1989-93 (1994), 12.

was only rarely engaged because it was too risky. The mariners were expected to serve indiscriminately on the other ships of the fleet. All the permanent crews should have been capable of demonstrations of skill on the Nile, but all did not serve on board ships that executed spectacular maneuvers. It seems likely, in regard to the types of combat in those days, that they had to serve especially on other vessels of the fleet, generally destined for the transport of troops. If there was recruitment outside this system, and no text mentions it directly, it was done little in advance of the season of navigation. As in Ifriqiya the recruits undoubtedly constituted a supplementary corps to be called **(p. 18)** on only for very large operations or a recent naval catastrophe.⁵⁵ The mariners of commercial ships could have been conscripted when the dynasty lacked official sailors. A letter from the Geniza archive, dated to the 1020s, specified that all the mariners had been recruited for the fleet and that the merchants could not return home.⁵⁶ This period corresponds notably with a resumption of hostilities with Byzantium.⁵⁷ Although this is the only record, to our knowledge, of such a conscription, perhaps at the time of the crusades, when crews fell short of the official number and it was all the more essential to defend the cities of the coast, the state requisitioned mariners of the commercial fleets on several occasions. It is important to note, however, that maritime commerce was so important for dynastic finance that the Fatimids only had recourse in a modest way to a conscription that would have paralyzed commercial activity.⁵⁸ Thus, it would be an error to see in the twelfth century a period of weakness for the Fatimid fleet.

⁵⁵ A similar system is attested at the same time in Muslim Spain. See Christophe Picard, *Océan Atlantique*, 335.

⁵⁶ Salomon D. Goitein, *A Mediterranean Society*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 1, 331.

⁵⁷ Yahya Ibn Sa'īd, *Histoire*, 23/3 (1932), 504. Al-Musabbihī, *Chronique d'Égypte : tome 40^e 366-420/997-1029*, ed. Ayman F. Sayyid, Thierry Bianquis (Cairo : I.F.A.O., Textes arabes et Etudes islamiques, 1978), 54; Maqrīzī, *Itti'āz*, 2, 294; Moshe Gil, "The Sixty Years War (969-1029 C.E.)," *Shalem*, 3 (1981), 1-55 (in Hebrew); Thierry Bianquis, *Damas et la Syrie sous la domination fatimide*, 2 vols. (Damas: Institut Français d'Etudes Arabes de Damas, 1986, 1989), 1, 307.

⁵⁸ William J. Hamblin, "The Fatimid Navy," 77-83.

Taking account of adversity, the fleet resisted, in the end, rather brilliantly and achieved several victories against European fleets that were appreciably more numerous.⁵⁹

The explanation for the survival of Fatimid naval activity is perhaps found in the salaries proposed by the caliph to his sailors. The profession of sailor is above all else a profession of the poor, and in Egypt, a poor person could not hope to earn more than two dinars a month in the twelfth century.⁶⁰ The Fatimids put in place a system of taxation that was very lucrative for the (p. 19) treasury, and the sources make note of multiple taxes on trade.⁶¹ The money collected in this fashion was spent, in large measure, on the purchase of slaves and for the army. The fleet benefitted from this system. Ibn al-Tuwayr wrote that the budget destined for the fleet was significant. A direct link between the salaries of sailors, the troops embarked, and the caliph is explicitly described in a text issuing from the very son of the vizier who had, it seems established the system.⁶² According to Ibn al-Tuwayr, the *mudawwana*, received from twenty to two dinars according to their position.⁶³ The texts suggest that in the navy the Fatimids created the conditions necessary for the existence of a corps of permanent sailors. It sufficed to propose sufficiently attractive salaries and advantages in kind that the poor could not hope to acquire elsewhere. The campaigns of recruitment were occasional practices, leaving a trace in the sources because of their exceptional character that caught the attention of the men of the time and of authors.

⁵⁹ Ibn al Qalānīsī, *Dhayl Tārīkh Dimashq*, 321-2; Ibn Muyassar, *Akhbār Miṣr*, *Choix de passages de la chronique d’Egypte*, ed. Ayman F. Sayyid, 147, 153, 155, 156; Maqrīzī, *Itti’āz*, 3, 224, 230, 233; William of Tyre, *Histoire Générale des Croisades*, 2, 220-3, 236.

⁶⁰ Ibn al-Tuwayr, *Nuzhat al-Muqlatayn*, 95-6; Elyahu Ashtor, “Le coût de la vie en Egypte médiévale,” *Journal of the Economics and Social History of the Orient* (J.E.S.H.O.), 3 (1960), 56-77.

⁶¹ Claude Cahen, “Un traité financier inédit d’époque fatimide-ayyubide,” *J.E.S.H.O.*, 5 (1962), 139-59; “Contribution à l’étude des impôts dans l’Egypte médiévale,” *J.E.S.H.O.*, 5 (1962), 244-78; H. Rabie, *The Financial System of Egypt* (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), 26-40.

⁶² Ibn al-Tuwayr, *Nuzhat al-Muqlatayn*, 95; Ibn al-Ma’mūn, *Passages de la Chronique d’Egypte d’Ibn al-Ma’mūn*, ed. Aymad F. Sayyid (Paris : I.F.A.O., 1983), 61-2.

⁶³ Ibn al-Tuwayr, *Nuzhat al-Muqlatayn*, 96.

Thus, whether one is considering the Ifriqiyan or Egyptian phase of Fatimid rule, it is very difficult to get a sense of the origin of Fatimid mariners and of their captains. The methods of recruitment of men serving on the ships are only known in summary fashion. The sources existing for Ifriqiya as for Egypt permit the hypothesis of two means of recruiting crews. The administration had at its disposal a regular role on which were inscribed those that Ibn al-Tuwayr called the *mudawwana*, that is, the sailors and perhaps the permanent artisans of the navy. In the case of shortages and only for limited operations, the Fatimids put in place a backup approach that consisted of recruiting men through the press. This recruitment must have happened shortly before the beginning of the navigation season because it would not have been possible to keep men in prison for too long a period. This double system was probably put in place under the caliph al-Manṣūr who developed the navy; it is clearly attested by the tenth century in the navy of al-Andalus, the great Fatimid rival.⁶⁴ In Egypt the activity and the manpower (p. 20) of the Fatimid fleets mentioned after 1099 allows the conjecture that the system of the press was not perhaps very developed. The dynasty was committed to the service of permanent mariners who could be mobilized with the opening of the navigation season and were remunerated with a salary that was considered adequate for the categories most attracted to the work, that is, the poorest members of society.

2-The Embarkation of Troops

In addition to mariners, the Fatimid navies transported soldiers. In fact, the sources that mention veritable naval battles opposing the Fatimid fleets to enemy fleets were rare.

⁶⁴ Christophe Picard, *Océan Atlantique*, 336.

The Fatimid army underwent several transformations and reforms that caused a complete reconfiguration of the ethnic origin of soldiers between the tenth and the twelfth centuries.⁶⁵

In Ifriqiya the dynasty relied especially on Berber Kutāma horsemen who were the first to support the new masters of the Maghreb.⁶⁶ The remaining troops included the Slavs (*ṣaqāliba*), the *Rūm*, and black slaves or *Zuwayla*.⁶⁷ Numerous in the entourage of the caliphs, the Slavs filled essentially high administrative or military offices, and only Maqrīzī mentioned them explicitly as soldiers.⁶⁸ As for the Arabs, a minority in the Fatimid army, they came especially from the Arab garrisons (*jund*) of Barqa and of Tripoli that fell under Fatimid domination.⁶⁹ In 919-920 these different corps of troops participated in the expedition of the future al-Qā'im against Egypt. Mariners and *Zuwayla* were recruited on this occasion.⁷⁰ The expedition was a failure, and all the prisoners were put to death except for the Arab soldiers.⁷¹ This difference in treatment permits the supposition that the Berbers, the Blacks, and indeed the Slavs were clearly associated with the Fatimids and thus merited death for the support that they had offered the dynasty.

(p. 21) In the Egyptian period, the caliphs al-ʿAzīz (975-996) and al-Ḥākim (996-1021) undertook important military reforms that weakened the influence of the Kutāma. Free Turks (*atrāk*) or slaves (*ghilmān*), but also Daylamites and black slaves from the Sudan

⁶⁵ Yaacov Lev, "The Fatimid army," 165-92; "Army, Regime and Society," 337-65; "Regime, Army and Society," 115-52.

⁶⁶ In 934, seventy thousand men were counted in the army. Among them about fifty thousand were Kutāma Berbers. See Al-Nu'mān, *Kitāb al-Majālis wa-l-Musayyarāt*, ed. al-Faqqi and S. Al-Yalawi (Tunis: , 1978), 638.

⁶⁷ Named for a town located south of Tripoli in modern Libya, which, since the ninth century, had been a center for traffic in black slaves.

⁶⁸ Maqrīzī, *Itti'āz*, 1, 223.

⁶⁹ Ibn ʿIdhārī, *Bayān*, 1, 159; Heinz Halm, *The Empire of the Mahdi*, 151-2.

⁷⁰ Al-Mālikī, *Riyāḍ al-Nufūs*, 2, 381: "li-yuḥashad al-baḥriyyīn wa-l-zuwayla."

⁷¹ Al-Kindī, *Wulāt*, 294; *Ṣīrat Jawdhar*, 157, n.352.

(‘*abīd*), were massively recruited over time to replace the Berbers.⁷² After 1073 the Armenian general Badr al-Jamālī (d.1095), summoned by al-Mustanşir (1036-1094) to put an end to the civil war (1062-1073), introduced massive numbers of Armenians into the Fatimid army. Thus all these elements of the army appeared at one moment or another on board Fatimid ships. In 994 it was probably the case of black slaves (‘*abīd*), dispatched to Tyre, then in revolt.⁷³ In 1021-1022 horsemen (*fāris*) and the *ghulām* were transported by sea to Tripoli in Lebanon in order to march on Aleppo.⁷⁴ Finally, about 1121, four hundred Armenian archers (*qūs ārman*) and seven hundred men from the Sudan embarked to support Yemenite vassals of the Fatimids.⁷⁵ These few examples are sufficient to show that there was an aptness in the diverse reforms that modified the ethnic composition of the Fatimid army and the composition of troops who embarked on board ship. But the soldiers who took their place on the bridges of ships were not alone. The Fatimids were particularly concerned about the souls and the bodies of these men. During the expedition of 1123 against the Palestinian coast, outside the horsemen (*fāris*) and the infantry (*rājil*), doctors (*al-ā’tbā’*), as well as muezzins (*al-mū’adhinīn*) and readers of the Koran (*al-qurrā’*), participated in the expedition.⁷⁶ A corps of doctors assigned to the troops were provided by the vizier Ibn Killis as early as the 990s.⁷⁷ In spite of the impression given by the account of Ibn al-Ma’mūn, the preparations must have taken time. Ibn al-Tuwayr indicated, in fact, that when there was an

⁷² Nāṣir-i Khusraw, *Sefer Nameh*, ed. and French trad. Ch. Schefer (Paris: PUBLISHER, 1881), 138; Ibn Sa’īd, *Al-Nujūm al-Zahira fī Ḥulā Ḥaḍra al-Qāhira*, ed. H. Nassar, (Cairo: PUBLISHER, 1970), 67; Maqrīzī, *Itti’āz*, 2, 100; Yaacov Lev, “The Fatimid Army,” 169; “Army, Regime and Society,” 340.

⁷³ Yaṣya Ibn Sa’īd, *Histoire*, 23/3 (1932), 454; Ibn al-Qalānīsī, *Dhayl Tārīkh Dimashq*, 51.

⁷⁴ Maqrīzī, *Itti’āz*, 2, 129; Thierry Bianquis, *Damas et la Syrie sous la domination fatimide*, 1, 307, 309.

⁷⁵ ‘Umara al-Ḥakamī, *Tārīkh al-yaman. Yaman, Its Early Mediaeval History*, ed. and English trans. H. C. Kay, (London: , 1892), text, 43; trans., 58.

⁷⁶ Ibn al-Ma’mūn, *Passages de la Chronique d’Egypte*, 61-2.

⁷⁷ Yaacov Lev, “The Fatimid Army,” 167.

expedition, the chiefs (*nuqbā'*) were supposed to assemble the mariners who could not be in (p. 22) Cairo.⁷⁸ William J. Hamblin estimated that two months on average were necessary between the arrival in Cairo of news concerning dangerous developments in Palestine, the preparation of the fleet, and the effective presence of this fleet on the scene of action. Most of the sieges undertaken by the Franks were completed in less than six weeks.⁷⁹ In the expedition of 1123 the author indicated that soldiers arrived with the individual changed with responsibility for expenditures, and that twenty emirs (*ūmarā'*) led these forces. The emirs were in charge of about one hundred soldiers each.⁸⁰ Thus, two thousand men embarked on forty combat galleys (*shinī*), resulting in fifty soldiers per vessel, to whom it is necessary to add oarsmen and mariners. The number of soldiers embarked could then seem relatively small, but it is also necessary to count the horses which required considerable space in a period when ships could only hold a few.⁸¹

These few examples suggest that the troops embarked represented only land army forces that the caliph wished to transport from one point to another. It is true that the texts make only infrequent references to naval combat, especially in Egypt, while during the Ifriqiyan period several texts recounted encounters between Fatimid and Byzantine or Abbasid fleets.⁸² In fact, the relative disappearance of references to high seas battles may signal a change of strategy in the utilization of the fleet. In Ifriqiya the Fatimids could rely on

⁷⁸ Ibn al-Tuwayr, *Nuzhat al-Muqlatayn*, 96.

⁷⁹ Maqrīzī, *Itti'āz*, 3, 190; Al-Qalqashāndī, *Sub al-A 'shā*, 3, 551-3. Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Al-Nujūm al-Zahira fī Muluk Miṣr wa-l-Qahira*, 16 vols. (Cairo: Dar al-Kutub al-Misriyya), 5, 244; William J. Hamblin, *The Fatimid Army*, 132; "The Fatimid Navy during the Early Crusades: 1099-1124," *The American Neptune*, 46 (1986), 77-83 (80).

⁸⁰ William J. Hamblin, *The Fatimid Army*, 132.

⁸¹ Ibn Mammātī, *Kitāb al-qawānīn wa-l-dawānīn*, 339; John H. Pryor, *Geography, Technology and War. Studies in the Maritime History of the Mediterranean, 649-1571* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 18.

⁸² During the raid in 919-920, the Fatimid boats were burnt by the naphtha launcher boats operating for Admiral Thamal that the navy called from northern Syria to defend Egypt. Ibn 'Idhārī, *Bayān*, 1, 182; Ibn al-Athīr, *Kāmil*, 8, 114; Maqrīzī, *Itti'āz*, 1, 71.

Sicily that they used as a relay base for squandrons that navigated near the Italian peninsula to raid and acquire booty. The Byzantine fleet had as its mission the defense of the Italian peninsula and its few Sicilian possessions. In this context encounters on the high seas were inevitable. In Egypt, in contrast, the navy was not used offensively. The political and ideological objective of the Fatimids was, at least until al-Mustanşir, to defeat (p. 23) the Abbasids and to take their place in Bagdad. The failure of the attempt of 1058-1059 caused the Fatimid caliph to give up on all projects involving Iraq.⁸³ The civil war that broke out shortly thereafter marked the end of this idea, and the dynasty concentrated on the defense of Egypt, and to the degree possible, that of Syria and Palestine. These strategic setbacks shifted the emphasis away from the use of the fleet during part of the Egyptian period; the objective was essentially continental, with the navy having only the role of bringing troops into the Syrian and Palestinian ports from which forces then made their way into the interior of Syria. Moreover, multiple truces were concluded with Byzantium that was the only power capable of sending fleets against the Fatimids.

Nonetheless, troops specific to the navy are mentioned. In question were the naphtha launchers who constituted the principal weapon of medieval navies.⁸⁴ The Fatimids used the naphtha launchers on ships generally called fire ships (*ḥarāriq*).⁸⁵ In Egypt the naphtha launchers were designated as the carriers of flaming torches (*mashā'ilīya*), and they served on

⁸³ Al-Mu'ayyad fi-l-Dīn al-Shirāzī, *Ḥikmat al-Mu'ayyad*, 124-130; Verona Klemm, *Memoirs of a Mission*, 82.

⁸⁴ In Ifriqiya, naphtha had already been used by Aghlabids. See Marius Canard, "L'utilisation du feu grégeois chez les Arabes," *Bulletin des Etudes Algériennes*, 25 (1946), 3-8; Muhammad Talbi, *L'émirat aghlabide*, 2, 425. Concerning the use of Greek fire by Muslims, see Vassilios Christides, "Naval Warfare in the Eastern Mediterranean (6th-14th Centuries): An Arabic Translation of Leo VI's Naumachica," *Graeco-Arabica*, 1 (1982), 137-48; "Naval History and Technology in Medieval Times. The Need for Interdisciplinary Studies," *Byzantion*, 58 (1988), 309-32; "New Lights on Navigation," 3-42.

⁸⁵ Aly M. Fahmy, *Muslim Naval Organisation*, 135-6; Vassilios Christides, "New Lights on Navigation," 12.

board the *'usharīyāt*. The *mashā'ilīya* operated for the navy, and their role was perhaps to assure the protection of the commercial vessels often threatened by pirates. Maybe they were part of the *mudawwana* of the *dīwān al-'amā'ir*, much as those soldiers of the navy (*rijālat al-baḥrīya*), mentioned in 1122-1123 with a corps of troops (*tā'ifa min al-'asākir*) in the fleet that arrived at Tyre, then threatened by the crusaders.⁸⁶ This distinction between two types of soldiers suggests that there existed troops considered part of the navy who were to be distinguished from the soldiers of the land army *stricto sensu*.

Thus, in spite of the strategic changes evoked, the navy was perceived as an armed force, with its own specificity, notably its men, mariners or soldiers. But what of the military leadership?

(p. 24)

3-The Commanders of the Fleet.

Each ship was commanded by one and perhaps two captains. Nevertheless, when the fleet took the sea, all men on board the ships obeyed one or two admirals whose titles were never very clear. A few of these leaders appeared in the sources that provide some information on their ethnic origin and the reasoning of the dynasty.

In Ifriqiya, the sources cite thirteen different admirals. However, there were two eras in the direction of the Fatimid fleets. The first period extends from 912, the date of the first Fatimid naval expedition, to 950. Eleven admirals were mentioned and only three of them appeared at least twice.⁸⁷ Six were Slavs, but one of them, Ḥābir al-Fatā, undoubtedly the

⁸⁶ Ibn al-Qalānīsī, *Dhayl Tārīkh Dimashq*, 207.

⁸⁷ The vocabulary is once again very problematic. The most used title to designate the man in charge of the fleet in Ifriqiya is *qā'id* (pl.: *quwwād*), which is another Arabic word meaning chief. In Egypt, as we shall see, the admiral had another title, and the term *qā'id* designated a general.

most capable, handled three successive expeditions between 927 and 929.⁸⁸ None of the Slavs mentioned had a real military function before taking command of the fleet. The one was the parasol porter of the caliph; the other was responsible for the harem. Finally, ʿĀbir was governor of Kairouan when he took command of the fleet.⁸⁹ Besides the Slavs, five men of Arab origin were mentioned as commanders of the fleet. They all belonged to old Arab families installed in Ifriqiya. Among them, Yaʿqūb b. Isḥaq al-Tamīmī stands out. He was one of two admirals charged with attacking Egypt in 919-920. Captured, he did not return to Ifriqiya until about 934, the date at which a fleet was immediately confided to him. Such a rapid promotion was probably a sign that he was the most capable for command of the fleet. In the meantime, his brother, Khālil b. Isḥaq al-Tamīmī, chief of the *jund* of Kairouan, was sent to Sicily to aid the governor of Palermo.⁹⁰ He went from there to the coasts of Calabria where he led raids and conducted sieges during at least three years since he only returned to Ifriqiya in September 941.⁹¹ (p. 25) These examples indicate especially that there was no real specialization in the command of the navy. The different men named chiefs of the fleet moved indiscriminately from a post that had nothing to do with the navy to the direction of a naval expedition that most often consisted of the transport of troops. Such a process explains the very relative effectiveness of the Fatimid fleet before 950. The dynasty was still seeking the strategy to adopt, and all the institutions were not yet in place. It was primarily the faithful who were called on to lead the troops. The Slavs, slaves or freed, in the pay of the caliphate, responded the best to this concern with fidelity, especially after the revolt of Abū

⁸⁸ Chronicle of Cambridge, in A.A. Vassiliev, *Byzance et les Arabes*, vol. 2, 2, *Extraits des sources arabes* (Bruxelles Institut de Philologie et d'histoire Orientale, 1950), 103-4; Ibn ʿIdhārī, *Bayān*, 1, 190-1.

⁸⁹ ʿĀbirat Jaʿfar al-ʿĀjib, in W. Ivanow, *Ismaili Tradition Concerning the Rise of the Fatimids* (London: 1942), 190; Farhat Dachraoui, *Le califat Fatimide*, 367-8.

⁹⁰ The word *jund* may be translated as a kind of military circumscription that was created by Arabs conquerors at the time of the conquest in the seventh century.

⁹¹ Ibn ʿIdhārī, *Bayān*, 1, 215; Ibn al-Athīr, *Kāmil*, 8: 337-9; Michele Amari, *Storia*, 2, 217-30.

Yazīd. From 950 one can detect a second phase of development. In 950 the last exponent of Slav origin, Faraj ou Faraḥ al-Khādim, was mentioned at the head of a fleet.⁹² The caliph al-Manṣūr certainly privileged loyalty, but the concern for effectiveness seems to have been reinforced along with a more refined naval strategy. After the revolt of Ifriqiya, the fleet could show itself to be an essential means of control of maritime space and facilitate the departure to Egypt. It was thus necessary to put in place a structure of command and an efficient organization for the navy. After 950, the office of head of the navy remained in the hands of the Arab family of Banu Kalbī who were at the same time masters of Fatimid Sicily and furnished at least three leaders of the fleet.⁹³ The new strategy was based on a continuity of command of the fleet and a better control of Sicily. These two elements permitted the Fatimid navy to realize spectacular operations and to be frequently victorious as at the sack of Almeria, the principal naval base of al-Andalus, in 955.⁹⁴ The leaders of the fleet did not have a particular title apart from that of *qā'id*. Under al-Manṣūr and al-Mu'izz, there existed an official responsible for maritime affairs called *ṣāḥib al-baḥr* or *mutawallī al-baḥr*, based at Mahdiya. Under al-Mu'izz (953-975), Ḥusayn, the son of Ya'qūb b. Isḥaq al-Tamīmī, held this office. If this function was never mentioned before him, the texts permit the supposition that his father inaugurated it under al-Manṣūr and transmitted it to his son.⁹⁵ With Ḥusayn b. Ya'qūb, the (p. 26) appointment did not seem, nonetheless, to encompass the same attributes.

⁹² Ibn al-Athīr, *Kāmil*, 8: 494. Chronicle of Cambridge, 2, 105; Al-Nu'mān, *Kitāb al-Majālis wa-l-Musayyarāt*, ed. □. al-Faqqī, I. Mashtu□ M Al-Yaghlawi (Tunis: 1978), 240; Idris 'Imād al-Dīn, *Uyūn al-Akḥbār*, 5, 337.

⁹³ The first mention of a member of the Kalbī family as chief of the fleet is Ḥasan al-Kalbī in 947. See Ibn al-Athīr, *Kāmil*, 8, 473.

⁹⁴ Al-Nu'mān, *Majālis*, 164-5; Ibn al-Athīr, *Kāmil*, 8, 558; Ibn Khaldūn, *Histoire des Berbères*, 2, 545.

⁹⁵ □īrat Jawdhar, text, 85, 87; trans., 125, 127; Ibn Khaldūn, *Histoire des Berbères*, 2, 536; Ibn al-Athīr, *Kāmil*, 8, 434; Idris 'Imād al-Dīn, *Uyūn al-Akḥbār*, 5, 232.

Ḥusayn seemed to be preoccupied only in a general sense with maritime affairs, as with naval construction and the transport of merchandise to Sicily.⁹⁶ Leadership of naval expeditions did not seem to apply to this function. The family of the Banu Kalbī of Sicily, in fact directed all naval operations mentioned, and they obeyed only a single caliph. This division of tasks tends to reinforce the idea of an effort of rationalization of maritime affairs before the departure for Egypt. The death of the Kalbit admiral, Aḥmad b. al- Ḥasan al-Kalbī, in 969 left the navy nonetheless without a true official leader.⁹⁷

From 969 to 1171, the sources made only six mentions of heads of the fleet.⁹⁸ However, in spite of the lacunae, elements of continuity and innovations appear. Thus, Ibn al-Tuwayr indicated that six generals (*quwwād*) directed the *mudawwana*. The generals themselves designated the chief of the expedition who was then to rejoin the commander of the fleet (*muqaddam al-ustūl*) who was under the direct orders of the caliph and another personage qualified as *fānūs* who could be the lantern carrier.⁹⁹ The chosen leader received from the hands of the caliph and in the presence of the vizier the sum to spend on a specific number of ships and soldiers. A name appeared for the years 1123, that of Ḥisām al-Mulk al-Baranī of Arab origin, whom the caliph ordered to proceed to the necessary expenditures for

⁹⁶ Ṣirat Jawdhar, text, 87; trans., 127.

⁹⁷ Ṣirat Jawdhar, text, 118; trans., 177-8.

⁹⁸ In 972 it was Bishara al-Nubī (certainly a black slave or a freedman). In 996, it was Rashīq al-ḥaqalabī (a Slavonic). In 997, it was Fā'iq al-Khādīm al-Barrāz and Ibn ḥamdān. The first was a Slavonic freedman, the second an Arab. In 1113, the chief of the fleet was Sharaf al-Dawla Badr b. Abī Tayeb al-Dimashqī, an Arab who was governor of Tripoli when the city fell into Christian hands in 1110. In 1136, Ibrāhīm, the brother of the Armenian vizier Bahrām, took the head of the fleet. Maqrīzī, *Itti'āz*, 1:183, 3, 161. Yaḥya Ibn Sa'īd, *Histoire*, 23/3 (1932), 447-9, 454; Ibn al-Qalānīsī, *Dhayl Tārīkh Dimashq*, 50-1.

⁹⁹ Ibn al-Tuwayr, *Nuzhat al-Muqlatayn*, 96: “*yuqaddam ‘alā-l-ūsḥul āmir kabīr min ā’yān a-ūmarā.*”

the equipment of forty galleys of combat (*shinī*).¹⁰⁰ Later texts also mentioned a *zimām al-ustūl*.¹⁰¹ The function of *zimām* appeared under al-Ḥākim, but it was only concerned, it would seem with the land army. Each *zimām* was responsible for a corps of (p. 27) troops and participated in the operations.¹⁰² Here the two terms did not appear to be synonyms because the *muqaddam* seems to have a role as quartermaster that the *zimām* did not possess in the land army. Outside the generals and the commander of the fleet, the chiefs (*nuqbā'*) who seem to be different from the generals, were to assemble the mariners mobilized for the operation. The generals could have been elsewhere than Cairo, the port from which the fleet departed. The generals belonged to the summit of the military hierarchy (*min 'āyān al-ūmarā*), and the six names known confirm the account of Ibn al-Tuwayr. Especially, he made precise that the salaries of all the men working for the navy ran from twenty to two dinars a month, without counting the fiefs (*iqṭā'āt*) given to each that could bring a return of from 600 to 1000 dinars a year.¹⁰³ This system of payment was put in place during the first military reforms and extended by Badr al-Jamālī. He aimed to make up for the pay that could be delayed in coming and was undoubtedly attractive for the mariners.

Thus, in Egypt, the direction of the navy seemed much more hierarchical than before. As in Ifriqiya, the caliph always had his hand on the direction of the fleet. However, in Egypt, the continuity introduced in the command of the fleet in the 950s seems no longer to exist. The role most often passive or defensive that was that of the navy during the major part of the Egyptian period explains, perhaps, the absence of the mention of its leaders. Confined

¹⁰⁰ Ibn al-Tuwayr, *Nuzhat al-Muqlatayn*, 95; Ibn al-Ma'mūn, *Passages de la Chronique d'Égypte*, 61-2.

¹⁰¹ Maqrīzī, *Itti'āz*, 3, 102.

¹⁰² Maqrīzī, *Khīṭa*, 2: 453-544; William J. Hamblin, *The Fatimid Army*, 135-6; Yaacov Lev, "The Fatimid Army," 183.

¹⁰³ Ibn al-Tuwayr, *Nuzhat al-Muqlatayn*, 96; Elyahu Ashtor, *Histoire des prix et des salaires dans l'Orient médiéval* (Paris: Ecoles Pratique des Hautes Etudes, S.E.V.P.E.N., 1969), 229.

to the role of escorts to merchant ships or to troop transport towards the Syro-Palestinian ports, the fleet did not permit the admirals to make a name for themselves nor the historians of the time to record their exploits. The leaders named to the head of the navy could come from any origin, but they were all soldiers. Undoubtedly more than in Ifriqiya, the Fatimids purchased the services of their commanders through an interesting financial system that must be studied in greater detail in future work. (p. 28)

4-Conclusion

The sources appear to indicate that the Fatimid navy was seeking from its time in Ifriqiya to utilize men on whom it could rely and that it evolved towards greater professionalization. Thus, in Ifriqiya, the men who found themselves on board ships were undoubtedly especially slaves of Slavic origin or freedmen faithful to the dynasty by reason of their particular statute. In Egypt, the Fatimids disposed of additional resources and undoubtedly established a system that proposed to those who enlisted in the navy, essentially the poor, a remuneration and advantages more attractive than those that they could have obtained in civilian life. At the highest level, the admirals remain little known because of the primary function of the fleet after the tenth century, essentially the transport of troops. They were chosen from among the faithful of the dynasty; this loyalty always was accompanied by a very interesting economic package based on salary but especially on compensation in kind. Nonetheless, this system had its weaknesses in its enormous cost to which have to be added the sums spent to find the materials necessary for naval construction. In the context of the crusades, the loss of domination over certain spaces and the fratricidal struggles between the various corps of troops prohibited the dynasty from fighting on an equal basis against Christian fleets and brought about a brutal rupture of the system.

Appendix: Chronology of Fatimid naval activities from 1099 to 1171.

1099: Fatimid fleet in Ascalon in order to help the army.¹⁰⁴

1100: No Fatimid fleet in action but intensive naval preparation in Egypt.¹⁰⁵

1101: Forty Fatimid ships at siege in Jaffa.¹⁰⁶

1102: Fatimid boats against the Franks.¹⁰⁷

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1103: Twelve Fatimid ships from Sidon and Tyre help the city of Acre.¹⁰⁸ An Egyptian fleet blockades Jaffa during summer.¹⁰⁹

1104: Acre is taken by the Christians after a blockade. The Fatimids do not send any boat to break it.¹¹⁰

1105: Fatimid fleet blockades Jaffa and leaves for Tyre and Sidon. Twenty-five ships are washed ashore because of a storm, and others sink.¹¹¹

1106-1107: Large European fleet attacks Sidon unsuccessfully, but no Fatimid ships are reported.¹¹²

1108: New crusader attempt to take Sidon. Fifteen Fatimid ships are sent from Egypt, but they are delayed at sea off Acre because of contrary winds. But ships use these winds to go down from Tripoli. They defeat the Christian maritime blockade.¹¹³

1109-1110: Blockade is put to Tripoli by crusader ships. The Fatimid fleet is delayed, and Tripoli falls into Christian hands.¹¹⁴ During winter, Beirut is under a siege and is taken by crusaders. The Fatimids send a fleet that enters into the bay of Acre but fails in trying to break the chain controlling the port.¹¹⁵ In summer Sidon is blockaded. The Fatimid ships in

¹⁰⁴ Anonymous, *Gesta Francorum et aliorum Hierosolimitanorum*, ed. and trans. Rosalind Hill (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd., 1962), 96; Baudri of Bourgueil, *Historia Hierosolimitana*, in *Recueil des Historiens des Croisades, Historiens Occidentaux*, 5 vols (Paris: Librairie Firmin Didot, 1844-1895), 4, 109; Albert of Aix, *Historia Hierosolimitana*, RHCOcc, 4, 495.

¹⁰⁵ Salomon D. Goiten, *Letters of Medieval Jewish Traders* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), 36-7.

¹⁰⁶ Ekkehard of Aura, *Ekkehardi Uraugiensis abbatis Hierosolymita*, ed. H. Hagenmeyer (Tubingen: , 1877), 183; Fulcher of Chartres, *Historia Hierosolimitana*, RHCOcc, 3, 406.

¹⁰⁷ Albert of Aix, *Historia Hierosolimitana*, RHCOcc, 4, 595-6.

¹⁰⁸ Albert of Aix, *Historia Hierosolimitana*, RHCOcc, 4, 601; Ibn Muyassar, *Akhbār Miṣr*, 74; Ibn al-Qalānīsī, *Dhayl Tārīkh Dimashq*, 142.

¹⁰⁹ Albert of Aix, *Historia Hierosolimitana*, RHCOcc, 4, 604-5; Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-ʿIbar* (Beirut: Maktabat al-madrasa, 1959-1961), 7 vols, 4, 143-4; Abū al-Mahasin, *Nujūm al-zāhira*, in *Recueil des Historiens des Croisades, Historiens Orientaux*, 3, 494-5; Maqrīzī, *Ittiʿāz*, 3, 32.

¹¹⁰ Ibn Taghribidī, *Nujūm al-zāhira*, 5, 188.

¹¹¹ Fulcher of Chartres, *Historia Hierosolimitana*, in RHCOcc, 3, 414-15; Albert of Aix, *Historia Hierosolimitana*, RHCOcc, 4, 610; Ibn al-Athīr, *Tārīkh*, 10:411-12.

¹¹² Albert of Aix, *Historia Hierosolimitana*, RHCOcc, 4, 651-4.

¹¹³ Ibn al-Qalānīsī, *Dhayl Tārīkh Dimashq*, 159-62; Albert of Aix, *Historia Hierosolimitana*, RHCOcc, 4, 634, 654-5; Ibn al-Athīr, *Tārīkh*, 10, 454.

¹¹⁴ Ibn al-Athīr, *Tārīkh*, 10, 454; Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-ʿIbar*, 4, 144-5; Ibn Taghribidī, *Nujūm al-zāhira*, 5, 179-80.

¹¹⁵ Albert of Aix, *Historia Hierosolimitana*, RHCOcc, 4, 670-1.

Tyre and Sidon try to break the blockade, but they are not able to oppose the fifty-five Norwegian ships. In 1110, a large destruction of Egyptian mercantile shipping happens around Tinnīs and Damietta.¹¹⁶

1111-1114: No Fatimid fleet reported.

1115: Seventy Fatimid ships blockade Jaffa with no success.

1118: Fatimid ships are reported in the area as support for the land army.¹¹⁷ **(p. 30)** The Fatimid emir Al-Afdal sends boats into the Red Sea in order to punish the ruler of Mekka.¹¹⁸

1119-1122: Fatimid ships are reported around Tyre and Ascalon bringing food and soldiers to help the last two Fatimids ports on the coast of Palestine.¹¹⁹

1123: Seventy to eighty Egyptian ships sent unsuccessfully to take Jaffa. A very important Venetian fleet destroys a Fatimid fleet at Ascalon.¹²⁰

1124: The crusaders put siege to and blockade Tyre. The Fatimid fleet is not reported around the city because it is supposed to be totally destroyed since 1123. Fatimid boats are reported in October 1124. They take advantage of Christian ships.¹²¹

1126: A Fatimid fleet of more than twenty galleys and fifty-three transport ships successfully raids the Palestinian coast and Cyprus.¹²²

1127-1135: No Fatimid naval expedition reported, but Fatimid ships are regularly sent from Egypt to bring food to the last Fatimid port in Palestine: Ascalon.

1136-1137: The Fatimid vizier Bahrām sends a fleet with his brother as commander.¹²³

1151: Big Fatimid fleet is sent in order to avenge the destruction of Al-Farama on the Egyptian coast in 1150. The fleet is reported in Jaffa, Acre, Sidon, Beirut, and Tripoli. The crusaders have a big loss.¹²⁴

1153: The Fatimids lose Ascalon. No Fatimid fleet reported.

1155: Fatimid ships reported in Tyre. They take boats, prisoners from the Christians.¹²⁵

1156: Naval warfare reported between Fatimid Christians ships in the area of Beirut.¹²⁶

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1157: Fatimid raids on the Syrian coast.¹²⁷

1158: A Byzantine emissary asks the Fatimids for naval help against Sicily.¹²⁸

¹¹⁶ Fulcher of Chartres, *Historia Hierosolimitana*, RHCOcc, 3, 422-3; Albert of Aix, *Historia Hierosolimitana*, RHCOcc, 4, 610-11; Ibn al-Athīr, *Tārīkh*, 10, 479-82.

¹¹⁷ William of Tyre, *Historia rerum in partibus transmarinis gestarum*, in RHCOcc, 1, 518-19.

¹¹⁸ Maqrīzī, *Itti 'āz*, 3, 57-8.

¹¹⁹ Fulcher of Chartres, *Historia Hierosolimitana*, RHCOcc, 3, 441.

¹²⁰ Fulcher of Chartres, *Historia Hierosolimitana*, RHCOcc, 3, 450-1; William of Tyre, *Historia rerum in partibus transmarinis gestarum*, in RHCOcc, 1, 543.

¹²¹ Fulcher of Chartres, *Historia Hierosolimitana*, RHCOcc, 3, 459-66; William of Tyre, *Historia rerum in partibus transmarinis gestarum*, in RHCOcc, 1, 558-76; Ibn Muyassar, *Akhbār Miṣr*, 96; Maqrīzī, *Itti 'āz*, 3, 102.

¹²² William of Tyre, *Historia rerum in partibus transmarinis gestarum*, in RHCOcc, 1, 587-8.

¹²³ Maqrīzī, *Itti 'āz*, 3, 161.

¹²⁴ Ibn Muyassar, *Akhbār Miṣr*, 145; Maqrīzī, *Itti 'āz*, 3, 202.

¹²⁵ Ibn Muyassar, *Akhbār Miṣr*, 153; Ibn al-Qalānīsī, *Dhayl Tārīkh Dimashq*, 332; Abū Shāma, *Kitāb al-Rawṭ atayn fī akhbār al-dawlatayn* (Cairo: , 1956), 2 vol., 1, 202-3.; Maqrīzī, *Itti 'āz*, 3, 224.

¹²⁶ Maqrīzī, *Itti 'āz*, 3, 230.

¹²⁷ Maqrīzī, *Itti 'āz*, 3, 230.

¹²⁸ Ibn Muyassar, *Akhbār Miṣr*, 156.

1158-1159: Victorious Fatimid raid on the coast of Palestine.¹²⁹

1166-1167: Crusader invasion of Egypt. Naval preparations in Cairo.¹³⁰

1170-1171: The new, and last, Fatimid vizier, Saladin, gives orders to transport boats from the Mediterranean coast to the Red Sea in order to attack the port of Eilat.¹³¹

¹²⁹ Ibn Muyassar, *Akḥbār Miṣr*, 155; Maqrīzī, *Itti'āz*, 3, 233.

¹³⁰ Maqrīzī, *Itti'āz*, 3, 283.

¹³¹ Maqrīzī, *Itti'āz*, 3, 320.