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Communication Dans Un Congrès Année : 2015

Gibbard-Satterthwaite Games

Résumé

The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem implies the ubiquity of manipulators-voters who could change the election outcome in their favor by unilaterally modifying their vote. In this paper, we ask what happens if a given profile admits several such voters. We model strategic interactions among Gibbard-Satterthwaite manipulators as a normal-form game. We classify the 2-by-2 games that can arise in this setting for two simple voting rules, namely Plurality and Borda, and study the complexity of determining whether a given manipulative vote weakly dominates truth-telling, as well as existence of Nash equilibria.
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Dates et versions

hal-01523671 , version 1 (16-05-2017)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : hal-01523671 , version 1
  • OATAO : 17001

Citer

Edith Elkind, Umberto Grandi, Francesca Rossi, Arkadii Slinko. Gibbard-Satterthwaite Games. 24th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI 2015), Jul 2015, Buenos Aires, Argentina. pp. 533-539. ⟨hal-01523671⟩
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